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This thesis was created with mixed feelings: boundless enthusiasm, determination and 
selflessness, an unfailing anthropological curiosity as to why people do things the way 
they do, and a level of joy, comparable to a child’s excitement, when discovering time 
and again the inexhaustible potential of anthropology’s methods and approaches. 
Needless to say, perhaps, more often than not this elation was overshadowed by a 
level of despair arising from the sheer scope of the work, the sleepless nights, and the 
feelings of guilt because of time spent away from my children.    
 
Now that this period of doctoral research has come to an end, and the final, 318th 
page of the thesis has been finished, I would like not only to quietly congratulate 
myself but also to express gratitude to a number of people who have inspired, 
supported, advised and helped me to become an academic researcher.  
 
First of all, I would like to thank the late Professor Reidar Grønhaug of the University 
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not among us any more, but he was the advisor for my master’s thesis and, later, my 
doctoral supervisor, and he helped me come to believe in myself.  
 
Associate Professor Olaf H. Smedal succeeded Professor Grønhaug as my PhD 
supervisor at the University of Bergen. Although we met infrequently due to 
geographical distance, his bright, creative aura and constructive advice prevented 
despair from taking the upper hand when, alongside writing the thesis, I was working 
on the first translation of an anthropology textbook into Latvian, and was also actively 
involved in launching social and cultural anthropology programmes at two of Latvia’s 
universities. Olaf respected my workload and successfully guided me through the 
various stages of writing the thesis. When working with Olaf, I always felt that he was 
there for me and I am truly grateful to him for that.   
 
I am also obliged to my colleagues from the International Marketing Department at 
Ålesund University College, who came to believe in me and my research project on 
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Norwegian businesses in the Baltics; they accepted me in their midst from 2004 to 
2009, providing financial support for the implementation of this project. In 2004, 
when I moved from the University of Bergen to Ålesund University College, 
Professor Grønhaug warned me jokingly, “Watch out, you are going to be the only 
anthropologist among economists, the only foreigner among Norwegians and the only 
woman among men in your department”. Although Professor Grønhaug’s light-
hearted comments were not entirely groundless, I value highly the experience gained 
at Ålesund. My career as a lecturer was launched there: I taught international 
marketing and intercultural understanding; I became acquainted with an economists’ 
approach to research and the specific character of international marketing; I learned to 
stand my ground and defend my convictions when my opinion differed from that of 
others. In particular, I would like to thank Professor Øyvind Helgesen and Associate 
Professor Jon Ivar Håvold for our interesting discussions, their understanding and 
supportive advice. 
 
I would also like to express here my gratitude to The Meltzer Foundation, which has 
generously supported my long-term research and fieldwork.  
   
Of course, I must also mention those Norwegian businesspeople in Norway, Latvia 
and Lithuania who dedicated their time – a very precious resource in business – in 
order to help me understand the specific character of Norwegian entrepreneurship and 
challenges in the Baltic market. Due to a promise of anonymity I cannot name them, 
but I would like to say to each and every one of them that without their obliging 
attitude this thesis could not have been written; I was truly happy and enthusiastic 
about our cooperation and our invaluable conversations. 
 
I would also like to thank the few Latvian anthropologists working in Riga for 
generating and sustaining anthropological thought in the daily environment; in 
particular, I would like to thank Ieva Raubiško, a PhD candidate in anthropology at 
the University of Oxford, for her understanding and friendly support in moments of 
creative despair.  
 
And finally, I would like to thank my very dearest people - my parents Ausma and 
Pēteris, who, through their unfailing, selfless and creative academic work, have 
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daughter Natālija and Raitis for their endless patience, love and understanding. Like 
all of you, I have been looking forward to the thesis defence, and I fully agree with 
you that there are things in life that are more important than a doctoral thesis. From 



















































Based on fieldwork undertaken between 2005 and 2008, this thesis provides an 
anthropological analysis of cross border Norwegian entrepreneurship in the Baltics in 
a timeframe that spans from the middle of the 1990s to 2008.  
 
The Baltic states had barely reinstated their independence from the Soviet Union when 
the Nordic countries, including Norway, began to devise strategies to enter these 
emerging markets. In the 1990s, the growing Baltic markets, as they were in such 
close proximity to Norway, were already being referred to in Norwegian public culture 
as an extended Nordic market. Norwegian entrepreneurship in the Baltics reached its 
apex in the early 2000s, when manufacturing businesses on the verge of bankruptcy 
were moved, one by one, from Norwegian villages to the Baltics. The process of 
relocating manufacturing facilities induced a series of responses and challenges both in 
the Norwegian villages left behind and in the new locations in the Baltics. This thesis 
examines the process of relocating the production facilities and small and medium-
sized companies from Norway to the Baltics; it analyses the causes, course and 
implications of the process.  
 
This work also depicts the Baltics as a strategically significant asset for Norwegian 
businesses. Through its reflection on the political and economic backgrounds of 
Norway and the Baltics around the end of 1990s and the beginning of twenty-first 
century, the present work examines the motives and strategies of Norwegian 
entrepreneurs entering the emerging Baltic market, as well as the readiness of Baltic 
actors and institutions to welcome them into their fledgling market economy. A 
special focus is placed on Norwegian business practices and experiences in building 
contacts within the local business environment and in cooperating with local 
bureaucrats and company employees in the Baltic states.  
 
The concept of embeddedness serves as a conceptual umbrella in this analysis of 
entrepreneurial activities. The focus is placed on the relations between the actor and 
the environment in which s/he operates. An examination is made of both the material 
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and the nonmaterial costs of doing business and the work explores the values, 
relations, contexts, perceptions and ideologies in which particular Norwegian and 
Baltic economic activities are embedded. Without discrediting the significance of 
economic calculations and social networks (usually posed as the core of 
embeddedness of economic activity in market societies) in the strategy formation and 
decision-making process, the present thesis highlights the significance of culturally 
constructed convictions and the cultural content of social relations in terms of 
meanings and representations. By viewing the embeddedness of entrepreneurial 
activities from below, this work provides an explanatory framework from which to 
explore why each entrepreneurial strategy is adopted and in what circumstances, and 
analyzes the processes through which an economic system becomes embedded. In 
embracing an analysis of embeddedness in relation to Norwegian entrepreneurship in 
the Baltics, the results are based not only on the empirical findings of the present 
research but also on the research of other anthropologists who have made in-depth 
studies of Norwegian entrepreneurial activities.  
 
The thesis concludes that it is unproductive and groundless to cultivate a notion of 
disembedded economies. Each step observed in the cross-border activities of 
Norwegian entrepreneurs in the Baltics can be traced and linked to multilayered 
relations and values, political and geographical constellations, imprints of the past and 
constructions of the future. And precisely because economic and socio-cultural 
relations are inseparable, anthropological research methods are ideally suited for 
researching the corporate environment. 
 
Central to this thesis is not only an argument about embedded market behavior; it also 
presents empirically and theoretically informed reflections on how to conduct 
anthropological research in a transnational business environment. The research here 
contains an outline of the development and character of business anthropology. In 
taking a stand on the significance of participant observation in researching 
transnational companies and their business environments, the thesis demonstrates how 
to carry out traditional anthropological fieldwork in international business settings, 
how and where to grasp this environment and make it tangible, and how to turn the 
data into something empirical. The methodological approach outlined here suggests 
that the traditional anthropological toolkit, representing a particularly “deep, extended 
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and interactive research encounter”(Clifford 1997:187), is vital in the research of 
transnational business operations in global markets, and that it is possible to grasp 
globally ongoing dynamics even when staying in a ‘bounded’ field site.   
 
This thesis is a contribution to the field of corporate ethnography and business 
anthropology and takes its place in a line of anthropological research on the encounters 
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An Intentionally Long Prologue. 
The Corporate Jungle –a 2010 Perspective 
 
I should apologize now to those who had hoped to open this thesis and immediately 
enter the world of intercultural business ethnography. I will instead open with a 
general overview of business anthropology rather than giving concrete empirical 
examples and describing my methodological approaches. Although many of us might 
find the topic of business both familiar and hardly exotic, in cultural terms, I would 
still like to share my impressions of how this branch of business anthropology was 
established and what is specific about it – issues that tend not to be discussed in 
anthropology study programs in Norway. For precisely this reason I have no difficulty 
in meeting the requirement put forward by Fredrik Barth, who said that in entering a 
new field of research, one has to forget the things one knew and become like child 
again (Barth 1995:10f), a child who knows nothing and absorbs in the self all that 
happens around – things that he or she perceives to be essential, or insignificant, and 
where nothing is taken for granted. In confronting this research, I had to explore the 
business environment as though it was another language, accepting “all its strange 
sounds, foreign words and difficult cases, and only then could I compare it with my 
mother tongue and translate from it” (Barth 1995:10).  
 
The metaphor contained in the title of this chapter is borrowed from an article by 
Jordan and Lambert (2009); it accurately reflects what I felt when starting my 
research on Norwegian business in the Baltic countries. I will commence this work, 
then, by focusing less on my groundbreaking experience in the corporate jungle (for 
that work, see chapter 2) and more on the attempt to outline the activities of 
anthropologists in a corporate environment. Thus, first I will draw upon my own 
experience and social science sources to examine the notions of business and 
industrial anthropology, from a contemporary angle.1 The second part of this chapter 
will examine more closely the process of this research in corporate settings – my 
“way in to a messy, exciting, still-undisciplined terrain” (Jordan and Lambert 
                                                 
1 Since I began this research in 2005, new work has been published to complement the rather scarce 
selection of anthropological literature about the world of business and the way it is researched in 
modern societies (see, for example, Baba 2006, Moeran 2006, Cefkin 2009, Mollona, De Neve and 
Parry 2009). I have also published discoveries in this field from 2006 onwards (Cimdina 2006, 2009). 
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2009:97) – and it will also explain the methodology used for the research, which 
began in 2005.  
 
Before we move to the corporate jungle we need to give a more clear-cut definition of 
what is meant by this matter-of-fact yet exotic collocation of words, or, in other 
words, we need to examine what we mean when we say “business anthropology”. The 
simplest explanations are as follows: one applies anthropological methods and 
theories when examining business environments and practices, in particular, trade and 
problem-solving, the formulation of strategies, or plain day-to-day work in 
organizations and companies in the private sector. One of the most prominent 
contemporary business anthropologists, Marietta L. Baba, defines business and 
industry as organized economic activity carried out in order to satisfy basic material 
needs:  
 
Business and industry are fundamental ways of organizing economic activity to 
meet basic human needs in modern market societies.2 Business means the buying 
and selling of goods and services in the marketplace … while industry refers to 
organized production of goods and services on a large scale (Baba 2006:1).  
 
Baba points out that these terms (business and industry), when used in an 
anthropological context, may also refer to one or more of the three major domains of 
anthropological research and practice in the private sector: 1) the anthropology related 
to the process of producing goods and services, and the corporate organization in 
which production takes place; 2) the ethnographically informed design of new 
products, services and systems for consumers and businesses; and 3) the anthropology 
related to the behavior of consumers and the marketplace (Baba 2006:1). 
 
Peter Buckley includes in his definition the aspect of profit, namely, the creation of 
added value and some aspects concerning the organization, its allocation of tasks and 
obligations, and internal communication:  
 
Business processes are collections of activities which are technologically or 
managerially linked so that they jointly affect value added. The organization of 
these processes may be termed the “architecture” of the firm: that is, the allocation 
of responsibilities amongst individuals and groups and communication between 
them (Buckley 1998: xvi).  
                                                 




He indicates that from the perspective of economists, business behavior and human 
activity is best explained in terms of the central principle of economic theory: the 
optimization of individual self-interest or the “rational, persistent pursuit of self-
interest”3 (Stigley 1976, in Buckley 1998:34). 
 
Anthropologist Fredrik Barth provides a wider conceptualization: not only does he 
point to profit as the essence of entrepreneurial activity, he also underscores other 
important aspects such as interpersonal relationships, context, choices and strategies: 
“Entrepreneurial activity lends itself readily to a description and analysis in terms of 
such general concepts as choice, strategy, profit” (Barth 1972:6). An entrepreneur 
must initiate and coordinate a number of interpersonal relationships to effectuate his 
enterprise (Barth 1972). To analyze the place of the entrepreneur in a wider context of 
interaction, it is also necessary to describe the social context he operates within that is, 
the rest of the community, which is composed of actors who also make choices and 
pursue strategies (ibid.). Therefore, in Barth’s (1967) analytical approach, the focus is 
on entrepreneurial activity as a chain of transactions4 between the entrepreneur and 
his or her environment. 
 
Even if anthropologists and other ethnography-oriented social scientists have been 
involved in the business area for a long time now – from the 1930s in the US (Baba 
2006; Cefkin 2009) and the 1940s in the UK (Mills 2006, in Cefkin 2009), it is only 
recently that the area has gained more attention and focus in terms of anthropological 
practice. Business circles are said to be increasingly using such terms as, for example, 
‘corporate ethnography’, ‘industrial ethnography’ and ‘business ethnography’ (Jordan 
and Lambert 2009).  
 
Francisco Aguilera (1996) discusses what an anthropologist could achieve in the 
business environment in the second half of the twentieth century. He states that in the 
1970s it was not easy to find a company, state agency or public cultural organization 
that would be willing to avail itself of anthropologists’ services. At that time 
anthropologists (in the US) were still associated with dusty bones; a PhD in 
                                                 
3 My emphasis.  
4 My emphasis. 
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anthropology could be taken to mean that the researcher lacked pragmatism. It was 
also believed that a company would require anthropologists’ services only if their 
involvement could ensure an immediate change in work arrangements or bring about 
improvements in the company balance sheet. However, over time Aguilera noticed 
that changes in the business environment made anthropological theories and 
approaches to research increasingly useful (Aguilera 1996).  
 
Today we witness a trend that goes against that of the 1970s. Cefkin (2009) and 
Jordan and Lambert (2009) claim that the heads of enterprises or companies are aware 
of the benefits generated by anthropologists and wish to recruit specialists from the 
field. The revival in interest in corporate ethnography manifests itself in terms of 
demand. Many organizations now recruit anthropologists: they work in factories and 
hospitals, and on fishing trawlers, and even observe building and engineering staff at 
work. An increasing number of companies have in-house anthropologists, whose daily 
routines are described in business media; over the last decade there has been a 
significant increase in demand for company anthropologists (Cefkin 2009; Jordan and 
Lambert 2009). 
 
One of the reasons why ethnography in the business environment has become so 
popular is the appeal of ethnographic methods. At the same time, 
 
corporate ethnography is surrounded by a mystique that draws on romantic ideas of 
traditional ethnography, the time when anthropologists ventured out to live with 
undiscovered tribes in the jungles of South America and New Guinea (Jordan and 
Lambert 2009:109).  
 
But do company decision makers draw immediate parallels between the 
understanding of “local” culture in terms of small-scale societies and the 
understanding of a company’s customers’ culture? Jordan and Lambert claim that 
they do it readily: “while earlier ethnographies may have served the interests of 
colonial administrators, corporate ethnography clearly serves the interests of its 
industrial founders” (ibid.). 
 
It follows from Cefkin (2009), Jordan and Lambert (2009) and Brun-Cottan (2009) 
that anthropologists today are involved in various companies providing advice to 
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management, developing projects and carrying out planning, as well as in marketing 
and sales research agencies that were set up in the 1980s and 1990s and at the 
beginning of twenty-first century. Companies that offer product and system design 
services, market research, management and strategic planning, and laboratory 
development are proud employers of anthropologists. For instance, from the pay lists 
of such companies as General Motors, Hewlett Packard, Kodak, Motorola, Sun 
Microsystems, IBM, Yahoo, Google, NASA, and many others, it is clear that they 
have employed in-house anthropologists (Cefkin 2009). Around 2000, the microchip 
development company Intel Corporation became known in the field for its large 
number of in-house anthropologists, some of whom had taken a leading strategic role 
in the organization. In 2004, Intel Corporation spent around $5bn on ethnographic 
research (Johnson 2006, in Brun-Cottan 2009:166). By 2006, they had more than a 
hundred in-house anthropologists working alongside their engineers (Brun-Cottan 
2009).  
 
An anthropological approach is thus commercially positioned as an efficient means by 
which to better understand both the changing labor market and its new consumers 
who use the Internet on a daily basis; it also helps explain the influence of various 
“cultures” (national, ethnic and sub-cultures) on production and consumption 
networks. Ethnographic research in the field of entrepreneurial activity allows 
companies to have a better understanding of the socio-cultural context of the markets 
(Cefkin 2009). However, no matter how solid, topical and flourishing this 
anthropological boom might seem (especially in the US), we should not discount the 
problematic aspects, notably, the methodological implications referred to by Jordan 
and Lambert (2009), Cefkin (2009), Brun-Cottan (2009) and others. But we will come 
back to those at a later stage.  
 
Admittedly, if I go by my own observations and the literature, I have not been able to 
ascertain the importance of business anthropology on this side of the Atlantic and, in 
particular, in Scandinavia and the Baltic countries, where anthropology is based on 
the British tradition. This was even more the case in 2004, as I started planning my 
research on Norwegian entrepreneurial activity in the Baltics. Why would 
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anthropological practices and business opportunities here and there be so different?5 
A brief outline of business anthropology will help us answer this question and better 
understand the long journey business anthropology has made from its beginning to the 
present day. 
 
1.1.The First Business Anthropologists 
  
The term “business anthropology” come in to usage only in the 1980s, when 
anthropologists became full time non-academic practitioners in niches related to 
consumer behavior and marketing. Prior to that time, the term “industrial 
anthropology”, “anthropology of work”, or “applied anthropology in industry” 
were used more frequently to denote areas of research and practice focused on 
business related phenomenon (Baba 2006:1).  
 
When Malinowski had just returned from his field research in the Trobriand Islands 
and laid the foundation stones of the emerging science of anthropology in the UK, in 
the US, business anthropologists (as yet unknown by that name) were already quite 
active; it seems astonishing that there is no mention of them in histories of 
anthropology.6 Baba and Hill (2006:1) and Pink (2006:1) provide explorations 
showing that anthropology is always inextricably bound to its historical and cultural 
context – meaning that there are important differences in the way the discipline is 
understood and practiced in different regions. 
 
The rapid industrial revolution in the US at the end of nineteenth century is an 
important reason why, along with so-called Native American research, applied 
anthropology turned into an active industry-based research activity. In Britain, applied 
anthropology had other priorities. Adam Kuper writes that from the outset British 
anthropology liked to present itself as a science, which was useful in terms of 
                                                 
5 Baba and Hill (2006) indicate that only in the US are there 1) formal academic training programs for 
distinctively identified applied anthropologists, 2) national and local professional organizations devoted 
to the application and practice of anthropology, and 3) full-time professional anthropologists working 
in various roles across occupational fields outside the academy (Baba and Hill 2006:1). In the UK, little 
postgraduate training in applied anthropology is available. Applied methods are only infrequently 
taught at the postgraduate level in British universities and many PhD-level anthropologists therefore 
lack the skills they need to be able to engage successfully with organizations and their research needs 
(Pink 2006:130).  
6 This indicates that there are different trends in UK and US anthropology. In Scandinavia and in the 
Baltic countries anthropology is based on the UK tradition; thus, the information on early business 
anthropologists on the other side of Atlantic was unexpected news to me, at least.  
19 
 
administration and organization, and this in a colonial rather than in an industrial or 
corporate context. The colonial governments and interests were the best prospects for 
financial support, particularly in the decades before the discipline was granted 
recognition by the universities (Kuper 1983:100). Baba points out that 
 
the relationship between anthropology and colonial interests is one of the reasons 
why European anthropologists were slow to adopt applied anthropology as a 
formal area of research and graduate training in the latter half of the 20th century 
(Baba 2006:2).  
 
European applied anthropology at the beginning of the twentieth century was 
associated with colonial interests and therefore became tainted by its lack of political 
correctness, causing embarrassment for some anthropologists who found themselves 
linked to colonial purposes. As a result, Baba states, 
 
many European anthropologists threw the “applied baby” out with the bathwater, 
and application simply was off-limits in many places until the last quarter of the 
20th century (Baba 2006:2).  
 
Industrial and business anthropology in both its embryonic form and its subsequent 
boom is most readily discernible in America. Baba proposes that, to a large extent, the 
rapid industrial growth of America was based on the theory of the economic man, that 
is, on the belief that individual employees would respond rationally to economic 
rewards by increasing their productivity to maximize the reward to themselves. The 
trick was to find the right incentive sufficient to motivate workers effectively but 
which must not be so generous as to detract from their profitability (Baba 2006:2). 
Initially, manufacturers did not have to worry about unions interfering in the 
optimization of workforce productivity: prior to the 1930s in the US, manufacturing 
companies did not have industrial unions (ibid.). Over time, however, unions started 
to emerge and the demands of workers in relation to their rights became more of an 
issue. One of the methods to avoid unionization was the so-called welfare capitalism 
approach – an ideology that became central to the future relationship of business and 
anthropology (Baba 2006:3). This approach was based on the premise that if 
management treated the workers well and ensured that they were satisfied, labor strife 
would subside and the unions would not grow stronger. Also, if workers were 




As Baba notes, the improvement of working conditions to reduce workers’ discontent 
was a primary concern of US manufacturers in the 1920s–1930s, and it was believed 
that a single variable (for instance, better factory lighting) was sufficient to ensure that 
employees would be happy with their working conditions. However, a significant 
confusion arose when it was established – by carrying out various experiments  at the 
Hawthorne plant7 (Schwarzman 1993, Wright 1994, Baba 2006) – that work 
productivity improved not only when the lighting was increased but also when it was 
so weak as to resemble twilight or moonlight. The prevailing theory8 of that time 
could not explain this anomaly. Repeated experiments showed that productivity was 
sustained or increased, no matter what the experimenters did to working conditions.9  
When psychologist Elton Mayo took up the matter he discovered that the workers 
themselves had developed a distinctive social system that became part and parcel of 
the production process and clearly enhanced productivity levels. While implementing 
the Hawthorne project  - the most influential behavioral science study of a business 
enterprise (Schwartzman 1993:5) - the researchers became interested in the 
relationships among variables in the social system and in what their effects on 
production might be (Baba 2006:4).  
 
Gradually it was discovered that there was a trend for the workers to band together as 
a means of defense against anything that might be perceived as a threat and that group 
work, one’s social situation at work and even conditions at home or within the 
community were tied directly to efficiency.  Workers were not motivated solely by 
pay and their working conditions. Such trends came to be defined as workers’ social 
systems or social organization of the group (Schwartzman 1993:8), and this is when 
                                                 
7 The Hawthorne plant was located in western Chicago and in the town of Cicero, Illinois, ans served 
as one of the major supply organizations for the Western Electric Company. The experiments were 
initiated because Western Electric management was interested in understanding relationships between 
fatigue and monotony and job satisfaction and dissatisfaction. In 1927, when the study began, there 
were 29,000 employees at the Hawthorne Works, representing more than 60 nationalities 
(Schwartzman 1993:5). 
8 The theory of organization was developed by engineer Frederick W. Tylor. According to Tylor, the 
activities of both workers and managers should be determined by “scientific” methods – through 
investigation of the skills and actions needed to perform a given role, careful selection of individual 
workers and managers based on their ability to perform the role, and detailed instructions that would 
direct each employee’s behavior so that maximum output could be achieved with a minimal input 
(Baba 2006:2). 
9 This phenomenon is known as the “Hawthorne Effect”, meaning that non-experimental variables 
affect the experimental results -the presence of researchers influences the outcome of the experiment.  
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the Hawthorne project was joined by anthropologists. Mayo knew that Malinowski 
and Radcliffe-Brown were researching natural social systems in the field and wished 
to apply this approach to the Hawthorne project. Thus, W. Loyd Warner, a student of 
Radcliffe-Brown, joined in and established industrial and organizational anthropology 
on the basis of what he did for the project (Baba 2006:5). With Loyd Warner as a 
team member, the experiments in 1931 and 1932 were altered in order to observe 
what the workers actually did on the job, in contrast to what they said they did during 
interviews.10 Warner encouraged the researchers to read anthropological theory and to 
analyze their observational data much as an anthropologist would do in studying a 
small society such as a band or a tribe (Baba 2006:5). 
 
Baba describes the insight into factory life that was obtained through the 
anthropologists’ presence, which was at odds with the conception of the “economic 
man”; for example, there were starkly contrasting points of view separating 
management and the workers, workers’ informal standards of a ‘fair day’s work’, and 
group solidarity among workers and their informal organization. It transpired that the 
actual patterns of social interaction among the workers contrasted with the formal 
organization. The finding in the early 1930s that workers were not simply “factors” in 
production but sentient beings who assigned their own meaning to phenomena and 
protected their interests was quite a ground-breaking one. Machines could not control 
the work process and management had to deal with workers who did not respond to 
“the logic of economic incentives” (Baba 2006:7). Arensberg indicates that new 
technology had led to boredom and that repetitive work decreased productivity. Thus, 
the goal of industrial anthropology was to discover the roots of workers’ alienation 
from their work in factories and offices and to provide solutions. One such solution 
was to create teams of industrial workers with shared tasks; another was to use 
informal networks as a means to improve morale (Arensberg 1987:65). 
 
On the basis of these findings the Human Relations School was founded. It was based 
on functional equilibrium theory, which viewed human organizations as integrated 
social systems with specific structures that interacted to maintain a smoothly 
operating whole (Baba 2006:7). Within the context of this theory, a conflict between 
                                                 
10 For more on this experiment, see Schwartzman (1993) and Baba (2006), in an exhaustive article on 
the development of business anthropology from the end of the nineteenth century to the present day. 
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management and workers was seen as a pathology reflecting the disruption of an 
equilibrium state that would adversely affect workers’ morale and hamper efficient 
production (ibid.). The generation of industrial anthropologists of the 1940s–1960s11 
undertook a series of important studies of both workers and managers, aiming at 
discovering factors and forces that could be manipulated to achieve an equilibrium 
state in the organizational system and to eliminate conflicts. Among these techniques 
were sociometric measures of human interaction and network and event analysis 
(Arensberg 1987:61). Arensberg and Chapple (1940), for example, developed 
recording equipment for measuring the frequency and duration of contact between 
two persons and the tempo of nonverbal communication. However, the 
anthropologists did not question the asymmetrical power relations in a company as a 
key source of conflict; these were taken to be a given (Baba 2006).  
 
The suggestion that anthropologists were active in companies at this time is 
corroborated by the circumstance that in 1941 a Society for Applied Anthropology 
was established at Harvard, according to Baba, and some of the founders were 
industrial anthropologists. At this time, there were paid in-house anthropologists in 
such large companies as Container Company of America, Inland Steel Container 
Company, International Business Machines (IBM) and others. Anthropologists 
produced industrial ethnographies as case studies of an entire company, mainly 
focusing on human relations within an integrated social system and working with a 
view to discovering laws of human interaction that could establish the foundation for 
a science of human behavior (Baba 2006:9). Based on the knowledge gleaned from 
studies of “primates and other animals” (ibid), they argued that conflict between 
groups is aggravated because of physical separation and lack of ongoing contact.12 
Another significant finding of the anthropologists of that time was that one cannot 
fully grasp the processes taking place in a given factory without fully understanding 
the particular historical, social, economic, technological and political circumstances 
                                                 
11 For example, C. Arensberg, E. Chapple, 1940, Measuring Human Relations; C. Arensberg 1955, 
Research in Industrial Human Relations; F. Richardson, 1961, Talk, Work, and Action: Human 
Reactions to Organizational Change.  
12 F. Richardson 1978, The Elusive Nature of Cooperation and Leadership: Discovering a Primitive 
Process that Regulates Human Behaviors provides an example of a key social variable – human 
contact – discovered by anthropologists through observational methods; he describes how this variable 
could be used to improve worker–manager relations (Baba 2006:9). 
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under which the factory operated (Warner and Low 1947). Warner and Low discuss 
the social roles of the factory in the community and the worker in the factory.  
 
Thus, in the first half of the twentieth century, applied anthropologists in the business 
and industrial sector in the US analytically applied and discerned concepts that were 
also familiar to British anthropologists at that time; for instance, “economic man”, 
“production”, “maximization of profit”, “group solidarity”, “social organization and 
social structure”, “formal and informal organization” (the actual patterns of social 
interaction), “power relations” (relations between workers and managers), “prevention 
and elimination of conflict”, and others. However, in British anthropology these 
concepts were not researched within the context of the corporate environment. In 
Britain, although anthropologists had opportunities to engage in applied work in 
industry around the middle of the twentieth century, they did not take these up, 
according to Pink, who explains that the colonial legacy of anthropology is 
fundamental to understanding the historical context of both academic and applied 
anthropology in Britain (Pink 2006:123). 
 
Mills indicates, however, that there has been an emerging link between anthropology 
and industry in Britain. He documents a lesser-known series of encounters between 
anthropologists and industrialists led by British businessman Israel Sieff13 in the first 
half of the twentieth century in Britain (Mills 2002, in Pink 2006:124f). This account 
illustrates how the relationship between so-called “pure” and applied anthropology 
developed after the era of applied colonial anthropology14 (Pink 2006:124). The 
leading anthropologists at this time were in a position to refuse to adapt their research 
agendas to meet the needs of industry. Here again, then, the contest between pure and 
applied anthropology was played out, and the former gained a distinct advantage 
(Pink 2006:124). Despite some anthropologists’ enthusiasm for the idea that they 
could provide industrialists with practical advice as to relationships with staff and 
productivity, the overall message to the industry was that anthropologists’ work was 
more exploratory; it would produce problems and questions but would not necessarily 
                                                 
13 A co-founder of Marks and Spencer, a department-store chain in the UK. 
14 Mills (2002) describes how during these years there were clear tensions between the practical 
anthropology advocated by Malinowski and the scientific academic anthropology of Radcliffe-Brown 
and his followers. This emerged as a contest between “pure” and “applied” versions of anthropology 
played out between personalities and departments (Pink 2006:124). 
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offer the sets of solutions they required. Interest in this work in the UK subsequently 
declined, and anthropology and industry went their separate ways (Mills 2002, in Pink 
2006:125). 
 
In the US in the 1960s, following a promising start over the previous three decades, 
the anthropology of industrial organizations entered a prolonged period of decline 
from which it has only recently begun to emerge (Baba 2006:11). The National 
Science Foundation was established in the US to stimulate and fund academic 
research. The US anthropologists could thus research more remote parts of the world 
and researchers began to emphasize that in order to become a ‘real’ anthropologist 
they had to carry out fieldwork outside their own society. Those involved in 
researching their own society, for example, industrial anthropologists, were given 
“second-class citizen status” (Baba 2006:12), which ultimately pushed many of them 
out of anthropology and into the business world. Changes in social science theory also 
took place around this time. Historians of social sciences criticized the industrial 
anthropologists of the present generation for being too management-centric and too 
alienated from the working class, thus failing to predict the rising wave of 
unionization and its theoretical consequences (ibid.). 
 
Just as anthropologists in the UK reacted negatively when their ties to colonial 
administration received public criticism, so American anthropologists reacted with 
distaste when they found out that certain agencies of the US government had 
attempted to engage anthropologists in research that would become part of counter-
insurgency programs in the developing world (Baba 2006:13). Multinational 
corporations were identified as potentially dangerous sponsors. During the 1960s, US 
multinational corporations were dominant overseas, making inroads into foreign 
markets and setting up factories in developing countries to curb production costs. 
Academic anthropologists who were conducting fieldwork in the very places where 
American business was making investments often saw the negative consequences of 
industrialization – including increasing poverty, new diseases and the disintegration 
of traditional social support (Baba 2006:13). Instances of unethical corporate behavior 
further alienated anthropologists from industry and caused some to begin labeling any 
work for industry as “unethical” (ibid.). Yet industrialization processes outside the 




With the century drawing to a close, the global flows of goods, services and 
information become increasingly stronger and such aspects as communication and 
consumerism – especially relevant to the corporate environment – became particularly 
topical. A consensus emerged that for businesses and corporations of the twenty-first 
century it is essential to establish an international presence. Economists started to 
speculate that over the first two decades of the twenty-first century most of the 
world’s growth would occur in emerging markets (Cavusgil, Ghauri and Agarwal 
2002). Once thought of as backward and low-tech, these regions were seen to be 
rapidly transforming their economies. Emerging markets, for example, in Asia and 
Eastern Europe became lucrative targets for corporations, as consumers in these 
regions gained a sufficient level of income to purchase services and goods offered by 
multinational companies. Indeed, western companies have become increasingly aware 
that in order to sell in these markets it is essential to understand their consumers and 
the ways to reach out to them. It has become equally important to cooperate with 
businessmen from other countries and to transfer companies to new locations so that 
costs can be kept down. For western managers struggling to maintain growth, cut 
costs and launch new products and industries, emerging markets appeared to be an 
ideal opportunity (Cavusgil, Ghauri and Agarwal 2002). Business in an intercultural 
context has become an increasingly popular topic both as regards various 
representatives in the field of communication and organization,15 and for 
anthropologists, such as Edward Hall, for instance. 
 
Edward Hall (1973, 1976, 1987) points out a hitherto unnoticed fact that too often 
business relations suffer because entrepreneurs fail to understand hidden differences 
between cultures. He underscores that social communication has a fundamental 
significance in business relations that goes far beyond language and into the 
nonverbal and contextual aspects of communication: 
 
Any culture is primarily a system for creating, sending, storing and processing 
information. Communication underlies everything. Although we tend to regard 
                                                 
15 To name but a few, these include Gert Hofstede’s Culture’s Consequences: International Differences 
in Work-Related Values (1984) and Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind (1991); and 
Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner (1997) Riding The Waves of Culture: Understanding 
Diversity in Global Business. 
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language as the main channel of communication, research reveals that 80 to 90 
percent of information is communicated by other means (Hall and Hall 1987:3). 
 
He further explains that the world of communication is divided into words, material 
things and behavior and, thus, by studying these in our own and other cultures, we can 
come to understand human behavior that exists outside the range of peoples’ 
conscious awareness (ibid.). Taking this position as his starting point, he attempts to 
help the business community tackle a growing challenge, namely, to interpret 
communication processes across cultural boundaries and prevent cross-cultural 
misunderstandings. Indeed, Hall was a founder of an increasingly popular trend 
towards ethnographic explorations of business environments and behaviors outside 
home societies, and of business communication in cross-cultural contexts. 
 
As of the 1980s, American anthropologists re-entered the business world and mainly 
focused on three research areas: 1) organizational behavior and management, 2) 
ethnographically informed design of products, services and systems, and 3) consumer 
behavior and marketing. Nowadays, each of these three areas is fairly well established 
in the USA, with representation in academic departments of various kinds, a tradition 
in the scholarly literature, and an active community of practice – including positions 
in major corporate research laboratories and institutes (Microsoft, Motorola, Xerox) 
and business functions in consulting firms (Baba 2006:23).16 It would go beyond the 
scope of this thesis to give an exhaustive survey of the literature in these three areas 
here, and it would not contribute to a further understanding of the present research 
agenda. Therefore, I will refrain from delving into these areas now but will return to 
essential aspects related to these areas, as far as they are relevant to this research.  
 
The return of anthropologists to the field of business in the US did not happen 
overnight. Comparing anthropological practice in the business environment in the 
1970s with work in the contemporary business world, Aguilera (1996) suggests that 
the possibilities for an anthropologist then were quite unlike those found today. If in 
the 1980s anthropologists had to find an enterprise willing to recruit them, then today 
there is a reverse trend – the enterprises themselves are actively recruiting 
                                                 
16 The reason I start by focusing on practices conducted primarily by American anthropologists is that 




anthropologists. In the 1980s, to get the enterprise interested in their competence,  
anthropologists carried out a 2–4 day observation of the enterprise, as well as 
interviewed all the interested persons; they included diagnostics of the business 
processes and the social situation. The anthropologist then submitted a report on the 
data thus collected, usually adding that a data analysis was required. Once the report 
had been submitted, the plan containing particular measures was agreed upon and the 
anthropologist was paid to carry out these measures to improve the enterprise climate. 
The entrepreneurs tended to think that they always knew better, and it was therefore 
difficult to “sell” anthropological knowledge. To gain a contract with an enterprise, an 
anthropologist had to immediately demonstrate solid ethnographic knowledge as 
regards the issues related to productivity processes, social relations and perceptions at 
the enterprise. Following the submission of the anthropologist’s report, enterprises 
occasionally accepted free anthropologist expertise on how to improve the operation 
of the enterprise and then tried to act themselves; they were usually surprised at the 
truths evident in anthropologists’ observations and would often end up signing 
contracts with them.  
 
In those days an anthropologist in the business environment tended to use traditional 
anthropology methods, without much adjustment to the circumstances. The model of 
social anthropology that encompassed space, time, personnel, principles of 
interpersonal network formation and principles of group maintenance were simply 
exported to the business environment. Aguilera (1996) gives a colorful comparison of 
how he was carrying out fieldwork in a small village in Spain and in a business 
context where ethnographic aspects showed significant differences from the village 
but the model as a whole was maintained (Aguilera 1996:737). The analytical 
components altered as follows: 
- Space, time, personnel: what in Spain had been orchards, pastures and 
cultivated fields became factories or office rooms. The ritualized time and the 
cyclical change of generations was replaced by the financial year, budgetary 
cycle and payment days; family ties transformed into corporate relations 
between men and women, and between recruitment of young staff and the 
retirement of older ones. 
- Principles of interpersonal network formation: the kinship and 
economic relationships of rural agrarian society became the history of having 
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worked in the same office in the past, or sharing offices in the present, union 
affiliation or the ‘old school tie’ network. 
- Principles of group maintenance: religious rites were substituted by 
business meetings, and the forms of various departments and minutes 
(Aguilera 1996). 
 
Also at this time, enterprises had to outdo their competitors: they had to be faster, 
produce more cheaply, to a higher standard and provide user-friendlier products than 
their competitors. This led to a need to modify business procedures. Although the 
anthropologist’s primary tasks were to a large extent quite similar to those of today, 
the types of fieldwork carried out by an anthropologist at an enterprise were quite 
different. From the description given by Aguilera it can be deduced that at the end of 
the twentieth century the main task of an anthropologist was to train the staff of an 
enterprise to analyze the processes that took place at said enterprise rather than take 
the results to the management and inform it about necessary changes at the level of 
the enterprise, as happens at present. The main method of an anthropologist was 
observation and the main task to help modify the work arrangements at the enterprise 
so that the workers themselves could understand how to bring about change to make 
the organization and its procedures more efficient. 
 
In 1986, notwithstanding the dynamics of business anthropology in the twentieth 
century, Baba stated, “we stand now much as the discipline stood 50 years ago, 
needing new centers of influence to speed the fusion of science and practice” 
(1986:25). In 1988, John F. Sherry Jr. wrote about a “renaissance of anthropological 
interest in international business” (1988:397). When he looks back at the history of 
anthropology, he does not deny that anthropologists’ interest in business has been 
discontinuous, and he discusses ways in which the anthropological perspective might 
be used to enhance the teaching of international business (Sherry 1988). Indeed, he 
examines ways in which the current interest of anthropologists in business activity is 
one source of synergy that can be effectively harnessed (Sherry 1988:396). The 
emergence of the National Association for the Practice of Anthropology in 1984 made 
it possible for “business anthropologists” to consort in a formal fashion for the first 
time (Sherry 1988:397). It was apparent in this new society that curriculum 
development would be a critical task: while each of the anthropology sub-disciplines 
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had something to say about business practices, none had fielded a tightly integrated 
module, let alone an entire course devoted to the subject that might serve as a 
paradigm (ibid.). One cannot but conclude that as recently as a couple of decades ago 
business anthropology, despite its almost hundred-year-old history as a sub-branch of 
anthropology, was still in embryonic form. 
 
1.2.Anthropological Practice in Contemporary Enterprise 
Although the formative stages of business anthropology as a sub-branch of 
anthropology (with its supporting study programs) seem to remain somewhat blurred, 
the research discussed above shows that there is beyond doubt a substantial demand 
for anthropological expertise in the business environment in the US today. In Britain, 
too, there is an acute need to deploy anthropology beyond the Academy. Indeed, in 
2003, anthropology professor Paul Sillitoe, while investigating why anthropology has 
become so popular, called for anthropology to “promote its professional identity 
beyond the Academy” in what he saw as obvious areas for practice – such as 
development, the media, museums, galleries, intercultural relations and refugee work. 
He emphasized that students, when making a choice of subject for their studies, are 
increasingly concerned about obtaining “value for money”, which implies not only a 
well-taught course but also a qualification that will lead to a well-paid career. 
However, areas such as banking, law, retailing and management were listed here as 
having less obvious potential for anthropologists, stating that in these occupations the 
benefit of anthropological training was less clear (Sillitoe 2003:2). However, Pink 
(2006) states that applied anthropologists have increasingly found a niche in areas 
such as the civil service, public and welfare sectors, research, design and development 
in business, the media industries and legal areas (Pink 2006:126). And although the 
relationship between applied and academic anthropology in Britain has been in some 
difficulties from the outset, manifesting itself in the contesting discourses of applied 
and “pure” anthropology, the twenty-first century has seen increasing support for 
applied anthropology in Great Britain (Pink 2006:127). For example, in 2003 the 
Berghahn Books series “Studies in Public and Applied Anthropology” was 
established specifically to publish volumes that bridge the gap between applied and 




Jordan and Lambert (2009), Cefkin (2009) and Brun-Cottan (2009) claim that 
companies are interested in recruiting ethnographers so that they can raise awareness 
of work organization, improve efficiency and income, influence customers and 
employers and the social and cultural environments they inhabit, and create and 
improve devices and services. The specific training anthropologists receive, their 
observational skills and analytical capabilities, can help companies to reach their 
goals. Business anthropologists are often involved in research that relates to 
organizations and workplaces, consumer culture and brand names, and the use of 
computers and exploration of information and communication technologies, which 
includes the interface between human beings and computers, a company’s working 
culture and the formation of a professional culture. Anthropologists in companies or 
enterprises often work as advisors to entrepreneurial structures and they research 
areas such as development of the organization and management consulting. 
Anthropologists’ work often involves the task of providing knowledge, for instance, 
by explaining why certain products or services enjoy increased demand. 
Anthropologists cooperate with product designers and market researchers in that they 
help them to understand the needs, grounds, habits and socio-cultural context of 
potential users. An ethnographer has to understand the daily routine, must be able to 
rectify erroneous explanations or aspects that have not been noticed, and should also 
be able to reveal the specific cultural significance of certain aspects of social practice 
in the area. 
 
Today, what is being produced by enterprises is important but so is the way in which 
this is achieved – this too belongs to the realm of anthropological investigation. 
Customers and purchasers are increasingly keen on buying relations; this enhances 
selling, and procedures that have to do with the presenting or packaging of the service 
(Cefkin 2009). Brun-Cottan (2009) identifies the multifaceted possibilities that 
anthropological research promises to companies that have not yet been exposed to 
ethnographic work, namely, the potential to  
- show that people say one thing but in fact do the opposite;  
- investigate cultural norms (e.g., a notion of the beautiful in various 
cultures); 
- identify unexpected needs and shortcomings; 
- identify the potential of products and services; 
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- show that small things can carry great weight; 
- explain abstract beliefs; 
- help track down and understand the needs of purchasers, customers 
and workers, as well as identify competitors and partners (Brun-Cottan 2009).  
 
Indeed, it might be said that the role of anthropologists in companies around the world 
has increased in scope but the potential and real gains from anthropological work 
have not always been understood and appreciated. This is especially the case in post-
socialist societies and also in Scandinavia, where I have not noticed the trends 
outlined here. It is worth mentioning, however, that some anthropologists have 
founded their enterprises in Oslo, Copenhagen and Stockholm17 and, among other 
areas, they have been active in the field of marketing. Still, it remains the case that 
much applied anthropology is not published in academic journals or books in 
Scandinavia or Britain (Pink 2006:130), and its practitioners seldom participate in 
anthropological debate. 
 
1.3.Methodological Challenges in Corporate Ethnography 
The popularity and demand that business anthropology and anthropologists have been 
enjoying have also presented the branch with difficult tests and trials: for instance, the 
usefulness of long-established anthropological research methods has been doubted. 
The peculiarities of anthropological fieldwork and the specific features of the 
international business environment have triggered a reconsideration of traditional 
anthropological methods and to what extent they are applicable to research on 
international business. To satisfy this demand, anthropological methods might need to 
be adapted in such a way as to get an immediate result in a short timeframe. Only in 
exceptional cases a study might last several months or even a year. In fact, the length 
of research for corporate projects spans from a couple of days to a couple of weeks, 
which means that traditional ethnography methods might need to be adapted to the 
new circumstances. To a certain extent, methods have always been adapted to 
circumstances but now, with the advent of new technologies, the process is being 
                                                 
17 AnthroFokus (Denmark), Glocals (Denmark), Human Culture (Denmark), CultureIT (Oslo), Rett Øst 




accelerated. Ethnographers no longer use paper and a pencil but digital technologies; 
thus, the research methods have changed,18 as well as the presentation of the 
ethnographic observations and information that have been obtained (e.g., video 
ethnography and PowerPoint presentations).  
 
British social anthropology has always largely been defined by its fieldwork method – 
long-term ethnographic fieldwork – derived from the tradition established by 
Malinowski and his students (Pink 2006:129). Sarah Pink states that many 
anthropologists have taken on board the need for new approaches appropriate to new 
global and local contexts (see the following chapter for more on this issue). She 
shows that the work of anthropologists employed in the UK, for example, in the 
Ministry of Defence, the Civil Service and the Department for Higher Education, is 
unlikely to involve actual fieldwork; instead, they produce work that is 
anthropologically informed, interpret statistical data and use a range of quantitative 
and qualitative methods (Pink 2006:126). Anthropologists employed in industry 
appear to have more opportunities to carry out fieldwork; however, much of their 
work takes place in interdisciplinary teams and many of their tasks might involve 
management and other roles that would be informed by anthropology rather than 
being anthropological in themselves (Pink 2006:127). 
 
Jordan and Lambert (2009) do not deny that by trying to please the business 
community the basic methods of anthropology are threatened, and they suggest that 
corporate anthropologists should consider the possibility of using economic methods 
and strategies that are single-target oriented rather than long-term in-depth methods to 
achieve results appropriate to a particular situation. The same could also be applied 
when a narrow range of issues needs to be examined, for instance, when a new 
product has to be evaluated. In such cases, traditional data collection in an ergonomics 
laboratory, or a survey of users, is replaced by a set of observations of customers as 
they employ the tool in their accustomed home or work environment. A short-term 
approach often ensures that the company gets the data it needs to solve a problem, 
especially when researchers knows what they are looking for and when the questions 
                                                 
18 E.g. cybernetics and video surveillance, that allows for the direct and continuous observation of 
workers so that they eventually forget that they are being observed; it also registers the production flow 
and identifies weaknesses. An example of such a computerized surveillance system is provided by 
Jordan and Lambert (2009) in a case study in a microchip factory in Malaysia. 
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are correctly formulated from the outset. Short-term ethnography can reveal details 
and corroborate the assumptions a company may have made but, in order to discover 
unknown systems, relations and connections, long-term ethnography is required. 
Short-term ethnography entails the use of methods conducive to rapid, structured data 
collection, such as focus groups and structured interviews, rather than questions asked 
in situ, or shallow versions of shadowing rather than deep participant observation 
(Jordan and Lambert 2009:126). 
 
As mentioned above, in the 1950s, British industrialists requested support from 
British anthropologists to deal with such issues as staff relations and corporate 
productivity. But anthropologists were quite skeptical about this and responded that 
anthropology was an exploratory discipline and thus could not be used for anything as 
concrete as recommendations to businesses. As we now see, the understanding of 
anthropologists as to their competence in the corporate environment has evolved 
significantly. 
 
In a corporate environment an ethnographer has to face many challenges and 
difficulties. Unlike research in an academic environment, which is mostly initiated by 
the researcher, corporate projects are initiated by the corporate decision-maker, 
“usually a person high in the hierarchy believing, for unknown reasons, that an 
ethnographic study could help the company achieve certain objectives” (Jordan and 
Lambert 2009:99). This means that there are certain limits on the topic and objective, 
the methods to be used, the duration of the study, and the funding, and the 
ethnographer has to stick to these limits. When engaging in negotiations, neither the 
ethnographer nor the businessman quite knows what they want from the other; both 
parties only gradually find out what they could usefully achieve by means of their 
cooperation, what should be considered a success and what would equate to failure. 
This is a general feature of corporate work, which is based on indirect confirmation 
that there is a lack of common understanding and a belief that such an understanding 
could be achieved during the course of the study. Although corporate anthropologists 
tend to refer to concrete objectives and clear results that need to be achieved (for 
instance, increase in production capacity by 20%), at least initially the company often 
has no idea about what it wishes to receive from the ethnographer (Jordan and 
Lambert 2009). More often than not, however, when a corporate ethnography study is 
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commissioned the management of the company assures the anthropologist that they 
need not worry about the return on investment, emphasizing that corporate 
ethnography is a research project and as such need not bring about an immediate 
yield. Nevertheless, an experienced anthropologist knows that when the results of the 
study are examined, at the earliest opportunity the question of how this is going to 
influence the company balance sheet is certain to arise (ibid.). 
 
When getting involved in corporate studies the ethnographer must realize that unlike 
the situation in academic research projects, where negotiations about funding are over 
and done with as soon as the project is confirmed, in the corporate world things are 
more complicated. If a corporate study is funded by the company, it is often the case 
that the objectives established at the outset, in management talks, over the course of 
time change radically. Unlike academic research, where the objectives are clear and 
the work is given the green light as soon as the project is confirmed, the situation is 
quite different in corporate studies. Corporate ethnographers have to change the 
objectives from time to time and to discuss repeatedly what the whole project is 
about. If the researcher is not quite sure about the objectives set by the company and 
the benefits to be derived from the study, neither the researcher nor the company tend 
to be willing to admit this. An experienced anthropologist knows that this is already 
the case at the outset of the project. It is precisely because of these unclear and 
changing objectives that a large part of the information that has been collected as 
potentially useful ends up being left unused.  
 
Corporate ethnography is further complicated by issues of business/enterprise 
confidentiality. An ethnographer needs to consider a scenario of what might happen 
when data cannot be obtained in the same way as in traditional research. Significance 
is also attributed to an anthropologist’s linguistic proficiency. In the Malaysian study 
carried out by Jordan and Lambert (2009), discussed above, interviews could only be 
conducted if the employees spoke English, for example. The situation was further 
complicated by the fact that some information was restricted and company rules 
stipulated that it was forbidden to directly interview employees without mediation by 




Among other things, Jordan and Lambert (2009) conclude that the most important 
task of an anthropologist working in a company is to know and understand the types 
of questions that need answering. The anthropologist will be able to work out the best 
method for getting these answers in particular circumstances. Once it is known what 
sort of data is needed, it is possible to decide on what methods and approaches to use. 
Ethnographers must bear in mind that any situation could admit the co-existence of 
several truths and that there are ways and means of discovering them. This means that 
they should not accept the ideas of the funding enterprise as self-evident values per se 
but they should rather be regarded as a target-oriented reflection (Brun-Cottan 2009). 
Jordan and Lambert also suggest that when starting off a study they should not blindly 
follow the official version of the company but rather use ethnographic methods to 
obtain a deep understanding of what really happens there and what the employees do.  
 
The short-term nature of much applied anthropology fieldwork has led to questions of 
whether this is “real” ethnography and anthropology (Pink 2006:129). Some have 
argued that short-term projects are often based on long-term experience in the field 
they are working in or that, because their work is informed by anthropological 
principles and questions, it is, no doubt, anthropological (ibid.). Such argument 
suggests that defining anthropology by its method might no longer be suitable in the 
contemporary global context, whether academic or applied (Pink 2006:129). 
 
There are diverging opinions among anthropologists as to the question of whether 
corporate ethnography should be carried out exclusively by anthropologists, or 
whether the task could also be done by other representatives in the field of social 
sciences. The main advantages of anthropology discussed by Aguilera (1996) include 
participant observation, ethnographic method and multi-level analysis, which provide 
a more complete understanding of the data. He believes that anthropologists are more 
helpful in analyzing the meaning of the words used by informants than representatives 
of other disciplines, which are more reliant on other types of data collection and 
analysis. On the one hand, Brun-Cottan (2009) thinks that the anthropologists 
involved in corporate studies are not making full use of their potential and thus risk 
turning anthropology into a commodity for the masses –a consumer good where it is 
only important to use such methods as guarantee immediate results. In her opinion, if 
anthropology gives up its ontological basis because of the pressure and need to be 
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efficient, anthropologists will jeopardize the particular skills and visions that make 
anthropology unique. These skills include the identification, description and 
presentation of various communities. To fine-tune such skills, an anthropologist needs 
time and space for the special vigilance they have been taught. On the other hand, 
Jordan and Lambert (2009) suggest that anthropologists should be aware of the 
implications that have emerged by dint of the activity of corporate ethnographers, 
namely, by virtue of the fact that they prefer situation-adapted short-term methods to 
long-term in-depth ones. To a large extent, it can be said that it is up to every 
anthropologist to decide whether (or not) to take part in corporate ethnography and of 
which methods they should avail themselves. 
 
Jordan (2009), like Cefkin (2009), sees the great demand for ethnography in the 
business environment as something that could engender the birth of a hybrid 
discipline that would open up new possibilities and creative approaches and, at the 
same time, challenge older and more rigid anthropological procedures and methods. 
The development of this new discipline is at the same time influenced by new modern 
technologies and the research opportunities they provide, as well as the sponsors of 
the anthropological projects, that is, the employers and entrepreneurs who are 
interested in subjecting their companies and plans to an ethnographic study. This is 
where research in academic and in corporate anthropology goes quite separate ways. 
Therefore, it seems necessary to conclude that this could lead to certain limitations: a 
narrowing of the ethnographic method, a downgrading of the focus of the research, 
and a reduction of both the topic and the time available for the work involved. 
 
1.4.Conclusion of the Prologue 
Although in twenty-first century the involvement of anthropologists in the corporate 
environment has become frequent, in both the applied and the academic fields, the 
role of an anthropologist in the business environment and in its research is still 
unclear, ambivalent, polysemous and subject to the ethnographical set-up, approach 
and objectives of the sponsor, that is, the entrepreneur. It is the sponsor who decides 
on the rules of the game, and its results are conditional upon his/her assessment. The 
professional duty and responsibility of an anthropologist requires impartiality: without 
taking sides with the sponsor or the informants, anthropologists must protect against 
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the implications of the anthropological in-depth analysis. Great importance in the 
anthropologist–sponsor and anthropologist–informant relations is attached to the 
question of positioning, both initially and over the duration of the project. 
Anthropologists’ challenges in the business environment have to do with this 
positioning and also with socio-cultural, individual, investigative and methodological 
limitations and their ability to overcome or reconfigure them. Time will show whether 
the project of “business anthropology” is going to be viable or whether it will come to 
be regarded as simply the new latest toy for emerging capitalists. Or perhaps business 
anthropology will turn into a lucrative anthropology business? 
 
The opinions of anthropologists diverge as to whether their involvement in various 
corporate ethnographies could bring about the loss of the unique character of 
anthropology because the circumstances of business ethnography are such as to 
impede anthropologists ability to be critical, to work to the full or to openly use their 
skills. There are tangible concerns about the risk that anthropology could become too 
commercialized if it attempts to apply only such ethnographic methods as provide 
instant results. If the issue is seen in this light, corporate ethnography could be carried 
out by any representative of the social sciences, as long as only short-term methods 
are used. Researchers disagree over whether the job can only be carried out by 
anthropologists, or whether it could be managed by any staff trained in ethnographic 
methods. On the other hand, anthropologists advocate that the researcher can identify 
the method best suited to the task, or adapt it to particular needs, so that problems are 
solved and entrepreneurial activity promoted. The anthropological knowledge, 
capabilities and skills used in ethnography constitute a large investment in the 
entrepreneurial sector, and its potential is not fully understood by all entrepreneurs. 
 
The objective for this prologue has been to outline how anthropologists made their 
entry into the business sector and also to provide an insight into business 
anthropology, its character and history. During my own studies of anthropology I had 
heard nothing about these aspects. This chapter was written in 2010,19 and looks at 
                                                 
19 For professional and family reasons, including a leave for child care, I had to take a break of several 
years from actively writing this thesis. But this pause, which has left some mental scars, has also had its 
bright side. Today I possess a much fuller understanding of what business anthropology specifically 
means than back in 2005, when I started this PhD project. It might seem, of course, that after such a 
lengthy research project, it would be strange if it were otherwise. Yet, I also found this more 
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specific features of business from a contemporary point of view. The following 
chapter is written from the perspective of events taking place in 2005, when I had 
only just started my research; as far as its application to business goes, this early work 
was created in a tabula rasa; I was unacquainted with Pink’s reflections (2006), and 
work by Cefkin (2009), Jordan and Lambert (2009), Brun-Cottan (2009) and Baba 
(2006) on anthropological methods in the corporate field. During undergraduate and 
postgraduate studies in anthropology, nobody had taught us about the specificity of 
this environment and the methods and theoretical insights used there. Conversely, I 
was well acquainted with the requirements of carrying out traditional Malinowskian 
fieldwork and I was determined to fully use this knowledge in my research of cross-
border entrepreneurship, namely, Norwegian companies in the Baltics. Have I fared 
well? Did the business environment limit my use of traditional anthropology methods 
and their usefulness for research? Were the traditional fieldwork instruments 
sufficient? Did I feel that the traditional anthropological methods were “endangered” 
or insufficient to work in an international business environment, or, quite the 
opposite, did I feel that they were significant and advantageous? These matters will be 
discussed in chapter two. 
 
From my own experience (and that related by colleagues in Scandinavia), formal 
training in field research methods is seldom given in anthropology departments. 
Gupta and Ferguson (1997) point to a similar situation in America. Students, as in my 
own case, usually receive little guidance in the selection of field research sites, and 
most often are left with stories about field research in its traditional form, as 
mandatory reading lists of virtually all anthropology students feature Malinowski’s 
Argonauts of the Western Pacific and other classical monographs, such as Chagnon’s 
Yanomamo. Every graduate anthropology student can imagine the process of 
traditional anthropological field research in traditional settings, but how to practically 
make use of this methodology in non-traditional settings is far from clear. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
comprehensive approach through business anthropology books that have been published more recently, 
i.e., since 2005. In the meantime I have also developed a study course in International Business 
Anthropology at the University of Latvia. 
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1.5.The Structure of the Thesis  
 
Having outlined the development and character of business anthropology, it is the task 
of this section to discuss the structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 will demonstrate how to 
carry out traditional anthropological fieldwork in an international business 
environment. To be more specific, this chapter will describe and discuss my 
methodological approach to Norwegian entrepreneurship in the Baltics at the turn of 
twentieth to twenty-first century. Fieldwork in Norwegian companies (see character 
list, page 11) was carried out from 2005 and 2007. However, the more general 
experience of Norwegian entrepreneurs in the Baltics addressed here is reflected in a 
timeframe that spans from the middle of 1990s to 2008 – depending on when each of 
the companies entered the Baltics.  
 
Articles by Brun-Cottan (2009), Cefkin (2009), Jordan and Lambert (2009) and Baba 
(2006) take anthropological work in a corporate environment almost for granted; this 
was not my experience in 2005. The success story of business anthropology presented 
in the previous section has not happened in Scandinavia, to say nothing of the Baltics, 
where social anthropology itself only started developing at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century20 (Cimdiņa 2010). In 2005, I had only a vague idea of what 
business anthropology was about. I had made the decision to use all the anthropology 
methods I knew to research the business environment and its actors but I had not 
acquired sufficient knowledge as to how and where to grasp this environment and 
make it tangible, nor how to turn the data into something empirical. When one speaks 
of working in the field, or going into the field, one draws on mental images of a 
distinct place with an inside and an outside, reached by practices of physical 
movement (Clifford 1997:187). Going to the “field” suggests a trip to a place that is 
agrarian, pastoral, or maybe even “wild”; it implies a place that is perhaps cultivated, 
but that does not stray too far from nature (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). What stands 
metaphorically opposed to work in the field is work in industrial places: in 
laboratories, in offices, in factories, in urban settings – in short, in civilized spaces 
that have lost their connection with nature (Gupta and Ferguson 1997:8). One of the 
basic arguments advanced by anthropologists when discussing the need to make the 
                                                 
20 The first Anthropology MA program in Latvia was opened in 2007, the first BA program in 2009, 
when the anthropologists who had studied abroad (myself included) gradually started returning home, 
eager to build up anthropology in Latvia.  
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traditional fieldwork methods more flexible, is globalization and its related “flux and 
fluidity” processes (Eriksen 2007:1f). Chapter 2, then, will show, through empirical 
evidence, that the traditional anthropological toolkit, representing a particularly deep, 
extended and interactive research encounter, is vital in the research of transnational 
business operations in the global age, and that it is possible to grasp globally ongoing 
dynamics even when staying in a “bounded” field site. This choice of methodological 
approach reflects a desire to avoid expending further effort on theorizing business 
practice as an end in itself rather than on the “practice of practice in doing 
ethnography” (Evens and Handelman 2006a:6).  
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the concept and the term ‘embeddedness’ – its origins and 
significance for the philosophy of science and for social sciences in general, and for 
anthropology in particular. Discussing with remarkable scholars of social sciences, 
this chapter argues that economic activities as in premarket so in market societies are 
embedded in social institutions. However, the work here will emphasize that there is 
little room for what anthropologists call “culture” (Wilk and Cligget 2007) in the use 
of embeddedness approach in the analysis of market societies: it limits itself to an 
explanation of the social dimension of an economic system in the form of networks, 
neglecting such factors as culture, power and geography (Sonnino 2007). It seldom 
takes into adequate consideration the process through which an economic system 
becomes embedded. Throughout the following chapters (particularly 5, 6 and 7), the 
concept of embeddedness will serve as a conceptual umbrella in the analysis of 
Norwegian entrepreneurial activities in the Baltics, showing that transnational market 
operations are embedded in social relations in the same way as they are embedded in 
political ideologies – they form the deepest strata of cultural values and experiences 
that shape us as human beings. In viewing embeddedness from below, this work 
provides an explanatory framework from which to explore, for example, why each 
strategy is adopted, and in what circumstances.  
 
Chapter 4 introduces the political and economic backgrounds of Norway and the 
Baltics at the end of 1990s and the beginning of twenty-first century. Insight into such 
context is vital as it provides an understanding of the motives and strategies of 
Norwegian entrepreneurs entering the emerging Baltic market as well as the readiness 
of the local Baltic actors and institutions in welcoming Norwegian investors into their 
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fledgling market economy. Such insight also provides a broader understanding of both 
regions’ political and ideological strategies in relation to the expanding Nordic 
market.  
 
Chapter 5 views social networks as the core of the embeddedness of economic 
activity in market societies. However, without discrediting the significance of 
networks in entrepreneurial operations, this chapter highlights the cultural content of 
social relations in which economic processes are embedded in terms of meanings and 
representations. The empirical work here depicts two strategies of Norwegian 
industrial entrepreneurs in entering the Baltic market. Analysis in the following two 
chapters (6 and 7) to a great extent is based on these empirical cases.  
 
The most embracing analysis of aspects of embeddedness in relation to Norwegian 
cross-border entrepreneurship in the Baltics is provided in chapter 6. The general 
findings and conclusions in this chapter are based not only on the empirical findings 
of the present research but also on the research of other anthropologists who have 
made in-depth studies of Norwegian entrepreneurial activities. While analyzing the 
framework of embeddedness of Norwegian and Baltic business actors, the focus here 
is placed on the relations between the actor and environment in which s/he operates, 
keeping in mind that the rest of the community that entrepreneurs operate within is 
composed of actors who also make choices and pursue strategies (Barth 1972). The 
analysis will examine both the material and nonmaterial costs of doing business and 
will explore the values, relations, contexts, perceptions and ideologies in which 
particular Norwegian and Baltic economic activities are embedded.  
 
The final chapter discusses the locus of the Baltics as a strategically significant asset 
for Norwegian businesses, and shows how the Baltic market is being constructed in 
Norwegian public culture, market-related policies and everyday talks. Images of the 
Baltic market will not be analyzed merely as discourse, however. Attention is paid 
here to the concrete social and economic practices that give rise to the production of 
these images.  
  
The thesis concludes with a short epilogue, the intention of which is to emphasize 
once more that the socio-cultural world is present in its entirety in every 
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entrepreneurial action. Based on the research, this thesis concludes that it is not 
productive to set apart economic and socio-cultural practices and to cultivate a notion 
of disembedded economies. Analyzing aspects of embeddedness in Norwegian cross-
border entrepreneurship in the Baltics, there was nothing to be observed that 
resembled a disembedded economic action: each entrepreneurial step taken could be 
traced and linked to multilayered relations and values, political and geographical 
constellations, imprints of the past and constructions of the future. And precisely 
because economic and socio-cultural relations are inseparable, anthropological 
research methods are ideally suited for researching the “corporate jungle” in 








A Whole Year to Study a Few Cases? 
2.1.Research Methodology: A 2005 Perspective 
 
When in 2005 I told my colleagues in the International Marketing Department21 of my 
intention to spend the following year in the Baltics doing field research for my PhD, 
they were quite shocked at the idea. Although my contract provided for more than a 
year of research activities, it was not easy to convince my head of department that I 
needed a year off for field research to complete my study on Norwegian businesses in 
the Baltic states.22 “A whole year? What are you going to do there? Do you mean you 
need a whole year to study a few cases?” was the response from my department. 
Rumor started to spread that I had a boyfriend in the Baltics and that this was the 
actual reason for my plan to stay there for so long. Others were taken aback by my 
impertinence in formally requesting such a long period of time off work. Obviously, I 
should not have been surprised at this attitude, knowing that the approach I had 
planned was contrary to traditional methods of economic science, which aims to 
become abstracted from detail, to discard the peripheral, to provide a simple account 
of essential elements, to build simplified systems and to ignore the fact that economic 
activity is embedded within a framework of social and political institutions and that 
cultural factors can be key determinants of economic performance (Buckley 1998). 
The outcome-oriented economists found it difficult to understand how a process-
oriented research methodology could be useful or necessary: “The dynamic steps 
through which particular outcomes [of research] may or may not be reached and 
through which social relations are reshaped” (Ray 2006:1) did not seem 
comprehensible to them. 
 
It was difficult for me as the only anthropologist in the department to convince 
economics colleagues and superiors about the importance of long-term field research 
                                                 
21 This thesis was produced on the basis of trilateral agreement among the Social Anthropology 
Department of the University of Bergen, the International Marketing Department of Aalesund 
University College, and myself. Aalesund provided financial support for the implementation of 
doctoral resercah  and in return I lectured on International Marketing and Intercultural Understanding 
at Aalesund.  




in anthropology and that it was indispensable for the completion of my project. After 
a month of negotiations I succeeded in persuading my head of department to agree to 
my trip, but only for half a year initially. “It’s only on the trial,” the head of 
department said, “so that I don’t have to make excuses to my colleagues. When the 
half year is over, we will give you an extension – if you have not managed to collect 
the necessary data in that time.” However strange this attitude might seem to an 
anthropologist it did not really shock me. During the first year that I had spent as the 
only anthropologist in a department of international marketing, teaching intercultural 
understanding to business students, I had a feeling that I was perceived as a 
representative of a marginal field who might tell students something about what 
people eat in this or that country and what manners they practice. 
 
Such an attitude would be unthinkable in a department of anthropology, but the fact 
that the work of an anthropologist could be so misunderstood in another field is one of 
the reasons for writing this comprehensive chapter on methodology. Another reason 
for this comprehensive approach was the range of thoughts that occurred to me during 
my research into the ways in which traditional fieldwork in anthropology should be 
carried out when researching business practices in a modern urban environment. The 
contrast between traditional anthropological methods and economists’ viewpoints on 
how to conduct research led me to question, reflexively and epistemologically, how to 
constitute field research in business settings and how to position myself within it. 
 
Thus, this chapter includes a discussion on the suitability of anthropologists’ 
competence and methods for researching transnational, global and large-scale 
realities. It includes what I told my economics colleagues to win their support for my 
field research, about the meaning of field research for anthropologists and 
anthropology, and about how suited a traditionally trained anthropologist is for 
grasping complex modern realities and discovering ways to navigate in such field 
locations. Finally, this section looks at how and why anthropologists should bother 
about economics and entrepreneurship when there are thousands of economists who 
already carry out research in this area.  
 
Besides presenting my own fieldwork material from Norwegian business activities in 
the Baltics, and my efforts to approach this by using participant observation, this work 
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will also look at approaches taken by Gluckman (1958) and Tsing (2005) as 
significant examples of how to approach macro anthropology grounded in practice 
(Evens and Handelman 2006a) and the realities of shifting locations. Discussions by, 
for example, Gupta and Ferguson (1997), Lien and Melhuus (2007), Passaro (1997), 
Evens and Handelman (2006a, 2006b), Norman (2006), Tsing (2005), and Clifford 
(1997) on the character of fieldwork as the main anthropological method will form the 
theoretical base of this chapter.  
 
 Fieldwork makes a “real anthropologist” 
 
All graduate students in social or cultural anthropology know that it is fieldwork that 
makes a “real anthropologist”, and that truly anthropological knowledge is widely 
understood to be “based” on fieldwork (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). Through the idea 
of “the field” anthropological work is distinguished from work in related disciplines 
such as history, sociology, political science, religious studies, literature, and 
especially cultural studies. The difference between anthropology and these other 
disciplines lies less in the topics studied than in the distinctive method anthropologists 
employ, namely, fieldwork based on participant observation (Gupta and Ferguson 
1997:2).  
 
The famous photograph of Malinowski’s tent pitched in the midst of a Trobriand 
village, and the photograph of Margaret Mead leaning intently towards a Balinese 
mother and baby, have long served as potent images of anthropological fieldwork 
(Clifford 1997). “Exotic” fieldwork pursued over a continuous period of at least a 
year has, for some time now, set the norm against which other practices are judged 
(ibid.). So essential is fieldwork in anthropology that no grant proposals that do not 
specify a workable field site are being funded (Passaro 1997); people recognized as 
anthropologists are critically defined by having done something close enough to “real 
fieldwork” (Clifford 1997). 
 
A major factor in the distinction of anthropology, and what may be referred to as its 
scientific practices, is the stress that anthropology places on the empirical and the 
ethnographic (Kapferer 2007:81). Perhaps the single most important dimension of the 
anthropological ethnographic emphasis is the primacy given to the ethnographic over 
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the conceptual, interpretational or the abstract theoretical (ibid.). According to 
Kapferer (2007), this anthropological insistence was born of the Enlightenment with 
its imperative that scientific knowledge should be based on direct, unmediated 
empirical engagement with the phenomena in question. 
 
The central role of fieldwork in anthropology has been emphasized in innumerable 
articles and books, for example, Jenkins (1994), Emerson, Fretz and Shaw (1995), 
Nielsen (1996), Clifford (1997), Gupta and Ferguson (1997), Passaro (1997), Tsing 
(2005), Evens and Handelman (2006a), Kapferer (2007) and Lien and Melhuus 
(2007). But it also has been suggested that the world being described by 
ethnographers has changed dramatically without a corresponding shift in disciplinary 
practice since fieldwork became hegemonic in anthropology (Gupta and Ferguson 
1997:3).  
 
Anthropology, like the other social sciences, is in a state of constant change and 
development; definitions of relevant facts, preoccupations, and questions and answers 
change all the time (Wilk and Cligget 2007:1). Presently, the range of topics 
anthropology can study and the array of theoretical perspectives it can deploy are 
immense (Clifford 1997:192). The mobility of people, things and ideas implies that 
relations between people and places have become an issue of concern (Lien and 
Melhuus 2007) and the “definition” of home is being fundamentally questioned 
(Clifford 1997). Contemporary political, cultural and economic conditions bring new 
pressures and opportunities to anthropology. In this context academic anthropology 
struggles to reinvent its traditions under new circumstances (Clifford 1997:192). 
Indeed, there are increasing doubts about the adequacy of traditional ethnographic 
methods and concepts for dealing with the intellectual and political challenges of the 
contemporary world (Clifford 1997; Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Passaro 1997; Tsing 
2005; Lien and Melhuus 2007). Concerns about the lack of fit between the problem 
raised by a mobile, changing, globalizing world, on the one hand, and the resources 
provided by a method originally developed for studying supposedly small-scale 
societies, on the other (Gupta and Ferguson 1997: 3) have been evident in 
anthropology in various expressions, not only in relation to research of transnational 




If ethnography was originally designed for small communities, how one carries out an 
ethnographic study of global connections becomes an important issue. Norman (2006) 
attempts to explore the implications of circumscribing a “field” in time and space and 
the shifting relationships that develop with informants. Gupta and Ferguson (1997) 
attempt to redefine the “trademark” fieldwork not as having time-honored 
commitments to the local but as paying attention to social, cultural and political 
locations and a willingness to realign their own location while building 
epistemological and political links with other locations. They suggest that such 
location work is central to many of the most innovative reconceptualizations of 
anthropological fieldwork practices in recent years. Passaro (1997) points out that 
although explicit reference to primitive natives has generally disappeared from 
anthropological discourse, the conceptions of “the field” that constituted and defined 
those natives persist. She observes that the world viewed by anthropologists is still 
broken up into “areas” and “sites” sanctioned for study, peopled with those who might 
no longer be exotic but who are still coherent Peoples and necessary Others (Passaro 
1997:148). She states that because “the field” functions as the master symbol of the 
discipline, even when nontraditional field sites are admitted into the canon of 
anthropology, we nonetheless continue to inflect them with a host of assumptions 
generated by a colonial worldview (Passaro 1997:148).  
 
In terms of what elements constitute fieldwork, Clifford (1997) clarifies the role of 
travel, physical displacement and temporary dwelling away from home, by looking at 
how the notions of travel, boundary, co-residence, interaction, inside and outside, 
which have defined the field and proper fieldwork, are being challenged and reworked 
in contemporary anthropology. He shows how definite spatial practices, patterns of 
dwelling and traveling have constituted fieldwork in anthropology. He also argues 
that the “disciplining of fieldwork, of its sites, routes, temporalities and embodied 
practices, has been critical in maintaining the identity of socio-cultural anthropology” 
(Clifford 1997:216). Notions of community insides and outsides, homes and abroad, 
fields and metropolis, are increasingly challenged by post-exotic, decolonized trends 
(Clifford 1997: 186). It is much less clear today what counts as acceptable fieldwork.  
 
Therefore, concerns about the relevance of traditional anthropological methodology 
exist not only as regards research in the field of international business, as was 
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observed in chapter 1, but also as regards research of contemporary life – in its 
changing, dynamic, multifaceted, fast and transnational aspects. International business 
is just one facet of this life that is difficult to grasp.  
 
Ethnographic fieldwork is at the core of the anthropological discipline and there are 
hundreds of monographs depicting anthropologists in their field sites, entering distant 
communities, living in mountain villages, sitting around the fireplace with “natives”, 
watching women preparing food and so on. But few and far between are those 
describing precisely how fieldwork should be carried out in non-traditional settings. 
As far as my own research was able to ascertain, no books or courses on the main 
anthropological method provide insight into how to conduct fieldwork in, for 
example, factories or the business environment of a large metropolis. How to enter 
this kind of field? How to dwell there? What exactly, except travelling and dwelling, 
are we talking about when we invoke anthropological fieldwork in less traditional 
settings? When we speak of working in the field, or going into the field, we draw on 
mental images of a distinct place with an inside and outside, reached by practices of 
physical movement (Clifford 1997:187).  
 
My Fieldwork: Entering the Corporate Jungle  
 
Like most young people, I assume, I started my anthropology studies (in 1998) with 
the hope of conducting a traditional village study in some mountain community (and I 
still have that dream). But when I started my PhD research in 2005 my previous 
competencies, the funding possibilities available and my practical, rational nature 
guided me to a closer and more complex community. The Baltic countries became my 
field site and the Norwegian entrepreneurs there became the main object of interest. 
The relatively non-exotic character of the Baltics and its closeness to Scandinavia did 
not prevent me from entertaining my dreams of the “field”, though, nor did it spoil my 
plans for this trip to my chosen field site.  
 
According to most of the monographs I had read, field research starts with the arrival 
at the field site, a search for suitable informants, or at least local contacts, and the 
hospitability or incomprehension of the indigenous people as they welcome the 
anthropologist. Had I not already started preparing for my field research a few months 
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before leaving Norway for the Baltics, the scene of my arrival in Riga in December 
2005 might even have been comic. If I had been seeking informants in the crowded 
Riga airport or, in the following days, going from company to company in Riga and 
later in Vilnius, it would probably have become a somewhat awkward operation. 
However, my fieldwork had begun a few months before my flight to Riga. Through 
local Norwegian acquaintances I was introduced to a man called Harald Hegstad who 
for several years had been establishing Scandinavian industrial parks in Eastern 
Europe, including the Baltic states. Since he was an upper-level manager, he could not 
tell me much about the real experience of Norwegian entrepreneurs in the Baltics, but 
he gave me an overview of the Norwegian industries located there with which he was 
familiar. This helpful information formed my starting point.  
 
During the following month, repeated telephone calls were made from my office at 
Ålesund to the top managers of the ten industrial companies recommended to me by 
Harald, of which I found six to be suitable for my project. Of these, four did not mind 
being engaged in further conversations with me. Visits to these four companies and 
the “remains” of their plants in Norway gave me a clearer picture of what to look for 
in the Baltics. I conducted three-hour long informal interviews with each of the four 
executives, and under their guidance visited their plants in Norway, which to a large 
extent housed only the design, administrative and sales units. These interviews gave 
me a rough idea of the motives for moving the Norwegian production units and 
subsidiary companies to the Baltics, as well as the information I needed to locate them 
in that area. It transpired that these subsidiary companies were located mostly in 
Latvia and Lithuania, which is why these two countries became the main field site for 
my research. Although I am fully aware of differences between these countries, I do 
not differentiate between them in my thesis, but rather designate them with the 
common toponym ‘the Baltics’. I have two good reasons for doing so: firstly, my key 
informants – Norwegian entrepreneurs in the Baltics – when talking about business in 
the Baltics did not differentiate between Latvia and Lithuania.23 Secondly, this 
approach helped to ensure the anonymity of my informants. Thus, even before leaving 
for the Baltics, I knew what companies and plants I was going to visit there. 
 
                                                 
23 See chapter 4. 
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In order to make production as inexpensive as possible, the Norwegian plants in the 
Baltics were not located in the capital cities. The further from Riga and Vilnius they 
were situated, the cheaper the labor costs and required outlay for premises and land. I 
spent the first months of my fieldwork visiting various Norwegian production units 
scattered across the Baltics, making inquiries about their motives, experiences and 
challenges in the Baltic market. When I called one of the directors of a Norwegian 
plant in the Baltics, which Harald Hegstad had recommended, to arrange a visit to his 
plant in the town of Livpils, he gave me the following answer: “Well, next Thursday I 
will be there and at 12 o’clock I might have a couple of hours free”. That Thursday, 
director Knut Kløver gave me a warm welcome, bought me a lunch at the company’s 
canteen, introduced me to his closest colleagues and proudly showed off his offices 
and the hangars where welding operations were at full capacity. He also generously 
devoted at least a couple of hours to answering my questions.  
 
 “Well, that is what we do here; I hope you will find at least something of this useful 
for your work”, Knut said hospitably at around 6 pm, when the workday at the plant 
was about to end. A bit confused, I realized that he was preparing to see me off to his 
car and say goodbye, but I had scarcely begun my observation and involvement. I 
asked for permission to stay at his plant longer, explaining that anthropologists 
conduct their studies by observing at the site for longer periods of time. He replied 
kindly, “We do not have any apartments here. It is just production and offices, as you 
have seen. But if you do not have a place to stay I can give you a number of a friend 
who owns an apartment building in the city. He will definitely help you, if you 
mention my name”. 
 
I explained that I had a place to stay, indicating that my intention was to stay longer at 
the plant and conduct more substantial observations. Knut looked a bit confused: 
 
Observe? What exactly? I already showed and told you everything. Apart from 
that, nothing much is going on here. The workday is over in an hour and 
everything will be closed. Everybody’s going home, except the security. As you 
saw, they are just welding and casting metal, nothing else, and I only turn up here 
once a month to control the situation. But sure, if there is something more you are 




Unsure about my prospects for further research at the factory, but nevertheless 
satisfied with what I had accomplished that day, I returned to the apartment I had 
rented just outside the capital city and spent the remainder of the evening making 
notes of my impressions, as every “real” anthropologist is supposed to do at the end of 
the day during fieldwork. The following day I transcribed the interviews I had 
recorded onto a minidisk. A couple of days later, I called Knut again, saying I wanted 
to make another visit. Knut was in Norway, but told me to go to Livpils if I wanted to 
do so. When I arrived, the office was closed and there was no one in sight, except the 
security guard who inquired rather unkindly about the purpose of my visit. It was 
apparently not possible to gain access to the hangars; however, after pleading at 
length I persuaded one of the security guards to let me into the anteroom of the 
hangar, though I was barred from going any further. Casting, grinding, sawing, 
welding, sparks, heat and gray smoke swirled in the air. The flashlight of my camera 
interrupted the workers who were surrounded by sparks and metal dust. Due to the 
deafening noise I did not even hear the production manager who, irritated by my 
appearance there, showed me to the door. I realized that interviews, conversations, 
involvement, observation or dwelling were out of question in such noisy and, as the 
production manager pointed out, dangerous conditions. 
 
I returned to the canteen and waited for the lunch hour when workers, blackened with 
soot, quickly formed a queue at the counter. Leaning over huge portions of warm, 
aromatic meals they ate hurriedly and then one after another exited the canteen to 
have a quick smoke before returning to work. The canteen and its backyard where the 
workers gathered for a five-minute pause in the afternoon was the only place I could 
hope to have a brief conversation with them. During the 30-minute break given for 
lunch the workers could only stand in the line and have their meals, but I could not 
keep myself from approaching some of them. I introduced myself to the workers, but 
they, without showing any particular interest in me, responded quite indifferently: 
“The management is not here right now. Knut will be back in three weeks, come then 
and ask him. We only weld and cannot tell you anything about the business”. The 
canteen was soon empty again and I was left alone with my cup of coffee. 
 
I spent the following couple of months planning and making similar visits to other 
Norwegian industrial units in the Baltics. The Norwegian companies I visited were 
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welcoming and did not spare time for my inquiries. I was shown around factories, 
even allowed to take part in meetings, and invited to dinner and lunch. Each of these 
visits lasted for a working day. When approximately four months of my fieldwork had 
passed I realized that although I had conducted about 54 in-depth interviews with 
Norwegian entrepreneurs in the Baltics, something essential was missing. Although 
the interviews at all the companies and industrial units were unstructured and open-
ended, the information obtained was quite similar across the board – polite answers, 
exact information about figures, budgets and profits, and opinions about politics and 
the situation with the workforce in the Baltics compared to and in Norway.  
  
Throughout these interviews and from hundreds of pages of business reports and press 
releases I had not acquired a single meaningful insight into the practice, namely the 
business operations, of these companies, their challenges, their manner of doing 
business and the ways in which they had chosen particular strategies in a foreign 
country. I had many transcribed pages concerning the experiences of these companies 
but the practice itself remained unclear to me. My superiors in the International 
Marketing Department in Norway believed that 54 in-depth interviews and about 20 
company visits was more than enough for a PhD project (I was required to send 
monthly field research reports to prove that I was actually doing something useful in 
the Baltics), but I felt that this data was far from sufficient for a thick description of 
Norwegian entrepreneurship in the Baltics. 
 
Did I ask the wrong questions? Did I talk to the wrong people? Why had my field 
research been unsuccessful in terms of acquiring the necessary data? How should I 
proceed?  
 
Can Corporate Encounters be Expressed in Words?  
 
Was it possible to express in words the segments of experience I was trying to get 
from factory workers and managers, if the answers to my questions were so concise 
and so short? “We’re just welding” was the typical answer I heard from the workers. 
How to grasp the practice and where to find challenges and daily life interactions at 
an industrial company? I recalled an article by Hanne Müller (2004) in Norsk 
Antropologisk Tidsskrift on learning based on practice; I tried to draw some parallels. 
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If a welder learns to weld almost speechlessly, how could he be expected to describe 
his work with words? Hanne Müller (2004) writes that the only words used to train 
welders are such phrases as “here”, “like this”, or “count up to three before you move 
the electrode”. The position of the arms and hands is also corrected and the teacher 
taps the apprentice on a shoulder to turn his body so that it takes the correct position. 
Müller claims that non-verbal knowledge is as precise as the theoretical form and it 
meets the needs of the welder who has to work so that particular objectives and results 
are achieved. The welding needs to be of a certain length and it should not have pores. 
If pores are discernable, the welding is not suitable. Nobody explains what exactly 
should be seen through the welding glasses. Only when the instructor had taken over 
the welding could Müller see, by means of the glasses, that there are nuances and 
variations in the mass that had to be welded – it reminded her of what happens when 
milk or water reaches boiling point. This particular association helped her understand 
when exactly it was that the electrode needed to be moved on. Only then could she 
express in words what she had to see in order to weld successfully. When a bubble 
appeared and it started expanding towards the right, she had to move the electrode. 
When she asked the instructor if her formulation was correct he nodded to confirm but 
added: “Yes but we don’t usually put it like that”. Thus, Hanne Müller demonstrates 
that there is a sort of tacit knowledge that has to do with associative images and these 
images are accordingly linked with the individual experience of a particular person. I 
realized that the noise, heat and sparks were preventing me from gaining access not 
only to the experience of factory workers but also to their tacit knowledge; I became 
aware that I had to change my data collection methodology. I needed to learn by 
participating and experiencing, not by asking. 
 
I did not choose to follow Hanne Müller’s approach, however. Admittedly, by 
learning to weld I would have gained easier access to factory workers and also a 
better understanding of the specific nature of their work, their routine and their 
relations with the management, but I would still not gain – working on a Norwegian 
factory floor – a broad enough insight into the formation of company strategies and 
aspects of intercultural interaction that constituted the focus of my main interest. To 
be more specific: how do Norwegian entrepreneurs or manufacturers operate in the 
Baltic market? How are their strategies formed, and what are they based upon? Where 
does the perception that the strategies are based upon come from? What are the 
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challenges of Norwegian managers in the Baltics and how do these challenges show 
in their practices? Unlike in Norway, factory managers in the Baltics avoid working 
on the factory floor in boiler suits; therefore, the time I might invest in welding and 
infiltrating a welder’s team would not be worthwhile, compared to the data obtained 
and their respective use.  
 
Furthermore, my general strategy was to take advantage of whatever opportunities 
might arise as to informal interaction with workers and managers. As I saw issues 
emerging, I crosschecked what I heard with other people in the company, always 
bearing in mind that there are multiple truths to be discovered. At the same time, I 
was desperate to find another method, which would bring me more empirical data 
because interviews, company visits and business reports did not provide me with 
sufficiently detailed answers to satisfy my research needs. How to carry out extensive 
participant observation in a company or industrial unit? The question remained open. 
Indeed, I had already understood that a year spent in a hangar would not take me very 
far.  
 
Although my resource books in anthropological methodology did not recommend 
such an alternative, I decided to apply for a job in a Norwegian company. In fact, I 
saw it as the only opportunity of getting closer to the everyday business operations of 
Norwegian managers in the Baltics, to observe how company-level decisions were 
taken. I had to experience it by “being there”, by taking part in the company’s routine 
in a particular enterprise area. It took me a month to find a company, Nordic Ltd, 
which would agree to recruit me for a part-time position for half a year, having been 
fully informed about my research intentions. Nordic Ltd had just entered the Baltic 
market and my duty was to help it complete this process: that is, I was to help it find 
partners and customers and introduce its products first in the Baltics, and later, when 
feasible, in Russia. The fact that Nordic Ltd was not an industrial enterprise did not 
mean that I stopped research into Norwegian factories – I will return to this in chapter 
4. For the sake of methodological brevity, I will postpone until then the analysis of the 




2.2.The Company as a Field Site: Sia Nordic Ltd 
The mother company of Nordic Ltd was called Safe Use AS and was established in 
Norway at the start of the 1990s. Today, the head office has moved within 
Scandinavia and it is said to be one of Europe’s largest and most experienced 
companies for the development of products for the registration, documentation and 
management of dangerous waste and chemical substances. Nordic Ltd entered the 
Baltic market in 2005 and was established and managed by Petra Liepa. Petra was a 
middle-aged Norwegian, an in-law of a powerful Baltic family. She had taken the 
surname of her in-laws, Liepa, which was the name she used in everyday business 
operations in the Baltics. ‘My name is Petra Liepa; I’m married to the Liepa family’, 
she always stated when introducing herself. Her mother-in-law was a well-known 
state official in the Baltics. Petra had a partner agreement with Safe Use AS that 
implied that Nordic Ltd would work from the Baltics searching for partners and 
clients there, who, when identified, would be visited in the community by Safe Use 
AS representatives. Nordic Ltd would receive 25 percent of the profits from all 
products sold.  
 
The timing for entrance into the Baltic market could not be better. First, the niche 
within which Nordic Ltd operated was new and free of competitors. Secondly, the 
products and services they offered were in the process of being imposed by law. 
Although there had been earlier regulations regarding management and 
documentation of dangerous waste in the Baltic countries, by 2006 a common 
regulation for all European Union countries was in the process of being worked out. 
Entitled REACH, this was a new European Union regulatory framework for the 
Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals, the management of 
dangerous waste included. REACH was to provide a comprehensive reform of the 
manufacturing, marketing, import and use of chemical substances, and was expected 
to improve health and the environment while safeguarding innovation and 
competitiveness.  
 
REACH was also an example of better regulation as it simplified EU legislation on 
chemicals by replacing 40 existing pieces of legislation with a single system for all 
chemicals.. Once in force, REACH would require the registration, over a period of 11 
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years, of some 30,000 chemical substances, in a process that would fill information 
gaps on substance hazards and identify appropriate risk management measures to 
ensure safe use. The onus would be on industry to generate the data required and to 
identify the measures needed to manage the risks. The first REACH obligation would 
come into force from 1 June 2008.  
By using Nordic Ltd and Safe Use AS products, industries could easily meet the 
requirements of REACH legislation as the products offered went hand in hand with 
this legislation – this was the advantage of  Safe Use AS in Scandinavia. When an 
official relationship with Nordic Ltd was established, based in the Baltics, the 
assumption of Safe Use AS was that this advantage would also be evident in the Baltic 
states, which were now members of the European Union and thus subject to its 
legislation.  
My job was to help Nordic Ltd in the entrance process of introducing their product to 
Baltic customers. My competence turned out to be quite useful since I had knowledge 
of locally spoken languages, local acquaintances and an understanding of Baltic and 
Norwegian settings and mentality.  
Nordic Ltd wanted to make their entrance into the Baltic market with the support of 
powerful local authorities. Petra aimed to acquire a solid reputation in the Baltic 
market from the very start and wanted to make it look like her company was 
recommended by the authorities. Initially, a Local Development Agency (LDA) was 
used for this purpose. The LDA helped us to get in touch with potential local partners 
and allowed us to use their conference rooms for meetings. Petra perceived this 
support as good advertising for her company. And, indeed, the good reputation of the 
LDA was significant. When invited to a meeting by the unknown Nordic Ltd, 
operating in an unknown niche, local companies I got in touch with seemed reluctant 
at first. When it was mentioned that the LDA would also be participating in the 
meeting and that the meeting itself would take place at Development Agency 
premises, most of the local companies agreed to the meetings. 
After a while, however, Nordic Ltd concluded that the operations of the LDA were 
too polite, not pushy enough and, hence, ineffective. Local company representatives 
brought flowers and gifts to the Agency and it became increasingly obvious that 
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establishing good relations with the LDA was more important for local companies 
than the negotiations with Nordic Ltd. For Petra, as director of Nordic Ltd, such an 
attitude was unacceptable. When two months had passed without a single agreement 
achieved, she exclaimed, with a certain level of arrogance,  
 
We are a serious Scandinavian company, operating on a global basis. This is not 
what we need. We have to think about profit, efficiency … but, obviously, for 
them efficiency is not an option; they just have to report how many meetings they 
have participated in (Petra Liepa, 2006). 
 
So we took up the reins ourselves: I continued to look for potential local partners and 
clients without assistance.  
 
At Ms Zhukova’s Office 
Instead of advertising via the internet or other mass media, Nordic Ltd chose to take 
the initiative to visit large and successful enterprises. The goal was to find one well-
known enterprise that could afford our product and to use that enterprise as a 
trustworthy reference in further local marketing operations. Petra worked at the 
networking, actively using her local surname and relations among her husband’s 
famous family. “My uncle-in-law, my sister-in-law, my mother-in-law”, she constantly 
repeated to her conversation partners.  
“I have good news. My sister in law [Eva Liepa] has arranged a meeting for us with 
Ms Zhukova”, she told me at one point. “We just have to ask her how her dogs are 
doing, and she will soften and serve her best cognac to us. Friday at 3 pm in her 
office. Is it not well done? We have to call Paal Riise [the manager of Safe Use AS in 
Scandinavia] immediately”, she said, smiling proudly. 
 
Ms Zhukova was a director of a leading Russian oil company. Such business 
magnates would not usually waste their time on matters and people of little 
importance. An appointment with her seemed like a success in itself. That Friday at 1 
pm Petra and I left for the airport to pick up Paal Riise who had just arrived from 
Scandinavia; we were prepared for a promising meeting. Together we drove to 
Zhukova’s office at the address I had been given by Petra’s sister-in-law. Beforehand, 
I had tried to find the location on the internet, but without any success. After half an 
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hour driving out of the city center, we were finally on the right street, or rather road. It 
did not look as though there would be any offices here: there were no buildings, no 
numbers. The territory we passed had forest on both sides and a nearly 2-meter high 
concrete wall with barbed wire entangled on the top. A gateway in the wall was open 
and reluctantly I drove in. After 200 meters there was another gateway with a barrier 
and armed security guards. They gave us a sharp look, but no questions were asked. 
“We have an appointment with Ms Zhukova”, I stated in the local language. 
“Zhukova is not here at the moment”, the guard answered in Russian. “Could we wait 
for her then, since we have an appointment?” I asked. It was apparent that he did not 
understand what I said, so I repeated it in Russian. He opened the barrier, waved us in 
and pointed to an unoccupied parking place among black, shiny, dark-windowed jeeps 
and BMWs. 
 
We went into the building, up a marble staircase and entered a reception area. 
Attractive almost model-like women gave us sharp looks. “My name is Petra Liepa; I 
am from the Liepa family, Eva’s sister-in-law. We have a meeting with Ms Zhukova”, 
Petra said, loudly and confidently. The young women seemed confused. I tried to 
break the uncomfortable silence by saying in the local language: “Good day; we are 
here for a meeting with Ms Zhukova. Miss Eva Liepa has arranged a meeting for us 
with her at 4 o’clock”. No one seemed to have understood, so I repeated it in Russian.  
 
We were told in Russian that Zhukova had left an hour ago and that they did not know 
anything about our appointment. Petra and Paal did not understand Russian. Prepared 
for the meeting, dressed up and carrying nice briefcases, they were looking forward to 
the meeting with great expectations. I did not wish to insult Petra, who had bragged 
about this meeting with a Russian business magnate, and about the good cognac, to 
her Norwegian partners for a long time; I could not just announce that there was no 
meeting planned today. The Norwegians, who had come to the Baltics specifically for 





The women at reception called Ms Zhukova and got confirmation that she was not 
expecting anyone and was not coming back to the office that day. I felt silly. The 
Norwegian delegation was standing by, hopeful; they were prepared for the meeting 
and did not understand what was going on as we were speaking in Russian. Petra had 
bragged so much about her local connections and the invitation to this important 
meeting that I could not embarrass her by telling everyone that no one was expecting 
us. I begged the receptionists to call Zhukova once more. They dialed her number and 
gave the phone to me. It was apparent that Zhukova did not know about our 
appointment. I explained the situation and mentioned the Liepa family, begging her to 
send someone else from her company to meet us. She called the vice-director and 
asked if he had some time for us; luckily he was available. I told Paal and Petra that 
Zhukova had apologized for having to leave to deal with some vital matters and that 
we would be having a meeting with the vice-director of her company instead. We 
were shown to the vice-director’s office.  
 
The office was joined with a meeting room. We sat down on a solid, leather couch. 
Massive polished wooden furniture, paintings in golden frames, a crystal chandelier, a 
marble table and marble windowsills formed the stiff interior of the office. The 
atmosphere was so formal that the otherwise vivacious Norwegians sat stock still. 
Two men dressed in suits entered, formally, without a sign of a smile. We shook 
hands and introduced ourselves. The vice-director introduced himself in Russian. I 
had scarcely begun to translate when I was interrupted by him and told that his 
lawyer, who was standing next to him – not I – would assist at the meeting and do the 
translating from English to Russian and from Russian to English. 
Since the Norwegians believed that they were invited to the meeting, they expected a 
warmer reception and more interested hosts. The Russians, on their part, were in a 
hurry and did not understand what this was all about. Therefore, the question “who 
are you and how can we help” seemed quite awkward to Petra and Paal. Paal started 
to present his company and the software solutions it offered, and then skipped to the 
legislative matters: 
In 2008 your national regulations for registration of chemicals and dangerous 
waste will be replaced by one common EU regulation. In accordance with 
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European Union legislation, all companies that have chemicals as a part of their 
business, processes, manufacturing, etc., are obligated to have MSDS available 
for all personnel who will be in contact with the given chemical. A MSDS is a 
document which has to be updated continuously, according to the new legislation 
(Paal Riise, 2006).  
The Russian lawyer translated and simultaneously consulted his boss, the vice-
director, providing him with answers without translating everything Paal had said. 
When Paal had spoken for some five minutes, the lawyer-interpreter requested a 
pause, in order to relate to the company vice-director what had been said. Further 
discussion took place in Russian, between the vice-director and the lawyer-
interpreter, without involving the Norwegians or provision of a translation. I 
understand Russian, but I was given an indirect hint that their mutual discussion was 
not to be translated to the visitors.  
 
“They are too ‘green’, some kind of environment protectionists. I do not 
understand what they are doing here”, said the vice-director to the lawyer.  
“Have we ever documented dangerous waste? Is legislation really as strict as they 
say?” the vice director asked. 
“No, we have managed without all this stuff”, answered the lawyer. 
“This could be a real drag to the business”, said the vice-director. 
“Right”, affirmed the lawyer. 
“Do we need it now?” asked the vice-director.  
“We can manage without”, answered the lawyer. 
“Are we going to get involved in this?” continued the vice-director. 
“No”, answered the lawyer with certainty. 
“Then we can finish up”, concluded the vice-director, muttering below his breath. 
 
None of this was translated to the Norwegians. The lawyer of Ms Zhukova’s company 
turned to us again and said:  
 
You see this is an oil company. We are not producing any chemicals here, so 
these dangerous waste issues you are talking about do not actually apply to us. 
You should talk to other kinds of enterprises, but honestly, I do not think you will 




I tried to explain that they had misunderstood, that we had nothing to do with the 
green movement or the control of dangerous waste, that we were not executing any 
kind of controls, just offering solutions for documenting chemicals and dangerous 
waste. But I was politely ignored. They pretended that the conversation between 
themselves had not taken place, and indeed it was not meant for our ears. We 
exchanged business cards and were seen to the door. Petra’s story about Zhukova’s 
dogs and expensive cognac remained an idea only of how the meeting might have 
proceeded had we been expected, welcome and useful to their business.  
 
It seems almost unnecessary to observe how shocked Petra and Paal were about the 
outcome of the hoped-for meeting. Later, it transpired that Eva Liepa and Ms 
Zhukova had had a conversation before our meeting. Why did no one at Zhukova’s 
company knew about the meeting that had been arranged? Perhaps Zhukova wanted 
to hide the connection, since she was not quite sure who Petra and Paal were. Or 
perhaps she made the appointment only for the sake of her relationship with Eva 
Liepa, but wanted to hide it from her colleagues because she foresaw that we could be 
perceived as an obstacle to their business.  
 
The attitude of Zhukova’s vice-director was as follows: as long as we can avoid the 
regulations, we will do so. Petra and Paal were associated with control and with the 
Green movement, and thus taken for an obstacle to their business. We were given a 
direct message not to destroy their business and there were no signs of a wish for 
further collaboration. Convinced that personal networks alone would not secure a 
solid ground for cooperation with the local partners, Petra decided to turn to local 
state institutions.  
 
The Agency of Pollution Control (APC) 
 
The state institution, the Agency of Pollution Control (APC), showed an interest in 
the products and services offered by Nordic Ltd, simultaneously admitting that such 
products would be too expensive for them. Nevertheless, they wanted to cooperate 
with us and suggested a seminar could be co-organized at which Nordic Ltd could 
inform a wide range of Baltic companies and organizations about their products and 
intentions. Pollution controllers from the chemical industry would be the target group 
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of the seminar. Petra liked the idea and began to organize the seminar a couple of 
weeks later. 
 
To the mother company Safe Use AS Petra presented the APC as an influential 
governmental actor; she wanted to give the impression that cooperation with the APC 
was a successful marketing strategy. It looked as though she needed to convince 
colleagues in Scandinavia about her success and decisions: that she was doing well in 
the Baltics, that her business was developing, that she was a part of important 
networks, and that moving to the Baltics was the right thing to do. She did not want to 
be associated with those Norwegians who were on the receiving end of a disdainful 
attitude because they had moved their business to the Baltic region. Among many of 
her fellow citizens the region was still associated with the idea of the “wild west in the 
east” and Scandinavians operating there were associated with fortune hunters and 
adventurers.24 
 
The seminar was to be held on 5 May 2006. Responsibilities for preparatory activities 




APC  Nordic Ltd/ Safe Use AS  Dead-
line 
Completed 
1 Book the conference 
hall  
 5.4.06 8.4.06 
2 Draw up the list of 
participants 
 7.4.06 7.4.06 
3  Create a description of Safe 
Use AS and Nordic Ltd and 
agenda suggestions for the 
seminar 
7.4.06 19.4.06 
4  Translate the description of 
both companies and the agenda 
for the seminar from 
Norwegian to the local 
language and send the 
translations to the APC 
8.4.06 19.4.06 
5  Send to the APC a list of those 
companies Nordic Ltd wants to 
invite to the seminar 
7.4.06 19.4.06 
                                                 
24 For more about perceptions of the Baltic region, see chapters 4 and 6. 
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6 Complete invitations 
and agenda for the 
seminar in the local 
language 
 8.4.06 21.4.06 
7  
 
Translate invitations and 
agenda for the seminar into 
English 
9.4.06 22.4.06 
8 Post the invitations 
to the selected 
companies and 
organizations 
 10.4.06 24.4.06 
9 Register the invited 
companies and 
organizations who 
wish to participate in 
the seminar 
 28.4.06 5.5.06 
10 Send the opening 
speech of the APC 
director to Nordic 
Ltd 
 29.4.06 28.4.06 
11  Send seminar presentations to 
the APC 
29.4.06 4.5.06 
12  Make 100 folders with 
presentations and seminar 
materials 
2.4.06 5.5.06 
14 Cover 50% of the 
total seminar 
expenses 




Table 1. Delegation of responsibilities when organizing the Nordic Ltd seminar in 
May 2006. 
 
I was appointed as a translator, coordinator and contact for all the parties involved. 
The organization of the seminar did not go very smoothly, however. The ways in 
which the APC and Nordic Ltd worked turned out to differ to quite an extent, as did 
their expectations of the event in question. Nordic Ltd expected the seminar to be held 
on a grand scale, in a five-star hotel with an audience of serious business actors. They 
expected efficiency from the organizers and that they would make a profit, as well as 
establishing cooperation with new partners as a logical outcome of the seminar.  
 
The first hold-up was caused by Safe Use AS. Description of their company and their 
suggestions for the agenda (item 3 in table 1) were sent two weeks late to the APC. As 
soon as the description and agenda were ready I translated the text and forwarded it to 
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the APC. Thus, the APC could complete the invitations and post them only on 24 
April – two weeks later than planned – with 1 May as the final date for registration.  
 
By 2 May only one third of the invited participants had responded and registered for 
the seminar. Since many recipients had not received the invitations by the final date of 
registration, Petra started to accuse the APC of sabotage, claiming that invitations had 
not been sent out on purpose, to prevent Nordic Ltd’s entrance into the Baltic market. 
My reminder about the delays caused by Safe Use AS, which led to the delay in 
posting the invitations, did not help. At that moment, Petra noticed that her Latvian 
surname was not on the participant list, only her Norwegian one. “What is wrong with 
these people? Can’t they even write my surname correctly?” she burst out in anger. 
She believed that her local surname, which indicates belongingness to important 
networks, would have helped in advertising the seminar. Stress levels were running 
high at this point: there were complaints, yelling, and there was also much shouting 
back and forth. It was too late to call off the seminar, but to hold it in a half-empty 
conference hall would be the worst advertising campaign ever, according to Petra. 
“Paal is coming down here [from Scandinavia] expecting many participants and what 
he will see?” Petra worried. To resolve the situation I proposed to call all the invited 
participants myself to check whether they had got their invitation and whether they 
were going to attend the seminar on 5 May. I ensured that by 4 May all the 
participants had received invitations and nearly all of them expressed an interest in 
taking part. There were no signs of sabotage from the APC; most had not called to 
sign up simply because the registration date had already passed.  
 
On 5 May, almost 70 percent of the invited participants showed up. The conference 
room the APC had hired was on the basement floor of a two-star hotel, a little way 
outside the city center. For the APC it seemed to be good enough, but Petra was not 
satisfied with the choice.  
 
“Is this a kind of secret, underground activity?” Petra asked me. “This is definitely not 
good commercially for us. As if we could not afford better!” It was obvious that the 
parties had different perceptions of what ‘a high standard’ of event looked like. 





“Where is the media and where are the journalists?” was the next question from Petra. 
She had asked me to prepare a press release about the seminar to inform the mass 
media about the event, and to inform the local population, companies and authorities 
about Nordic Ltd products for the registration and management of dangerous waste. 
Since the niche Nordic Ltd operated within was unexploited in the Baltics, Petra 
perceived the seminar to be not only a marketing campaign for their product but also 
an information campaign about the newest EU legislation, which would be beneficial 
for their product. 
 
During the seminar it became increasingly obvious that the APC and Nordic Ltd had 
different intentions and expectations. As a mediator between parties I had to listen to 
the various complaints and often felt paralyzed at not being able to satisfy the wishes 
of both parties. I had not been able to fulfill Petra’s orders because the APC, as the 
official seminar organizer, had objected to them. In fact, I had written the press 
release as Petra wished and completed a list of 40 recipients from among various 
Baltic media. As a matter of good practice I had informed the APC about the intention 
to publish it, but in return got a clear message that I should not inform the media. The 
APC representative wrote:  
 
This issue at the APC is strongly regulated, namely, info of that kind should be 
submitted for the APC general director’s approval … As a state institution we are 
not allowed to advertise the production of a private enterprise. For us it is 
essential that pollution controllers participate in the seminar. We are financed by 
the Baltic Environment Foundation and the seminar is being organized within the 
framework of the project “Training and competition promotion for environment 
experts”. Business representatives are driven to promote cooperation, not as the 
primary target group of the seminar. It might seem complicated, but, as a state 
institution, we have to report on each seminar and keep to the guidelines (APC 
representative, 2006).  
 
In other words, as a state-owned company the APC was not allowed to lobby on 
behalf of a private company, nor was it supposed to organize a seminar in this way. 
Petra wondered – and never got an answer – why then did the APC want to organize 




The list of participants for the seminar was drawn up by the APC (item 2 in table 1). 
While Nordic Ltd wanted to have participants representing as broad a spectrum of 
potential partners and clients as possible, the APC made sure that the seminar 
conformed to the interests of pollution controllers and was correlated with the APC 
guidelines. Any form of official advertising for private enterprise could look like 
corruption and therefore could not be permitted.  
 
Despite an inefficient registration process (item 9 in table 1), there were almost no 
free seats in the conference hall. The audience consisted of local people, mostly from 
the regions. They sneaked quietly into the conference hall, as if trying to enter unseen. 
Well dressed, self-confident and smiling, Petra was standing at the door welcoming 
delegates and shaking hands with everyone. However, seemingly feeling lowly and 
insecure of themselves, most of the guests became confused, and took a step back as 
if trying to avoid this mode of communication. English was obviously a problem for 
most of them. Petra commented, “It looks like there are few self-confident people 
here. Hard to believe that there could be enterprise managers here, or at least someone 
with the ability to take decisions”.  
 
A Seminar, or the Hidden Advertising Campaign 
 
The seminar was opened by the vice-director of the APC. He gave a presentation 
about Baltic legislation in the field of environmental protection, dangerous waste and 
dangerous chemical substances. He also informed the audience about MSDS25 
requirements, which varied from source to source within a country depending on 
national laws and provisions. The floor was then given to Paal Riise. While presenting 
Safe Use AS products, he also referred to the upcoming EU legislation in the 
respective area, namely the REACH26 regulation discussed above, which would 
replace the existing national provisions in this area. He then emphasized that their 
software had been developed to document chemical substances and waste compliance 
with all the requirements of the new regulation and other legislative provisions. With 
                                                 
25 A Material Safety Data Sheet is a form containing data about the properties of a particular 
substance. MSDSs are widely used for cataloguing information on chemicals, chemical compounds, 
and chemical mixtures. MSDS may include instructions for safe use and potential hazards associated 
with a particular material or product (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Material_safety_data_sheet  accessed 
05.06.2011.) 
26 A new European Union regulatory framework for the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
Restriction of Chemical substances; it includes the management of dangerous waste. 
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true enthusiasm Paal Riise expounded: 
In accordance with European Union legislation, all companies which have 
chemicals as a part of their business, processes or manufacturing, are obligated to 
have MSDS available for all personnel who will be in contact with the given 
chemical … According to the legislation all MSDSs shall have a revision date 
printed. Every second year the legislation for exposure limits changes, and as a 
consequence of that all MSDSs have to be revised based on the latest legislation 
… The formal importer of the product and the producer of the product are 
responsible for checking that MSDSs are in accordance with the latest legislation 
… The EU legislation and the fact that we are a part of a universal system … 
makes us all responsible for the environment and the future for not only ourselves 
but also our children and our grandchildren. We can contribute in this process to 
fulfill the given regulations regarding handling of chemicals and dangerous waste 
(Paal Riise, 2006). 
The idea Paal was trying to send out to the audience was as follows: since the new 
REACH regulations included the Baltic region, the solutions offered by Safe Use AS 
and Nordic Ltd had to be put into use. He repeatedly highlighted the fact that their 
software solutions complied with the law. Given that the Baltic states are subject to 
EU regulations, Paal believed that he would find a good market for his products there. 
Solutions of this kind were novel in the Baltic market and would make everyday 
operations in every company easier, notably in those that day in day out worked with 
chemicals, including schools in their chemistry classes, hospitals with hundreds of 
liters of medicines and disinfecting liquids, pharmaceutical companies, paint factories, 
oil refineries or industries working with dangerous substances. To back up what he 
was saying, Paal mentioned one of the leading paint manufacturers in Norway, which 
spent over 10 million Norwegian crowns to get to grips with the new REACH 
regulations. 
 
“How much do your solutions cost?” was the very first question from the 
audience to Paal.  
“Well. I would not like to start by naming numbers. The price always depends on 
each specific situation”, Paal answered.  
“Just approximate”, the inquirer did not give up. 
After thinking a while, Paal said, “Solutions for one substance cost 1500 
Norwegian crones”. 
 
People started to do the calculation and their faces expressed indignation. Trying to 
back out of an awkward situation, Paal continued, “It is because it takes three hours 
for our chemists to work out one solution. So you pay no more than the cost of three 
hours’ work”. But Paal’s words met only surprised looks. “1500 crones for 3 hours’ 
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work!” an older lady exclaimed. “Then our chemists would have to work 20 hours to 
afford that!” People started to chatter; Paal looked worried. I explained to him that 
such a price seems unreasonably high in the Baltics. I suggested that perhaps he 
should mention that for their Baltic clients they could make an adjusted offer. But he 
chose not to mention anything. 
 
“Are there any more questions”, I asked the audience in order to switch to 
another subject. 
“Well, let’s see first whether we really will be affected by the REACH 
regulations. Regulations have not been that strict so far”, commented a 
representative of a Baltic pharmaceutical industry. 
“If it is not completely clear yet when this REACH will be enforced, then, I 
suppose, it will take a while till the first inspections are carried out”, added his 
colleague.  
“How much is the penalty we have to pay if you find some imperfections in our 
management of dangerous waste?” asked one participant to the APC vice-
director. 
“Are there going to be changes regarding these penalties as well?” asked another. 
 
The local companies were concerned about how to avoid the upcoming regulations. 
The best solution for them seemed to be to avoid them as long as possible. The Nordic 
Ltd product was perceived as an expense for the company and the audience members 
clearly viewed their relationship to the EU with a certain ambivalence. Whether the 
Baltic region really would have to obey EU regulations was taken to be unclear. After 
the presentation, one of the participants came up to me and said quietly:  
 
You see – for our entrepreneurs it is much cheaper to pay the penalty once, twice 
or even four times, than to buy these expensive solutions you are talking about. 
Besides, we are being inspected only once a year and have never had any 
penalties so far. 
 
There had been a similar attitude at Ms Zhukova’s, where we were even warned not to 
destroy her business. Nordic Ltd and Safe Use AS were being associated with control 
and regulations, but in fact they had nothing to do with control. Petra and Paal were 
only trying to sell software solutions for documenting dangerous waste and chemicals, 
but by continuously quoting and referring to “the latest legislation”, they nearly 
scared away their potential clients.  
  
At the seminar I met also Eva Liepa and found out that Ms Zhukova had called her 
after our visit. It turned out that she had known of our meeting, but she perceived us 
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as a drag to her business and therefore chose not to meet us. “Why are you so tense? 
When there is a real need, then we will go deeper into this. No need to stir up trouble 
now”, Ms Zhukova had told Eva. Eva later tried to explain to Petra and Paal why their 
marketing strategy was a failure:  
 
For the time being, the solutions you are trying to sell are just an expense. As 
long as the registration of chemical substances is not mandatory no one will care. 
You have chosen the totally wrong target group. It is more lucrative to the APC 
to penalize the companies that fail to fulfill MSDS requirements. As a state 
institution, the APC cannot afford your product. Remember that Latvia and 
Lithuania are low-cost countries. Did you notice the APC vice-director’s reaction 
when I mentioned that I had invited representatives from the Green Party and 
City Council? He did not like it. Guess why. You should have organized the 
seminar for the Green party and City Council – they would have been interested 
in preserving the environment and they would have been able to influence 
legislation to your advantage (Eva Liepa, 2006).  
 
Apparently it was Eva who convinced Petra that the APC did not distribute the 
seminar invitations on time in order to sabotage the entrance of Nordic Ltd into the 
Baltic states. But these suspicions of sabotage were inaccurate. When making 
telephone calls to remind people to sign up for the seminar, I discovered that all the 
people on the guest list had received the invitation. However, it is plausible that such 
sabotage might have been commonplace, since Eva was so sure about it. The APC 
was actually doing its best to get the seminar underway, and it was well prepared; its 
objectives just happened to be different from those of Nordic Ltd. When the seminar 
was over, an APC representative collected the remaining handouts and sighed with 
relief. Turning to a colleague, the representative said: “Anyway, it’s good we 
managed to organize the seminar in time”. It transpired that the objective of the APC 
was to make proper use of the funding allocated to pollution control training projects. 
The allocated amounts would expire and be withdrawn unless used by 12 May 2006. 
Organizing the seminar in collaboration with Nordic Ltd was convenient, since the 
grant rules stipulated that the training needed to involve some international experts. 
Nordic Ltd was an international company that possessed expertise of sorts because its 
staff was well acquainted with the most recent legislative developments in the area of 
waste and registration and the documentation of chemical substances. Such a seminar 
would perfectly fit into the APC annual report into the use of the grant allocated to the 
training of pollution controllers. Thus, as far as the APC was concerned, the seminar 
was not market-oriented right from the outset. Nordic Ltd did not have any idea about 
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this because it did not choose to critically evaluate why the APC was so willing to 
cooperate. As Barth (1972) writes, one needs to pay a lot of heed to the context and 
environment in which a businessperson operates – this context consists of 
interrelations and actors that present their own strategies, and bear in mind their own 
profit; failure to assess and understand this context can lead to the failure of the 
overall company strategy. Why was it that the APC disliked the presence of the Green 
Party and the City Council representatives? Perhaps Eva was right in saying that for 
the APC it was more convenient to levy fines than to foster a marketing campaign 
aimed at achieving a better waste documentation system. Or perhaps the APC as a 
state institution was afraid of being accused of advertising the services of private 
enterprises. Although the press release I prepared about the seminar was not published 
to prevent this kind of situation, it is beyond doubt that during the seminar Nordic Ltd 
advertised its products and services directly, thus breaching the rules laid down for a 
state-organized seminar. 
 
For the APC the impression it made on the audience was not a crucial factor: the 
entrepreneurs from the private sector already knew the APC, and the rest of the 
audience was made up of their colleagues, who were of course well acquainted with 
its operations. It had done its duty to train and inform pollution controllers about 
recent developments in their field. Unlike Nordic Ltd, the APC expected neither profit 
nor other benefit from the seminar. For the APC it was simply a grant-funded seminar 
that needed to be duly accounted for to the providers of the grant. What Nordic Ltd 
expected from the seminar was an impressive market entry, good marketing, profit, 
efficiency, and the potential to create networks and partnerships for further operations 
in the Baltic states. Petra hoped that her cooperation with the state institution would 
introduce Nordic Ltd to local customers and partners in a trusted and prestigious 
context. But the state official Eva Liepa disagreed: 
 
You should have thought about who you chose to cooperate with from the very 
beginning. It is apparent that you chose the wrong way to enter this market. You 
should have started from the other end, not with the users and consumers, but 
with the decision makers and authorities. 
 




Invite people who can influence the situation so that the services you are offering 
become compulsory. Use the available networks, powerful politicians in the right 
departments, the Green Party. When legislation is changed so that it is 
advantageous for you, then you can start to earn money. This should be your goal 
for the next seminar – with a different kind of audience. I can advise you about 
the right people (Eva Liepa, 2006). 
 
Petra thought this was good advice and opened her planner at once to set the date for 
the next seminar. She was eager to succeed and ready to use any influential people 
prepared to assist; she expected to gain a lot by using others’ acquaintances. She did 
not even question why the APC or someone else should be interested in helping. Petra 
expected a lot of input from the Local Development Agency, as she had from the 
APC, but did not think in terms of reciprocity. 
 
Paal was reticent about Eva’s advice. He did not agree with her lobbying plan, but in 
her presence did not want to state this out loud. When Eva and Petra left, he said:  
 
I understand that one can gain a lot by using influential networks here, but I am 
not sure that is the way we should proceed. I am not comfortable with her [Eva’s] 
reasoning. If I had good contacts with politicians in Norway, it would not even 
enter my head to ask them to change the legislation for the sake of my business, 
or to ask for influence of other kinds. Serious companies should care for the 
environment and their workers, in the Baltic states too, and our product is 
necessary for them. We have to work so that they choose us, no matter what 
politicians say (Paal Riise, 2006). 
  
But the potential customers in the Baltics failed to see what could be gained from the 
services offered by Nordic Ltd. When the audience repeatedly asked what profit could 
be made by using Nordic Ltd software solutions, Paal gave indirect, evasive answers 
because the software was not conceived as profit oriented:  
You should intensify preparatory activities so that you are ready to fulfill the 
legal requirements when REACH regulations come into force. Detailed guidance 
and specific IT tools are currently being developed to make the transition to the 
new system as easy as possible. Nordic Ltd software solutions can ensure a 
comprehensive flow of information about the risks of substances to industry in 
general and also to consumers. We strongly encourage companies to switch to 
safer alternatives. By doing so they would promote ethical and socially 
responsible business (Paal Riise, 2006). 
The gain was neither tangible, nor profit bearing. The benefit was gained in terms of 
health and the environment, as well as in terms of enterprises in the form of improved 
consumer confidence in chemicals; these benefits were expected to outweigh the 
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increased costs for companies. Nordic Ltd and Safe Use AS were attempting to market 
not only their services and solutions, but also a Norwegian mentality, their 
relationship to the law and sense of responsibility – the Norwegian way of thinking. 
Their perception was that people in the Baltic states, under similar circumstances, 
would act in the same way as Norwegians. Theoretically, circumstances in the Baltics 
were becoming similar: as members of the EU the Baltic states were subordinate to 
the same regulations regarding dangerous waste and chemicals as Sweden and 
Norway, being connected by EU regulations through the EEA agreement. But looking 
at this from the local actors’ perspective, the circumstances were rather different.  
 
Drawback or Advantage? Interpretation of the Law in the Context of 
International Entrepreneurship 
 
The most important finding while carrying out fieldwork at Nordic Ltd concerned the 
insufficiency of interview as a methodological tool in business research. It was clear 
that interviews alone could not provide an especially rich insight into what was going 
on in a company, how its representatives were going about reaching their goals and 
why they failed or succeeded in their strategies. Likewise, using economic methods 
and research strategies that were single-target oriented rather than long-term in-depth 
methods in order to please the business community (Jordan and Lambert 2009), or 
adapting anthropological methods in other ways to get an immediate result in a short 
time (ibid), was simply not going to provide the insights and answers I was searching 
for. It was through participant observation and the access this provided to the multi-
layered “truths” and meanings in which such transactions were embedded that I could 
acquire an understanding of how Nordic Ltd strived to enter the Baltic market and 
why their entrance into the Baltic market failed. The most serious mistakes Nordic Ltd 
made while marketing itself in the Baltics were its excessive reliance on the 
importance of law and on the prestige of the state institution and its failure to 
understand why the APC was willing to cooperate. After all, state institutions in the 
Baltics were not especially prestigious and did not enjoy such trust and high esteem as 
they did in Norway (see chapter 5 for further discussion of this). Baltic businessmen 
turned out to be less law-abiding and more short-term oriented than their Norwegian 
counterparts. The Norwegian company also failed because of their style and 
perception of the local society. By announcing that the situation in the Baltic states 
was similar to that of Norway 30 years ago, they were making a case for themselves 
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as being more advanced. They truly believed that they were in a position to share their 
experiences with the Baltic businesspeople and teach them what was right and how 
things should be done. However, their constant reference to the law brought about 
unpleasant associations with Big Brother, which seemed inappropriate in the Baltics. 
Besides, the price of the product was too high for a country used to low costs. When 
the conference audience heard how much they would have to pay for the software in 
question, their already-limited interest was lost completely. As for assistance from 
local authorities that had been expected areas of networking and (hidden) advertising, 
the expectations of Nordic Ltd fell flat, because the company was not itself oriented 
towards reciprocity. Instead of expressing gratitude with cognac or flowers, at least to 
the APC people for providing networking assistance, which would have been polite in 
the Baltics, the Scandinavians made jokes about them.  
 
When both cases are considered, we can see that Petra was quick to understand the 
particularities of the local business environment, that is to say, the benefits that could 
be gained from good contacts with influential Baltic people. She was, however, 
unable to use this finding to her full advantage because she did not position herself in 
such a way that her partners could understand why it could be useful and profitable to 
cooperate with her. Petra soon realized that the right local surname could help her in 
her business operations far more than her reputation as Norwegian businesswoman. 
She claimed quite emphatically that she was of local kin but even a decent local 
surname is of no help when you ignore the rules of reciprocity. Nordic Ltd expected 
others to do the most important part of the job for them, believing that the LDA and 
the APC would work hard in order to establish partnerships and networks on their 
behalf. What the APC received as reward was arrogance and an inconsiderate attitude: 
Safe Use AS delayed information that made organizing the seminar even more 
difficult, led to late participant registration and resulted in Petra accusing the APC of 
sabotage. 
  
The Norwegians were misunderstood; they talked about legislation too much, 
believing that by exaggerating the role of legislation the marketing process would go 
more smoothly. But as a representative of the Local Development Agency observed, 
“If it works in the law-abiding Scandinavia, it would necessarily fail in the Baltics”. 
This statement highlights the very different perceptions in Norway and the Baltics of 
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the nature of the state (see chapter 6). The role of perception in creating business 
strategy will be discussed further in the following chapters. 
 
The company’s attempts to enter the Baltic markets give us some food for thought 
about the importance or relevance of laws and provisions in international business 
practice. To what extent are they shaping and influencing the ways perception, 
practices and strategies are formed? The following chapters will return to this issue, 
but having given such a detailed description of the case it is necessary to look not only 
at the challenges of data collection but also at the content of the cases, although I will 
come back to these matters in chapter 6. 
 
Norwegians are known as conscientious, law-abiding people, who value the common 
good; they also perceive themselves as such. This can be concluded not only from the 
case outlined here but also from the vast selection of sources available on Norwegian 
society (Archetti 1984; Sørhaug 1984; Gullestad 1992; Hodne 1994 Lien et al. 2001, 
for instance). That Nordic Ltd overstated the significance of law in international 
business and, possibly, the differences in the ways legislation is perceived in the 
Baltics and Norway, are significant reasons why they failed to conquer the Baltic 
markets. The Norwegian company believed that the upcoming REACH legislation 
was its greatest asset – its trump card to play during its advertising campaign in the 
Baltics, because the services they offered were fully in line with the requirements of 
the REACH regulations. To clarify this somewhat, by using their software solutions 
any company could be certain of full compliance with all the requirements of 
REACH. Besides, at that time there were no other companies working in that market 
niche. Even if there was still more than a year to go before REACH legislation would 
need to be implemented, Norwegian companies had already started to prepare for the 
upcoming modifications to the law, that is to say, to consider what these 
modifications would mean to the activities of their businesses and to calculate what 
needed to be altered or adapted so that every single activity would meet the new 
REACH requirements. Therefore, the Norwegians, in promoting their software in the 
Baltic markets, took the legal provision as an undisputed advantage in their 
international business plans. They were unaware that over-emphatic references to the 




In 2006, the Baltic states had been an EU Member state for two years; however, 
Baltic businesspeople were not sure whether they would fall under the scope of 
application of EU law. Once they were certain that the Baltics would have to comply 
with REACH regulations, they started mulling over ways to evade the provisions; 
they began to calculate whether if it would not be cheaper to pay a fine for failure to 
meet the standards rather than invest money to safely meet the new statutory 
requirements in a timely manner. Thus, Baltic entrepreneurs failed to see why they 
would need the services and software of Nordic Ltd – all the more so at such an 
exorbitant cost – because their calculations showed that the fine they would have to 
pay would be much smaller than the software investment to ensure that the REACH 
requirements were met. The repetitive references to the law, and the high cost of a 
product that was not even intended to bring about immediate profit, made the 
entrepreneurs lose any interest in it. The locals saw in the Norwegians the envoys of a 
monitoring institution and were happy to see them leave. They did not want any 
closer interaction with their guests, not least, perhaps, because virtually all would 
have had something to hide either from the work inspectorate or the environment 
agency inspectors. 
 
2.3.The Field as a Site or Fieldwork as Practice? 
Examples have been provided here of the diverse approaches to data gathering used 
during this fieldwork. I have attempted to include in this chapter some analytical 
remarks showing how I reached the conclusion that an interview is an insufficient 
instrument for understanding the ways entrepreneurs act and develop strategies. 
Having carried out participant observation at Nordic Ltd, I carried out similar 
fieldwork in another Norwegian company managed by Krister Hjellum (see chapter 7) 
in the Baltics, which lasted until the end of the research year 2006.  
 
When the year of fieldwork was over I could state with certainty that I had carried out 
a period of valid fieldwork, which I would not have felt I could have said after the 
first four months spent going around industrial parks, reading companies’ yearly 
reports, recording many interviews and occasionally trying to observe workers on the 
factory floor. While working in Nordic Ltd I was truly involved in the everyday 
activities of the company; I was present and obtained answers to my questions – not 
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as shortcuts, through interviews but by carrying out particular duties and sorting out 
all kinds of major and minor problems faced by the Norwegians in the Baltic market. 
 
My fieldwork was both spatial (shorter, multiple visits to industrial parks) and, later, 
more extensive, wherever and whenever I was with Nordic Ltd representatives. I often 
visited different places within a particular scale in the areas of the Baltics in which 
Norwegian production units were located. For logistical reasons, these units were 
located within 100 kilometers of large ports and airports. The scale of my field site 
was determined by the location of the particular company. I returned to transcribe 
interviews and jot down my field notes (and sleep) in an apartment I rented in a 
suburb of the capital. Similar practices can be found in Jordan and Lambert (2009) in 
the description of fieldwork at a Costa Rican factory – after spending a couple of days 
at the factory, Jordan retreated to her own house for the rest of the week.  
 
Intensive work for Nordic Ltd (at that time it did not have its head office yet) at 
various locations gave me an opportunity to participate in different social situations, 
and to closely observe and analyze the problems the company was facing. Thus, the 
starting point for my research was a particular social situation rather than a place. A 
social situation can be characterized as a collection of events that the analyst may 
construe as connected with one another, which take place in a relatively restricted 
time span (Mitchell 2006). Both social situations – the meeting at Ms Zhukova’s 
company and the seminar organized by the APC – were not just happening in a 
physical sense, that is, in the office of Zhukova’s vice-director and in the conference 
room. The events that led to the meeting and to the APC seminar, and the encounters 
that actually took place, as well as the reactions triggered by the meeting and the 
seminar, were part and parcel of the said social situations. Each of those situations, in 
which I observed and participated, had a prehistory and a future. By so defining a 
social situation and by taking it as a starting point in a similar manner to Gluckman 
(1958) and Mitchell (2006), I was free of concerns about the extent to which the 
methods of anthropological fieldwork could be applied and implemented in the 
contemporary modern and global reality where bounded locations have ceased to 
exist. Even being in a bounded location, that is, in the sense of a confined area, in one 
place, the analysis of the given situation led me to other places and other events. The 
situation starts before you get into it, the parties involved bring their own experiences, 
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notions and sense of responsibility, their own social and cultural backgrounds, pasts, 
intentions, interests and future objectives. By exploring all these complex phenomena, 
a situational analysis links the micro and macro levels, as well as the local, “glocal” 
and global levels. In a similar way, Gluckman (1958)27 demonstrates how 
understanding is achieved through a situational analysis: even an apparently bounded 
field can give as deep an insight into macro structures and large-scale processes as 
situational analysis can in shifting locations. Gluckman states that social situations 
constitute a large part of the raw material for an anthropologist – that is, the events 
observed. From these events and their interrelationship in a particular society he 
deducted the abstract social structure, relationships and institutions of that society 
(Gluckman 1958:2). 
 
Let us look at one event at a physically “bounded location” – meeting Ms Zhukova’s 
vice director – and apply situational analysis to it. This event brings us far beyond the 
physical borders of the situation. It provides an insight into Norwegian and Slavic 
business cultures and their notions of how to do business and with whom to 
cooperate. It reveals attitudes towards legislation, the state, environmental protection 
and safety at work for employees. It also points to the growing influence of the EU on 
the new member states (the Baltics became a member states in 2004) and to the 
efforts to harmonize legislation within the EU (to replace the existing 40 pieces of 
legislation by a single framework for chemicals). The situation reveals what 
Norwegians and Baltic residents think about the processes in the EU structures, and 
also about the systems that are in place to monitor and record operations involving 
hazardous waste by 2008 and thereafter. It also reveals something of the attitude of 
the Russians residing in the Baltics vis-à-vis local national languages and the State, 
and the importance and strength of local networks. Each of these ‘leads’ can be 
untangled further and exposed in the light of new events that are related to a given 
situation. By unraveling the situation step by step, we get an analytical picture in 
which micro and macro levels are simultaneously represented, which allows us to 
understand both the mysterious business meeting and the processes in which 
                                                 
27 A textbook example of a social situation used as an analytical tool is Gluckman’s “Analysis of a 
Social Situation in Modern Zululand” 1935 (1958). The article deals with the events surrounding the 
ceremonial opening of the first bridge in Zululand, built under the new schemes for local development. 
In the analysis of social situations, some restricted sets of events are analyzed to show how general 
principles of social organization emerge in a particular context. 
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entrepreneurial strategies are developed. Situation analysis allows us to trace threads 
of influence in different directions, thus reflecting both micro and macro dynamics 
and the “glocaliness” of the specific situation.  
 
As stated earlier, there is a tendency in contemporary research in the field to 
encourage an anthropology that is focused on “shifting locations” rather than 
“bounded fields”. Gupta and Ferguson (1997) indicate that anthropology appears 
determined to give up its old ideas of territorially fixed communities and stable 
localized cultures, to understand an interconnected world in which people, objects, 
and ideas are rapidly shifting and refusing to stay in one place (Gupta and Ferguson 
1997:4). Lien and Melhuus (2007) suggest that the twentieth-century assumption in 
social anthropology that social and cultural life could (and should) be studied in one 
place at a time, which implies a proliferation of firmly localized ethnographic 
accounts documenting almost infinite cultural variation within the human species, has 
changed. Thus, endeavors to decentralize the field as a natural practice of dwelling 
have more recently become commonplace (Clifford 1997, Gupta and Ferguson 1997, 
Tsing 2005, Lien and Melhuus 2007). For example, most contributors in Lien and 
Melhuus (2007) deliberately decenter the notion of the field as a locally bounded unit. 
Their volume reflects a shared effort to revitalize the ethnographic method in order to 
grasp global, transnational processes. 
 
In my view, in discussions about how appropriate it is to carry out traditional 
fieldwork while researching modern realities, too much attention is given to 
discussions of “travelling” and “leaving home”, of going to “another place”; this pays 
insufficient attention to the tool of participant observation, which constitutes a 
foundation of anthropological method. When the suitability of fieldwork to modern 
realities is discussed, why should one focus on “travelling from home” and on the 
field site rather than on participant observation? Is it because of the “tyranny of the 
moment” (Eriksen 2001b) that anthropologists are willing to work quickly? This 
indirectly tallies with arguments about the weaknesses of the methods of traditional 
anthropology when applied to research in the field of international business 
transactions that take place in large-scale society.  
 
To whatever extent anthropological topics and field sites may change, whether they 
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are in bounded or shifting locations, at home or far away, it is possible and indeed 
crucial to use participant observation as a basic anthropological method in our 
changing world – including in the corporate environment. Interviews can give hints 
and suggestions, but not a deep understanding about the essence of practice. In 
practice, the person reveals him/herself far more than during an interview. It might be 
misleading to base conclusions solely on the answers received during interviews, for 
what people do and what they say they do may be rather different (Holy and Stuchlik 
1983). When I asked managers of Norwegian industries about the challenges they 
faced when entering the Baltic market, they typically responded, “It went quite well. I 
cannot remember any particular challenges, except for some problems with local 
bureaucracy.” While I was working for Nordic Ltd, I was able to observe the 
difficulties the Norwegian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Russian entrepreneurs faced on a 
daily basis when they tried to reach a common understanding on how to do business. 
These were not minor problems, quite the contrary – they usually prevented deals – 
but the entrepreneurs themselves do not reflect upon this in the way an anthropologist 
would like them to. 
 
According to Passaro (1997:148), the delineation of a culture area presupposes the 
specific kind of Otherness to be found there; a similar idea is discussed by Gupta and 
Ferguson (1997) and Clifford (1997). However, statements about the quest for 
otherness in the field sites can also seem exaggerated. In my fieldwork I was not 
seeking to find otherness, but to comprehend the growing tendency since the year 
2000 to transfer business from Scandinavia to the Baltic states. I wanted to see 
through the eyes of the anthropologist this practical business world, which for me, 
until then, had been an unknown sphere. Similarly, it is not the search for otherness 
that is the goal in the ethnographies of Lien and Melhuus (2007) and Tsing (2005). 
Putting a sufficient distance between the researcher and the research object, which 
from time to time has been the precondition for successful fieldwork, should not be 
equated to a quest for otherness. Even when the ethnographer is positioned as an 
insider, a “native” or “indigenous” anthropologist in his or her community, some 
distance taking and translation of differences (not in the sense of a quest for or 
construction of Otherness) will be a part of the research, analysis and writing. No one 
can be an insider to all sectors of a community, after all, as indicated in the research 




It is not (and it should not be) the distance, duration of travel or the seeming otherness 
of the research objects that determine the compliance of the fieldwork site to 
traditional standards. In tracking anthropology’s changing relation to travels to more 
distant or nearer places, it is useful to think of the “field” as a practice rather than a 
place. Thinking of the field as practice allows us to apply the traditional 
anthropological method in untraditional field sites (like factories and among business 
actors and in continuously changing surroundings); it allows us not to be bounded in 
one place, but in several places (such as being with company representatives, 
wherever it may be). 
 
Similarly, it is not distance that determines how an anthropologist will typically enter 
the field – the scene described in most traditional anthropological monographs. 
Instead, we can focus on entering the field as a process and a practice, not as a site. 
Fieldwork may start (as in my own case) before going to the physical field location, 
and this implies communication and interaction with people rather than entering a 
physical site. In recent discussions about anthropological methods there has been too 
much focus on the field as a site instead of fieldwork as practice. The focus should 
rather be on anthropological fieldwork as participant observation, which means a 
particularly “deep, extended and interactive research encounter” (Clifford 1997:187).   
 
2.4.“Glocal” Situations in “Glocal” Field Sites 
One of the basic arguments advanced by anthropologists when discussing the need to 
make traditional fieldwork methods (within the scope of “Malinowskian” standards) 
more flexible, is that of globalization and its related flux and fluidity processes 
(Eriksen 2007:1f). It is said that one cannot grasp globally ongoing dynamics if 
staying in a bounded field site. But is this really the case?  
 
 Lien and Melhuus suggest that it is precisely the lack of empirically grounded 
research, with detailed descriptions and careful contextualization of the social 
phenomena under study, that makes much of the social science literature on 
globalization appear shallow and over determined (Lien and Melhuus 2007:xi). They 
point out that the term globalization becomes a fetishized entity in itself, multi-
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referential and increasingly disconnected from the empirical reality it purports to 
describe. Referring to Eriksen (2003:5), Lien and Melhuus note that statements about 
fluidity and flux may be accurate at a macro level, but tend to be less relevant at the 
level of experience. Thus, the transformative potential of global process cannot be 
assumed, but needs to be discovered repeatedly (2007:xi). 
 
The followers of the Manchester School also write about the inadequacies inherent in 
the reflection of practice in anthropology and express their concern that practice is 
reduced to narrative, and ritual practice is reduced to the said of a story (Evens and 
Handelman 2006a:7), but “the saying always exceeds the said, however coherent, 
meaningful, and efficacious the later, and practice is primarily in the saying” (ibid.). 
According to Evens and Handelman, more effort is expended on theorizing practice as 
an end in itself than on the practice of practice in doing ethnography (Evens and 
Handelman 2006a:6). The theorizing of theory and the theorizing of practice have 
taken up an increasing amount of space in anthropology at the expense of the kind of 
detailed ethnographies that enabled the fruitful formulations of situational analyses 
and extended cases (ibid.). Ironically, and simultaneous with a growing concern about 
insufficiency in the reflection of ethnographical practice, there are discussions on 
adapting fieldwork to the expressions of globalization, for example, in replacing long-
term fieldwork in a bounded location by short-term, de-centered field periods, 
repeated visits and interviews, the use of the internet, cybernetics, reports, and 
analyses by mass media.  
 
While emphasizing that anthropologists are especially well equipped to research 
global processes, Lien and Melhuus suggest that in order to extend the benefits of the 
anthropological approach (open-ended and inductive, insisting on the “natives’” point 
of view and a socially embedded understanding of social life) to studies of how 
people deal with transnational flows, mobilities and shifting scales, “we need to let go 
of the anthropological truism that the field is synonymous with a local, bounded unit” 
(Melhuus and Lien 2007: xi). The notion of multi-sited ethnography is suggested, 
then, as a way of escaping the bounded nature or boundedness of the traditional 
notion of the field, embracing instead a mapping of complex spaces into which 
fieldwork literally moves. Even if this suggestion were in line with my own 
understanding about the research of events and situations by means of participant 
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observation, I would still not want to underestimate the potential of traditional 
fieldwork in the so-called bounded location. The boundedness to which, for instance, 
Lien and Melhuus point can be “opened-up” by means of a thorough analysis of the 
situation. Besides, is it not that case that the boundedness of traditional fieldwork is 
exaggerated?  
 
There is a certain irony in the fact that the ethnography most often mentioned as the 
benchmark of anthropology as the synchronous study of small-scale, isolated village-
based society (that is, the opposite of the study of transnational connections), offers a 
key to an approach to globalization (Eriksen 2007:5). Eriksen refers to Malinowski’s 
Argonauts here and indicates that the Trobriands (who became incarnate of the model 
of the primitive society) have turned out to be just one of the so-called primitive 
“bounded” societies where commerce played a major role. Kula trade turns out to be 
even more encompassing than initially believed (in Malinowski’s account), stretching 
not only across the Coral Sea, but far into the highlands of New Guinea (Amselle 
2000, in Eriksen 2007:5). 
 
Gluckman’s fieldwork (widely perceived as eminently traditional) in Northern 
Zululand from 1936 to 1938 was not carried out in only one place but in a dispersed 
manner, sometimes within a range of 13 to 22 or more miles when particular events 
needed to be inspected (like the opening of the bridge in Nongoma). Gluckman lived 
13 miles from Nongoma in the Deputy Chief’s homestead and, moving from one 
place to another, observed different situations and events. In virtually every situation 
he discovered so many inter-relationships with other events and situations that it was 
difficult to perceive them as bounded. Could we call Gluckman’s fieldwork multi-
sited, given that it contained a thorough description of several events that were linked 
by Gluckman’s “presence as an observer but which occurred in different parts of 
Northern Zululand and involved different groups of people” (Gluckman 1958: 8)? 
Even though the concept of multi-sitedness had not yet been described at the time, the 




The implications and advantages of Gluckman’s well-grounded situational analyses 
and the extended case method28 are manifold, extending to matters of ethnographic 
observation and analysis, to situational flow between the local and the global, to the 
ontological nature of social life, to reflexive and activist anthropology, and more 
(Evens and Handelman 2006a:8). Gluckman’s approach implies that the complex 
events he refers to as “social situations”, within which the actions of the individuals 
and groups involved take place, are seen as a reflection of the complexity of social 
structure (Kempny 2006:193). Gluckman’s situational analysis is a useful tool to 
show how macro processes are reflected in individual actions (ibid.). The extended 
case and situational analysis have from their beginning been cognate with complexity 
in social ordering, with the non-linearity of open-ended social fields, and with 
recursivity among levels of social ordering (Evens and Handelman 2006b:223). Evens 
(2006:59f) explains that situational analysis means to produce a scientific picture of 
social life but to do so by showing this life as it is lived. It confronts us with the social 
dynamic itself, that consummate aspect of social reality, which ultimately cannot be 
captured by ‘the said’, at least not with the terminological fixity of logical logic and 
rational language.  
 
Thus, the situation analysis proposed by the Manchester School turns out to be a 
useful contemporary methodology: by using participant observation in one location, 
we may perceive and reflect both local (in fact glocal) life in its ethnographic present 
and the fluidity and flux of the contemporary world, regardless of the fact that such 
anthropological presentism and localism have been criticized for being of limited 
value as a basis from which to pursue an understanding of global processes and 
transnational flows (e.g., Gupta and Ferguson 1997). The followers of the Manchester 
School seem to have been years ahead of their time in formulating a methodological 
and theoretical question of crucial importance to anthropology today. 
 
                                                 
28 I limit myself to situational analysis here, although the extended case method be an even better way 
to show the manifestation of macro anthropology grounded in practice (Evens and Handelman 
2006a:6). Gluckman drew an important distinction among what he called “apt illustrations”, “social 
situations”, and “extended case studies”. The distinction between the first two is one of the degree of 
complexity of the events described. The distinction between social situations and extended cases is 
partly one of even more complexity, but it is also one of the duration of time spanning the events 




A more up-to-date example of how to carry out fieldwork in the global age is 
presented by Tsing in her ethnography on the destruction of rainforest in Indonesia 
where, in the 1980s and 1990s, capitalists’ interests reshaped the landscape through 
legal and illegal entrepreneurship. Her work Friction is a useful example of how 
analysis of the local can be “located inside the world of globalization’s struggles and 
passions” (Tsing 2005:270). 
 
Tsing focuses on zones of potentially productive cultural friction that arise from 
encounters and interactions between agents with dissimilar expectations, motivations, 
aspirations and interests. They reappear in new places with changing events (Tsing 
2005). The only ways she can conceive of by which to study them consist of the 
“patchwork” and the “haphazard” (Tsing2005: xi). Tsing admits that the result of such 
research may not be traditional ethnography, but she shows that it can be deeply 
ethnographic in the sense of drawing from the learning experiences of the 
ethnographer. Tsing self-critically admits: 
 
my project stretches and changes the practice of ethnography. As I reach to 
describe global connections, my ethnography necessarily diverges from the 
holism of a more familiar model, in which each anecdote or custom forms a scrap 
in a large, unified pattern (Tsing 2005: 271).  
 
She uses ethnographic fragments to interrupt stories of national histories, and by using 
these fragments she asks us to pay attention to details. Through fragments presented 
in depth she manages to give the reader a more nuanced understanding of global 
connections. Following global connections out of Kalimantan, she finds herself 
exploring other sites, including powerful centers of finance, science and policy (ibid.).  
 
Her method of “patchwork” and “haphazard” studies resemble the above-mentioned 
types of fieldwork that are decentered, multi-local and made up of repeated shorter 
visits. But no matter how “patchwork” and “haphazard” the field study may be, she 
demonstrates the essential importance and irreplaceability of participant observation 
in fieldwork. She depicts the process of her ethnographic learning in the Meratus 
Mountains. She describes how she discovered that even the forest landscape is social. 
Originally she entered the Meratus forest “with the eyes of the naturalist” (Tsing 
2005: xi), admiring the diversity of species and forest views from many mountain 
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ridges. Only by carrying out participant observation, namely, by walking and working 
with Meratus Dayaks, did she learn to see the forest differently. What the forest 
Dayaks showed her was a terrain of personal biography and community history. 
Individuals and households tracked their histories in the forests:  
 
house posts resprouted into trees; forest trees growing back from old swiddens; 
fruits and rattans were planted in the growing forest … People read the landscape 
for its social as well as its natural stories” (ibid.). 
 
Without participant observation approach such revelations, most probably, would not 
be possible. No interview would lead to such revelations. I will take the liberty of 
drawing an analogy with my own field experience. To me, the business environment 
was like an unexplored forest, but by participating in it with the eyes of the 
ethnographer I discovered it as social. Business is all about human interaction, 
perception and communication; indeed, the business landscape is first and foremost 
social in nature. 
 
One of Tsing’s basic ideas is that anthropological fieldwork (perhaps not quite in its 
traditional sense but definitely in the sense of participant observation in “patchwork” 
form) can reflect global connections. Global connections are everywhere – capitalism, 
science and politics all depend on them (Tsing 2005:1). In this sense, there are no 
bounded localities: every locality and situation is glocal – a part of the global. 
 
2.5.Conclusion: The Essence of Fieldwork and its Practical 
Application 
In the discussion presented here of (traditional) fieldwork as a basic anthropological 
tool used to analyze international business and glocality, this chapter has become 
much more comprehensive than initially intended.  
 
When I started my fieldwork in 2005 I was concerned with whether traditional 
fieldwork as the basic anthropological method would be appropriate for my 
transnational and non-traditional research object, namely, Norwegian 
entrepreneurship in the Baltics. But after reading Sherry (1995), Gupta and Ferguson 
(1997), Clifford (1997) and Passaro (1997) during the fieldwork, and Gluckman 
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(1958), Tsing (2005), Evens (2006), Evens and Handelman (2006a, 2006b), Kempny 
(2006), Mitchell (2006), Norman (2006) and Lien and Melhuus (2007) while writing 
this chapter, I realized that such thoughts and even a reconstruction of the fieldwork 
tradition is already well underway in anthropological practice. All these 
anthropologists have discussed anthropological approaches to the field as a locally 
defined unit, as representing a project of scale making and delineation of a field. They 
have also been concerned with how such arbitrariness of scale and location (Lien and 
Melhuus 2007), especially in a transnational, global age, can be translated into an 
ethnographic method. A common conclusion throughout their work (albeit with 
individual nuances) is that we need to de-center the notion of the “field” as a locally 
bounded unit, exploring instead the field as a “network of localities”, that is inherently 
multi-local or even trans-local (Hannerz 2003, in Melhuus and Lien 2007: xii).  
 
Testing this assumption of the inadequacy of traditional fieldwork to modern reality 
contra my field experience gave me the opportunity to understand more fully the 
above-mentioned indications, as well as the means to question them. Visiting 
Norwegian industrial units in the Baltics and working at Nordic Ltd reflected different 
ways of “circumscribing a field” (Norman 2006: 229) and forming a unit of analysis. 
The ethnography in both cases concerned similar issues, but the method and approach 
used (interviews and repeated shorter visits contra participating observation) provided 
very different insights. It took me four months to learn by experience that open-ended 
interviews and short repeated visits are not enough to understand the phenomena in 
question. I am thankful, therefore, for having received permission to extend my 
fieldwork in order to change the method fundamentally and thus come to a solid 
conviction about the signification of traditional fieldwork (in the sense of 
participating observation) in the work of the anthropologist in the global, 
transnational, contemporary large-scale world.  
 
Mere questions cannot provide answers that mirror practice, for “saying always 
exceeds the said” (Evens and Handelman 2006a:7). Although my colleague 
economists felt that 54 qualitative unstructured in-depth interviews were more than 
enough for a PhD project, it was not enough for a truly anthropological approach. 
Instead of trying to take shortcuts by asking questions of my informants, I tried to 
participate and observe the practice in order to find the answers myself. Such 
87 
 
observation is possible not only in ‘tent-in-the-village’ settings but also in 
transnational everyday business life, if one finds a way to participate in it.  
 
As Norman observes (2006:228), the experiences of fieldwork open up an awareness 
of the uncertainties inherent in social life and the contradictions inherent in being a 
social person. This process of coming to know through experience requires time; 
therefore, some months might not be enough to carry out fieldwork in so-called 
traditional communities or in those employing modern technologies. When fieldwork 
is brief or unfocused, the complexity of uncertainty may well slip from analytical 
view (ibid.). Trust is the keyword in informant and researcher relationships and it 
takes time to gain and consolidate trust. The ethnographic emphasis on time and trust 
as key elements in the study of social life ensures a validity that is difficult to achieve 
through other methods (Lien and Melhuus 2007: xi). 
 
As to arbitrariness of scale and bounded location, situational analysis is proposed here 
as an analytic tool to be used to avoid such issues. By calling to mind the situational 
analysis established by Gluckman and the Manchester School, I would like to remind 
readers that it is a useful tool: by studying severe events and situations, and by 
showing relations in-between as well as in a glocal context, it thus reveals the 
particular situation from both the micro and macro levels. 
 
This is not to suggest that there is something inherently wrong in the alternative 
approach proposed by most of the above-mentioned anthropologists, namely, as a 
means of following connections, associations and putative relationships in the multi-
sited field. In today’s flux and flow realities this is not only understandable but also 
necessary (as long as we hold on to participant observation). Still, even working under 
contemporary conditions, we have to know how to outline research borders. However 
much we would like to follow connections and putative relations, we would not be 
able to physically trace the Kula trade, which stretches not only across the Coral Sea, 
but also far into the highlands of New Guinea. 
 
Clifford (1997:215) asks, what, if anything, is left of the injunction to travel, to get 
out of the house, to “enter the field”, to dwell, to interact intensively in a (relatively) 
unfamiliar context. I would say much is left, if we do not equate fieldwork to mere 
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traveling to some place, but to the practice of participant observation. My fieldwork 
experience, Tsing’s (2005) monograph and the ethnographies collected by Lien and 
Melhuus (2007) brilliantly demonstrate qualitative fieldwork practice in our changing 
and transnational world, comprising both traveling and participant observation.  
 
The fact that the anthropologist studies his/her own communities in addition to 
mountain villages at the other end of the world does not mean that participant 
observation has been lessened or challenged. Participant observation should be the 
essence of fieldwork, not traveling and being located in an exotic place. Therefore, the 
present thesis justifies the field as practice (not site), and the site as work (not place), 
and proposes the viewing of fieldwork not as a “spatial practice of intensive dwelling” 
(Clifford 1997:190), but as intensive participant observation. This approach allows 
traditional anthropological fieldwork to be carried out smoothly in both international 
and glocal business environments. 
 
 I will not yet confirm the views of Cefkin (2009), Brun-Cottan (2009) and Jordan and 
Lambert (2009) (see chapter 1), according to whose work a change in anthropological 
territory and environment inevitably leads to the need to change and adapt traditional 
anthropology methods to the particular circumstances of the new area of research, in 
this case, research into the business environment. My own research chimes with that 
of these scholars in that the work of a business anthropologist is bound to be different 
from that carried out in an academic environment: that is, an anthropologist will face 
many challenges and problems in businesses, and there would be differences not only 
in the positioning of the researcher in relation to the research but also in the 
conditions, topic of study, circumstances, objectives, their volatility and dynamics, the 
work environment, the availability of information, time management and other limits 
as set by the commissioner and sponsor of the project. All such factors would be 
different – and all these factors make research more difficult and have an impact on 
both the study and its final results. But has not adapting to the work environment 
always been part and parcel of any fieldwork? An anthropologist who works in the 
business environment, just like an anthropologist who researches the social 
organization of the Baktamans, or conflicts in Yanomamo society, has to be alert all 
the time, able to adapt, to accept changes and, if need be, restructure the study 
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because, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, referring to Ray (2006), the 
anthropologist’s work is not outcome-oriented, it is oriented towards the dynamic 
steps through which particular outcomes may or may not be reached and through 





Conceptualizing the Embeddedness of Economic Actions 
 
The case of Nordic Ltd in the previous chapter was described with the purpose of 
highlighting methodological aspects of research into international business. However, 
when describing and explicating a research method we unavoidably immerse 
ourselves not only in the empirical part of the research but also, indirectly, in the 
theoretical principles concerning the social character of economic activity.  
 
Thus, in the preceding chapter, we have already encountered (albeit obliquely) part of 
Lienhardt’s notion (1985) of “rabbit-size” theory,29 and a fuller picture of the 
theoretical framework of this study will be provided in the present chapter. The first 
section will review the umbrella concept through the frame and shelter of which to 
examine aspects of Norwegian entrepreneurship in the Baltics, namely, the notion of 
embeddedness – its origin, substance and significance for the philosophy of science 
and for social sciences in general, and for anthropology in particular.  
 
The second section of this chapter and the start of chapter 4 will examine how it is 
possible to see and “feel” the embeddedness of business activity in social institutions, 
both as it is dealt with by other researchers and as I intend to deal with it here. Besides 
analyzing the use of social networks in entrepreneurial activities, this work will show 
that entrepreneurs’ practices are embedded in the deepest strata of the values and 
experiences that shape us as human beings. 
 
 “The social world is present in its entirety in every ‘economic’ action”, according to 
Bourdieu (2005:3). The originator of such a socio-cultural approach to economics was 
Polanyi (1957) who, by introducing the term and the concept of embeddedness, 
emphasized the way economies are embedded in society and culture. But while 
Polanyi argued that all non-market economies are embedded in social and kinship 
relations and institutions, he tended to see the market economy as disembedded.  
 
                                                 
29 Godfrey Lienhardt (1985) noted that a good monograph in anthropology should be like a stew 
containing elephant-size empiricism and rabbit-size theory, but that it should be cooked in such a way 
that the taste of rabbit could be discerned in each mouthful.  
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That economic behavior is heavily embedded in social relations in premarket 
societies, and that it has become more autonomous with modernization, is depicted by 
Granovetter (1985) as a common view among social scientists. This view sees the 
economy as an increasingly separate, differentiated sphere in contemporary society, 
with economic transactions no longer defined by social or kinship obligations, but by 
rational calculations of individual gain (Garsten and de Montoya 2004). 
  
Although the concept of embeddedness is not uncommon in the social sciences, 
finding a definition can prove problematic. The lexical meaning of the word suggests 
how the concept might be used in the social sciences, but such a stochastic approach 
would be less than satisfactory here. The concept of embeddedness joins a handful of 
other social science concepts, such as social capital and identity, whose rapid 
proliferation across fields has outstripped analysts’ abilities to keep track of 
increasingly polyvalent meanings (Krippner and Alvarez 2007:2). According to 
Krippner and Alvarez (ibid.), embeddedness may be the most dramatic example of 
this phenomenon. What does the concept of embeddedness mean, however? It is a 
recognizable term, but would we consider it to be one of the key notions of the social 
sciences? Or, rather, is it a marginal term from a specific scientific field?  
 
Dictionaries of anthropology, sociology, economy and philosophy, such as those 
written by Barfield (1999), Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1994), Black (2003) and 
Honderich (2005), do not contain the term embeddedness. Neither does the dictionary 
of English (Hornby 1992), nor the literature on cross-cultural management (Holden 
2002; Schneider and Barsoux 2003; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1998). I did 
not find explicit use of the term embeddedness when browsing through diverse 
theoretical books in anthropology (Eriksen 2001; Barnard 2006; Ensminger 2002) or 
writings on emerging economies (Cavusgil, Ghauri and Agarwal 2002; Cohen and 
Dannhaeuser 2002).  
  
A deeper search of the literature on economic sociology revealed that embeddedness 
over the last fifteen years has served as the crucial counter-concept used by economic 
sociologists to mark a distinctive approach to the understanding of economic 
processes (Granovetter 1985; Lie 1991; Krippner 2001; Beckert 2003; Krippner et al. 
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2004; Krippner and Alvarez 2007). The definition offered by sociologist Beckert is as 
follows:  
 
Embeddedness refers to the social, cultural, political, and cognitive structuration 
of decisions in economic contexts. It points to the indissoluble connection of the 
actor with his or her social surrounding (Beckert 2003:769).  
 
Polanyi, who at various times and in various contexts is referred to as a historian, 
economist, anthropologist, economic anthropologist and economic historian, first 
invoked the term in his writings completed in the middle of the last century (The 
Great Transformation, 1944). Polanyi is remembered today as the originator of 
substantivism, a cultural approach to economics, which emphasized the way pre-
market economies are embedded in society and culture. Polanyi’s central thesis was 
that while previous economic arrangements were “embedded” in social relations, in 
capitalism, the situation was reversed – social relations were defined by economic 
relations. In Polanyi’s view, in the sweep of human history, the rules of reciprocity, 
redistribution and communal obligations occurred more frequently than market 
relations, but capitalism destroyed them irreversibly. The “great transformation” of 
the industrial revolution changed all modes of interaction. While Polanyi argues that 
all economies are embedded and enmeshed in social relations and institutions, he 
tended to see the market economy as disembedded. 
 
Polanyi’s division in separating the formal and substantive meanings of economy 
echoes the evolutionist thoughts of Maine and Tonnies. In the nature of things, the 
development from embedded to disembedded economies is a matter of degree, and 
the distinction between the two is fundamental to the understanding of modern society 
(Polanyi 1968b), thus bringing out dimensions of economic change, development or 
transformation.  
 
It was not until Granovetter’s (1985) work that the term embeddedness took so firm 
root, that it initiated what amounted to a minor revolution in economic sociology. As 
Swedberg notes, “If one ... were to choose one single year as the birth date for New 
Economic Sociology, it would be 1985, since this was the year ... when an article30 
                                                 
30 This of course refers to M. Granovetter’s (1985) article.  
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appeared that was soon to become the most popular article of all contemporary 
economic sociology” (in Krippner 2001:775). 
 
Conversely, in the indexes of anthropology theory books, the term embeddedness is 
rarely present, although conceptualization of the economic and the social is the core 
of economic anthropology. A question arises, then, about whether the notion of 
embeddedness is so embedded in anthropological thought that it does not require 
explicit conceptualization and terminology? If so, how do anthropologists 
conceptualize the relationship between the socio-cultural and the economic? 
 
Thus, the aim of this chapter is to trace the origins of both the concept and the term 
embeddedness and to discuss their use in the social sciences from Ancient Greek 
times to the present day. By differentiating the concept from the term, the chapter 
focuses on their respective origins, meaning, use and the critical discussions related to 
them in both social sciences and philosophy. Although in defining embeddedness it 
might seem artificial to separate the concept from the term, I chose to do so to reflect 
on the origins of the term, which are more recent than the concept of embeddedness, 
which can be traced as far back as Ancient Greek philosophy and which touches upon 
fundamental philosophical issues relating to human nature. 
 
By concept, I mean a traditional linguistic meaning of concept, namely, the semantic 
content of a linguistic sign, based on de Saussure’s sign model.31 By term I mean a 
word or compound words generally used in specific scientific contexts, in the sense of 
terminology. 
 
Embeddedness is associated mostly with the substantivist school in anthropology, and 
is especially identified with the work of Karl Polanyi; with critics of neoclassical 
economy; with Granovetter’s economic sociology; and with the idea of the moral 
economy. It has also some obvious relation to Marxist thought and to fundamental 
philosophical questions of human nature.  
 
                                                 
31 A sign – for instance, a word – gets its meaning only in relation to or in contrast with other signs in a 
system of signs. 
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3.1.Embeddedness at the Crossroads of the Substantivist–Formalist 
Debate  
 
The need to examine all areas of human activity as a whole has long been stressed by 
anthropologists; in fact, it has been an important aim from the outset of modern 
anthropology, namely, from Malinowski onwards, who declared: 
 
 An ethnographer who sets out to study only religion, or only technology, or only 
social organization cuts out an artificial field for inquiry, and he will be seriously 
handicapped in his work (Malinowski 1984:11).  
 
He describes the preconditions for carrying out fieldwork so that the society in 
question is fully understood, and emphasizes the interaction and indivisibility of areas 
of social life, including the economy. In Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922), a 
cornerstone of anthropological thought, Malinowski demonstrates how the laws of 
supply and demand in exchange among Trobriands were modified by social 
relationships. He showed the interrelation between social and economic relations as 
inseparable in the Kula and in the Trobriand chieftainship. Indeed, he reflected upon 
the embeddedness of economic practices in social relations, although without using 
the term itself. 
 
The fact that social and economic lives are inseparable is reflected in subsequent 
developments of anthropology, in particular, in the branch of economic anthropology 
– the most salient expression of which initially was the so-called formalist–
substantivist debate. Rumblings of this debate can already be heard in Malinowski’s 
(1922) critique of Western economics in his studies of the economy of the Trobriand 
Islands. The ongoing debate about whether Western economic tools can be used for 
the study of ‘primitive’ economies lasted until the 1960s. Economic anthropologists 
argued with economists because the former saw the latter as ethnocentric and narrow 
minded, as ignorant of the importance of culture in shaping economic behavior (Wilk 
and Cligget 2007). Thus, economists and economic anthropologists engaged in 





Scholars in the field of social sciences agree that Polanyi opened this debate – either 
deliberately or accidentally. In “The Economy as Instituted Process” (Polanyi 1968b: 
139) he defined two meanings of the term ‘economic’: formal – meaning rational 
decision making, which refers to formal economics; and substantive – meaning the 
material act of making a living, which refers to its interchange with man’s natural and 
social environment, insofar as this results in supplying him/her with the means of 
material want-satisfaction (ibid.). Polanyi states that the two root meanings of 
‘economic’ have nothing in common: “the laws of the one are those of the mind; the 
laws of the other are those of nature” (Polanyi 1968b:140). According to Polanyi, 
only in the historical development of the modern Western world have the two come to 
have the same meaning, for only in modern capitalism has the economic (substantive) 
system fused with rational economic (formal) logic to maximize individual self-
interest. Only capitalism institutionalizes formal principles through the medium of the 
marketplace and the flow of money (Wilk and Cligget 2007). But studying societies, 
social scientists are faced with a great variety of institutions other than markets, in 
which livelihoods are embedded (Polanyi 1968b). Polanyi’s proposition is that only 
the substantive meaning of economic is capable of yielding the concepts required by 
the social sciences for an investigation of all the empirical economies of the past and 
present. Such economies cannot be approached with analytical methods derived from 
a form of economy that is dependent upon the presence of specific market elements. 
The human economy, he observes, “is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, 
economic and non-economic” (Polanyi 1968b:148). Significantly, he added, 
 
the inclusion of the non-economic is vital. For religion or government may be as 
important for the structure and functioning of the economy as monetary 
institutions or the availability of tools and machines themselves that lighten the 
tool of labor (ibid.).  
 
According to Polanyi, in modern capitalism the economy is embedded in the 
institution of the marketplace. But in the economic systems of other cultures the 
economy is embedded in other social institutions and operates on different principles 
from the market. In some cultures the economy may be part of kinship relations, 
whereas in other places religious institutions may organize the economy (Wilk and 
Cligget 2007). Polanyi observes that economies that are not built around market 
principles, are not focused on the logic of individual choice, which is the basis of 
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modern Western economic science. To study these other societies we need other 
principles, he states, and these will depend on how the substantive economy of 
making a living is organized in each place; in contrast, the modern market economy, 
in which all things are disembedded from their social conditions of production, is best 
understood through formal economics (Gudeman 2001). Polanyi concludes that 
economics should therefore seek to find out how the economy is embedded in the 
matrix of different societies. He remains one of the most cogent critics of neoclassical 
economics (Lie 1991). 
 
Formalists, in their turn, turned their attention towards universal economic behavior, 
focusing on decision making and choice. They set out to demonstrate that classic tools 
of economics could be useful in a series of case studies and that they could be applied 
to noncapitalist economies. They wanted to demystify non-Western economic 
behavior, to show that people are rational. Formalists preached that there was reason 
and rationality behind a lot of behavior that seemed strange to outsiders; you just had 
to understand more about the environment people lived in so that you could see what 
their resources and constraints were. At that point their behavior could be viewed as 
logical and understandable, even by the strict rules of Western economics. Wilk and 
Cligget point out that the problem was not with Western economic science but with 
economists’ ignorance about the real circumstances that framed people’s lives (Wilk 
and Cligget 2007:11). 
 
After mutual counterattacks, the debate gradually fizzled out without a convincing 
winner or mutual understanding because, as Wilk and Cligget state, the parties were 
for the most part arguing past each other, avoiding the fundamental issues. The 
strongest formalist proposition was that the economic rationality of the maximizing 
individual was to be found in all societies, in all kinds of behavior. The strongest 
substantivist position, represented chiefly by Polanyi, was that the economy is a type 
of human activity, embedded in different social institutions in different kinds of 





3.2.The Duality of Human Nature  
 
An analogy can be drawn between these issues of formalist and substantivist debates 
and those that run deeply in the Western philosophical tradition from the time of the 
Enlightenment. Wilk and Cligget (2007) remind us that economics began in Europe as 
the study of moral philosophy. The fundamental questions here concerned the origins 
of selfishness and altruism (for example, are humans self-interested or altruistic? Are 
people naturally prone to place their own needs above the needs of others and to take 
what they want at expense of others?) and were not uncommon in economic 
philosophy at a time when it was emerging as separate from theology and moral 
philosophy. Thomas Hobbes’s (1588–1679) position was that people are naturally 
prone to place their own needs above the needs of others and therefore have to be 
forced into working together for the common good. It would be overdone to say that 
he held the view that the only motive for human action was self-interest, but he did 
mean that most people care primarily for themselves, and that children are born as 
concerned only with themselves, but with appropriate education and training they 
might come to be concerned with others (Honderich 2005:394). Opposing Hobbes’s 
notions would be the idea that there is an inherent moral sense in people that leads 
them to naturally care for each other, and that therefore people need no coercion in 
order to cooperate. 
 
Is selfishness a response to the ‘natural’ state of man and altruism (namely, putting 
another’s interests above one’s own) caused by something artificial? Early moral 
philosophers such as Hobbes and Rousseau (1712–1778) were interested in the so-
called primitive people, or the “State of Nature”, because they perceived that 
primitive people represented a natural state. When Hobbes said that savages’ lives 
were “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Honderich 2005:395), he was arguing 
that the only way to guarantee long-term preservation was to give up their state of 
nature and create a stable society with a firm government that would enforce 
cooperation and peace. Rousseau’s depiction of the “noble savage”, with a pure and 
untainted human nature (Honderich 2005:402), living naturally in a state of peace and 
prosperity, was an argument against the need for the coercive nation state, since he 




Economics, in the hands of Adam Smith, followed Hobbes rather than Rousseau, and 
accepted that human beings are essentially selfish. Many of the fundamental concerns 
of economics can be traced back to Smith and, with these concerns, many basic 
concepts have the same root. According to Smithian thought, the explanation of 
human behavior is to be found in “the rational, persistent pursuit of self-interest” 
(Stigler 1976, in Buckley and Chapman 1998:34). It has remained a central tenet of 
economic theory that the optimization of self-interest best explains human behavior 
(Buckley and Chapman 1998) and even altruism may well turn out to be in one’s own 
best interest.  
 
Where the utilitarians saw an opportunity for healthy competition arising from their 
attempts to look after their self-interest, other social philosophers such as Emile 
Durkheim (1858–1917) saw intolerance and eternal discontent. Just like the early 
anthropologists, he placed importance on society as an interactive whole:  
 
economic functions are not their own justification … they constitute one of the 
organs of social life, and that social life is above all a harmonious community of 
endeavors, a communion of minds and wills working towards the same end ... If 
industry can only be productive by disturbing that peace and unleashing warfare, 
then it is not worth the cost (Durkheim 1958:16). 
 
Durkheim’s idea that the economy is rooted in and is subject to society in general 
keeps resurfacing in the anthropology of the economy. On this, Polanyi based the 
concept of substantivism in his history of the economy. Durkheim never accepted the 
premise of “the rational, persistent pursuit of self-interest”, beginning a disagreement 
that is partly responsible for the emergence of sociology as a field distinct from 
economics (Wilk and Cligget 2007). Sociology, in the hands of Auguste Comte and 
Durkheim, assumed that human beings are naturally social, that we cooperate and 
make sacrifices because it is a part of our social nature, not because we selfishly 
calculate the results of our actions – that is, people often think like unique individuals, 
but when taken in large numbers, people fall into groups and are willing to fight and 
die for their families, tribes and nations (ibid.).  
 
Differences of opinion developed among sociologists, however, about the exact 
means by which humans maintained their solidarity and altruism towards one another. 
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Durkheim stressed the encompassing nature of social groups, stating that people were 
kept in line by group pressure, by their desire to conform, and by their fear of 
consequences. But Max Weber (1864–1920), for example, thought that an 
individual’s moral imagination had much more of an effect than social pressure. All 
people, according to Weber, learn a set of moral precepts as they grow up in a 
particular setting and religion. Their ability to be social and to cooperate altruistically 
is a product of that moral imprint. Anthropologists, with their notion of culture as a 
system of learned and shared behavior, have tended to draw on both Durkheim and 
Weber (Wilk and Cligget 2007). 
  
3.3.The Twofold Economy 
 
Reflections on the duality of human nature had already been expressed by Aristotle 
(384 BC–322 BC), however, who, by drawing a distinction between value in use and 
exchange value in the first book of Politics, outlined an early distinction between two 
economic terrains. Man was presented by Aristotle as naturally self-sufficient, but 
commercial trade was presented as the unnatural urge of money making. The notion 
of two economic terrains appears in the distinct exchange types described by 
Aristotle, ranging from the natural and desirable to the unnatural and objectionable:  
 
Of everything which we possess there are two uses: …one is the proper and the 
other improper … He who gives a shoe in exchange for money or food to him 
who wants one, does indeed use the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper or 
primary purpose, for a shoe is not made to be an object of barter (Aristotle 
2008:41).  
According to Aristotle, barter, the direct non-monetary exchange of commodities, is 
natural because it satisfies the natural requirement of sufficiency – the necessaries of 
life and nothing more. In an exchange that involves transferring goods between 
households mediated by money each participant starts and ends with use value, of 
which he approves, but the item is not being used in its natural aim or function 
because it was not made to be exchanged. In retail trade a person buys in order to sell 
at a profit. Retail trade is concerned with getting a sum of money rather than acquiring 
something that is needed. Whereas Aristotle views household management as 
necessary, honorable and as having a natural terminus, he is skeptical about retail 
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trade because it has no natural terminus and is only concerned with getting a sum of 
money. Aristotle observes that exchange value is essentially a quantitative matter that 
has no limit of its own; he states that it is from the existence of wealth as exchange 
value that we derive the idea that wealth is unlimited. Usury is depicted by Aristotle 
as the most hated sort of exchange – exchange that makes a gain out of money itself, 
and not from the natural object of it. He condemns the lending of money at interest as 
the most unnatural mode of acquisition (Barnes 1984).  
Aristotle has a positive attitude towards the economic activities that are embedded in 
the subsistence needs of human nature. His criticism targets the economic terrain that 
is directed at wealth getting in the sense of money making. He blames money – the 
unnatural terminus – for people’s unlimited desires for riches. Aristotle thought that 
when a man pursued wealth in the form of exchange value he would undermine the 
proper and moral use of his human capacities. He shows how economy comes to 
reflect the duality of human nature, and how the material side of a human intersects 
with the spiritual one when it comes to economy.  
 
Adam Smith also distinguished between value in use and value in exchange in his first 
book, Wealth of Nations (1776): 
 
The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value 
in exchange; and, on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in 
exchange have frequently little or no value in use … Nothing is more useful than 
water: but … scarce anything can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the 
contrary, has scarce any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods 
may frequently be had in exchange for it (Smith 1976 [1776]:33). 
 
 Smith showed that prices or exchange rates in the market did not directly correspond 
to use values. He provided an answer to this seeming paradox by advancing a 
complex theory of labor value to explain exchange rates (Gudeman 2001). 
 
When distinguishing between value in use and value in exchange Smith did not 
directly refer to Aristotle. But Marx’s theory of surplus value represents an 
elaboration of Aristotle’s distinction between use and exchange value (Gudeman 
2001). Marx declared, “exchange value … refers to the quantitative proportion in 
which use-values of one sort are exchanged for those of another sort” (Marx, in 
Gregory 1982:11). Gregory points out that Marx’s great advance over his 
101 
 
predecessors was to see that exchange value was a historically specific property of the 
commodity, which presupposed certain social conditions for its existence. 
 
Maillassoux (1972) argues that Marx formulated the idea that economic systems are 
always embedded in social formations and that these formations fall into an 
evolutionary range of “types”, or modes of production. He also states that he did so 
long before Polanyi. Like the substantivists, Marx also thought that the modern 
economics was ethnocentric, that its way of looking at the world was determined by 
the capitalist system in which economists lived. Economics provided only an illusion 
that people were able to make choices in a free market; in reality, according to Marx, 
they were in chains everywhere (Cligget and Wilk 2007). 
 
Outlining the complex ways in which terrains of community and market have been 
invoked in the long discourse on the economy, Gudeman (2001) shows that in the 
nineteenth century the notion of use value was replaced by utility; by the mid-
twentieth century, the concept of utility was transformed to preference or subjective 
preference (Gudeman 2001:16). Exchange value came to mean prices, which resulted 
from the interaction of demand and supply in the market, and Aristotle’s distinction 
between use and exchange disappeared. In much modern economics, the market 
domain was seen as freestanding. If the original starting point (with Montesquieu in 
1748 and Adam Smith in 1776) of the economic system was societal then, with 
Malthus in 1798 and Ricardo in 1817, the political economy cut loose from all 
dependence upon society as a whole and became autonomous; it behaved according to 
laws of its own (Polanyi, Arensberg and Pearson 1968:124).  
 
The Aristotelian division between use and exchange has remained topical in various 
forms. Weber, for example, distinguished between substantive and formal rationality 
(Weber 1978:86). Around the turn of the century he initiated a return to a societal 
approach to the economy, placing emphasis on the interactive aspect of economics 
(Polanyi, Arensberg and Pearson 1968). This represented a compromise between the 
social and the economic view. Weber used the “formal rationality of economic 
action” to designate the extent of quantitative calculation that is technically possible 
and that is actually applied (Weber 1978:86). By formal rationality he referred to 
action based on calculation and means-to-ends reasoning. By substantive rationality 
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he designated material behavior shaped by political, religious or ethical standards. 
This included an idea of the degree to which the provisioning of given groups of 
persons with goods is shaped by economically oriented social action under some 
criterion of ultimate values, regardless of the nature of these ends (ibid.). Weber 
claimed that in practice these ideal types are mixed together; he did not provide an 
interactive or dialectical theory of their connection, although the concept of a long-
term transition from substantive to formal rationality informs many of his historical 
studies (see Gudeman 2001).  
 
3.4.Embeddedness after Polanyi: The Concept and the Term 
 
In anthropology, Polanyi’s influence was substantial during the 1960s and 1970s; 
subsequently, his work became strongly identified with the substantivist side of the 
strident and irresolvable “formalist–substantivist” debate. Although Polanyi only used 
the term “embeddedness” in passing,32 the concept is shorthand for the method of 
analysis developed throughout the body of his work.33 Its impact on the social 
sciences – especially anthropology and sociology – was significant.  
 
Following Granovetter’s lead, contemporary sociologists discuss the use of the term 
much more thoroughly than anthropologists and use it to link the social and economic 
aspects of their surveys of the market. Granovetter’s article (1985) concerns the extent 
to which economic action is embedded in structures of social relations in modern 
industrial societies. While Granovetter popularized the concept of embeddedness and 
gave the term its specific shape in the context of the contemporary practice of 
economic sociology, it is commonly assumed that he drew the concept from Polanyi’s 
various mid twentieth-century writings (Krippner 2001). Drawing on Polanyi’s 
opposition of the embedded and disembedded economy, he argues that 
anthropologists utilize an oversocialized conception of human action (embedded 
economies), whereas economists employ an undersocialized one (disembedded 
markets): 
                                                 
32 Krippner (2001) notes that the term appears only twice in his major work The Great Transformation 
(1944). 
33 Essays of Karl Polanyi, edited by Dalton, G. (1968): Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies: 





Much of the utilitarian tradition, including classical and neoclassical economics, 
assumes rational, self-interested behavior affected minimally by social relations 
… At the other extreme lies what I call the argument of ‘embededdness’: the 
argument that the behavior and institutions to be analyzed are so constrained by 
ongoing social relations that to construe them as independent is a grievous 
misunderstanding (Granovetter 1985:1f).  
 
Granovetter states that his own view diverges from both schools of thought. He 
asserts that the level of embeddedness of economic behavior is lower in nonmarket 
societies than is claimed by both substantivists and development theorists, and that it 
has changed less with “modernization” than they believe; but he also argues that this 
level has always been and continues to be more substantial than is allowed for by 
formalists and economists. Granovetter asserts that in non-market economies there is 
more instrumental action than anthropologists recognize, whereas in market 
economies there is more embedded material action than economists concede. 
Gudeman (2001) shares this view, but states that Granovetter does not provide an 
economic theory built on the connection, interaction and variation of the two broad 
realms. 
 
Despite widespread agreement on the merit of embeddedness in terms of opening a 
significant space for social relations in the analysis of economic life, the resurrection 
of the term “embededdness”, owing to Granovetter, has not gone unnoticed by 
contemporary critics. For example, Beckert is critical of the term and concept of 
embeddedness for it does not provide a theory of intentionality and strategic agency 
of its own (Beckert 2003). A noticeable figure in this group of critics is Greta 
Krippner, who, at first, claims that the concept of embeddedness enjoys a privileged 
and largely unchallenged position as the central organizing principle of economic 
sociology (Krippner 2001), and then turns a critical eye on the use of the concept. 
Krippner states that Granovetter’s particular reworking of Polanyi’s concept is 
somewhat at cross-purposes with Polanyi’s own intentions for the study of economic 
life, and asks how it is possible that contemporary scholars working in an explicitly 
Polanyian vein have (unwittingly) subverted Polanyi’s own vision of market society 




Krippner also critiques the way in which the emerging field of economic sociology 
has been shaped by the idea of embeddedness. She argues that the concept of 
embededdness has deflected attention away from important theoretical problems. In 
particular, she suggests that the relative neglect of the concept of the market in 
economic sociology is a result of the way in which the concept of embededdness has 
been formulated (Krippner 2001). She admits that paradoxically, “the basic intuition 
that markets are socially embedded … has led economic sociologists to take the 
market for granted” (Krippner 2001:776). 
 
Krippner also points to some confusion among contemporary interpreters of Polanyi, 
and notes that a standard reading of The Great Transformation suggests that in the 
context of developing his thesis of embeddedness, Polanyi paradoxically treats the 
market itself as “disembedded” (Lie 1991). Much of Polanyi’s substantive empirical 
research was devoted to demonstrating the subordination of markets to other historical 
and cross-cultural institutional forms. According to Krippner (2001), it is difficult to 
read Polanyi’s statement in any other way than as declaring that with the rise of a 
market society, “instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social 
relations are embedded in the economic system” (Polanyi 1944, in Krippner 
2001:780). While Polanyi agreed that markets had existed in previous societies and 
currently existed in contemporary non-western societies, he suggested that industrial 
economies were unique in that markets had come to dominate all other principles of 
social organization. Thus, the tendency of economists to reduce economic life to the 
market was acceptable, at least as an approximation, in describing the West during the 
ascent of the machine age (Krippner 2001).  
 
Embededdness provides a powerful platform for launching a critique of neoclassical 
economics. However, it is criticized for being much less useful when turned towards 
the task of developing a positive research program for economic sociology; indeed, it 
is incoherent as an organizing principle for economic sociology (Krippner and 
Alvarez 2007). Polanyi exaggerates the distinction between premodern and modern 
economies, treating the former as embedded and the later as disembedded (Krippner 
and Alvarez 2007). In contrast, Granovetter is said to view modern market economies 
as fully embedded. Polanyi’s views regarding the conditions under which economies 
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may be said to be disembedded – and what substantively is implied by such a 
statement – remain a controversial issue (ibid.). 
 
In anthropology the term embeddedness has not received a similar level of attention in 
more recent studies; prior to Garsten and de Montoya (2004) and Gudeman (2008), 
any discussion of it has been difficult to find in the theoretical literature. The 
drawbacks attributed by anthropologists to the term embeddedness are few and far 
between, but this seems to be due to the fact that the term itself has not been widely 
used in anthropology; rather, Polanyi’s idea of embeddedness is discussed. For 
example, Gudeman mentions that Polanyi (1944) has provided an account of the 
historical shift from non-market to market societies, but states that he did not develop 
a model of community–market interaction, nor did he foresee the ways that 
communities persist and are required for markets, or how markets sometimes support 
and provide the conditions for new communities (Gudeman 2001). Gudeman also 
comments on Polanyi’s view that land and labor constitute the economy’s invariant 
elements and notes that he takes little account of local and cultural constructions of 
the economy or the way that knowledge, technology and customary performances 
influence economic processes (ibid.). 
 
Wilk and Cligget argue that Polanyi’s emphasis on economic institutions (the social 
groups that carry out production, exchange and consumption) has been called into 
question; for such an approach, using society as a whole (rather than the individual) as 
a unit of analysis, assumes to too great an extent that people generally follow the rules 
of these institutions (Wilk and Cligget 2007). 
 
3.5.The Concept, not the Term 
 
Even if the term itself acquired prominent status in sociological analysis and theory 
(after 1985), and in the substantivist–formalist debate, the idea of embeddedness is 
not limited to the work of Polanyi or Granovetter. As mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter, even at the outset of modern anthropology the idea of the embeddedness 
of economic practices in social relations and institutions was present. In describing 
Kula, Malinowski was the forerunner of such an approach. Gudeman emphasizes that 
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anthropologists often have considered the relationship between social ties and the 
economy by focusing on reciprocity, or the back and forth delayed exchanges that are 
buttressed by social bonds (Gudeman 2001). For example, as Gudeman notes, 
Gregory (1982) sorts economics into gift and commodity systems. Reciprocity is 
dominant in one, trade in the other. Gregory explains that commodity exchange 
establishes a relationship between the objects exchanged, whereas gift exchange 
establishes a relationship between the exchanging subjects. In other words, 
commodity exchange is a price-forming process – a system of purchase and sale – but 
gift exchange is not. What a gift transactor desires is the personal relationship that the 
exchange of gifts creates, and not the things themselves (Gregory 1982:19). The 
embeddedness concept, though not the term, emerges in the core of the distinctions 
between gift and commodity systems. 
 
One of the most important points in Sahlins’s Stone Age Economies (1972), which 
according to Gregory is the most mature version of substantivist theory, was that gift 
exchange and commodity exchange should not be seen as polar opposites but rather as 
the extreme points on a continuum: the key variable in the movement from one 
extreme to the other is “kinship distance”. Gift exchange tends to take place between 
people who are relatives; as kinship distance increases, and the transactors become 
strangers, commodity exchange emerges. This argument, which is based on a wealth 
of anthropological evidence, is a sophisticated restatement of Marx’s distinction 
between commodity exchange and non-commodity exchange (Gregory 1982). 
 
Based on ethnographic findings reported in their edited volume on money, Parry and 
Bloch (1989) propose a new approach to the difference between gift and commodity. 
From this perspective, there are two related but separate transactional orders in most 
societies; on the one hand, there are transactions concerned with the reproduction of 
the long term social or cosmic order; on the other, there is a sphere of “short term 
transactions concerned with the arena of individual appropriation, competition, 
sensuous enjoyment ... the world of commerce ... [which are] often identified with 
exchanges between strangers” (Parry and Bloch 1989:24). They visualize exchange in 
terms of short-term interests and long-term morality; one expresses rational 
calculation, the other manifests communal commitment. Money stands to be aligned 
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with short-term interests but can be socially transformed for communal use (Gudeman 
2001). 
 
Distinctions between gift and commodity exchange relate closely to the notion of 
mutual relations between people, and the interplay between moral and cultural beliefs 
and economic activities in traditional societies, set against the influences of 
modernization and change. ‘Moral economy’ is a term used in a number of contexts to 
describe just such an interplay. Scott’s The Moral Economy of the Peasants (1976) 
relies on the notion of mutual relations between people, set against the destructive 
force of modernization. In his study of Southeast Asian peasant society he identifies a 
subsistence ethics, which provides the explanatory basis for economic behavior in the 
face of upheaval, uncertainty and famine. In place of individual self-interest, Scott is 
concerned to show how “the right to subsistence is an active moral principle in the 
tradition of the village” (Scott 1976:176, in Luetchford 2005:395). 
An ethics of mutuality operates for the common good in moral economies. In the face 
of scarcity social ties operate to prevent economic actors from behaving to maximize 
personal profit. Thus, the above examples indicate that embeddedness in anthropology 
is typically associated with the notion of the moral economy and gift exchange, 
precisely because they imply a close interplay between cultural and social mores, and 
economic activity. This resembles the various ways in which custom and social 
pressure coerce economic actors in a small community to conform to traditional 
norms and the common good at the expense of profit. As Evers (1994) asserts, trade 
and profit pose a challenge to the organic peasant community, which is founded on 
mutual help and solidarity. The demand for profit sits uneasily with the ethic of the 
community, in which the value of goods is determined by the use to which they can 
be put rather than the exchange value that can be realized in the market (Luetchford 
2005). 
3.6.New Epoch, New Terms? 
Bourdieu also describes society and the economy as two inseparable phenomena, but 
he attempts to find new terms to conceptualize the relationship between them. He 
stresses that economic terms and models are incapable of accounting for human 
behavior and states that a systematic discrepancy exists between theoretical models 
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and actual practice. He further argues that various works of experimental economics 
have shown that in many situations economic agents make choices that are 
systematically different from those predicted in the economic model: sometimes they 
do not play the game according to the predictions of game theory; sometimes they 
resort to “practical” strategies; on occasion, they evince a concern to conform to their 
sense of fairness or justice and a wish to be treated the same way themselves. He 
makes his point as follows:  
The science called ‘economics’ is based on an initial act of abstraction that 
consists in dissociating a particular category of practices, or a particular 
dimension of all practice, from the social order in which all human life is 
immersed. This immersion, some aspects or effects of which one finds in Karl 
Polanyi’s notion of ‘embeddedness’, obliges us to conceive every practice as 
‘economic’, as a ‘total social fact’ in Marcel Mauss’s sense (Bourdieu 2005:1).  
Bourdieu opposes the notion of the economic sphere as a separate universe governed 
by its own laws of self-interested calculation and unfettered competition for profit. In 
describing the logics of the economy,34 he attempts in each case to bring to bear all 
the available knowledge relating to the different dimensions of the social order, such 
as the family, the state, the school system, the trade unions and grassroots 
organizations, and not merely knowledge relating to banking, firms and the market. 
Bourdieu also deploys a system of concepts, developed in response to observational 
data, as an alternative theory for understanding economic action. His terms of habitus, 
cultural capital, social capital and symbolic capital could be seen as alternative 
approaches to the embeddedness of economic practices. The introduction of these 
terms, he states, is merely one aspect of a more general shift of language, which is 
essential to express a view of action radically different from that which implicitly 
underlies neoclassical theory (Bourdieu 2005:2).  
Bourdieu describes how the economic agents he observed in Algeria in the 1960s had 
to learn or reinvent everything that economic theory considers to be a given, that is, 
everything it regards as an innate part of human nature. This included the idea of work 
as an activity procuring a monetary income, as opposed to mere occupation, along the 
lines of a traditional division of activities or a traditional exchange of services. It also 
included the possibility of impersonal transactions between strangers, linked to a 
                                                 
34 For example, in studies he carried out in Algeria on the logic of the economy of honor and “good faith”, and on 
the economic and cultural determinants of practices of saving, credit or investment.  
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market situation, as opposed to all the exchanges of the economy of “good faith”, as 
the Kabyle people call it (Bourdieu 2005:4). He points out that it was only gradually 
that economic transactions there ceased to be conceived in relation to the model of 
domestic exchange, and hence as governed by social and family obligations. And the 
Kabyle case is only one of myriad instances that clearly demonstrate the indissoluble 
ties of the economic and the sociocultural:  
 
Only a very particular form of ethnocentrism, which assumes the guise of 
universalism, can lead us to credit economic agents universally with the aptitude 
of rational economic behavior, thereby making disappear the question of the 
economic and cultural conditions in which this aptitude … is acquired (Bourdieu 
2005:5).  
 
3.7.The Conceptual Umbrella 
 
By examining the epistemology of the concept and the term embeddedness, and its 
existence at the crossroads of scientific branches and opinions, I conclude that 
embeddedness involves different views of the relationship between the economic and 
the social. The precursors of the concept, not necessarily termed embeddedness, are to 
be found in the philosophical treaties about human duality in Ancient Greece and 
Western Europe, as well as in the works of Durkheim, Marx, Weber and Malinowski. 
As a result of Polanyi’s work, the term embeddedness became particularly topical in 
economy and anthropology, and some decades later Granovetter achieved its 
actualization in sociology. Despite the fact that the substantivist school has fallen into 
decline and the tempos of market economy development have reached a certain level, 
which, according to many theorists, should no longer need roots in socio-cultural 
worlds, the anthropologists of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries do not consider 
these two phenomena as separate. To quote Bourdieu, “the social world is [seen as] 
present in its entirety in every ‘economic’ action” (Bourdieu 2005:3).  
  
A conclusion could be reached in saying that the concept of embeddedness can be 
expressed by or complemented with other notions, as we saw in Bourdieu’s work, as 
well as in the above-mentioned works about gift and commodity systems, in terms of 
how exchange and gift giving can create community and interpersonal relationships. 
Without explicitly using the term embeddedness to conceptualize the relationship 
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between the social and the economic, Gudeman depicts the economy as consisting of 
two domains – community and market – and examines the dialectics between them 
(Gudeman 2001). The idea of embeddedness is clearly expressed, but instead of using 
the term embeddedness, he explores: a “community realm with its grounding in local 
values” (Gudeman 2001:1); a “connections between sociality and impersonal 
exchange” (Gudeman 2001:2); material action that cannot be separated from 
religious, social or other “non-economic” practices (Gudeman 2001:4); and the notion 
that “economic practices and relationships are constituted within the two realms of 
market and community” (Gudeman 2001:5).  
 
Similar attempts analytically to conceptualize relations between the market and the 
community, or between the economic and the social, are not hard to find in other 
anthropological publications pertaining to the economy. Despite the fact that the term 
embeddedness has not been subject to direct discussion, as it has been in sociology 
(where in the mid 1980s the concept not only emerged as the central organizing 
principle of economic sociology, but also spilled over into sociological subfields) 
anthropology has its own, distinct claim to embeddedness, as Polanyi’s writings 
figured centrally in the debate between formalists and substantivists in economic 
anthropology. Not only since then but also prior to the concept of embeddedness 
being expressed more formally, it has been integrated in anthropological thought (cf. 
Sahlins 1972). The idea of embeddedness finds expression in anthropology as the 
existence of close and indissoluble links between the economy and sociocultural life, 
and in such compounds as “submerged”, “rooted”, “is part of”, “constituted within”, 
“grounded in” and others, rather than the term embeddedness. Embeddedness is often 
taken as a conceptual umbrella for an approach to the study of the economy: it 
concerns the integration of the economy into broader sociocultural systems. 
 
Theoretical vagueness is the common complaint that critics make against the concept 
of embeddedness. Indeed, Granovetter has recently declared embeddedness to be 
meaningless and has distanced himself from the term: “I rarely use ‘embeddedness’ 
anymore, because it has become almost meaningless, stretched to mean almost 




A majority of anthropologists instead of abandoning the concept of embeddedness 
work on it continuously, always looking for new ways of providing a better 
conceptualization and terminology of the relation between the social and the 
economic. And embeddedness is not the only concept and term capable of casting 
light on such relations. Wilk and Cligget (2007) observe that there are many 
alternatives to the formalist rationality hypothesis and to the substantivist idea that the 
economy is always embedded in other social institutions and that these premises are 
not mutually exclusive. In addition, Gudeman identifies imperfections in the ways the 
interaction between these two areas is reflected. Most of the scholars working with the 
topic, he claims, tend to emphasize dyadic ties between social and economic spheres 
rather than larger realms, and they fail to offer a view of the connection between the 
market and the communal realm (Gudeman 2001:19).  
 
If we look from the origins of the concept of embeddedness in the social sciences to 
the present day, it seems clear that the main questions – of how to conceptualize it and 
which terms to use about the fluid relation between society and economy – remain 
open. Admittedly, the use of the term embeddedness in explaining the relations 
between market and community, or between society and the economy, does not seem 
to have become generally accepted in the social sciences. However, there are a 
number of authors who wish to show that the contemporary global economy is 
embedded in social relations and glocal sociocultural realities.  
 
3.8.How Much Room for Culture? 
The assumption that social relations shape economic behavior has provided social 
scientists with a useful platform for questioning the individualistic and profit-
rationality oriented analyses of neoclassical economics, and for elaborating an 
alternative approach to the study of the economy (Sonnino 2007:62). However, as 
discussed above, embeddedness has been criticized for being conceptually vague and 
indefinite, for lacking its own concrete account of how social relations affect 
economic activity and exchange, and for lacking analytic reflection on practices’ 
multi-layered meanings. As in Polanyi’s substantivism, there is little room for what 
anthropologists call “culture” (Wilk and Cligget 2007:9); in studies based on 
embeddedness, everything concerns social structure, groups and institutions rather 
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than systems of symbols, meaning, or customs (Sonnino 2007, Wilk and Cligget 
2007).  
 
Anthropologist Thomas Schweizer (1997) points out that it is one thing to 
acknowledge embeddedness as a major force in the present world in a general way, 
and another to identify the exact linkages, the new options opened up, the refined 
strategies of actors and the uneven outcomes produced, which may vary from 
community to community, between actors, and between historical moments 
(Schweizer 1997: 739). Commenting on Schweizer’s work, Alvin W. Wolfe admits: 
 
we anthropologists have not, until recently, formalized the study of this 
integration (call it “embeddedness” if you will). We have been fairly well united 
on the idea of interpenetration of societal/cultural domains, but we have lagged in 
developing formal methods of analyzing it so that it could be measured (Wolfe 
1997, in Schweizer 1997:755).  
 
Koponen (2002) adds that much of the research on embeddedness takes on what 
Granovetter has called an “embededdness from above”  - resulting in “a propitiation 
of social life in analysis that are essentially ‘economic’”(Koponen (2002:547) and 
aiding in a critique of rational economics, but without offering an alternative.  What is 
needed, insists Koponen, is an explanatory framework that tells the story about why 
each strategy is adopted and under what circumstances.  
 
In her critical review of the notion of embeddedness, anthropologist Roberta Sonnino 
(2007:63) concludes that conventional sociological theory on embeddedness has two 
main limitations. Firstly, it does not take into adequate consideration the process 
through which an economic system becomes embedded and fails to identify the 
tensions and trade-offs inherent in the dynamics of embeddedness. Secondly, it limits 
itself to explaining the social dimension of an economic system in the form of 
networks, neglecting such factors as culture, power and geography, which may also 
affect and shape economic transactions (Sonnino 2007:63). 
 
Characteristic examples of traditional network-oriented embeddedness in relation to 
entrepreneurial activities in modern societies can be seen, for example, in the work of 
Brian Uzzi and Thomas Schweizer. Uzzi (1996, 1999) depicts the specific dimensions 
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of embedded relationships and the mechanisms by which they influence economic 
action, for example, by showing a firm’s ability to obtain loans and to lower the costs 
of borrowing. A key feature in his approach is the idea that organization networks 
operate on a logic of exchange that differs from the logic of markets (Uzzi 1996:676). 
He refers to this exchange logic as “embeddedness” because ongoing social ties shape 
actors’ expectations and opportunities in ways that differ from the economic logic of 
market behavior (ibid.). To the analysis of embedded aspects of the apparel industry 
he applies network theory, which suggests that embeddedness shifts actors’ 
motivations away from the narrow pursuit of immediate economic gain towards the 
enrichment of relationship through trust and reciprocity. Trust helps reduce 
transactional uncertainty and creates opportunities for the exchange of goods and 
services that are difficult to price or enforce contractually (Uzzi 1996:677). He finds 
that embedded ties develop primarily from third party referral networks and previous 
personal relations, which 1) set expectations for trust between newly introduced actors 
and 2) equip the new economic exchange with resources from pre-existing embedded 
ties (Uzzi 1996:679). He also suggests that organizations tied to network partners by 
embedded, as opposed to arm’s length, ties increase their probability of survival (Uzzi 
1996:683f).  
 
Referring to Sayer (2001), Sonnino express skepticism about trust being taken to be 
the core of embedded relations. She indicates that the tendency to neglect the analysis 
of cultural context can “inadvertently produce an overly benign view of economic 
relations and processes” (Sayer 2001:698), as embeddedness can easily be taken to 
mean that practices hitherto seen as governed purely by narrow self-interest are 
actually embedded in relations of trust (Sonnino 2007:63). But in reality, according to 
Sayer (2001), “the social and cultural embedding of relations between firms usually 
depends not so much on trust per se, but on overlaps in their self-interest” (ibid.). This 
point is particularly relevant in the case of Nordic Ltd (see chapter 2) where the 
advertising for the software programs for registering dangerous waste failed not only 
because of low socially responsible business awareness among the local 
entrepreneurs, but also because the interests involved (the Agency of Pollution 
Control and Petra Liepa, director of Nordic Ltd) did not overlap. While Petra strived 
to organize the seminar for the purpose of advertising, for the APC, the event was 
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simply a grant-funded seminar that needed to be duly accounted for to the grant 
providers. 
 
To measure the depth of embeddedness among !Kung people and in a Javanese 
village, Schweizer (1997) proposed social network analysis as an important tool. The 
social network perspective he applies starts with individual actors and observes their 
social, economic, political and communicative ties to others and the emerging patterns 
of order (Schweizer 1997:740). According to him, network tools are ideally suited to 
the in-depth investigation of embeddedness. At the substantive level he traces how 
locality, kinship and other social identities interact with and can explain the pattern of 
gift giving and ritual ties in these societies. These are issues of the interpenetration of 
different fields of activity and hence of the domain of embeddedness. Embeddedness 
in terms of hierarchical linkages is considered by studying extralocal ties and by 
problematizing the significance of local as well as larger units of societal integration - 
namely, to what extent do local units of association and the larger context constrain 
the flow of gifts and ritual activities (Schweizer 1997:741). 
 
A broader set of issues concerns how the institutional and cultural underpinnings 
construct values and beliefs that shape economic life. In approaching economic action 
as an extension of social life, the notion that economic activity is embedded in social 
institutions directly raises the issue of how social values shape economic action. 
Timothy Koponen (2002) suggests an alternative to the purely network-orientated 
approach and suggests that the way the economy is instituted can be understood by 
looking at the reasons actors have for participating in actor networks of production, 
distribution and consumption. Through his research on American recycling, he shows 
that much of the “making” or instituting of the economy happens outside the market, 
through political mechanisms, contracts and standards, and that these relationships 
impose value upon goods differently than do market relations (Koponen 2002:543). 
Thus, rather than a singular reason for the circulation of goods, as proposed by Adam 
Smith, there may be many ways in which the economy is instituted, as earlier 
proposed by Polanyi. Koponen refers to Michel Callon’s (1999) argument that it is the 
economist who makes the economy look like a market (Koponen 2002: 563), and he 
demonstrates that the social values that add “economic value” to goods are not 
uniform but highly contextual. He explains that the measure of social embeddedness 
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is not as important as the values imposed upon other actors through social structure in 
the economy (Koponen 2002:543).  
 
Koponen questions the assumption that the market will decide what is good and bad, 
and that the market models our behavior as closely as possible to a “purely 
competitive market”. By extending the social embeddedness argument of Granovetter 
(1985), Koponen points to the way social institutions regulate and institutionalize the 
subjective values that inform actors about the “rightness” and “wrongness” of action 
within sets of institutionalized rules; he investigates how actors’ actions are embedded 
in “social” values. He does not focus on the producer but on what is produced: in 
other words, he looks at the creation of things and the places in which they are 
created. The actors in a production network are seen as impressing values upon the 
thing being produced (Koponen 2002:547). Koponen’s approach is based, among 
others, on Appaduarai’s (1986) and Kopytoff’s (1986) theoretical suggestion, that 
commodity is a thoroughly socialized thing (Appadurai 1986:6). Appadurai suggests 
defining a commodity not by its existence, but by its subjective values as social 
things: 
 
Focusing on the things that are exchanged, rather than simply on the forms or 
functions of exchange, makes it possible to argue that what creates the link 
between exchange and value is politics, construed broadly (Appadurai 1986:3).  
 
Furthermore, Kopytoff highlights that from a cultural perspective, 
 
[t]he production of commodities is also a cultural and cognitive process: 
commodities must be not only produced materially as things, but also culturally 
marked as being a certain kind of thing (Kopytoff 1986:64). 
 
Thus, Appadurai, Kopytoff and Koponen agree that human actors “encode things with 
significance” (Appadurai 1986:5) and that value is not a component of economic life, 
but an aspect of social life (Koponen 2002:565). 
 
To overcome the limitation explored by, among others, Wilk and Cligget (2007) and 
Sonnino (2007) – that is, explaining the social dimension of an economic system as a 
network, while neglecting such factors as culture, power and geography (which may 
also affect and shape economic transactions) – the present work will in the following 
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chapter address the Norwegian entrepreneurial strategies and practices employed 
upon entering the Baltic market. First, in chapter 4, I will describe the political and 
economic context of the region in terms of industrial Norway and the Baltics at the 
turn of the twenty-first century. These contexts will provide a better understanding of 
the Norwegian entrepreneurs’ motives for entering the emerging Baltic markets and 
of the strategies they employed in the entrance process. This will be the first step 
towards understanding economic action as embedded not only in social relations, but 
also in political, geographical, ideological and cultural relations. 
 
In practice, of course, these kinds of relations are not separable, but in order to 
structure the present argument about the embeddedness of economic action the 
empirically imbued chapters on Norwegian entrepreneurship in the Baltics will be 
organized as follows: chapter 4 will provide insight into the political and economic 
circumstances shaping entrepreneurial practice; chapter 5 will keep the main focus on 
social relations – namely, the role of social networks in the market entrance process; 
chapter 6 will analyze the embeddedness of economic activities in local socio-cultural 
relations, the continuity of these activities with the past and their multilayered local 
value systems; chapter 7 will concentrate upon socio-geographic and ideological 
relations, namely, how the locus of the Baltic market is constructed by Norwegian 
public culture, policies, myths and entrepreneurs, and how these constructions shape 
marketplace behavior. The following chapters (some more descriptive, some more 
analytic) will show, then, that economic action cannot be separated from any of these 






Entering the New European Market: The Baltics 
 
In summer 2006 I visited Tore Hauge, whom I had first met in the Baltics in 2002 
during research for my Master’s degree. I wanted to have a closer look at his 
industrial operations in the Baltics.35 He had chosen the small town of Linava as the 
location for his production facility, which is located around an hour-and-a-half’s drive 
from the capital city. Here, he was able to recruit for his metalworking plant from 
among the town’s 10,000 residents. Having arrived at Tore’s plant, I met two more 
Norwegian entrepreneurs, Jon Volstad and Mari Rye, who had moved their businesses 
from Dale in Norway to Linava. They were eager to show me proudly around their 
plants and the town itself, which they sometimes called, in jest, a Norwegian colony. 
As there were no cafeterias at their plants, I readily agreed to their suggestion to go 
and have breakfast in a local café, which was a three-minute drive away, before 
touring the units. There was no discussion about which café we should go to; I 
realized later that the town had only one café where the food and the service were said 
to be good.  
 
One could feel by the attitude in the café that Tore and Jon were frequent visitors to 
the place. “Is she not here?” Jon asked Tore, while desperately looking around for 
somebody and explaining to me that he was trying to spot the waitress who was the 
best at taking an order. When the desired waitress did not appear, Tore, flirting in a 
broken version of the local language, ordered breakfast for himself from another 
waitress.  “Breakfast, two eggs”, he said, producing an ungrammatical string of local 
and English words. Jon was next in line and ordered “to gammeldags bondefrokost” in 
pure Norwegian, later appearing slightly puzzled that the waiter did not understand 
what he had said. “I’ve been asking for this pretty often; it’s high time she 
understood”, he explained to me. 
 
“Fried eggs for the first gentlemen and two helpings of farmers’ breakfast for the 
second gentleman.” I clarified the order to the waitress in the language she 
                                                 




understood. “Thank you,” she replied kindly. “I thought so”. While waiting for the 
food to be brought to us, I was about to start a discussion on Norwegian 
businessmen’s motives in coming to the Baltics, but Jon, watching and commenting 
on what was going on in the café, was in no hurry to change the subject. “Look, local 
men don’t know how to use a knife and a fork. They are cutting this way, but in 
Norway, the knife and fork are used together, like this,” he demonstrated, pulling his 
knife and fork over the empty plate. A couple of minutes later the waiter came, 
bringing a hot breakfast for both. “Look, Tore,” Jon said, surprised. “I ordered food in 
Norwegian and got exactly what I wanted!” “But you are almost like local ladies, 
you’re hardly eating anything,” he said, when the waiter placed in front of me my 
coffee and a glass of fresh carrot juice.  
 
Had they been younger, Jon and Tore would have moved to the Baltics for good, but 
back home in their native village of Dale at Fjord County they have property and 
families, with three children each; they were not ready to exchange their life in 
Norway for a life in the Baltics. The previous week Tore’s son had come to Linava to 
try out his father’s brand new Volvo. “Just imagine how much it would have cost in 
Norway. I could never have afforded one,” Tore commented. Here, he can enjoy 
driving his new car for 150 days a year – the amount of time he has spent in Linava 
on a yearly basis since 1996, managing his production facilities. Not having finished 
talking about his Volvo, he notices a passing Russian-made Dnepr motorcycle and 
immediately changes the topic, enthusing, “This is exactly what I’d love to buy; an 
old-timer Russian bike with a sidecar. It’s quite something; you don’t have them in 
Norway. Besides, I could take one to Dale; in Norway they charge no tax for old-
timer vehicles!”  
 
Initially, Jon Volstad and Mari Rye had come to Linava once every six weeks. They 
did not want to stay here more often or for a longer time, because in Linava there 
were no decent standard apartments for them to rent. Finally, and at the same time as 
Jon planned to move his plant to the Baltics, Mari Rye launched her business in 
Linava to build apartments to Norwegian standards. The foundations for the building 
had already been laid; a local man had had plans to build a block of exclusive 
apartments, but had gone bankrupt. Being aware that there was a thriving demand in 
Linava for flats “worthy” of Norwegians, Mari and Jon bought the abandoned 
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foundations and completed the project. Mari has many a story to tell about the time 
when the works took place, the time when she came to know the ‘ins and outs’ of the 
local builders’ mentality:  
 
At home [in Norway], when you tell people to do their work this way or that, 
they do what they are told to do. But here it’s quite the contrary; if we order 
brown walls, they’re painted white. When we had instructed the workers, we 
happily went home, being certain that everything will be done the way we want. 
But when we came back to inspect the work, everything was the wrong way 
round. They had taken liberties to improvise with totally different colors than 
those we wanted. They even had the cheek to ask whether a nice looking outcome 
was the only thing that mattered! (Mari Rye, 2006). 
 
It has not been easy for Mari to put down roots in Linava: the locals seem unfriendly 
and services, in her opinion, are underdeveloped. Still, she said, things are shaping up 
little by little: one sees this, for example, in the number of cars – each time Mari 
arrives, she notices there are more of them. And people buy more expensive cars, 
although this is totally wrong, she says, “in the Baltics, they have strange priorities; 
one should prioritize the house over the car”.  
 
The block of flats mentioned above has now been completed: five flats and two rooms 
in the building are reserved for Norwegians. These flats have a separate entrance, and 
accommodate the Norwegians who come visiting or on business to the plant. I, too, 
was offered overnight accommodation, at a price that was rather high for the region, 
in one of the rooms intended for Norwegians. It had stood empty for some time, as 
Norwegians do not come here as often as they used to. In Jon and Mari’s stories, one 
can sense nostalgia for the days when Norwegian dinners were jointly cooked in this 
house: cod on Tuesdays, potato balls (potetball) on Thursdays – jointly enjoyed in the 
good company of Norwegians, while watching Norwegian television via a parabolic 
antenna.   By 2007 Mari intends to open a company in the capital city to recruit Baltic 
builders for jobs in Norway.  
4.1.First Come, First Served 
Linava became an attractive place for Norwegian manufacturers in 1995, when Jurgis 
Matulis, a young man from this small town, spent a year in Dale and shared a flat with 
a Norwegian. The Norwegian, for his part, was a close acquaintance of an 
entrepreneur in the vicinity of Dale. As a result, the Dalenians came up with the idea 
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of opening plants in Linava. Jurgis’s stories about low production costs proved 
tempting, and shortly after Jurgis’s return to the Baltics, the first Norwegian company, 
Norbygg Ltd, arrived in Linava and employed 40 local residents in the new ship-
building facility and oil rig equipment supplier. The equipment produced in Linava 
was exported to Norway, where the company sales office was located, and from there 
to customers in other countries around the globe, including the Baltics. 
 
Other entrepreneurs from Fjord County followed Norbygg’s example, including Jon 
and Mari. Norbygg Ltd offered to rent them production facilities on a site where 
Norbygg Ltd, over the course of time, had bought several buildings suitable for 
production, as well as land. In this way, Norbygg Ltd expanded its operations in the 
Baltic states, covering not only manufacturing but also maintenance and rental of real 
estate. Jurgis, for his part, offered his assistance to ease the path of newcomers from 
Fjord County in terms of dealing with local administrative issues. He completed the 
paperwork for the registration of all Norwegian companies who arrived in Linava, 
because, he said,  
 
People, having come from afar, they actually don’t know anything: neither the 
language – maybe English, but hardly any – nor the revenues service procedures! 
I was here, on the ground, and helped, too. I also recruited staff. Import–export, 
nobody in Linava had any experience with this back then; I did all this all on my 
own. I ran to the customs offices, to the revenues service; I organized 
transportation; I loaded and unloaded (Jurgis Matulis, 2006). 
 
Thus, without actually planning it, an industrial area gradually took shape in Linava, 
hosting mainly Norwegian companies that all came from the same region. These firms 
had had their production facilities in Norway but, from the early 1990s, they began to 
close down, being on the verge of bankruptcy, and moved instead to Linava. Norbygg 
Ltd kept on building new hangars on its site, and all available industrial buildings 
were fully occupied. New clients kept coming, and Jurgis became the local manager 
of Norbygg Ltd. 
 
Tore Hauge insisted that I should visit not only his Norbygg Ltd site, but also the 
factories located further away. As well as a range of other companies, Linava hosts an 
Icelandic textile plant and, not far from it, a yacht-building facility, the owners of 
which are, as might be expected, Norwegians from Fjord county. “I’m going to buy 
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myself one of these in the summer,” said Tore, tenderly stroking the frame of the 
newest model of the yacht. A local Linava man had been appointed production 
director of the yacht-building facility, and he kindly leads the way around all areas of 
the plant; we are followed everywhere by the smells of varnish and paint. He tells us 
that this is a very advanced production facility; the original facilities rapidly became 
too small and for three years now the yachts have been built in this new plant. All the 
craft produced here are exported to Norway. The prices are too high for the Baltics; 
for the locals, it is cheaper to buy a second-hand boat. Besides, the Baltic rivers do not 
have any marinas yet, like those in Norway. In the Baltics, last year’s model of a 
motorless yacht would cost NOK 70,000, and the production director does not know 
for sure what extra charges they impose on the craft in Norway; still, the plants get 
plenty of commissions from Norwegians. Ten workers produce four boats per week 
that are delivered to Norway in a special truck. Glues and paints are ordered via local 
companies, but many other materials and such items as lighting fixtures, laths, chairs 
and light bulbs are brought over by the Norwegian owner himself once every three 
weeks. Jon says that the yachts are built to an excellent design and are of good 
quality; he, too, has already purchased such a yacht and promises to take me for a sail. 
Whether the yachts are regarded as being produced in the Baltics or Norway, nobody 
can tell for sure, but taking a closer look at last year’s model, I find that the 
registration plate bears the name of Fjord County (where Dale is located).  
 
While staying in Linava, it was clear that Norwegian businesspeople are frequent and 
welcome visitors here; the locals know them and greet them kindly. Yet the striking 
reactions of Tore, Jon and Mari towards the local mode of life, in both everyday terms 
and in entrepreneurial practices (which Norwegians found to be rather different from 
those at home), was an obvious hint that the actions of newcomers from Fjord County 
and the actions of locals at Linava were embedded in different lifeworlds. Still, it is 
too early for an analysis of aspects of embeddedness; the empirical material is still too 
thin. There are many more empirical details to sort out before getting to grips with a 
thorough analysis of the aspects of embeddedness in Norwegian entrepreneurship in 
the Baltics.  
 
The first question to be answered is this: what might have made Tore, Jon, Mari (and 
the other Norwegians we will meet in the following chapters) break their ties with 
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manufacturing facilities traditionally rooted in Norway and choose instead a location 
where, according to Jon, there was not even any accommodation that meets 
Norwegian standards? Likewise, if we want to understand their strategies, it is 
essential to gain insight into industrial and general entrepreneurial conditions for 
production in terms of the native regions in Norway and in the Baltics.  
 
4.2.The Norwegian Industrial Sector at the Turn of the Twenty-First 
Century 
 
Economist Arne Selvik (1986) compares Norway’s industrial sector to a small but 
strong donkey capable of adapting to rigorous conditions. This donkey is 
environmentally friendly and sturdy but, at the same time, stubborn and unpredictable. 
The animal is not in its prime, but experienced and nimble enough to kick out with a 
hind leg, throw off the rider and gallop away to another country when it feels it is 
being tethered. If compared to the old English Shire horse, the Norwegian donkey is 
versatile and waywise, but burdened with a rider who gets increasingly heavier. 
However, if pitched against the young stallions of developing countries, it appears 
unwieldy, slow and too home loving (Selvik 1986:10).  
 
When describing Norwegian industry, Selvik not only applies this thought-provoking 
comparison but also underscores its holistic nature, a hallmark of anthropology, 
indicating that industry cannot be regarded as an isolated sector in a society. The role 
of industry in Norway, like that of other business, has so far been more all embracing 
than mere manufacturing of profit-yielding wares.  
 
Throughout the post-war years, industry has been the principal instrument for 
implementing a number of superior social goals: security, equality, sparse settlement, 
high income, full employment and regional development (Selvik 1986:14). The 
assumption of such auxiliary functions has weakened the ability of Norwegian and 
other Western industrialists to both work profitably and increase exports and the 
number of jobs available. Partly, therefore, Norwegian industries have to shoulder a 
greater burden of “indirect costs” than their competitors in other countries to the 
detriment of their competitive capacity. Social responsibility has been one of the 
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keenest slogans in Norway’s public discourse on entrepreneurship. The Confederation 
of Norwegian Enterprise (Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon, NHO)36 – Norway’s key 
organization for employers and the leading business lobby – indicates that social 
responsibility includes the manner of creating values, the impact of a company’s 
operations on people, the environment and society, and the integration of social and 
environment-related values into company strategies and daily operations. Thus, 
competing with other sectors for better conditions and the favors of politicians, the 
industrial sector still has to be not only a model source of export revenues, and a tax 
payer, but it must also solve regional problems, employ women and shape the socio-
cultural environment, depending on what values in a specific period are highlighted 
by the policy of a particular government (Selvik 1986:12). This is by no means 
negative, but, by carrying out all these roles, production becomes expensive and not 
very productive (ibid.). Having made an assessment of industrial challenges in 
Norway at the turn of the twenty-first century, Selvik claims that expectations 
regarding Norwegian industry should be re-evaluated, asking at the same time to what 
extent industrial enterprises and Norway itself, as an industrial nation (or “an 
experienced donkey”), are able to perceive the signs of change in order to effectively 
use fresh market opportunities on national and international scales.  
 
Looking at it from another angle, Norway is one of the world’s richest countries: 
welfare standards are very high; unemployment is very low; business is successful; 
and the state deposits more and more money into the oil fund. Norway could, in a 
sense, sit back and enjoy the wealth of its resources (Reve and Jakobsen 2001:11). 
However, when asked how attractive and powerful Norway actually is in terms of 
entrepreneurship, Reve and Jakobsen reply that it is by no means as brilliant as 
Norway’s position among the top-ranking most prosperous countries of the world 
might imply. The only concerns politicians raise with Norwegians are the risks that 
too great a proportion of the oil billions might be wasted, as a result of which society 
must put up with the thought, “we must save because we are so rich” (Reve and 
Jakobsen 2001:12). According to Reve and Jakobsen, forecasts for traditional 
industries over the next few years (before 2030), subject to competition and unrelated 
to oil, do not indicate any growth; increasingly, investments in the industrial sector 
                                                 
36 NHO, Bedrift og samfunn  http://www.nho.no/bedrift_og_samfunn/ (accessed 05.05.2011.) 
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are channeled abroad (ibid.). They observe that Norway is typical of countries with 
raw materials; it has low indicators regarding knowledge-based exports, investment in 
research and development, and productivity growth. Like Selvik (1986), Reve and 
Jakobsen (2001) doubt that Norway is attractive for entrepreneurship.  
 
Similarly, both the NOU Norwegian Public Report “Industrien mot 2020 – kunnskap i 
fokus” (launched in 2005), and the BI Norwegian Business School’s report “Et 
verdiskapende Norge” (issued in April 2000), indicate serious challenges to 
Norwegian industry (according to estimates, productivity in Norway stood at 9% 
throughout the 1990s, while for the USA it was 30% and for Sweden, 44%). With 
competition in international markets growing increasingly stronger, for reasons of 
competitiveness, a company must be able to offer a low enough price; it has to think 
about cost effectiveness and innovation. A major part of Norwegian industry is based 
on the generous use of natural and oil resources, and is thus subject to regulations in 
these fields. Norwegian industry is also dependent on the situation in the international 
market and on access to foreign markets, for its domestic market is not large. High 
and ever-increasing production costs threaten the competitiveness of a number of 
companies. One of the key resources for industry that influences competitiveness is 
the labor force. High employment in Norway restricts the possibilities for expanding 
the labor force. The NOU White Paper (2005) indicates that Norwegian small and 
medium-sized companies are experiencing an acute shortage of labor in terms of 
economic growth, as well as restricted access to markets and adequate competitive 
capacity. The report therefore urges the application of innovation, which would be 
able to turn industry onto a profitable and internationally competitive course under 
changeable market conditions. 
 
From 2000, concerns regarding Norwegian industrialists’ inability to compete in 
global markets due to high labor costs have been increasingly reflected in the media: 
due to wages, holiday allowances and other costs, as well as the high currency 
exchange rate of the Norwegian crown, Norway has the highest labor costs in 
Europe.37 Economists claim in the media that Norway is too rich to engage in 
traditional industries and forecast a loss of at least 60,000 industrial jobs in the near 
                                                 
37 ”Norge dyrest i hele verden” VG, published 31.10.2002. 
http://www.vg.no/nyheter/okonomi/artikkel.php?artid=4032482 (accessed 20.05.2011.) 
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future.38 In addition, newspaper headlines such as “Tempted across the border”,39 
“Norwegian politicians on pilgrimage to the Baltics”,40 “Anticipate a massive 
relocation of production units from Norway”41 to the Baltics and provide an 
illustration of this situation.  
 
Still, under the impact of globalization, not only is competitiveness increasing in 
domestic markets, but so also are the opportunities offered by foreign markets. The 
accessibility of the required competencies, in combination with internationally 
competitive conditions of production, will decide where a company will invest, where 
it will open a plant, create jobs and pay taxes. Norwegian small and medium-sized 
companies identified at an early stage that it was important to seize the opportunities 
offered by an increasingly thriving market in the neighboring region, the Baltics, to 
which Norway was ready to provide generous support in order to secure the interests 
of Norwegian entrepreneurs working there. 
 
4.3.Norwegian Strategies vis-à-vis the Dynamics of the Emerging 
Baltic Market  
 
A willingness to cooperate, and a readiness to seek closer ties between the Baltic and 
Nordic areas was evident as soon as it became clear that the Baltic states might break 
free from Soviet power. The Republic of Latvia, for example, declared full 
independence from the Soviet Union on 21 August 1991. As early as the start of 1991, 
the Nordic Council of Ministers requested the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) to 
survey investment plans and requirements for the three Baltic countries and a further 
mandate was given to survey finance issues, with particular emphasis on the 
prerequisites for the Baltic countries to attract foreign investment. On 10 September 
1991, the NIB report, “Investment needs and financing mechanisms in the Baltic 
Countries”, was published. This report provides insight into the Scandinavian estimate 
                                                 
38”Norge dyrest i hele verden.” VG, published 31.10.2002. 
http://www.vg.no/nyheter/okonomi/artikkel.php?artid=4032482 (accessed 20.05.2011.); 
”Bedrifter i kø for utflagging.” Aftenposten 30.10.2002. Pp.22. 
39 ”Lokkes over grensa.” Økonomisk Rapport 22/2001, published 25.06.2002. 
http://www.orapp.no/nyheter/neringsliv/lokkes-over-grensen-/ (accessed 25.05.2011.). 
40 ”Norske politikere valfarter til baltikum.” Økonomisk Rapport, published 19.02.2003. 
http://www.orapp.no/nyheter/neringsliv/norske-politikere-valfarter-til-baltikum-/ (accessed 
25.05.2011.) 
41 ”Spår massiv utflagging fra Norge.” Aftenposten,30.10.2002. Pp.22. 
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of the economic situation in the independent post-Soviet Baltics. By 1992, the Nordic 
Council of Ministers had in place a comprehensive cooperation program for the Baltic 
countries, including an allocation of DKK15 million to support various Baltic–Nordic 
co-operation activities. Through the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Nordic 
governments had proposed an industrial cooperation program that would, among 
other things, focus on investments and technology transfers. Nordic Information 
Offices had already been opened by this stage in Tallinn and Riga.  
 
The NIB (1991) report states that the Baltic countries faced a daunting period of 
transition over the coming decade as they moved away from almost complete 
economic dependence on the Soviet Union and attempted to expand trade and 
economic relations with other countries. To stem the economic decline of recent years 
and to lay the foundation for sustainable economic development, urgent efforts were 
said to be required to rehabilitate or replace infrastructure, services and a wide range 
of primary sector activities. The NIB survey identified among other investment needs 
for the coming years a requirement for over US$2,000 million to reduce 
environmental pollution in seventeen “hot spots” in the Baltic countries, US$700 
million for forestry and related industries such as pulp and paper, US$85 million in 
international and mobile telecommunications links, at least US$50 million for roads, 
and US$125 million for fisheries (NIB 1991:3). 
 
The investment climate in the three Baltic countries was characterized in the NIB 
(1991) report as rather poor. It states that reform of the banking system was just 
beginning, some skilled personnel were available but that further training was 
required, there were inadequacies in the economic infrastructure and unresolved 
questions about taxation, property rights, investment protection, international treaties 
and trade agreements. By 1991, a growing number of companies and private investors 
in the Nordic countries were expressing interest in investing in private sector activities 
in the Baltics. Baltic income levels were less than 10 percent of those in the nearby 
Nordic countries. The NIB report indicates that there was a strong political will in 
Nordic countries to assist the Baltics in their post-independence efforts and that such 
gaps in income levels could be substantially reduced by free trade and free movement 
of financial capital in the form of official and private investment (NIB 1991:8). 
Around 174 proposals from Baltic small and medium-scale industries demanded 
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US$551 million in total for various investment needs. For example, a building firm in 
Latvia proposed an investment of about US$20 million in machinery for the 
production of closed and half-closed mineral wood panels; they expected to sell a 
quarter of the output to western construction firms. A furniture plant in Lithuania 
proposed an investment of US$2.5 million for upgrading existing machinery and 
purchasing new equipment for the manufacture of frame furniture (NIB 1991:16). 
 
When the 1991 report was published, the investment climate in the Baltics was 
characterized by great uncertainty, both politically and legally. In 1991, the ruble was 
still the only legal tender and none of the Baltic countries had its own currency. 
However, legislation had started to permit foreign investors to establish wholly owned 
subsidiaries. The foreign partner could now become the chairman of the board or 
managing director of a company; foreign owned companies were exempt from paying 
tax on profit for the first two years after the moment of declared profit (NIB 1991:18). 
 
Furthermore, the education level in the Baltic countries was characterized as fairly 
high and as strong in industrial techniques, especially in high technology areas. The 
NIB report states that the labor force in the Baltic countries was abundant and wages 
relatively low, so it could be used in labor-intensive fields. Moreover, it notes that the 
Baltic people had a thorough knowledge of the (ex)USSR market, culture and 
language – all valuable factors when western companies wished to use investments in 
Baltic countries as a gateway to that broader market (NIB 1991:18f). 
 
The report also notes that the taxation systems were subject to constant change, 
making long-term predictions of net earnings extremely difficult. Taxes on payroll, 
turnover, luxury goods, land and environmental fees were just being introduced when 
the report was written. The issue of ownership of property, in particular, and of land 
and natural resources, also remained open. According to Soviet legislation it was 
illegal to own land and it remained unclear what arrangements would be made for 
former all-union property and how public property would be privatized. Finally, laws 
and international treaties on all kinds of industrial rights and patents were non-





The NIB report summarizes the characteristics of the investment climate in the Baltics 
as to the beginning of 1990s with the conclusion that it was essential that the Baltic 
countries pass investment protection legislation in accordance with normal western 
practice (ibid.). 
 
Less than a decade later, Johansen et al. (2000) showed that Nordic firms responded 
quickly to the opportunities in the former Soviet Baltic area, and they represented a 
wide variety of business activities. Johansen et al. (2000) predicted that labor and 
production cost advantages would continue to attract manufacturing companies 
because of lower costs when compared to Scandinavia, and also compared to Asia and 
other low-labor-cost areas. The Baltic labor market also had the advantage of high 
levels of education and skills. However, Johansen et al. (2000) suggest that labor costs 
could rise quickly as labor unions developed and as people came to expect higher 
standards of living. An undeniable advantage in terms of the Baltic states’ 
attractiveness in the eyes of investors in the 1990s was the advantage of leading 
industrial experience in the FSU. Soviet Latvia, for example, contained only one 
percent of all the inhabitants of the Union, but produced 29 percent of all passenger 
wagons for rail transportation, half of all telephone receivers, every fourth radio, 22 
percent of trolley cars and many other goods at a percentage rate that greatly exceeded 
the ratio of Latvia’s inhabitants to those of the ex-Soviet Union (Pabriks and Purs 
2002).  
 
While they lag behind Western Europe and Nordic countries today, the three Baltic 
nations were at the leading edge of Soviet industrial development (Kultalhati et al. 
1997, in Johansen et al. 2000:207). Although most early post-Soviet investors in the 
Baltic region, from Finland and other Nordic countries, were already present, 
Johansen et al. predicted that additional new alliances would be formed between 
Baltic and Nordic countries (Johansen et al. 2000:207). This prediction is actually 
coming true: the growth of the Baltic states in the European political arena since the 
late 1990s has been exceptionally intensive.42 Let us take, for instance, the example of 
Latvia.  
 
                                                 
42 Landmarks of the accesion to the European Union (EU) by the Republic of Latvia 
http://www.arhivi.lv/index.php?&336 (accessed 07.01.2011). 
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On 10 February 1999 Latvia becomes a full-fledged member of the World Trade 
Organization. On 15 February 2000 official negotiations are launched with Latvia 
and Lithuania on accession to the EU. On 30 March 2001, at the meeting of the EU 
accession negotiators, negotiation chapters on “Free movement of goods” and 
“Culture and audiovisual policy” were closed. On 17 May, chapters on “Free 
movement of capital” and “Company law” were concluded, and chapters on 
“Taxation” and “Financial control” were opened. On 12 June, at the EU Inter-
governmental Conference, the chapters on “Freedom to provide services” and “Social 
policy and employment” were closed. On 27 June, at the meeting of the EU accession 
negotiators, the chapter on “Free movement for persons” was closed and negotiations 
were launched on the “Justice and home affairs” chapter. On 28 November, at the 
meeting of the EU accession negotiators, the chapters “Environment”, “Competition 
policy” and “Financial control” were closed. On 7 November 2002, the Saeima 
(parliament) of the Republic of Latvia opened a permanent office at the European 
Parliament in Brussels; in Copenhagen, on 13 December 2002, the European Council 
passed a decision on completing negotiations and invited ten EU candidate countries – 
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Malta and Cyprus – to join the EU.  
 
It is little wonder then that Norwegians, like other potential investors from the Nordic 
countries, were more than happy to take a long shot in the emerging Baltic market.  
 
4.4.The Norwegians Get Busy 
 
In 2001, the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) launched a report entitled 
“EUs østutvidelse. Behov for et norsk krafttak”43, clearly reflecting Norwegians’ 
concerns about insufficient engagement in the rapidly growing Baltic markets. At a 
time when the EU provided generous support to the processes of change in EU 
candidate countries, Norway’s involvement had been comparatively modest; its 
profile in candidate countries was low, because Norway stood outside the EU 
enlargement process (NHO 2001:7). Concern had also been voiced over whether 
Norwegians knew enough about the EU region, which, after the accession of 10 new 
                                                 
43 The expansion of the EU eastwards requests an all-out effort from Norwegians.  
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members in 2004, was to become the dominant global trading bloc with 475 million 
people.  
 
It is estimated in the NHO report (2001) that Norway in its relations with the Baltic 
states and Poland had an unexplored trading potential of around NOK8.5 billion and 
that the economic growth of those countries in the short and long term would 
considerably exceed that of Norway and the EU. Notably, the report mentions that 
those markets would be of interest to Norwegian manufacturers because of their low 
production costs and high unemployment rates44 among skilled workers. By 
deploying production facilities in the Baltics, Norwegians could conveniently produce 
for EU markets.  
 
The NHO report insisted that a Norwegian strategy should be produced concerning 
the EU candidate countries in the Baltics and that Norwegian interests in those 
markets should be identified, because only through joint, focused activity on the part 
of public institutions and businesses would Norwegian interests in the enlarged EU be 
secured (NHO 2001). The NHO report states that it wants Norway and its business 
community to reinforce contacts with neighboring countries, because good working 
relations would not emerge without assistance. Although the emerging Baltic markets 
are on their doorstep, the rates of Norwegian investments there and trade interactions 
were low. As a reason for this, the NHO report points to the risks attached to 
emerging markets and limited knowledge of them following half a century of isolation 
from the outside world. The strengthening of relations was not only an economic but 
also a political wish, because, as the NHO report states, Norway needed to support 
candidate countries in their EU membership aspirations for reasons of solidarity.45  
 
In order to promote cooperation and influence with candidate countries, the NHO, 
among other things, recommends that the government set aside NOK1 billion for a 
three-year support program that would bolster the economic and societal development 
in those countries and reinforce political and economic relations between Norway and 
the candidate countries. In order to develop Norwegian business activity there, the 
                                                 
44 In 1999, unemployment in Estonia was around 10 percent, in Latvia it stood at 12 percent, but in 
Lithuania it was 17 percent (NHO 2001:15). 
45 My emphasis. 
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report suggests that different types of business support be implemented, both advisory 
and financial, by opening loan opportunities and providing guarantees.  
 
The NHO report also insists that Norwegian support programs should be competitive 
with programs undertaken by other Nordic countries and that Norwegian companies 
should have the same conditions as EU companies seeking to establish themselves in 
candidate countries. For instance, at this time, EU companies, on an annual basis, 
were able to apply for financial support in their country under various EU programs 
for an amount equivalent to NOK25 billion. The NHO (2001) report suggests 
expanding the NORAD46 matchmaking program (designed to support the 
establishment of sustainable and profitable joint ventures between Norwegian 
companies and companies in South Africa) to include EU candidate countries, or to 
set up a similar program to stimulate Norwegian–East European business cooperation.  
 
In its further recommendations, the NHO report (2001) suggested that for reasons of 
cooperation between countries, Norwegian participation should be expanded in media 
such as the Development Forum, Østersjørådet, Barentssamarbeidet and EUs 
Nordlige dimensjon. Norwegian businessmen should be offered knowledge and 
information about EU candidate countries, about business opportunities there and 
about national and international business start-up programs. The report recommends 
that a center should be set up, giving information and advice about entering EU 
candidate country markets and helping companies to draw up applications for support 
programs. It also states that the Baltic Sea Region should be advertised as an 
attractive region of high economic growth; it was estimated that in the short term the 
Baltic states would increase their GDP by 60 percent. Cooperation with candidate 
countries, it stated, must be sustainable, foreseeable, and have long-term stable 
funding (NHO 2001). 
 
The activities of both the NHO (Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise) in 2001 and 
the Nordic Council of Ministers in 1991, in requesting the Nordic Investment Bank 
(NIB) to survey financing issues, with particular emphasis on the prerequisites for 
Baltic countries to attract foreign investment, indicate that economic actions may well 
                                                 
46 Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. 
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be embedded not only in social relations or networks but also in politics. In order to 
strengthen the capacities of their entrepreneurs and investors, as well as their power 
position in a strategically advantageous geographic region (in the name of solidarity, 
as postulated by the NHO), the organizations of the Nordic states declared their 
strategic viewpoints and plans that needed to be realized in order to achieve the goals 
set. As the case below will illustrate, the strategic actions of several Norwegian 
industrialists were to be put to work precisely by the stimulus of Norwegian state 
policies and support measures.  
 
4.5.The Baltic Sea Billions,47 or a Struggle to Assist?  
 
Norwegians were concerned about the fact that the EU had turned down EFTA48 
countries’ desire for a closer formal cooperation in membership negotiations with 
candidate countries on the pretext that they were bilateral negotiations between the 
EU and each specific candidate country. The EU has regularly declined Norway’s 
offer to contribute to EU support programs (for instance, to the PHARE49 program for 
the development of the infrastructure sector), indicating that this is an internal EU 
support program targeted at third-party countries (NHO 2001). 
 
The enhancement of business competence and knowledge of the market economy 
were named in the NHO report as potential areas of support that might be achieved 
through staff and student exchanges and Norwegian university scholarships. Notably, 
the upgrading of environmental standards was perceived as an area where Norwegian 
competence could be successfully invested. New candidate countries were expected to 
carry out considerable improvements in the environmental sector in order to meet EU 
criteria and to make a transfer to more environment-friendly and cleaner production 
processes. Norwegians saw their opportunity to use this niche to invest in an upgrade 
of the energy, water and waste sectors. In addition, the case study on Nordic Ltd in 
chapter 2 provides a useful perspective on the Norwegian belief that their industries 
could have a major role in the environmental sector of the new EU member states. 
Norwegian businesspeople possess long-standing experience in infrastructure building 
                                                 
47 Østersjømilliardene (NHO 2001). 
48 The European Free Trade Association. 
49 The Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies. 
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(for instance, in roads, power plants, bridges and airport landing systems) in 
developing countries, and the NHO report stated that they were willing to apply this 
competence in the EU candidate countries (NHO 2001). 
 
In 2000, the Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs indicated that Danish 
engagement in the Baltic Sea region exceeded Norway’s50 contribution fourfold and 
that Swedish engagement had been three times broader than that of Norway. The 
Swedish Riksdag allocated a billion Swedish crowns towards business development in 
the Baltic Sea region: first in 1996 and then again in 1998, with the aim of stimulating 
growth and employment in both Sweden and the Baltic Sea region, and reinforcing 
the position of Swedish companies in the area (NHO 2001). Norwegian support and 
engagement targeted, for the most part, environment and democratization, and, to a 
lesser extent, the field of entrepreneurship. 
 
The Danish research report, “Launching a Region – Potentials, Possibilities and 
Prosperity”,51 reveals that in 1998, Norway had potential for increasing exports to 
Estonia by 37 percent, to Lithuania by 77 percent, and to Poland by 117 percent. In 
all, the report estimates that Norwegian exports to the Baltic states and Poland could 
be increased by NOK3.15 billion. As regards imports to Norway, the unexplored 
potential amounts to 437 percent from Lithuania, 421 percent from Latvia and 9 
percent from Estonia.  
 
This demonstrates that at the end of the 1990s and in the early 2000s Scandinavian 
ministries and agencies, when estimating the numerical value of Baltic economic 
development, could see an unfulfilled cooperation potential and niches where their 
compatriots could operate. Baltic purchasing power was rising, inflation was around 
1–3 percent, trade with the EU has been growing by 20% annually since 1993 (NHO 
                                                 
50 The Norwegian program for cooperation with countries from Central and Eastern Europe by 2001 
targeted NOK 228 million, mostly towards Russia, less so in relation to the Baltics. The program was 
administered by the Norweigian Foreign Ministry. The 2001 budget proposal was NOK 369 million. 
The SND Investment Fund for Central and Eastren Europe held NOK 70 million, but the amount was 
due to be increased to NOK 120 million. This fund allocates financing for smaller scale projects and 
targets small and medium-sized companies. The majority of projects were in the Baltics and Poland. 
There were growing interest in the fund. By 2001, all Baltic capitals hosted offices of the Norwegian 
Trade Council (Norges Eksportråd) (NHO 2001). 
51 “Launching a Region – Potentials, Possibilities and Prosperity”, Danish Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, 2000.   
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2001). However, investments by EU states in the candidate countries were lower than 
expected, and in 1997 constituted only 5 percent of the total EU direct investment of 
EUR31 billion, which was the highest figure for direct investment in candidate 
countries (NHO 2001). Of course, the NHO report was not the only source 
announcing that new business opportunities in the Baltic region were very promising. 
Particularly active in propagating the “ocean of possibilities” at the other side of the 
Baltic Sea was the Norwegian Industrial Development Agency (NIDA) with its 
slogan,  
 
Should your company need a competiveness boost and access to export markets, 
join other Norwegian companies in the industrial fairytale in the Baltics!  
 
There were certainly some challenges that had to be overcome to break with the social 
ties and companies’ legacies in their native regions, and to establish production 
relations in the foreign and seemingly unpredictable Baltic market. The assets 
Norwegian entrepreneurs required to help them pluck up their courage for such a step 
were those that could offer safety, predictability and some kind of guarantee. Two 
particular cases follow that will help explain this situation further.  
 
4.6.A Safety Net for Norwegian Businesses 
 
The company N-Welding AS was formed in Central Norway in the mid 1940s; it was 
established as a manufacturer of wooden furniture. This side of the business went into 
decline, so the company took up the manufacturing of metal railings in the 1950s; 
finally, in the 1960s, it went into mechanical engineering. Like a number of 
Norwegian small and medium-sized companies in the 1950–60s, N-Welding AS 
experienced both good years and bad; at times they were on the verge of bankruptcy, 
but pulled through successfully. Ever since then, N-Welding AS has been producing 
mechanisms that provide us with comfort in our workplaces, as they allow for the 
adjusting of the back of office chairs to the required angle. We do not see these 
gadgets as they are mounted under the chair, and even if we saw them, we most 
probably would not give any thought to where they have been made. Yet, an insight 
into the conditions of production of these gadgets would help us to understand the 




It is with these fixings that N-Welding AS makes its living by selling them to chair 
manufacturers in Sweden and Germany, though less are sold in Norway. As 80–90 
percent of the products are exported, N-Welding AS is very sensitive towards 
fluctuations on the global markets. The company entered the twenty-first century with 
concern for its competitiveness as the production costs in Norway had been rising 
year on year. For many years, the company had employed around 140 workers, but 
over time only 80 were left: due to reduced demand and lower competitive capacity, 
there was no need for so many staff. Italian firms with their constantly low prices and 
large volumes were the fiercest competitors to N-Welding AS. Fixings produced by N-
Welding AS were not cheap, but they were of excellent quality, durability and were 
easy to use. They were highly competitive in European markets in terms of quality, 
but not in terms of price:  
 
If wages are once again being raised by 5% in Norway, this is a fait accompli, 
and you cannot do anything about it. We cannot tell our customers in Germany 
that they’ll have to pay more for our product because our wages and electricity 
tariffs have been raised (Knut Kløver, 2006). 
 
One day in 2001, while reading a monthly publication from the mechanical engineer’ 
trade union, Knut Kløver noticed an advert in which the owner of a Norwegian 
metalworking company in the Baltics, Tore Hauge, offered welding services for a 
comparatively low price. Having contacted the company, Knut discovered that several 
Norwegian firms were already operational in the field of furniture manufacturing and 
metalworking in the Baltics.  
 
A couple of hundred  kilometers from the village where the N-Welding AS plant was 
then situated in Norway, in a hamlet adjacent to a small fjord, reachable only by ferry 
from the nearest town, there stands a huge plant with dark windows, Tekstil AS. With 
its central location, bright color and massive size, it shapes the village identity and is 
impossible to ignore. Its fresh, stately, modern, clean and untarnished bulk in no way 
suggests lack of production. Although it is silent and exudes a tranquility 
uncharacteristic of an industrial facility, the building does not remind one of factories 
in the post-Soviet Baltics, abandoned after production has been stopped, repelling 




Although hardly any work is going on at the Tekstil AS plant, the village identity is 
still connected to the name and business of the factory. The villagers still talk about 
earlier days, when the factory worked at full capacity, employing 100 knitters and 
dressmakers, and about how things could have been. The history and traditions of the 
plant are demonstrated by samples of warm woolen sweaters in Norwegian patterns 
displayed on each storey of the plant, and by woolen underwear hanging decoratively 
on a clothesline. Today, only one woman is in charge of a small workshop, where 
knitting machines turn out, one after another, pieces of patterned, knitted woolen 
fabric. This production facility for sweater material is the only one retained in the 
Tekstil AS plant in Norway, so that the collars can still proudly display the “Made in 
Norway” tag – a mark of quality and tradition without which those woolen items 
would lose their value for the Norwegian market. In addition, the administration and 
the product design group are still located in the main building of Tekstil AS; other 
facilities will be rented out to prevent closure of this large modern plant. Only fifteen 
people are now working in the Tekstil AS factory in Norway.  
 
Being aware that there was a slim chance of continuing to produce woolen items in 
Norway, given the ever-increasing costs, Helge Hofset, the production manager of 
Tekstil AS, together with a member of the factory’s board, went to the Baltics in 1998 
to search for a suitable site for re-location. The original idea of renting an already 
operating facility in the Baltics had failed because machinery of good enough quality 
could not be found there. However, they managed to find a plant with free space that 
produced similar wares, and Tekstil AS bought the company. By 2007 Tekstil AS has 
been working in the Baltics for eight years; traditional Norwegian woolen garments 
are knitted and sewn by 90 Baltic workers. Hofset now spends most of his time in the 
Baltics. If some years ago his weekdays in this industrial town seemed uninviting due 
to unsavory food, and an ugly and unsafe environment, he now enjoys his time there. 
He has put down roots, learned the local language and runs the factory operations by 
himself.  
 
N-Welding AS for its part was more cautious than Tekstil AS and did not decide to 
move to an unknown country in Eastern Europe, with the attendant risks of such a 
move. Still, Tore Hauge’s advert in the technical paper aroused interest in 
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opportunities in the Baltics. Knut Kløver, the director of N-Welding AS, had little 
knowledge about the Baltics and the Norwegian programs that supported the entering 
of foreign markets. He had barely heard anything about the Program for Cooperation 
with Russia and Eastern Europe (Samarbeidsprogrammet med Russland og Øst-
Europa) and told me, when I first met him in 2005, that he believed his company was 
too small to ensure safe entry into the market of a strange country. Larger companies 
might have been able to establish direct contact with Baltic officials, but he felt the 
name and size of N-Welding AS was too insignificant for that. N-Welding AS did not 
have its own contacts in the Baltics and applying for support with the Norwegian 
Industrial and Regional Development Fund (SND) seemed like an unwieldy and 
complicated process. Moreover, Knut had heard that the SND had granted funding to 
a certain company but could not release it due to budgetary problems. The manager of 
another company told me that the whole business with the SND had been “damn 
tricky” and fraught with unpredictable bureaucracy: by the time it was his turn for the 
review of his carefully prepared application, the funding scheme had already been 
terminated. Seemingly high risks, lack of knowledge about post-Soviet countries and 
a poorly developed capital market in those countries had prompted several Norwegian 
businessmen to seek financial and governmental support to launch their businesses in 
the Baltic states: for instance, they sought support for project development, financial 
arrangements such as “soft loans”, guarantee arrangements, risk coverage, as well as 
advice from lawyers and accountants that could help to control the solidity and 
integrity of potential cooperation partners, for it is at the outset of operations in 
foreign markets that most mistakes are made.  
 
Knut explored the potential for taking part in activities that could establish a contact 
network in the Baltics. He also hoped that the presence of Norwegian institutions 
would be increasingly felt there, which would help him to feel a greater level of trust 
in relation to this unknown region. He also reasoned that this might influence political 
processes in EU candidate countries, through the strengthening of the rule of law and 
reduction of corruption. Knut started frequenting seminars held in Norway on 
production opportunities in the Baltic market that were organized by the Norwegian 
Industrial Development Agency (NIDA). NIDA’s initial goal was to develop strong 
regional and local industrial clusters through ownership in infrastructure, investment 
and knowledge networks. Its main objective was to contribute to the achievement of 
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the Norwegian government’s policy goals in remote areas, and within this framework 
contribute to unleashing innovation capability and increasing wealth creation in all 
parts of Norway. Importantly, the principal mission of this public agency was to help 
Norwegian industries to develop and enhance an innovative industrial environment in 
Norway’s regions. However, continuing competitiveness for Norway in the 
international arena depended on drastic cost cuts, to which Norwegian regional policy 
could offer no solution. Therefore, over time, NIDA started targeting the nearest 
neighboring countries in Eastern Europe; the idea was to build a cluster of regional 
industries in the area. An active promotion campaign was launched to make 
Norwegian entrepreneurs aware of the opportunities in the Baltic market and to give 
them a hand in exploiting these opportunities.  
 
“Without networks to help them, it seems, businessmen wouldn’t know where or how 
to begin to go about their tasks. Indeed, their world would probably fall apart”, Brian 
Moeran (2005:7) observed. This quotation illustrates the position that Knut, as a 
director of a medium-size regional company on the verge of bankruptcy, found 
himself in when realizing that moving production to the Baltics might be a solution to 
his company’s financial problems. Knut tried several networks in search of support 
for mostly informational and financial issues; in the end, NIDA was able to solve all 
of them: 
 
We are neither Hydro, nor Statoil; we do not have our own lawyers who could help 
in this context. I can only say that if not for NIDA, we would not have come here. 
Still, we did not have much choice. Our bank in Norway dropped a clear hint that 
recently our figures had been in the red ... And our large international customers 
made us understand that they would not buy anything from us unless we reduced 
costs by 5 percent the following year. In fact those two conditions made us move to 
the Baltics. The bank recommended us to contact NIDA and NIDA did the rest 
(Knut Kløver, 2005). 
 
The importance of networking in business relations is emphasized by Moeran (2005). 
While carrying out fieldwork in a Japanese advertising agency, Moeran set up a 
number of important relationships that helped him further in social networking, with 
one of these relationships becoming especially important. Yano, an agency employee, 
asked him to keep an eye on his son, who was a student at a university in London 
where Moeran worked. Moeran met the young man a number of times and, upon 
Moeran’s return to Japan to follow up on research, Yano became one of his trusted 
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‘knots in the network’ through whom he could obtain information of vital importance 
to his studies. Moeran recognizes that initially his relationship with Yano was based 
on the principle of reciprocity and was instrumental in character, but later it grew into 
friendship. Mutual co-operation and assistance are important features of networking.  
 
Although Knut’s relation to NIDA was not of an identical type, the benefits Knut 
received from NIDA were similar to those Moeran received from Yano. A noteworthy 
difference from the relation between Moeran and Yano is that Knut ‘reciprocated’ 
NIDA’s services with money, but still NIDA became for Knut the important “knot in 
the network” in the Baltic market entrance process. Relations between NIDA and 
Knut were based on mutual interest and trust. NIDA offered Knut predictability and 
safe entry into a seemingly unsafe market, but Knut paid for these services. Thus, 
business organizations and firms also form mutual networks; they can be regarded as 
human networks that build relations within them and beyond their borders. Social 
networks within economic operations reveal such values beyond rational calculation 
as trustworthiness and voluntariness, and display the social essence of economic 
relations.  
 
As Yano was in Moeran’s (2005) case, NIDA was Knut’s social capital. By utilizing 
the concept of social capital we can identify and consequently discuss the 
consequences of these mechanisms through which social structures affect economic 
action. Social capital   means various kinds of valued relations with significant others 
(Jenkins 1992:85), or social obligations and connections of importance for an 
individual, which guarantee a high profile. This profile, for its part, acts as a filter of 
trustworthiness in certain situations; it may be convertible into economic capital and 
institutionalized in the form of a title of nobility (Bourdieu 1986:243). Since social 
capital is not a static or natural quantity, it requires constant sustenance and the 
cultivation of relationships for it to yield material or symbolic benefits (Bourdieu 
1986). As we will see, Knut and NIDA held to these principles.  
 
According to Moeran (2005), it is the kind of qualitative observation characteristic of 
anthropological research that can help the researcher to understand the formation and 
existence of formal corporate networks. As he observed, social networks in Japan take 
shape in patterns according to parameters like kinship, graduation from the same 
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university, common geographical origin, or metaphorical relationships among 
“classmates”, which are based on belonging to a group of siblings and the feeling of 
being of the same generation. These are sufficiently important reasons for building 
contacts that expand an individual’s social networks (Moeran 2005). Moeran detected 
that in Japan these personal contacts underlie the building and sustaining of formal 
corporate networks. Relations between two individuals, who, through further co-
operation, bring together higher-ranking representatives of their organizations, grow 
into relations between organizations. This demonstrates rather a curious phenomenon, 
namely, the relations between two corporate organizations do not only operate at the 
level of top management; quite often, they run through all the levels of power, on a 
basis of individual links and social networking. The individual origins of the 
corporate network explain a number of things: why those links and networks work 
between some organizations but not others, for example. It also elucidates why 
choices are made in favor of certain corporate networks: networks with a high level of 
credibility are prioritized. Trustworthiness is of particular importance because by their 
character informal personal networks and formal corporate networks are both carriers 
of information. They are used in the business environment to obtain information, to 
overtake competitors in getting access to information, and to communicate with 
people who can help in solving a problem. All of this also pertains to the operations of 
NIDA. However, a noteworthy aspect in the network activities of Norwegian 
entrepreneurs is that many of them choose to relate to formal state actors, such as 
NIDA, rather than kinship, classmates or other more informal networks.  
 
4.7.Welcome to an Industrial Fairytale: NIDA 
 
Initially NIDA’s international operations were rooted in the Barents Sea Cooperation 
(Barentssamarbeidet) and in development cooperation with northwest Russia during 
the early 1990s. NIDA opened its office in a Northwest Russian city in order to make 
it easier for Norwegian businesses to penetrate Russia’s market; thus, Norwegians’ 
requirements in Russia were gradually assessed. As Harald Hegstad, director of 




Norwegian businessmen could not deal with Russian bureaucracy and mafia. 
They needed a safe haven, a place where businesspeople could feel secure in all 
possible ways, a 24-hour security guard and a building of good quality; nothing 
of that was available in those days (Harald Hegstad, 2005). 
 
When the Norwegian Foreign Minister had a meeting with the governor of northwest 
Russia in the mid 1990s, Harald Hegstad managed to have included in the minister’s 
speech a sentence about the building of a Norwegian industrial park in the region: 
 
For the Governor this was like a message of joy from heaven. The very next day 
he announced through his community that a Norwegian business center would be 
built here. And things had to be the way he said. Since that day we have not 
experienced any problems in Russia. However, many of those companies who 
choose to act on their own encounter problems. Nobody from our park has had 
any difficulties, as obviously everybody knows about our direct contact with the 
local authority and the trouble they will be facing should they try to touch us. The 
principal idea of the park in Russia was security and good relations with the local 
authority (Harald Hegstad, 2005).  
 
Not only NIDA’s leadership, but also a vast amount of academic literature (Johanson 
2001; Johanson 2002; Ledeneva 2006) has reported on the sense of insecurity 
surrounding the Russian market at that time. Harald said he was convinced that it was 
 
one thing is to do away with a small company in a small town, but where 23 
companies are working together under the scrutiny of government authorities, 
nobody will be tempted to touch those companies (Harald Hegstad, 2005).  
 
In 1995, NIDA started planning to build an industrial park in Northwest Russia, and it 
was completed in 1998. A total of 23 companies moved into this Norwegian industrial 
park, which included round-the-clock security, a number of joint services, conference 
rooms and a cafeteria.  
 
In the meantime, an increasing number of Norwegian industrial businesses had 
approached NIDA expressing a wish to work in the Baltics. They asked why NIDA 
only operated in Russia, when they perceived the Baltic region to be more of a live 
issue. As a result, NIDA obtained authorization from the Ministry of Local and 
Regional Affairs (Kommunal- og regionaldepartementet) to expand their international 
operations to also target the Baltic markets. In 1999, in order to assess the status quo 
and get to know the Baltic states, NIDA’s representatives travelled around the Baltic 
region and discovered that Finns and Swedes had mainly invested in Estonia, but 
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Norwegians had mainly moved into Latvia. On arriving in Riga, the Norwegian 
presence was felt on almost every corner where Norwegian brands were displayed. 
Reflecting on the time when NIDA came to the Baltics, Henning Hansen, Director of 
the NIDA Industrial Park there, said:  
 
We felt that this was the right country. Norwegian businessmen, too, felt more 
attracted to Riga, Riga as a gateway to the Baltics, as a Baltic capital. Still, when 
taking a bird’s-eye view, we do not see borders, we see only the Baltics. 
Norwegian businessmen do not care much whether they will settle down on the 
Latvian or Lithuanian side of the inner borders in the Baltics – the countries are so 
very much alike. What they actually care for is average wages in the Baltics; 
therefore I always have with me up-to-date information. Our principle was as 
follows: we will build an industrial park in a place where we can receive a blessing 
on our actions from the local authority; we are going to attract Norwegian 
investments to the community, but the local authority will help us tackle 
bureaucratic hindrances (Henning Hansen, 2005). 
 
In order to form social ties with high profile locals, NIDA invited several local 
authority leaders from the Baltics to Norway; together they went on a tour through a 
number of Norway’s regions where Baltic local municipalities were promoted as 
attractive for industrial activities. In total, fifteen Norwegian companies, including N-
Welding AS, expressed interest in deploying their production facilities in the industrial 
park NIDA was planning in the Baltics. The municipality of Linava in the Baltics had 
already established a good and trusted level cooperation with Norwegians Tore Hauge 
and Jon Volstad, and Linava was therefore ready to host NIDA as well. However, the 
building and area offered in Linava seemed too expensive for Norwegian 
manufacturers and thus, slightly disappointed, NIDA’s representatives abandoned the 
idea of cooperating with the Linava local authority. 
 
NIDA suggested that Norwegian manufacturers should decide where they wanted to 
locate their production units. A tour to the Baltics was arranged for those who were 
interested in order to inspect potential locations. They were welcomed in a number of 
places and finally Livpils was chosen as the most suitable. This small town was close 
to the capital, the airport and the port, and the mayor was very responsive; also, the 
7600 m2 property and the surrounding plot of land were available for an acceptable 
price. The Norwegian government gave NIDA permission to make an investment of 
almost NOK5 million towards the purchase of this industrial area in Livpils, and thus 




Rent agreements with the manufacturers who wanted to relocate to NIDA’s park in 
Livpils were concluded before the industrial facilities were equipped; in this way, 
NIDA knew how many square meters of industrial area were required and what 
equipment each company needed. The tenant manufacturers were given the option of 
contributing to the process of preparing the buildings so that they could, if need be, 
adjust the proceedings according to their requirements. This meant that each company 
could start its production in a made-to-measure plant.  
 
While fitting out the units to accommodate production, contacts with Livpils 
municipality were useful. There seemed to be no sign of corruption – which had been 
Norwegian entrepreneurs’ main worry in relation to working in Eastern Europe. The 
mayor of Livpils was happy about the upcoming industrial micro cluster and the new 
jobs emerging in his municipality. Things went smoothly, then, until Henning Hansen 
discovered that the park could not be connected to mains electric power. The local 
energy company insisted that NIDA should pay for a 6.5 km cable to supply power to 
the property. The energy company claimed it could not afford to lay the cable itself as 
the associated costs were estimated at NOK 2 million. NIDA argued that the 
establishment of a micro cluster in Livpils municipality was in the interests of the 
community and the local council alike. They further retorted that the demand should 
have been made before they bought the property, and that it was insane to demand 
such a huge investment for connecting power; they stated that neither Norway nor 
Sweden would do anything like this. NIDA’s protests achieved nothing, and they 
were forced to pay for the cable and its installation. This, however, did not solve 
everything. The next events were described by Henning, as follows:  
 
There is a bridge in Livpils that shelters a Rivertroll.52 In order to draw the cable 
up to our territory, we had to lay the cable either two meters under the riverbed or 
along the side of the bridge. Along the side of the bridge there ran a trench where 
the cable could be laid. But the troll did not want the cable to be laid there. The 
troll was an important creature, because in Eastern Europe he who has a round 
stamp is the master of the situation. He who has the seal has the power. We could 
                                                 
52 A metaphor frequently used by Henning Hansen to denote the unpredictable attitude of a seemingly 
corrupt Baltic bureaucrat, who can make running a business complicated. The metaphor in all 
likelihood is borrowed from a Norwegian fairy tale Three Billy Goats Gruff (De tre bukkene Bruse). 
The fairy tale pictures three goats who must cross a river to get to a meadow on the other side of a river 
in order to eat grass. In order to do so, they must cross a bridge, under which lives a fearsome troll who 
threatens to eat anyone who passes the bridge ... 
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not get anything done without that seal, we did not know how the river-troll could 
be persuaded to let us lay the cable through the trench on the side of the bridge. 
We discovered that there already were some cables in the trench but the troll said 
that there was no more room for ours.  
 
But then it turned out that our local manager’s father knew the river-troll; they 
were old hunting companions. Our manager’s father called the troll and said, 
‘Look, give them permission to put that cable in the trench, or else they are 
unable to start production for several months’. ‘OK, OK’, said the troll. And 
that’s how we got the troll’s stamp and laid the cable across the bridge in ten 
days. 
 
Unlike Norway, decisions in the Baltics are made to a great extent on the grounds 
of opinion; individuals are empowered to make their opinion come true. But you 
cannot argue against an opinion. I suspect that Baltic legislation has been 
designed with intent to enable corrupt deals, so that an opinion preferred by a 
particular individual could become true. Norwegian and Swedish legislation 
works by virtue of complying with conditions. If you have fulfilled conditions, 
then legal rights are on your side and you can demand that these rights be 
exercised. Decisions are not underpinned by opinions but by compliance with 
certain conditions. This is the greatest problem with Baltic legislation: too many 
legally unjustified decisions made on the grounds of opinions. The power was in 
the hands of the River-troll; he could give or deny us his seal.  
 
Had we not discovered our friendly connection with the troll through our local 
manager and his father, the battle would probably still be going on. We would 
never have paid him any money; we would have acted through the media and 
authorities, until we achieved what we were entitled to by democratic means. We 
have clearly defined, both for ourselves and for others, our position as regards 
bribes: should anybody demand a bribe from us for issuing a permit that is due to 
us, we would sooner accept failure and go home than pay up. Our position is to 
act within the law and to arm ourselves with patience when dealing with 
formalities, but should this fail, then draw in the media and inform other investors 
about a negative experience in the Baltics, or go to the city mayor who had 
promised to help us. And this event was proof of the fact that there is nothing to 
be done here by a small company on its own, without connections; it would be 
lost in a situation like this. This was the only surprise that was unacceptable to 
our way of thinking, and it remains the only problem we encountered in the 
Baltics while launching NIDA park and working there (Henning Hansen, 2005). 
 
 
It follows from Henning’s monologue that social networks in the corporate 
environment are not uniform, as already indicated by Moeran (2005). NIDA was 
inclined to form its business networks in the Baltics with formal state actors (such as 
the mayor of Livpils municipality), whom they perceived to be trustworthy guarantors 
of successful business operations there. The case related by Henning also indicates 
that it is not easy for participant or observer to work out when two people are 
communicating as individuals and when they are acting as individuals representing 
business organizations. These roles can be mutually exchanged or replaced depending 
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on the situation. This is connected with the choice of different social roles for certain 
situations. Business contacts, coalitions and other important relations are built for 
performing even seemingly unrelated tasks (for instance, undertaking parental duties 
or going out hunting); such activities also expand an individual’s social networks. 
Carrying out research on networks is difficult, for they do not have well-defined 
borders; starting from an unsophisticated relationship between two people, social 
networks can lead a researcher in unpredictable directions. 
 
When talking about social networks in the post-Socialist space, one cannot disregard 
the blat networks in the Soviet Union that served as a foundation for many a 
successful business. Blat relations, or informal contacts and personal networks, which 
were used to obtain goods and services under rationing (Ledeneva 1998), blat was the 
primary way of getting things done in a non-market society in which money counted 
for little. Blat resulted from the combination of the shortage of goods and 
consumerism; from the paradox between the ideology of equality and planned 
economy and the practice of differentiation through privilege and a closed distribution 
system. Blat exchange was vital to the functioning of the Soviet system; it became an 
everyday pattern of behavior and an entrenched mentality (Ledeneva 1998; Cimdina 
Barstad 2003). 
 
Ledeneva (1998) explains that a blat relationship is not merely an exchange of goods 
and services; it is rooted in human relations and, moreover, its principles of 
reciprocity can seem rather strange. Blat networks were not usually built on the 
grounds of immediate bilateral reciprocity, but rather as relationships that would “bear 
in mind” the need to return the favor. Helping out with personal contacts was not 
rewarded in a tangible, immediate manner, but was linked to a possibility that another 
person’s help could sometimes prove useful, as in the case of the river-troll and 
NIDA’s local manager who, due to a blat-like relationship, obtained permission to put 
the electricity cable in the trench. Reciprocity in their case was based on an 
opportunity to ask assistance when either of them felt that it was their “turn … to help 
again” (Ledeneva 1998: 6). The significance of blat networking is not to be sought in 
an immediate real benefit, but in the importance of the relations themselves. Another 
feature of blat is the insignificance of money: for instance, cars belonging to a good 
acquaintance would be repaired for a cheaper price, because they supplied other 
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clients and created a good reputation for the particular business; for reasons of 
trustworthiness only clients recommended by others were served (Ledeneva 1998:10). 
Money was not important in blat relationships because in Soviet times it could not 
guarantee access to goods and services to the extent that good relations could.  
 
The fact that blat can only work through non-market ethics and informal human 
relations does not rule it out from the market-oriented economy, according to 
Ledeneva (1998). Blat has been adapted to function in new market conditions. It 
might still work if not in the sphere of trade and in accumulation of commodities, as 
in Soviet times, then in dealings with bureaucracy – as we saw in NIDA’s dispute 
with the river-troll. 
 
As further cases will show, blat-like relations turned out to be more important in 
terms of business needs in the Baltics than good formal relations with the 
municipality.  Baltic people routinely use their networks for business activities as they 
used to do for personal consumption in Soviet times. This state of affairs seemed to be 
unknown to NIDA and its tenant manufacturers. Good contacts in such cases can play 
a much more significant role than bribes (Cimdina Barstad 2003). 
  
Especially at the beginning of the 1990s, personal contacts played a crucial role in the 
development of small enterprises in the Baltics. The launching of private business had 
not been attempted before and thus advice and help was essential. One of the local 
Baltic entrepreneurs put it this way:  
  
When I decided to grip the long awaited opportunity and throw myself into 
business there was a lot of help I needed. My registration documents were 
presented by my friends or their friends. Informal channels were the essential 
factor in starting a business. The advice and information I got through my friends 
and acquaintances I considered as the most reliable. I think that business was 
bound to depend on informal contacts because the contract system was not 
developed yet. There were no efficient mechanisms for solving conflict situations 
or imposing sanctions on unreliable partners. Therefore, I think that the informal 
contacts, as you call them, and trust relations formed within blat networks were 
the only guarantee one could rely on (Cimdina Barstad 2003:120). 
  
The range of difficulties that personal contacts in the Baltic business environment 
could help with was vast: receiving permissions, the arranging of privileged 
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conditions for loans, the postponing of payments, freedom to withdraw private money 
from banks, queue jumping and the speeding up of bank transactions. Examining the 
situation in Russia, Ledeneva (1998) states that only those who could rely on the 
support of their contacts in banks, in state organizations or in local administration 
could run their business successfully. Similarly in the Baltics, access to all kinds of 
resources, especially information, was limited unless contacts were available. The 
selection of partners, bankers and guarantors was normally determined by the 
recommendations and advice of acquaintances (Cimdina Barstad 2003).  
  
Thus, we can progress to the next chapter in the knowledge that economic practices 
are part of social relationships, or that economic relations are also social relations – a 
cognition that is clearly demonstrated in an analysis of social networks. As observed 
in chapter 3, research into the networks of business environments allows the 
contestation of the instinct of economists to separate economics and entrepreneurship 
from social processes. But before we go deeper into an analysis of the embeddedness 
of entrepreneurial actions in social relations, we should take a look at social networks 





Chapter 5.  
Social Networking as the Core of Embeddedness? 
5.1.Social Networks as an Analytical Instrument 
 
The Kula exchange described by Malinowski can be regarded as one of the first 
descriptions of network research. The Kula ring cannot be compared directly to 
modern business environment networks, yet it demonstrates the basic functions of 
networks and their significance in actors’ daily lives. The Kula exchange is more a 
social and symbolic than an economic transaction and its prerequisites are reciprocity, 
a successful (intercultural) communication and an agreement on values and their 
significance. The establishment and practice of common customs and rituals, through 
exchanging shells and other objects of symbolic significance, could not take place 
within the Kula framework without successful (intercultural) communication.  
 
The notion of social networks was first introduced by Barnes in 1954, although 
interpersonal relations between individuals and groups that structure behavior have 
been examined by anthropologists ever since Malinowski. Barnes, however, raised it 
from a metaphorical to a conceptual statement about social relationships in social 
situations, and the relatively unstructured quality of social relationships in large-scale 
societies (Mitchell 1974). 
 
The metaphorical use of the idea of the social network emphasizes that social 
links of individuals in any given society ramify through that society. The 
analytical use of the idea of social network seeks to specify how this ramification 
influences the behavior of the people involved in the network (Mitchell 1974: 
280). 
 
Network analysis is an analytical instrument that views circles of relatives, friends, 
coalitions, groups, businesses, industrial companies and even nation states as 
scatterings of points connected by lines that form networks (Boissevain 1979:392). 
The introduction of network analysis opened a door to the study of interacting people 
engaged in actions that could alter and manipulate the institutions in which they 
participated (ibid.). “The basic simplicity of the idea of a network” (Barnes 1972:3) 
relates to questions about who is linked to whom, the nature of that linkage, and how 
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the nature of the linkage affects behavior (Boissevain 1979:392). As Barnes notes, 
the“configuration of cross-cutting interpersonal bonds is in some unspecified way 
causally connected with the actions of these persons and with the social institutions of 
their society” (Barnes 1972:2).  
 
Barnes (1972), Mitchell (1974), Boissevain (1979), and Whitten and Wolfe (1974) 
agree that there is no such thing as a theory of social networks; rather, they show that 
what forms the theoretical basis for network analysis is exchange and action theory. 
Exchange theory, suggests Peter Blau (1964), encompasses the social world as an 
endless series of exchanges that involve, for example, objects, monetary means and 
communications. According to Blau, people enter social interactions because they 
need something from other people:  
 
An apparent ‘altruism’ pervades social life; people are anxious to benefit one 
another and to reciprocate for the benefits they receive. But beneath this seeming 
selflessness an underlying ‘egoism’ can be discovered; the tendency to help 
others is frequently motivated by the expectation that doing so will bring social 
rewards (Blau 1964:17).  
 
Exchange theories in social sciences have grown in volume; generally, they build on a 
view of the social order as the outcome of exchange between actors. Economists 
would probably analyze exchange by applying rational-choice or rational-action 
theory, focusing on the personal advantage individuals gain through co-operative 
exchange. As Whitten and Wolfe explain, action theory is a type of exchange theory. 
Action theory involves studying 
 
the interpersonal, maximizing exchanges that take place between individuals 
linked to one another in effective personal networks owing to their common 
relationship to a socially significant ego (Whitten and Wolfe 1974, in Mitchell 
1974:293).  
 
An anthropologist would stress that both social relations and the pursuit of individual 
advantage are effects of the symbolic nature of the thing exchanged.53 Both 
                                                 
53 Refering to Gregory (1980,1982) and Simmel (1978), Humphrey and Hugh-Jones explains various 
forms of exchange as follows: “in gift exchange, inalienable objects, of the same kind, pass between 
people already bound together by social ties whilst in commodity exchange, alienable objects, of 
different kind, pass between people acting as free agents. Gift exchange underwrites social relations 
and is concerned with social reproduction; commodity exchange establishes relations between things 
and ensure their reproduction” (Humphrey and Hugh-Jones 1992:7). In monetary exchange, the value 
of one exchange object – money – has no direct use, but is merely a claim of other definite values. The 
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anthropologists and economists would agree that the breakdown of the exchange 
process would result in a conflict. 
 
Mitchell (1974) and others (for instance, Schweizer 1997) have pointed out that there 
is scant data on measures of density in social networks. However, the goal of the 
present research is not to measure the extension and density of social networks, but 
rather it seeks to examine the content of the networks. Network analysis focuses not 
only on interlinkage, but also on the content of the relations and the inherent tensions 
in social relations. Originally, Mitchell (1969) identified content, directedness, 
durability, intensity and frequency as the salient interactional criteria of social 
networks that must be considered in an analysis of social networks (Mitchell 1969: 
20–27). Some years later, he distinguished among three categories of content of social 
interaction. The first examined the communication content, in which the links 
connecting points representing persons in a network diagram represent the passage of 
information of some sort (an aspect elaborated upon by Granovetter in 1973, as the 
strength of weak ties). The second category is that of transaction or exchange. The 
third category is the normative content, which refers to the actor’s construction of the 
meaning of that relationship to him in terms of his understanding of the other person’s 
expectations of his behavior (Mitchell 1974: 292–294).  
 
Schweizer also indicates that a vital role in the contemporary analysis of social 
networks is played not only by social relations but also by social cognition or 
“cultural meaning”; more precisely, Schweizer studies how action as produced by 
actors located in social networks struggles with cultural goals and how social 
institutions are thereby generated (Schweizer 1997:740). As discussed in previous 
chapters, it is the lack of research focus of this kind that was indicated by some critics 
of the embeddedness approach. Schweizer explains that actors at any point in time are 
positioned in a certain social structure, giving them access to economic and social 
capital, but they are likewise constrained and motivated by the cultural models 
available to them. Social action is the outcome of both network position and cognition 
(Schweizer 1997:756). Action is induced by a combination of mental schemas that 
actors have acquired and developed during their socialization; cultural schemas on 
                                                                                                                                            
realisation of such a claim depends on its acknowledgment by economic community as a whole, or on a 
government as the representative of the community (Humphrey and Hugh-Jones1992:8). 
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their part are embedded in action and are not wholly conscious (Schweizer 1997: 
756). 
 
Of vital importance for an understanding of social network content is a 
methodological approach used in this research, namely, participant observation, as 
some involvement of the observer with the people studied is essential. This is because 
“the determination of the content involves knowing what meaning the actors in any 
situation are attributing to the cues, signs, and symbols being presented in the 
interaction” (Mitchell 1974:296). Because of the holistic nature of ethnographic data 
collection, ethnographic cases are well suited for the assessment of the connection of 
social behavior and cognition through the use of social network tools (Schweizer 
1997:74).  
 
The identification and measurement of networks without the analysis of the content 
that shapes these network relations would preclude a full understanding of the 
business practices in which I am interested. The comparing of networks with regard to 
density, size, and even composition would be similar to the way butterfly collectors 
compare the coloring, wingspread and number of spots of their favorite species 
(Boissevain 1979:393). Would the determination of those qualities allow us to predict 
butterflies’ behavior? Schweizer finds it interesting that even the knowledge that the 
actors have and the norms guiding their action are in most cases insufficient to explain 
and predict the properties of the network that is generated by their individual actions. 
Actors are seen as being motivated by their particular cultural models. Their 
meaningful interactions create a larger network that may be very different from what 
individual actors intended (Schweizer 1997:756). 
 
In this analysis of entrepreneurial activities I aim to show that the social relations in 
which economic processes are embedded have a cultural content in terms of meaning 
and representation. I aim to approach embeddedness not only by identifying specific 
social networks, with the help of which Norwegians enter and establish themselves in 
a new market, but also by analyzing the content and meaning of those networks. 
Because, “when we are asking what is in a social tie we are asking about cultural 
belief” (Schweizer 1997:740). This concerns a belief about one’s own identity and the 
identities of others, and a belief about the place and manner in which to do business, 
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and this substantiates the idea that at the core of analysis should lie a reassessment of 
the relationship between social ties and meaning. Identity matters in embedded 
relationships precisely because it assigns value to the transaction and enriches the 
social capital of exchange partners in the network (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993, in 
Uzzi 1996:677). My intention is to use the idea of the social network and the concept 
of embeddedness to link individual behavior to the larger social system, to conceive 
of the network as a set of relationships that people imbue with meaning and use for 
personal or collective purposes. By emphasizing subjective and multi-layered 
meanings and purposes of action, I presume that network analysis as a research 
instrument will provide theoretical insights into those aspects of society that are 
overlooked by structural and institutional approaches. By focusing upon 
embeddedness within social networks I hope to show how layered contexts, multiple 
voices and sociocultural connectivities in entrepreneurship can be given empirical 
groundings, and how they help to locate the complexities of individual choice and 
action within manifold webs of opportunity and constraint.  
 
5.2.Manufacturing under the Auspices of NIDA: The Case of N-
Welding AS 
 
N-Welding AS was not pressured by NIDA to move to Livpils. A couple of years after 
the NIDA industrial park in Livpils had been opened, N-Welding AS was still holding 
off, making estimates and calculating what they as a small regional company would 
be able to afford. But in 2002 it was finally decided that 40 percent of N-Welding AS 
production would take place in Livpils, although the other facilities would remain in 
Norway. In Norway, the company makes semi-finished machine parts from Swedish 
and German raw materials. The semi-finished product is then delivered to Livpils, 
where the parts are accurately welded together into a finished product. Development, 
administration and sales of the finished product take place in Norway.  
 
Key to an industrial park’s success are trustworthy tenants of long standing. 
Therefore, the NIDA industrial park in Livpils goes to some lengths to keep tenants 
happy with production conditions. If tenants are not successful, NIDA is not 
successful either. Knut Kløver was concerned lest he should be cheated in the Baltics, 
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and believes that his relation with NIDA has protected him from this. Knut, together 
with the rest of the board of N-Welding AS, had been for some time seriously 
considering plans for their operations in the Baltics: they did not come here to play 
games of chance. Knut’s compatriots had warned him that he should be cautious and a 
friend knew somebody who had paid for a property in the Baltics, but on the 
following day it transpired that he had not become the owner of this property. It is 
important for Knut to know that his company is in safe hands when operating in the 
Baltics under the auspices of NIDA. Production in NIDA’s park was costly, but Knut 
did not complain because the problems that NIDA resolved during the initial period of 
operations outweighed the costs. Thus, Knut and NIDA benefited one another.  
 
Had Knut started work there on his own, he estimated that infrastructure costs alone 
would have amounted to 70 percent of his total investments. The plant in NIDA’s 
industrial park is fully adjusted to the needs of N-Welding AS. Knut started paying 
rent only when he had properly launched production and his business had started to 
bring in a profit. For Knut, this seemed much easier than spending significant 
amounts of money in advance, buying a building and installing equipment – and 
providing water, sewerage, electricity, gas – as well as spending a significant amount 
of time tied up with local bureaucracy. NIDA staff also helped him find workers who 
spoke English, introduced him to the mayor of the town, and provided him with 
information on Livpils. It was because of these advantages that Knut did not opt for 
setting up production by himself at Linava, as Tore Hauge’s advert had suggested.  
 
Production in Livpils requires many employees. N-Welding AS currently employs 17 
local workers here. The only criterion when recruiting workers is their welding skill, 
as every fortnight a truck full of 25 tons of semi-finished elements to be welded are 
sent to the Baltics from Norway via Sweden. It took quite some time before the 
personnel understood what was most important when making equipment and which 
things should be focused on, because local workers had never seen products made by 
N-Welding AS. The language barrier is handled by a local production manager who 
knows English, and by the secretary, who speaks Norwegian at an intermediate level. 
Knut had heard that thousands of young people in the Baltics know Scandinavian 
languages, and knowledge of Norwegian was the only requirement when recruiting a 
secretary. Knut speaks English with the local production manager. It took a long time 
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before the man understood what the quality of the products should be, but by 2006 he 
is as good a production manager as the one who works at the facility in Norway, and 
the product quality is excellent. Knut observes that workers in Livpils display more 
commitment than workers in Norway. Having spent three intensive years working in 
Livpils, Knut now visits once a month for a couple of days. During this time, the 
production manager compiles a list of problems that have arisen during Knut’s 
absence and over the course of two days these are reviewed and resolved. Even if 
there are no pressing problems, Knut still comes to Livpils once in a month to 
demonstrate that he cares for and is interested in what is going on in his plant. Knut’s 
staff in Livpils also know Russian and, of course, he is aware of the proximity of the 
huge Russian market; still, Knut is in no hurry to make plans for Russia, because the 
business needs to be established firmly in the Baltics first.  
 
The production process and machinery are identical in Livpils and in Norway; Knut 
observes that only the people are different. The production in Livpils is around 15 
percent more efficient than in Norway. The workers are paid average wages for the 
Baltics. Salary negotiations have just been concluded: the workers wanted their wages 
to be increased by 2.6 percent, but Knut raised the pay by 3.5 percent. Some of the 
workers are skilled welders; some are simply people with life experience who can 
turn their hands to almost anything. There are a lot of these people in the Baltics, Knut 
was told. They are hard working, accurate and efficient. Knut was convinced by the 
assurance that people do not need a university degree to carry out this type of work.  
 
The most important concerns for Knut are safe and predictable production conditions, 
which, he believes, it would not have been possible to secure in the Baltics without 
NIDA. Knut communicates with local authorities through NIDA’s local manager who 
has good contacts in the town because he was born and raised here. He says that 
thanks to NIDA, he has not come across either bribe taking or corruption in Livpils. 
Knut’s secretary has convinced him that the times when money was extorted from 
companies in the Baltics in a menacing way – showing up at the door and threatening 
physical violence – are long gone, although this was still the case in the early 1990s.  
 
In addition, Knut’s fellow Norwegians, who started working in the Baltics in 1995, 
maintain that the business culture back then was totally different to that found today. 
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Although Knut has heard that in some Baltic areas an unofficial fee is demanded for 
getting documents completed on time, he is determined never to give in to such 
demands. He has also heard that workers here steal from their workplaces, but he has 
not observed anything like that at his own plant. Knut even told the factory workers 
that they could borrow tools should they need any for home repairs, but none of the 
factory tools has so far disappeared. However, Knut is not so certain about the 
business environment in the Baltics: he knows that not so long ago an attempt was 
made on the life of a Rimi boss in Riga when a bomb was planted in his shop. Knut 
believes that this was because the man had failed to pay protection money. This threat 
spread like propaganda throughout Norway, shaping opinions about the business 
culture and climate of competitiveness in the Baltics. Apart from a couple of seminars 
held by NIDA, newspapers were Knut’s only source of information on the Baltic 
market.  
 
Profits from the N-Welding AS facility at Livpils not only bolster the company in 
Norway but also allow it to implement plans for expanding the plant at the NIDA 
park. Recently, Knut has invested in a varnishing machine at a cost of 1.5 million 
NOK, which puts a black coating onto the mechanisms welded together at Livpils. 
Knut intends to expand facilities, as the existing building is becoming too small for 
his production rates. Currently, he has 900 m2 in NIDA park and is planning an 
extension of 1200 m2: in total, then, N-Welding AS would have at least 2000 m2 of 
covered production space built to the same standards as the plant in Norway. N-
Welding AS pays an annual rent to NIDA of NOK 600 000; in Norway, the costs 
would be only a little higher. Knut so far has invested NOK5.5 million in Livpils. 
Production equipment costs the same here as it does in Norway. The only difference 
lies in labor costs: workers in Norway cost exactly nine times more than in Livpils. 
This is the basis for N-Welding AS’s profits.  
 
If Knut were younger, he says he would move to Livpils and set up a large plant. But 
he is to retire soon; back at home he has property and a wife, children and 
grandchildren. Therefore, he opts for coming to Livpils only once a month: after work 
on a Wednesday, he takes a direct flight from his town, spends two full workdays at 
Livpils on Thursday and Friday and is back at home by Saturday morning. Everything 




5.3.An Unreliable Strategy 
 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, relations between Norwegian businesses and 
the Baltics were marked by a growing interest in moving labor-intensive production 
facilities to small Baltic towns due to the cheap labor resources. This trend has also 
been widely covered by the Norwegian media. An Økonomisk rapport of 6 February 
2003 observed,  
 
The year 2002 will enter the history of Norwegian industry as the great year of 
facility relocation. That year, a number of Norwegian industrial enterprises saw 
an opportunity of improving profits through cost reduction or simply by moving 
all or a part of the plants to the Baltics where wages are ten times lower than in 
Norway, unemployment rates are high and the distance pleasantly short.  
 
Norwegian businesses were welcomed to the Baltics by famous Norwegian brands of 
the time, such as Statoil, Narvesen, Rimi, Cubus and Dressman. Scandinavian 
entrepreneurs from an increasing range of sectors gradually showed an interest in 
working in the Baltic market. Norwegian call centers, pig farms, chain stores (even 
the King of Norway himself came to launch one of these) and hotels were relocated. 
Norwegian IT companies commissioned Baltic professionals to do software 
programming for fees that were three times lower than in Norway; it became 
commonplace for Norwegian companies to hold board meetings and workshops in 
Baltic capital cities, and “an Industrial Network Norge–Baltikum” was set up. The 
Baltics had become an extension of Norway’s domestic market, “et lite stykke 
Norge.”54 Various Baltic capitals could be reached quickly and comfortably by direct 
flights from almost any Norwegian city. Norway’s media teemed with headlines about 
the opportunities awaiting Norwegian entrepreneurs in the Baltic market.55 
 
                                                 
54 ‘A little part of Norway’. 
55 ”Nordmann størst på gris i Latvia”, Økonomisk Rapport, published 26.06.2002.   
http://www.orapp.no/nyheter/neringsliv/nordmann-storst-pa-gris-i-latvia-/  (accessed 08.08.2011.)  
”Norske politikere valfarter til baltikum”, Økonomisk Rapport, published 19.02.2003.    
http://www.orapp.no/nyheter/neringsliv/norske-politikere-valfarter-til-baltikum-/ (accessed 
08.08.2011.) 
” Norske bedrifter ønsker EU-utvidelse” Økonomisk Rapport, published 14.09.2002. 
http://www.orapp.no/nyheter/neringsliv/norske-bedrifter-onsker-eu-utvidelse-/ (accessed 08.08.2011.) 
”Norge ledende i nye EU-land” Økonomisk Rapport, published 14.09.2002.  
http://www.orapp.no/nyheter/neringsliv/norge-ledende-i-nye-eu-land-/ (accessed 08.08.2011.) 
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“Hundreds of companies are moving to the Baltics”, the newspaper Økonomisk 
rapport wrote on 1 July 2004, indicating that more than 600 Norwegian companies 
were already operating in the Baltic states. On 2 February 2006, the newspaper 
Aftensposten Reise wrote: 
 
Following the decline of Communism, the sun has risen over Riga: cheap airline 
tickets, rich cultural life ... Norwegian chain stores can make Latvia a Norwegian 
favorite weekend destination ... Norwegians feel at home here.  
 
The adverts for NIDA’s industrial park encouraged many Norwegian manufacturers 
in distress to consider the Baltics. They were tempted by  
 
 growing numbers of Norwegian companies in the Baltics;  
 low labor costs;  
 adapted, safe environments and business infrastructure; 
 a long-term solution for breaking into international markets;  
 engagement in Norwegian industrial clusters abroad;  
 international contact networks for starting up international business. 
 
NIDA saved Norwegian regional companies who were on the verge of bankruptcy by 
offering them an opportunity to relocate part of their facilities to the Baltics, thus 
reinforcing their companies in Norway. In the Baltics, manufacturers would get good 
workers for low pay, which is an issue for Norwegian industries in their native 
villages at home. Thus, Norwegian manufacturing companies could still take part in 
all stages of production, and implement new projects under competitive conditions in 
domestic and foreign markets.  
 
By the end of 2005, NIDA’s industrial park in the Baltics extended to over 3 hectares 
and the total floor-space of the buildings was more than 8,000 m2. N-Welding AS, like 
other Norwegian companies working there, had a 15-year rental agreement contract, 
which is proof of a well-thought out plan of action and a long-term production 
strategy. There was no cause for concern regarding investments, because all the 
companies were making considerable profits and the political and economic situation 
in the Baltics did not raise any concerns; on the contrary, the Baltic market with its 
low costs, strategic location and one of the fastest-growing economies in Europe was 
extremely attractive. The mayor of Livpils regularly came to visit. Another electronics 
company and a metalworking company had joined the park; Swedish and Icelandic 
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firms, too, had showed interest. The environment gradually taking shape in Livpils 
was one that NIDA originally intended to build in Norway, namely, an industrial 
micro cluster. Norwegian managers appeared on the ground in factories less and less 
frequently, because the reins of leadership were left in the hands of trusted local 
managers. All workers had been trained, the production run its course and profits 
were rolling in. The N-Welding Ltd factory had an online virtual communications 
system allowing direct communication with the administration offices in Norway, 
which gave access to the necessary instructions and product quality criteria. In other 
words, production under the auspices of NIDA in the Baltics functioned efficiently.  
 
In the meantime NIDA’s activities in the Baltics had been repeatedly assessed by 
Norwegian experts; Norwegian bankers and ministers had made visits to the site and 
had highly commended the work at NIDA’s park. Therefore, it came as a surprise to 
NIDA’s administration and tenants when Stortinget, the Norwegian parliament, 
decided to suspend NIDA’s operations in the Baltics, and to sell the industrial park by 
the end of 2006, despite all the effort that had gone into making it such a success. The 
industrial park that had been established with such a great amount of effort was to 
close, the Norwegian government was to discontinue investments in new EU member 
states, and support for Norwegian companies that wanted to move part of their 
production from Norway to the Baltics was to be stopped.  
 
It goes without saying that the reaction from N-Welding Ltd and other Norwegian 
manufacturer tenants was far from positive. The tenants had been certain that 
anything that NIDA, as a Norwegian governmental institution, was doing was well 
thought out and undertaken with a long-term perspective. NIDA had been a guarantee 
not only to them but also for bank loans they had taken out in Norway. Several 
tenants had plans to extend their production under the auspices of NIDA. N-Welding 
Ltd allied with other Norwegian companies to prevent NIDA being bought by a less 
dependable investor who might raise rent and impose more stringent manufacturing 
conditions. Rent agreements secured certain rights for NIDA’s tenants in case of a 
change of ownership and, if the worst comes to the worst, Knut and his allies were 
ready to buy the whole industrial park rather than allow it to be bought by an “Ivan” 
from Russia. However, this had not been Knut’s goal or strategy when coming to the 
Baltics. He had never been willing to handle property affairs outside Norway or deal 
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with local authorities in the Baltics, as he had neither the social nor cultural capital for 
doing this. To date, for these assets in the Baltics, he had been dependent on NIDA. 
 
Looking at the situation from Bourdieu’s perspective, we could say that the social 
position of entrepreneurs in the field “market” stands in a relationship of domination, 
subordination or equivalence to each other by virtue of access to the goods or 
resources (capital) that are at stake in the field (Jenkins 1992:85). Bourdieu 
differentiates these resources into economic capital, social capital, cultural capital and 
symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1986). Thus, the entrepreneur’s social position in the 
market can be interpreted by virtue of their relationship to the relevant form of capital. 
As discussed above, NIDA comprised not only Knut’s social capital – in terms of 
relations with significant others in the Baltics – but also his cultural capital.  
 
Cultural capital in this context can be viewed as legitimate local knowledge and 
affiliation. In his monograph The Business of Ethnography, Moeran (2005) describes 
the usefulness of his cultural capital when attempting to arrange an opportunity to 
study the operations of an advertising agency in Japan. By mentioning his research 
supervisor, place of work, and the Japanese university he had graduated from, the 
author achieves a cultural capital that exerts a favorable effect to attain the result he 
needs. An important aspect here is the possibility for converting this cultural capital: 
education of international repute can be converted into other forms of capital both 
locally and abroad. This helps overcome the ethnocentric prejudices an employer or 
potential business partner might have. In addition, Bourdieu states, cultural capital is 
convertible, under certain conditions, into economic capital (Bourdieu 1986:243). In 
the case discussed here, Knut has no other affiliation in the Baltics than NIDA, which 
simultaneously is also his supplier of local knowledge. Left without NIDA, he feels 
stripped of vital resources and thus insecure in the Baltic market.  
 
Norwegian manufacturers had not only been motivated to move production to the 
Baltics by cheap labor and favorable rent conditions. NIDA also evoked the synergy 
effect and promised to build a park of Norwegian mechanics industries where a 
number of similar industrial enterprises would operate side by side, thus creating a 
strong Norwegian micro cluster in the Baltics. Norwegian manufacturers in Livpils 
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felt deceived, especially Knut Kløver, who had relied completely on NIDA and 
perceived his future success in Linava as dependent on NIDA’s operations:  
 
Suddenly it was forbidden by law to encourage others to join the cluster. That 
almost means that we are located in an industrial park that has been forbidden by 
law or a decree: for sure, under these circumstances no company is going to move 
here from Norway. We feel deceived. We were promised a cluster of mechanical 
industries, but, at present, any further development of the cluster is forbidden by 
Norwegian national law, the law of the same country that launched the building 
of the cluster and encouraged us to join it with promises of secure long-term 
production conditions in the Baltics. 
 
NIDA is under orders to move out of the Baltics during 2006. Everything that 
was conceived here will be abandoned and NIDA will move away in order to 
stop earning money. And all that because of an uproar kicked up by the mass 
media. For the reason that some manufacturers relocated not just a part of but 
their whole businesses. A company closed down its foundry in Norway and 
moved all its facilities here. That, however, was not NIDA’s idea when opening 
the industrial park in the Baltics. We run our Baltic plant in support of the 
Norwegian plant as a guarantee that we may earn profits and be active in Norway 
as well. That was NIDA’s original idea, and not draining industries off 
Norwegian regions with the help of state aid. 
 
We feel betrayed because, for other Norwegian manufacturers, the doors to this 
place are closed, marketing Livpils in Norway has been discontinued, and we are 
going to remain here all on our own. Under another owner, the place will most 
probably come to accommodate local companies as well, but this was supposed 
to be a Norwegian micro cluster. That was what created the value added for the 
high rent we paid here. While the park was being widely advertised in Norway, 
we had regular visitors from Norwegian local authorities and companies. 
Sometimes even whole buses full of Norwegians with hangovers (Knut laughs 
out loud). And this has nothing to do with rational economic thinking, because 
NIDA’s park earned good money. This is only a political decision. I thought I 
could trust the Norwegian state (Knut Kløver, 2006). 
 
This case illustrates the significance of trust in establishing social relations. Knut’s 
choice to enter the Baltic market through NIDA was determined first of all by his own 
lack of knowledge and his lack of trust in the unknown, unpredictable, foreign, risky 
and to a great extent mystified “otherness” of the Baltic market. As a Norwegian 
governmental agency, NIDA represented the familiar, the trustworthy, the safe and 
the reliable, not only for Knut but also for other Norwegian manufacturers who 
became tenants of NIDA’s industrial park in Livpils, and for the banks that issued 
credit for establishing production in a high-risk zone. The comparatively stable and 
predictable economic situation and entrepreneurial environment in Norway had 
influenced Knut’s perception regarding the role of social networks. Being comfortable 
and safe under NIDA’s auspices, Knut did not feel any need to establish his own 
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relations with the locals or to learn about local ways of life. As we will see in chapter 
6, the need for safety provided by personal social networks is not as important in 
Norway as in the Baltics, and since Knut had remained under the safety net of NIDA 
while operating in the Baltics, he did not know what it meant to operate there on his 
own and how vital local networks and knowledge of the business environment could 
turn out to be. Knut was unsure about how he would manage matters without NIDA 
and this was perhaps the main reason for his worries when he found out about 
NIDA’s closure.  
For Knut, NIDA also comprised symbolic capital – the prestige and social honor of 
operating under the high standards of publicly recognized production facilities owned 
by the Norwegian state in the Baltics, compared to those compatriots who had moved 
to the Baltics on their own and were operating in less advanced facilities and with less 
recognition from their compatriots. Working under the umbrella of NIDA made Knut 
feel as if he had received a kind of national approval of his decision to move 
production facilities to the Baltics, and he had believed that this approval would 
accompany him in his further expansion there.  
 
Bourdieu states that symbolic capital is any property (any form of capital, whether 
physical, economic, cultural or social), when it is perceived by social agents endowed 
with categories of perception that cause them to know it and to recognize it, that is 
given a value (Bourdieu 1998:47). According to Bourdieu, the choice of business 
strategy and its location can be interpreted as subject to an actor’s capital and his 
skills in making use of/applying it. Bourdieu’s notion of strategy involves the social 
agent’s ability to “play the game” or “play the hand” dealt in the “space of 
possibilities” available (Deborah Reed-Danahay 2005:35). Having worked under the 
safety net provided by NIDA, Knut did not yet know how to play the local game or 
how to master the situation, since “the power over space .... comes from possessing 
various kinds of capital” (Deborah Reed-Danahay 2005:135). Physical location comes 
to express social location because individuals with a lot of symbolic and cultural 
capital are able to dominate and define the most prestigious locations (ibid.). 
 
The only secure capital Knut possessed in this situation was economic: the material 
resources accessible for an individual, which are immediately and directly convertible 
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into money, and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights (Bourdieu 
1986:243). In economics this is regarded as the most significant human capital upon 
which the whole entrepreneurial activity is focused. However, the data on corporate 
ethnography show that in entrepreneurial activity, it is not possible simply to separate 
the amassing and use of economic capital from other forms of capital, which are as 
important, if not more so, in directing actions in the marketplace The actor’s ability to 
operate in an entrepreneurial environment is influenced by interaction among various 
capitals and their possible transformation.  
 
NIDA’s case is also illustrative of the warning expressed by Moeran (2005), namely, 
that networks not only open opportunities for further co-operation, and connect people 
and events, but may also “shut off” or burden co-operation. By choosing to make use 
of one branch of a network the actor might be forced to give up or become 
disadvantaged in relation to another. When describing his activities in the Japanese 
advertising agency, Moeran (2005) explains that if the agency had opted to build co-
operation networks through one of its clients – the Mitsubishi Motors alliance, for 
example (which would offer the opportunity to co-operate with their bank and with 
heavy industry, thus acquiring a vast network of potential advertisers) – it would have 
had to forego co-operation with Mitsubishi competitors, who also inject considerable 
earned incomes into the advertising agency. In the present study, having been overly 
reliant on NIDA, Knut was left in a vulnerable position because production conditions 
for his company were dependent solely on one source; thus, he did not have any 
alternative relations of trust when NIDA was unexpectedly forced to leave the Baltics. 
Therefore, when taking decisions on co-operation and networking, people need to be 
careful, as over the time choices have to be made and certain contacts might be lost. 
How N-Welding Ltd’s operations might have turned out if Knut had entered the 
Baltics on his own will be shown in the work that follows.  
 
5.4.On His Own 
 
Unlike the case of N-Welding AS, the industrial activity of Tekstil AS in the Baltic 
market did not depend on NIDA’s work. Starting production in the Baltics went 
without a hitch for Helge Hofset, production manager at Tekstil AS, as he was greatly 
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helped by local cooperation partners in the Baltics, who were friends of friends. A 
Swedish acquaintance had introduced Helge to these Baltic men. Early in 1998, Helge 
made his first visit to his potential cooperation partners, and six months later, 
production was launched in a small industrial Baltic town. A functioning production 
facility was bought to establish Solveig Ltd as a daughter company to Tekstil AS, to 
which machinery and other equipment were moved from Norway.  
 
Cooperation with local Baltic partners spared Helge the potential ordeals involved in 
entering a new market. Helge appointed the manager of the factory he had bought as a 
production manager in Solveig Ltd. She certainly knew the ins and outs of 
bureaucracy of her home country and obtained all the documents required for 
launching production; she arranged the formalities and dealt with customs clearance 
procedures, which seemed complicated and cumbersome to Helge, who did not know 
the local language.  
 
The product developer Bjørg Vatne (from the mother company Tekstil AS in Norway) 
was offered the chance to move to the small Baltic town, but she did not wish to do 
so. Had this been the capital city, she would probably have agreed to live there for 
some time, but not in a small industrial settlement. A solution was found: she would 
come and stay at the Baltic plant for one week in three. Helge, for his part, agreed to a 
different solution: to spend, on a monthly basis, three weeks with Solveig Ltd in the 
Baltics and one week with Tekstil AS in Norway.  
 
Before starting business in the Baltics, Helge did not have any particular business 
plan. The original idea was to open another production facility for Tekstil AS in the 
Baltics. However, the harder it got to sustain competitive production in Norway, the 
more industrial operations were moved to Solveig Ltd in the Baltics. By 2002 they 
produced a strategy that foresaw moving the remaining facilities from Norway to the 
Baltics – not to boost profits but to earn at least something. Production costs in 
Norway had soared and demand for woolen wear was going down. Helge says that 
there was no other reason behind relocation except labor costs. Had they not moved, 
the company would not exist today: this is as clear as day, he adds. Although sweater 
parts are still knitted of Norwegian wool by Tekstil AS in Norway, they are knitted 




Ready-made woolen garments are sold in Norway and, from there, to Western Europe 
and America. Helge is planning to gradually enter the Baltic markets and, from the 
Baltics, to move further into Eastern Europe. A local salesperson has already been 
employed. There are some competitors in the Baltics, but for the most part in the low-
price segment. The Baltic manufacturers do not produce many expensive, exclusive 
knitted articles. During his eight-year stay in the Baltics, Helge has noticed that, 
compared to 1998, the market has developed rapidly: people earn and spend more, 
and the number of wealthy people who can afford to pay for a high quality product is 
steadily growing. The market in Ukraine and Russia is definitely larger, but Helge 
believes they should move towards this little by little, starting from the Baltics.  
 
Not long ago Solveig Ltd wished to take part in a tender announced by Baltic defense 
forces, but Helge did not send in his proposal because they would not have stood a 
chance against the low prices of their competitors. Helge also has doubts about 
whether tender competition is fair and transparent here. In the Baltics, he said, it is 
often like that: if you want to win a tender, offer the organizer some private reward. If 
anything like that happened in Norway, he noted, it would be called corruption and 
would appear in the press the very next morning, but here in the Baltics this seems to 
be acceptable. He laughs and adds that oddly enough he has stopped reacting to such 
matters. However, should anyone demand recompense for awarding a tender, he 
would definitely fly into a rage, for something like that is totally unacceptable to him. 
Before embarking on operations in the Baltics, the Board of Tekstil AS called a 
meeting where they discussed potential challenges in the Baltics and unequivocally 
decided that any engagement in shady and unethical deals, such as giving in to 
demands for bribes, was unacceptable and would not be tolerated. The company was 
to remain spotless, as it has always been in Norway since its establishment in the mid 
1800s.  
 
For the first five years, Helge made no attempt to break into the Baltic markets. 
Solveig Ltd produced in the Baltics only for export. However, following five years of 
successful work here, Helge decided to form another textile company, Ingrid Ltd, in a 
village he had taken a liking to some time ago. He had found a suitable location 
before starting negotiations with the local authority. He had already bought a building, 
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but there were problems with water and electricity supply. Helge sought assistance 
from the local government officials who had welcomed his idea of opening a textile 
plant in their community; however, they were not especially interested in addressing 
matters concerning utilities. One local authority official asked whether in such a case 
his people would be guaranteed jobs in the newly opened factory, to which Helge 
answered that the competition had not yet been announced. Another official had 
invited journalists; shortly afterwards they published the local authority 
representative’s portrait in the newspaper, alongside an article stating that a new plant 
would create 30 jobs. This took place just before elections were due to be held. After 
the meeting, the local authority’s interest in the matter ceased.  
 
Helge recruited the first workers for Ingrid Ltd as early as 2003; in the same year 
machines and equipment were delivered from Norway. In early 2004, Helge sent in a 
request for the required power supply. However, by 2005 the company had not yet 
begun operations because the power had still not been connected. Helge blamed red 
tape. He was skeptical about the competence of local bureaucrats and thought that 
they were not flexible enough. Having visited local Baltic factories, Helge felt they 
were badly maintained and lacked satisfactory sanitary conditions; he also felt the 
machines were outdated and did not meet present-day safety requirements – and still 
nobody would close them down. While launching a new modern production facility, 
he kept receiving instructions from labor inspection authorities about alleged 
violations of requirements. Feeling discriminated against, Helge became angry. 
Further unplanned-for delays also occurred when looking for a company to design the 
new factory facilities. The design company that had won the tender started work six 
months later than planned, and then it appeared that they did not have all the required 
licenses for undertaking design work. Helge has become critical of his cooperation 
partners: he now believes that even a signed contract does not guarantee that promises 
will be fulfilled.  
 
Just before Christmas 2005, Helge suddenly received a demand that a fire hydrant be 
installed in the vicinity of Ingrid Ltd, which is located in the town’s industrial area; 
the area has nine production plants. The local authority, however, wanted Helge to 
install a fire hydrant for all of them. Being aware that the factories had functioned to 
date without a fire hydrant, and given that they were demanding that he alone should 
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installs one for everybody’s benefit, Helge retorted angrily that he was not interested. 
He later reached an agreement that he would install fire safety equipment for his 
factory alone. However, he felt strict regulations were punctually and even 
excessively imposed on him rather than on local Baltic companies. He believes that 
the locals think Norwegians possess unlimited funds, and therefore the price that 
Helge’s companies have to pay for services is sometimes higher than the price asked 
from local firms.  
 
Feeling that there was an unfair attitude in all this, and disproportionate requirements 
were being placed on him, Helge tried to find an institution to apply to, to help him 
solve his acute problems, but without success. He complained to me with some 
indignation,  
 
I am truly disappointed that there is no institution where one could express one’s 
opinion and file a complaint about such preposterous things; that there is nobody 
out there who would check the validity of claims and the quality of services at 
public institutions. It is because of this that bureaucrats sit there in their chairs as 
untouchable petty kings (småkonger), and heaven forbid you argue against their 
opinion and request a detailed argumentation for their demand! Here I have been 
denied a possibility to voice my opinion and to suggest improvements to the 
situation and streamline such processes. On several occasions I have tried 
offering recommendations or providing sound arguments and I explain how 
things could be done in a logical and correct manner, but these petty kings, armed 
with seals, only shrug their shoulders and do what they want. They take no 
responsibilities, and still they are aware that their signature and seal have power: 
it is in their power to halt and freeze so many processes. In Norway a situation 
like this is unthinkable. While I invest money and do not ask questions, I am 
always welcome to the Baltics. But as soon as I ask a question or argue with the 
local authority opinion, everything gets complicated, unexpected difficulties crop 
up and it becomes impossible to plan one’s business operations (Helge Hofset, 
2006).  
 
Helge even received direct demands for bribes to make his business run more 
smoothly, and this was a new experience for him. A local customs officer asked him 
what the prices were for fireplaces in Norway. Helge brought the man a couple of 
brochures about fireplaces, and then the officer hinted that he had expected a fireplace 
not a brochure – which would have made all customs procedures run more smoothly. 
Helge, however, did not bring any fireplaces. Even when all his papers were in order, 
the customs personnel used to demand local money corresponding to around EUR7 to 
have the process move more quickly. This is not much, only NOK50, says Helge, and 
those for whom time is money usually pay it. And so does Helge, although this makes 
him angry because he knows that all his customs papers are in order. When someone 
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offers a bottle of brandy to customs inspectors during a check-up, they are mollified: 
Helge has understood this while working in the Baltics, but cannot accept it as a 
norm. When he arrived from Norway for the umpteenth time, he was not allowed 
across the Baltic border because his car’s license plate did not bear the letter N. 
Exhausted after a long journey, Helge asked what he could possibly do about it, as he 
could not go back to fetch the sign. The customs officers had an answer ready: a small 
gift, the officer said. “Forget it”, said Helge, “I would sooner go back to Norway 
then”. The officers seemed surprised and, having discussed the matter among 
themselves for some five minutes, let him through.  
 
Helge thinks that his Baltic colleagues would sooner give in to such demands. He 
remembers how shocked he was the first time a customs officer asked him to pay 
EUR7. “Sometimes, when arriving from Norway in a car, I bring with me a bar of 
chocolate or some other small item – not to waste time on the border”, Helge 
confesses.  
 
A couple of times Helge had to leave the labels he was bringing over at the border, in 
hand luggage, because he had not been generous enough with customs officers. He 
grew convinced that the authorities here do not exist for the purpose of making 
people’s lives easier, but to mess them up. According to Helge, in Norway this 
mentality would be strange; things might have been that way maybe 50 years ago, he 
thinks. Helge is not going to give up and compromise his principles, although it is 
painful and irritating. He admits that honest businesspeople and investors suffer 
because they are honest, but everything runs smoothly for the crooks as they are 
always ready to reward inspectors and officers for small favors.  
 
After relating these episodes, Helge was lost in thought: why had the opening of the 
other factory in the Baltics, Ingrid Ltd, caused him so many headaches? He came to 
the conclusion that he had not met the right locals. His first plant, Solveig Ltd, was 
opened in 1998 with a Baltic partner who knew how to run things, and Helge did not 
have to rack his brains over the process. This time around he had had no partners, but, 
when problems grew out of control, he retraced his old contacts. He explained,  
 
I have realized: should you need key information or a solution to a problem, do 
not turn to public institutions, but to the people you know who, in case of need, in 
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their turn, have people they know who can help to deal with things. Sometimes I 
do not even know how they did it, but it does not matter as long as the problem 
has been solved. Over eight years, I have built a decent circle of friends; such 
acquaintance networks are extremely important here; you can rely on them much 
more than on government institutions. And Norwegians cannot be half as much 
help to me here as the locals can (Helge Hofset, 2006).  
 
 
In the long run, the cheap labor is worth all these problems, Helge says. Currently, in 
Solveig Ltd in the Baltics they have as many positions as they had in Tekstil AS in 
Norway before it was closed down. Unfortunately, he goes on, it is not easy to find 
good workers in the Baltics any more because after joining the EU much of the most 
skilled labor emigrated. Now companies have to recruit from among a less qualified 
workforce. If good sewing machine operators can be found then good production 
managers and mid-level managers are no longer there. Helge asserts that it is 
especially difficult with male workers due to alcohol issues; in recent years, Helge has 
had to fire ten workers because of drinking.  
 
The workers seldom communicate directly with Helge; this is usually done through 
the production manager who speaks English. However, one summer, one of the 
workers called Helge and asked on which day he was going to return from Norway to 
the Baltics. This seemed suspicious and Helge called the production manager to find 
out what was going on. During Helge’s absence, five workers had taken to drinking. 
They received a warning for a workplace violation and still went on drinking the next 
day. When Helge arrived he gave the men repeated warnings and told them to go to 
the hospital to be breathalyzed. Next day, he found out that the men had not been 
there and sacked them. A week later the men asked to be taken back, but Helge 
refused because he needed to maintain a decent level of discipline and quality of work 
in the factory.  
 
The wages in Helge’s factory correspond to average wages in the Baltics. Helge has 
not given the workforce a pay rise since the sackings; the men had started drinking on 
the very day when the workers had last received a pay rise. Helge had come to the 
conclusion that it had been the pay rise that caused the drinking. Helge is certain that 
his staff are very satisfied with their jobs, because nobody has left of his or her free 
will. He is even more satisfied with the workers at this plant than with those in 
Norway. They are flexible, and they do not object to working several shifts; there are 
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no regulations demanding that the need for an extra shift should be announced to 
workers a particular number of days in advance. Over time, he has also learned to 
give orders because the staff are used to being given orders here and expect them. 
According to Helge, in small towns the most difficult thing is to find mid-level 
managers who think independently and innovatively, and are able to take decisions, 
assume initiative and responsibility; most of them expect to be given instructions and 
prompted about what to do. Few managers want to move to a small town from the 
capital city, although they might agree for a large salary.  
 
While Helge is at the Solveig Ltd factory, he carefully checks the production process 
and before leaving for Norway makes sure that the workers and mid-level managers 
have understood their tasks. On one occasion, complications arose in the factory the 
day after he had left. The local manager chose not to disturb Helge and decided to 
wait for him to return. When Helge came back after a week, he only found out about 
the problems when he asked how they had been getting on. Upon being told that 
during his absence production had been stopped due to some uncertainties, Helge was 
perplexed and angry – why had they not called? The mid-level manager explained 
quietly that things could not be explained over the phone, that one needs to see what 
is happening and how. Helge, angrily and loudly, admonished his manager, saying 
that the factory could not afford to wait for a whole week before he comes and tells 
them what to do. Helge believes that the manager is now more likely to ask questions 
when something is unclear, but he is still not sure whether this is actually the case, or 
whether it is just that the local staff are afraid of him. He wishes to understand what 
the personnel think about working for Solveig Ltd, what they gossip about, what they 
like or do not like – but as the majority of workers do not speak English and do not 
communicate with their employer of their own free will, it is difficult for Helge to get 
a deeper insight into the factory’s sociocultural environment, especially as production 
is often run from a distance.  
 
As the workers do not understand English, communication with them is held via the 
local mid-level manager. However, Helge suspects that she only passes on 
information in an ‘edited’ form, and then only if she feels she has to. Thus, when 
communicating with the workers directly, Helge sometimes uses the language of 
fingers and gestures to show what is to be done and how. More generally, the mid-
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manager level has lost her status, as far as Helge is concerned.  She had decorated her 
office smartly and trendily, but bought the cheapest chairs for the sewing-machine 
operators. Helge flew into a rage: “How can we demand that workers turn out a 
perfect, exclusive product, when we do not provide them with comfortable chairs on 
which they have sit all day long?” Gradually, Helge took over the mid-level 
managerial functions, the manager was fired and an English language course 
organized for the staff. Currently, workers invite him to barbeques every now and 
then, and give him some souvenirs; cooperation is gradually improving. He is starting 
to feel he has been accepted. 
 
The largest number of disputes Helge has had with the staff of Solveig Ltd concerned 
product quality: workers could not picture exactly what Norwegian buyers expect of 
the woolen articles and why the cost of a jumper, by the time the garment reaches the 
other coast of the Baltic Sea, is almost equal to their monthly wage. “These woolen 
garments are very expensive in Norway; therefore they must be of one hundred 
percent quality. We cannot turn out a product which is not perfect”, Helge repeats, 
making his rounds of the workshop and demonstrating himself what the end product 
should look like, as the consumer will be a Norwegian who must not even suspect that 
the sweaters have not been made by fellow Norwegians. For a Norwegian, wool from 
Norway seems warmer than imported wool, and when buying a Tekstil AS sweater, a 
Norwegian gladly pays for an ‘authentic’ history (although, in this instance, that 
authenticity is imaginary). It is for this reason that the Chairman of the Board of 
Tekstil AS insisted that the knitted fabric should be produced from Norwegian wool, 
in Norway, so that the ready-made garments could be labeled “Made in Norway”.  
 
In contrast, the raw material for the mechanisms produced by N-Welding AS comes 
from Sweden and Germany. A part of the production process takes place in the 
Baltics, but clients in Germany and Sweden are still buying a Norwegian product, 
because Norwegians own the patent and have developed it. German customers know 
that since 2002 the assembly of the mechanisms has been taking place in the Baltics, 
but as quality has not deteriorated, nobody has objected. All output by N-Welding AS 
in Livpils goes for export, but Knut is also planning to produce for the Baltic market 




Unlike N-Welding AS, the Tekstil AS website does not even mention that a part of its 
production is located in the Baltics, as the sustained myth about the origin of the 
sweaters and their Norwegian identity equates to a high ‘value added’ aspect of its 
production. Should the product be alienated from its authentic place of origin, this 
value might be lost. At the end point of the value chain are the Norwegian consumers: 
they are needed to increase demand for the finished woolen articles and to save the 
Tekstil AS market. An insight into the biography of Tekstil AS products and into how 
the raw materials become finished goods can help in an understanding of how 
“subjective meanings become objective facticities” (Berger and Luckman 1966:9). 
This insight also sheds light on how the construction of goods can aid an 
understanding of the social construction of the economy (Koponen 2002). These 
aspects of production, which might be termed the “value biography” of goods, bring 
the social embeddedness of production to the fore (Koponen 2002:562). The value 
does not come from any universal set of values ‘out there’. They are the products of 
how actors’ lives are shaped in cultural contexts (Koponen 2002:564). Thus, as 
Koponen points out, aspects of the embeddedness of entrepreneurial actions can be 
disclosed by focusing on what is produced: a creation of things and the places in 
which they are created. Norwegian ‘hands’ in a specific native location are seen as 
impressing values upon the sweaters produced: commodity appears as a thoroughly 
socialized thing (Appadurai 1986; Kopytoff 1986). 
 
 
Bjørg, the product developer of Tekstil AS, admits that it would be easier to 
manufacture the entire product in the Baltics, including the knitted fabric – this would 
make the intricate customs procedures run more smoothly:  
 
At present, it is like this: first, the knitted fabric has to be imported from Norway 
into the Baltics and then the ready-made sweaters have to be exported back to 
Norway as Norwegian goods. This involves superfluous work and expenses. 
Besides, the EU’s internal customs regulations do not apply to Norway (Bjørg 
Vatne, 2006). 
 
However, there is a concern that the value of more than a century-long biography of 
these woolen garments would fall if the whole production process was detached from 
its Norwegian context, which shows that goods as well as social relations can be 
endowed with symbolic capital. Symbolic capital can be a material thing that has 
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acquired symbolic meaning, for the most part due to a sentimental mythical past 
(Bourdieu 1996:121).  
 
All in all, Helge sees production in the Baltics as a good solution to improve the 
international competitiveness of the Norwegian enterprise Tekstil AS. Over the last 
eight years he has acquired enough social and cultural capital while operating in the 
Baltics and his economic capital has been significantly raised, due to low operating 
costs:  
 
I knew next to nothing about the Baltics when I arrived here. I had only heard 
that I would be lucky if I survived here for a week. That was unfortunately the 
delusion most Norwegians got from the mass media seven or eight years ago. My 
impression of the Baltics now is much better than I expected. Also, friends who 
have visited once wish to return to the Baltics again and again. If I had to give 
advice to other Norwegians who wish to launch production here, I would say that 
it is worth it. Only, one must bear in mind that employing cheap labor requires 
making thorough arrangements, messing about with red tape, and documents 
beyond imagination. It is not like one can come here and do what one wants. It 
seems that here they have more laws and regulations to be complied with than in 
Norway. It is definitely worth coming and working – however, one must stay 
alert, cast aside Norwegian naivety and credulousness, and as soon as possible 







Actor and Environment: The Sociocultural Aspects of 
Entrepreneurship 
 
Taking forward the analysis of the embeddedness of economic practices initiated in 
chapter 5, this chapter will focus less on the significance of networks and various 
types of capital for Norwegian entrepreneurial activity in the Baltics, and more on 
aspects pertaining to values in cultural practices that influence the establishing and 
maintaining of the relationships of which various entrepreneurial activities consist. 
Norwegian business people in the Baltics often reflected upon the local business 
environment – the ways in which it is similar to or different from the situation ‘at 
home’ – thus suggesting there are solid grounds for an analytical discussion of the 
relationship between actors and environment.  
 
In order to substantiate the validity of the findings, these observations are placed 
within a wider empirical context and will be made to resonate with research into the 
specific character of Norwegian business activity that has been carried out by other 
anthropologists. Two of these studies deal with Norwegian businesses in northern 
Norway’s coastal communities of the 1950s–60s; the others follow Norwegian 
businessmen entering foreign markets in the 1990s and the early twenty-first century. 
Anthropologists Brox (1972), Barth (1972), Henningsen (2007), Wold (2007), 
Partapuoli (1998) and Hansen (2008) have carried out research into Norwegian 
businesses in various locations (in Norwegian markets and those of other countries; in 
large companies with branches all over the world, and in small companies consisting 
of management and a few employees). However, despite the diversity of topics, the 
examples allow us to discern the common qualities of Norwegian entrepreneurship 
that illustrate the argument for embeddedness, notably, the circumstances in which 
different sociocultural environments present challenges for Norwegian entrepreneurs.  
 
Barth (1972) and Brox (1972) analyze the way Norwegian entrepreneurial activities in 
the coastal villages of Northern Norway are influenced by the interaction of the 
ecosystem with the social environment. Barth analyzes how individuals use their 
social relations to be able to achieve certain ends, and underscores the impact of 
174 
 
social environment on business activity. He extends social relations to include a 
broader social context – general features of social life in a community – and 
emphasizes that they should be looked at in association with the entrepreneur’s 
activities, in a shared system of values (Barth 1972:6). He puts emphasis on the 
formalistic aspects of entrepreneurship when writing that entrepreneurial activity 
lends itself to description and analysis in terms of such general concepts as choice, 
strategy and profit56 (ibid.). However, he also emphasizes the fact that in order to 
understand choices and strategies and to analyze the place of the entrepreneur in a 
wider context of interaction, it becomes necessary to describe the social context57 that 
she/he operates within (ibid.). Barth reminds us that the rest of the community is 
composed of actors who also make choices and pursue strategies. Thus, when 
attempting to understand business practices, the entrepreneurial activity is always the 
focus of our attention as a chain of transactions between the entrepreneur and his 
environment in interpersonal relations,58 which an entrepreneur must initiate and 
coordinate in order to effectuate the enterprise (Barth 1972). Looking at Knut’s and 
Helge’s social contexts in the Baltics from the perspective of Barth, Helge’s 
entrepreneurial activity seems more viable than Knut’s, since Helge’s activities were 
carried out as transactions between the entrepreneur and the local environment in a 
much more encompassing sense than those of Knut. Brox shows that disregarding 
common ethnic origin, an entrepreneur–client mutual interaction can shape differing 
social structures in a culturally homogeneous area (Brox 1972:19). The analysis of 
relations between entrepreneurs and other members of the community, as well as the 
depiction of the environmental and social history, demonstrate the anthropological 
character of the study. Contrary to economists’ approaches, it is argued that costs and 
benefits cannot always be placed in economic categories and that it is social 
relationships that determine the significance of material and immaterial values.  
 
Henningsen (2007), Wold (2007) and Partapuoli (1998), alongside an analysis of 
entrepreneurs and the business environment, pose a question that is also important in 
terms of the present research: how do global processes influence the marketplace as a 
construct in which businesspeople suddenly become national or local, and what 
                                                 
56 My emphasis.  
57 My emphasis. 
58 My emphasis. 
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happens to the interpretation of the market as a global formation? Henningsen (2007) 
looks at the process of economic revival in a small Norwegian town following the 
departure from this town of the principal employer, Hydro. The attempts to revive the 
economy are rooted in the unique values and identity of a small town in the rural 
mountain landscape of Telemark, the heartland of the folk culture elaborated in 
Norwegian nationalist imagery (Henningsen 2007:144). This case indirectly 
demonstrates the indissoluble connection between the economy and the local cultural 
environment. Wold’s (2007) research brings the topic of the globalization of business 
activity to Brazil, where the Norwegian company Hydro arrived just after it ceased 
operations in its town of origin, Rjukan. Wold looks at the change that has taken place 
in the Brazilian company since Hydro took over. Among other things, she analyses 
the way that Hydro representatives attempted to introduce Norwegian business values, 
such as democratic and long-term decision taking, to Brazil’s business environment.  
 
Partapuoli (1998) deals directly with relations between the actor and the alien 
environment. She attempts to explain what it means to do business in the Norwegian–
Estonian intercultural environment. The main empirical focus is on the co-operation 
among management level actors from twelve Norwegian companies in Tallinn. The 
researcher juxtaposes global flows and local adaptation practices, implying that views 
about the ideal prototype of business activity and environment tend to be 
misinformed. Finally, the relations between the actor and an ‘alien environment’ are 
also dealt with by Hansen (2008), who looks into how Norwegian managers in charge 
of some of the Norwegian-owned affiliates in China “walk the line between 
expectations and demands provided by their headquarters, which are embedded in a 
Norwegian style of management” (as well as jurisdiction), with expectations and 
demands rooted in Chinese reality (Hansen 2008:196).  
 
My research works alongside the studies carried out by Wold, Partapuoli and Hansen 
in the analysis of relations between Norwegian businesspeople and an ‘alien 
environment’ that seems more dichotomic than co-operative: even in companies that 
have tried to emulate Norwegian management traditions more often than not 
Norwegian managers feel it is something of a challenge. Henningsen’s study is 
important here because it accentuates the significance of place and how place is 
construed during business activity, and reveals what happens in a village after a major 
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employer has moved abroad to a cheaper location. Barth’s work is of particular 
importance in conceptualizing entrepreneurship in these terms, which also found an 
empirical manifestation in Brox’s article, which outlines the role of social context in 
building business strategies and making choices.  
 
6.1.Values and their Alignment in the Transnational Marketplace 
 
Consider the problem of two drivers approaching an intersection on different 
roads. It is in the interest of both that there be a convention which assigns 
priority to one road or driver over the other, because without such a convention 
either both must slow down or yet get the occasional crash (Hargreaves Heap 
and Ross 1992:7).  
 
Understanding and consensus concerning rules and values shape not only culture but 
also the foundation of social and economic life. Like the two drivers approaching an 
intersection, entrepreneurs, bureaucrats and staff within a company must be able to 
adequately respond and act in order to avoid a collision of opinions and actions and, 
thus, a failed deal or lackluster performance. Mutually acceptable conduct in a 
company or in communication between a company and the wider public is facilitated 
and for the most part also ensured by social conventions. These conventions regulate 
action in markets or marketplaces, which, according to Applbaum contain “both sites 
of global commercial integration as well as one of the principal vehicles by which it is 
accomplished” (Applbaum 2005: 275f). Barth (1966) notes that the marketplace can 
be perceived as a general reflection of public life where consensus on values is 
created as the result of repeated transactions and efforts to achieve agreement. Actors 
have conflicting interests but in the long run a market price is established through 
compromise; similarly, in social life with its values and ideas people attempt to 
achieve maximum recognition of those ideas. Consensus on values takes shape as a 
result of countless transactions and the seeking of agreements.  
 
On the other hand, one may ask whether people would be capable of communicating 
and carrying out transactions without jointly acquired cultural constructions. More 
precisely, do the values and interests that every actor is trying to maximize, and the 
customs which underlie communication, have common sociocultural origins? Is the 
way a transaction is performed a product of a specific culture? With respect to the 
177 
 
material analyzed here, do the values by which Norwegian entrepreneurs are guided, 
and which they seek to realize, have different origins from those which guide Baltic 
businessmen and employees and which they strive to achieve?  
 
Barth would agree that communication is regulated by laws and customs alike; he 
would, however, indicate that these are not sufficient to explain the social process 
itself. His main argument is that a social form in society is generated in the course of 
individual interactions and, therefore, when actors change their conduct, society 
changes too. Barth maintains that actors, in this case entrepreneurs, should try to reach 
an agreement about the form of interaction, and that during the communication as an 
agreement process, the rules for market conduct take shape. Barth’s analytical process 
can be explained as the approach of a rational actor, namely, he assumes that people 
make conscious choices, that they are aware of the possibilities arising from their 
choices in a particular social context, and that they prioritize them in a rational way.  
 
 The vast majority of anthropologists would agree that individuals are never just the 
instrumentally rational agents we find in neoclassical economic theory (Hargreaves 
Heap and Ross 1992; Henrich 2002; Ortiz 2005; Douglas’s and Isherwood 1978). As 
Hargreaves Heap and Ross (1992) describes, an individual’s motivation has a specific 
goal but, in order to achieve it, a broader society model, the order of things, and the 
individual’s specific place in it should be understood. ‘Man’ as a rational creature is 
aware that he has to ‘share’ the world with other individuals and that, in order to 
attain his goal, he has to communicate with others, reach an agreement and enable his 
actions to be recognized by others. Common conventions enable individuals to co-
ordinate their activity to mutual benefit; it is a condition of the possibility of mutual 
understanding, which is most urgent where there are disputes to be settled (ibid.).  
 
 It follows from the above mentioned works that the goals and values accepted by a 
society at a specific time and place represent the result of countless disputes and 
agreements among individuals.  To understand why certain values are agreed on, we 
need to examine the role those values play in ordering social relations. It is culture 
rather than economic effectiveness and calculated advantage that, leads people to 




Henrich (2002) and Ortiz (2005) note that definitions of advantage and rationality can 
be culturally specific and in terms of economic activity they emphasize the aspect of 
sociocultural orientation of actions rather than that of the choice of action:  
 
While economists are concerned with how markets direct the actions of profit-
maximizing actors, anthropologists have been interested in exploring how 
actors’ perceptions, social relations and obligations affect their economic 
decisions (Ortiz 2005:59).  
 
Henrich (2002) does not deny that people may often look for the most cost-effective 
solutions, but argues that people rarely seek alternatives because they trust culturally 
inherited practices. This tendency is also upheld by cognitive anthropology, where the 
significance of “learned prototypes” (Strauss and Quinn 1994: 285) in our choices and 
actions is emphasized. If alternative practice is introduced in society in some way or 
another, then, in the case of a success, it is also accepted by other ‘pioneers’ in the 
community and the practice gradually spreads. As indicated by Henrich, it gains 
increasing popularity in each successive generation: this mirrors Barth’s opinion that 
society changes as the result of human interaction. 
 
Human conduct is not determined by cost effectiveness because humans have limited 
capacity to process information and evaluate different correlations and co-variations: 
this is related to the specific character of human memory, to people’s imaginative 
capacity, and to their ability to make accurate assessments (Henrich 2002). Besides, 
Henrich observes, people have access to limited information. For instance, few 
farmers know how to make a forecast about the number of rainy days in the future and 
how it will affect total crop capacity. Such an estimate would require accurate records 
and calculations, and long-term observations (ibid.).  
 
The works of Ortiz, Strauss and Quinn, and Henrich all indirectly but clearly outline 
an argument about the embeddedness of practices: practices emerge not as a result of 
calculating advantage, but rather in the way of social continuity. Actors follow the 
conduct models and experiences of other fellow citizens, which they themselves have 
gone through. This allows us to conclude that entrepreneurs’ practices are embedded 
not only in social relations or, to be more specific, in networks, as related in previous 





Henrich (2002) illustrates this argument with an example from the life of some 
Mapuche farmers in south-central Chile, who sow only wheat, although climate 
conditions in the region would be suitable for growing other crops, such as barley. 
Henrich concludes that their choice is not underpinned by the cost–benefit decision-
making model; the farmers have neither experience of nor credible information on 
barley yields, so they are not familiar with the market for barley and with processing 
costs. Thus, their estimates involve a wide margin of error. Nevertheless, they are 
certain about their choice in favor of growing wheat. Only three Mapuche farmers 
tried to grow barley: one of them borrowed this practice from a modern farm, another 
one from an expert in agronomy, and a third one from a neighbor who was one of the 
two aforementioned farmers. Henrich concludes that: 1) society without further 
scrutiny takes over cultural practices from earlier generations and does not seek 
alternatives while those practices prove themselves good enough; 2) innovations enter 
society through actors whom a member of the community regards as an authority (an 
agronomy expert, a modern farm); 3) seeing positive results, an even wider 
community adopts the new practices as their model of action.  
 
Similarly, Norwegian manufacturers are gradually adopting the practice of moving 
their production to a country where costs are lower, although initially this tends to be 
opposed by a majority of local inhabitants and burdened due to local social pressures. 
In addition, they are unaware of how their production will succeed in another country. 
At the outset, those who have discovered new opportunities, like Tore and Helge, 
were publicly censored for closing down factories in their home villages. 
Nevertheless, when the prestigious governmental actor NIDA stepped in to support 
the relocation of production facilities, an increasing number of manufacturers moved 
their facilities to the Baltics. They became aware of the advantage of this strategy and 
hoped that with NIDA’s involvement it might receive approval from the general 
public.  
 
Barth’s analytical approach could be criticized for downplaying the impact of 
sociocultural aspects in each ‘rational choice’. Henrich, for his part, stresses the 
impact that culturally inherited practices have on decision making, but an issue 
remains unaddressed here: whether innovative practices undertaken by actors 
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endowed with symbolical capital (for instance, the modern farm or NIDA) are in fact 
adopted by others because they prove more advantageous than traditional ones due to 
their cost-effectiveness. Because, if not due to a perceived advantage, why else are 
these practices adopted? Taking forward the discussion about the actor and the 
environment and the factors that explain the actors’ (in this context, entrepreneurs’) 
conduct, we inevitably arrive not only at the underlying principles of the concept of 
embeddedness (dealt with in detail in chapter 3) but also at the question of what the 
embeddedness of economic practices can tell us about the marketplace itself.  
 
As actors’ transactions, exchanges and other economic activities are conditioned by 
sociocultural influences, the marketplace itself, which consists of actors’ transactions 
and exchanges, is first and foremost a sociocultural formation. Lien (1997), in 
analyzing relations between Norwegian company Viking Foods and its market, 
explores a range of meanings and metaphorical connotations associated with the 
market. One of the most common ways of conceptualizing the market is in terms of 
space, namely, the market as territorial space (Lien 1997:89); other ways include the 
market as battlefield (Lien 1997:91), the market as an environment of natural 
selection (Lien 1997:93), and the market as a flux of transformation (Lien 1997:94). 
Norwegian entrepreneurs’ relations with the Baltic market are best reflected in the 
first metaphor: the Baltic market as a space into which raw materials or semi-finished 
products may be entered and then removed as finished articles. This is the Baltics as a 
marketplace ‘out there’, still unfinished, unpredictable, but with potential, in contrast 
to the finished, stable and predictable Norwegian market (see chapter 7 for an analysis 
of the construction of the Baltic market as a territorial space). In order to enter this 
space, a number of obstacles must be overcome, obstacles that, according to my 
Norwegian informants, were absent from the Norwegian market.  
 
Notwithstanding Norwegian entrepreneurs’ skepticism and their fear of the imaginary 
Eastern European business environments, the metaphor of the “market as battlefield” 
(Lien 1997:91) cannot be used in relation to the Norwegian companies in my study. 
However, Lien relates battle to the “market as a territorial space extended into 
something that, like territory in times of war, one must fight for, and that may be lost 
or won” (Lien 1997:92), and where products serve the role of weapons (ibid.) – not as 
a battlefield with bureaucracy or imaginary mafia, as reflected by my study. 
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Additionally, the third metaphor is related to the product, a product’s life cycle, or the 
market as a place where products live or die (Lien 1997:93) following the principle of 
the survival of the fittest. The products of the Norwegian companies studied here had 
not yet reached the Baltic market. The Baltics was the territorial space where products 
manufactured for Norwegian and global markets were endowed with their second life 
or simply “resurrected” after their “death” in the world markets. The global market 
was for them a “battlefield” where the fittest products survive, but the Baltic market, 
as a space or as a territorial field, was where these products could be brought back to 
life by cheap labor.  
 
Norwegian entrepreneurs discussed here did not really aspire to analyze consumer 
trends, to read the “signals of the market”, or to feel its “pulse” (Lien 1997:94), in 
order to adapt to market transformations. Therefore, my research refers instead to the 
entry of Norwegian entrepreneurs into the Baltic market as a space (territorial and 
socio-cultural) with the purpose of producing goods for the global market. The only 
direct attempts to launch their product on the Baltic market were made by Nordic Ltd 
(see chapter 2), but they failed; the Baltic market in 2006 was not ready for their 
product and the management of Nordic Ltd did not pick up on this.  
 
Metaphors offer a rich source of connotations that help to structure experiences and 
serve as a guide for further actions (Lien 1997:95). The view of the Baltics as a place 
to manufacture but not get actively involved in the market explains the Norwegian 
manufactures’ passivity concerning their relations with other actors in the Baltic 
market. Relations with Baltic actors are built only as far as they are required to deal 
with bureaucratic obstacles and find good employees. The activity of Norwegian 
manufacturers in the region takes place on a discursive level; it takes place verbally: 
“The discursive elaboration of an imagined ‘market’ serves as a key factor in the 
reproduction of the locality itself” (Lien 1997:95). This is vividly reflected in the 
coverage by mass media, whose role in the Norwegian entrepreneurs’ strategies will 
be further elaborated upon in chapter 7. The relevance of metaphoric connotations lies 
primarily in the way they serve to guide, structure and legitimize action. Referring to 
Fernandez (1974), Lien concludes that each metaphoric assertion evokes a dominant 
state of mind, which implies a set of performative consequences (Lien 1997:96). Lien 





Table 2. Metaphors – performative consequences (Lien 1997: 97) 
 
 
The main market metaphors in this thesis are:  
 1) the market as a territorial space with such leading principles as defense (being 
protected by NIDA, or valuable local actors) and entitlement to produce (which is 
given by bureaucrats); 
 2) the market as a flux of transformation that requests reflexivity and adaptation 
through interpretation in order to function, if not in relations with competitors and 
consumers, then definitely in relations with workers and bureaucrats.  
 
A businessperson’s skills and assets are required not only to sell goods but also to 
organize the manufacturing of goods. When doing business, an entrepreneur must 
initiate and coordinate a number of interpersonal relationships to effectuate the 
enterprise (Barth 1972), be it a production facility or a sales department. Henrich 
(2002) adds that entrepreneurs’ transactions are embedded in observed peer practices, 
while Granovetter (1985) notes that the construction of a transaction value and the 
reason for economic action itself are usually embedded in social values set in a 
particular context. Being aware of the reasons behind variations in actors’ practices, 
Cimdiņa (2006, 2009) points out that in an international setting a variety of business 
strategies may prove useful, as each entrepreneur might have their own unique socio-
culturally constructed interpretation of the industry and environment within which 
they operate. Likewise, they might have unique interpretations of how to do business. 
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Over time, when entrepreneurs operating in the same environment and industry have 
acquired understanding and experience, a common understanding of how to conduct 
business and operate in the marketplace might emerge. This is because where many 
persons act in a similar manner, it seems reasonable to assume that they agree on 
certain relevant evaluations and values, and regard their own behavior under the 
prevailing circumstances to be optimal in terms of these evaluations (Barth 1972).  
 
6.2.The Embeddedness of Corporate Values  
 
By corporate values I mean the preferred states (in a company) in relation to the way 
things should be done (Schneider and Barsoux 2003:30), or the opinions that guide 
the company’s internal conduct and its relationship with its workers, customers and 
partners. As this section will show, it is difficult to separate corporate values from the 
socio-cultural values we act out in our everyday lives: just as economic action is 
embedded and social, so are corporate values embedded and social. Entrepreneurial 
practices are closely related to the understanding of the social culture of society; the 
processes of both social stability and change can be discerned in entrepreneurial 
activities (Barth 1972).  
  
When people set up an organization they will typically borrow from models or ideals 
that are familiar to them (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1998:161). Norwegian 
entrepreneurs (just like those of any other nation) build their strategies probably 
unaware that their choices are underpinned by the impacts and values of the 
sociocultural environment. According to the findings of the present research, 
corroborated by Partapuoli (1998), Wold (2007) and Hansen (2008), the challenges 
for Norwegian businessmen when entering a new market are mostly related to a desire 
that business activity there should correspond to their preconceptions of ‘correct’ 
business activity, ‘correct’ employees, ‘correct’ relations between the entrepreneur 
and the state, and a ‘correct’ attitude by the state towards entrepreneurs. 
Consequently, challenges emerge for the most part in the moments when 
entrepreneurs come in contact with different views about what a ‘correct’ business 
environment might be when dealing with business-related problems. Having 
summarized the insights of my research, I conclude that the values that (in Norwegian 
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opinion) should underlie ‘correct’ business practices are most graphically revealed in 
the following:  
1) Norwegian entrepreneurs’ relations with their Baltic employees;  
2) The organizing of company operations under unpredictable circumstances;  
3) Building and maintaining the relations between a company and the surrounding 
social environment.  
 
 
The Entrepreneur as an Employer: Work Organization in the Company  
 
The relations between a Norwegian entrepreneur and his employees in the Baltics 
could be seen most vividly in the dynamics at play in Solveig Ltd, the company led by 
Helge Hofset, and in N-Welding Ltd, managed by Knut Kløver. The activities of the 
Norwegian companies visited (as well as other research studies) reveal, directly or 
indirectly, the inability of Norwegian managers and Baltic employees to reach a 
shared understanding. Almost all the Norwegian manufacturers complained that the 
Balts are unaware of high product quality criteria and none of them was pleased with 
Balts’ opinions on company management styles. Almost all admitted that they do not 
trust local suppliers, both Mari Rye and Helge Hofset complained that local builders 
failed to meet contract terms, and Petra Liepa complained about the sabotaging of the 
seminar on the registration of chemical substances.  
 
The way that work is organized in a company can be best observed both directly 
(which was a difficult thing to do in a metal processing plant, and a little easier in a 
textile factory) and by paying attention to how people talk about their work 
environment, which provides a means of understanding and “narrating” the corporate 
organization (Moeran 2006:21). Similar in this to Moeran’s case, in this study the 
fieldwork fragments of speech, between my informants and myself “often coalesced 
into stories, and stories – both those that people told me and told among themselves – 
can teach the ethnographer a great deal about the memory system of the organization” 
(Moeran 2006:38). More often than not these stories were about understanding or 
misunderstanding the local workforce and bureaucrats on whom the efficiency and, 




One of the most visible disputes in Norwegian companies in the Baltics was related to 
Norwegian management style and the reaction of local employees to it. In business 
literature, the management style is related to authority and/or power distance 
(Hofstede and Hofstede 2005). The manner in which employees are guided and the 
way they respond to management relates not only to the organization of work in the 
company but also to the values and balance of power in the society in which the 
entrepreneurs and employees grew up and were socialized. Before attempting a more 
detailed analysis of the embedded aspects of Norwegian work organization, and of the 
management of staff in particular, I wish to present a story of a Norwegian 
telecommunications entrepreneur whose memories and reflections on his Baltic 
experiences also reflect the kinds of experiences discussed throughout this thesis. 
 
Telecom Norway AS is a Norwegian subsidiary of a large international concern that 
supplies telecommunication equipment and technical infrastructure for the telecom 
sector. Telecom Norway AS established its representation in the Baltics in 1995, when 
a tender was announced in relation to a partnership in telecommunications 
development funding. Telecom Norway AS won the tender and became the supplier of 
telecommunications equipment in the Baltics during the first stage of its development 
and modernization. The tender constituted US$100 million, which was one of the 
largest industrial investments in the region in that period. Telecom Norway AS became 
a co-responsible actor in the development of the Baltic telecommunication sector in 
partnership with a local telecommunications monopoly. Steinar Jensen, who was 
initially responsible for only one telecommunications development project in the 
Baltics, was soon put in charge of the Telecom Norway AS operations in all the Baltic 
states, and he opened an office in each Baltic capital. Steiner himself remained 
working in the main office, which initially employed more than 80 people. In 2005 the 
company downsized and a number of functions were outsourced. Steinar Jensen 
recalls the following about starting operations in the Baltics: 
 
We were not sure about what lay in store for us in Eastern Europe and thought 
that locals could not do things as well as we could. (Vi hadde kanskje den 
norske nisselua langt ned i panna når vi kom). And that, of course, cost us a 
pretty penny. We launched operations in the Baltics with fifteen Norwegian 
employees. We wanted our Baltic company to work like the Norwegian one. In 
a couple of years, we transferred knowledge, mentality and the desired 
corporate culture to local staff. In two years’ time, we had only three 
Norwegians out of fifteen left in the Baltic main office. I am the only 
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Norwegian today who remains in our Baltic company; the other 30 staff are 
local. We buy more and more services in the local market; this is cheaper than 
hiring a large number of employees. It turned out that Baltic companies 
provided high quality services for a good price! At first, we relied only on 
ourselves, but gradually started procurements and making partnerships in the 
local market.  
 
I realized pretty soon that employees in the Baltics were used to a command 
style. It is difficult for a Norwegian manager to understand that. I wanted to 
introduce a corporate culture like in Norway; thus, I held a number of meetings 
to which all employees were invited. The local staff were confused; they were 
expecting to receive a command, an order on what, where, when and how 
things must be done, but instead they were requested to share their thoughts and 
recommendations on what should be done and how! After all, they knew the 
local environment better than I did; I had just arrived in the Baltics! The fact 
that the boss does not decide everything and that the boss sometimes may be 
wrong was new to them, and they were not used to that. They were invited to 
the meetings to discuss things, not to receive orders. But things did not go 
smoothly: they did not feel secure. Thus, a secure environment had to be set up, 
I thought. We changed curtains, bought new ones with a floral pattern, put 
plants and colorful furniture in the meeting room to create happy culture 
(gladkultur) and an informal friendly atmosphere. But then they thought this 
company could not be taken seriously.  
 
I tried to persuade my employees: you needn’t stand to attention in order to talk 
to your boss, you can voice your opinion and be sure that nothing will be used 
against you, should your opinions differ from mine. But they thought me naive, 
started thinking they could do whatever they wanted. It seemed that what I had 
heard about local staff was true, namely, they had as much freedom as they 
allowed themselves (ikke mer frihet enn det som de tar dem til). The company 
had flexible working hours, they could regulate that by themselves: work longer 
hours one day and do less the next; the main thing was to get the work done. 
But they started to misuse that; they thought I was gullible and tried to twist me 
around their finger. They lacked responsibility. Freedom in the workplace 
should be treated with responsibility. I tried to convince them about it and 
presented several examples from Norway (Steinar Jensen, 2006).  
 
The challenges that Helge felt as a manager in the Baltics (see chapter 5) were similar 
to those encountered by Steinar. Helge struggled with the excessive caution displayed 
by local staff in their communication with management, and with the consequences of 
this over-cautious communication: problems were left undiscussed and 
misunderstandings in the production process slowed down the effectiveness of 
operations and sometimes even stopped production. Like Steinar, Helge was on a 
number of occasions disappointed about his employees’ lack of responsibility; he 
strove to find mid-level managers for his company who could think independently and 
innovatively and would be able to take decisions, assume initiative and responsibility. 
Like Knut and Steinar, Helge felt he had no other choice but to get used to employees 




Research by Wold (2007), Partapuoli (1998) and Hansen (2008) demonstrates that 
concepts in relation to what a manager should be in Brazil, Estonia and China cause 
problems for Norwegian entrepreneurs, as they do not consider it necessary to 
exercise strong control over their employees, give them orders, or show their 
superiority by means of various visible symbols. Norwegian managers try to 
encourage less hierarchical relationships through the example of their own conduct. 
Authority in a company, as in social life in general, is demonstrated in a number of 
ways with the help of different symbols, including dress code, behavior, zoning and 
furnishing the company premises. The starched interior of Ms Zhukova’s office (see 
chapter 2) with its solid leather couch, large, polished wooden furniture, paintings in 
golden frames, a crystal chandelier, a marble table and marble windowsills contrasted 
with Steinar’s plain, happy-culture meeting room and Helge’s modest office 
furnishings. Helge even dismissed his local mid-level manager for her excessive 
spending on office decoration at the expense of chairs for sewing-machine operators. 
In contrast to Ms Zhukova’s office, which people could enter only by appointment for 
a purpose ‘acceptable’ to the management, and then only having got past armed 
security guards and haughty secretaries, the doors of Helge’s office were always open 
for company employees or co-operation partners. And, unlike Zhukova’s office staff, 
who were dressed in formal suits, and had no sign of a smile, Helge and Knut not 
infrequently donned overalls and joined their employees in the manufacturing process 
so that the workers would get a clear understanding of what both output and working 
morale should be.  
 
While discussing the challenges faced by Norwegian entrepreneurs in China, Hansen 
notes that Norwegian entrepreneurs without an engineering education were not 
appreciated by their subordinates or by their business partners because the engineer 
was the ideal of the Communist elite. The majority of the political and business elite 
in China are graduates from engineering schools (Hansen 2008). In their desire to 
adapt to the local management style, Norwegian managers in China tend to rely on a 
Chinese perception that the relations between a subordinate and a boss must be like 
those between children and their father. Norwegians take this into account but still do 
not achieve the results of Chinese managers because, although they make an effort to 
approach the ideal Chinese management style, Norwegians apply their own cultural 
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concept of parent–child relations, which are not based on authority, subordination and 
obedience, as in China, but on helpful support and guidance in the case of uncertainty 
(Hansen 2008).  
 
Wold’s (2007) study juxtaposes Norwegian managers and Brazilian bosses; the latter 
manifest their authority with clothing and room decoration (the management offices 
are located on top floors, separated from other employees whose communication with 
bosses takes place via a secretary). These symbols, like Zhukova’s office layout, 
hulking security guards and haughty secretaries, demonstrate a vast power distances 
in the company, clearly separating employees of different ranks, making clear who is 
a welcome (or unwelcome) visitor. Estonian employees, for example, being used to a 
wide power distance, did not think it was correct protocol for a chief executive to 
sweep the floor (Partapuoli 1998). In this case, sweeping the floor (performed by a 
Norwegian manager) signals equal relations in the workplace. Likewise, Brazilians 
were astonished when their Norwegian boss played football with his subordinates 
(Wold 2007) – providing a graphic example of manager–subordinate relations in 
Norwegian companies. As in the case of Helge and Knut, and in Wold’s (2007) and 
Partapuoli’s (1998) studies, the open door to the manager’s office demonstrates that 
the manager is not dissociated from other employees. Norwegian casual clothing, for 
its part, highlights equality and brings knowledge and skill to the fore as the true value 
in the workplace. 
 
It is a notion of democratic relations in the workplace, not authoritarian ones, that 
Norwegian managers seek to emphasize with their conduct and use of symbols, thus 
acknowledging equality as a value of the Norwegian community. Internal procedures 
within an organization encourage all its members or their elected representatives to 
take part in deciding key matters of the organization’s operations.  
 
However, although democratic management style facilitates co-operation and equality 
among employees, it can also meet with resistance. Hansen (2008) and Wold (2007) 
propose that a democratic management style makes decision making too sluggish. In 
China, where income is directly related to the amount of work done and to 
productivity, Chinese employees of Norwegian companies indicated that negotiations 
and joint decision making reduces the speed and efficiency of operations, which, in 
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turn, lowers income (Hansen 2008:205). Employees at Telecom Norway AS did not 
take Steinar seriously when he tried to make the company environment more 
democratic and they took advantage of him because he did not control their every 
step. During Helge’s absence the workers started drinking because they believed that 
they should be in tip-top shape only when the boss is on site. Helge himself took over 
the duties of the local manager, as he could not find a sufficiently responsible and 
independent manager for his company in a small Baltic town. Employees’ ideas about 
what relations with managers should consist of influence not only the company’s 
management style but also the effectiveness of operations. However, it should be 
added that in the Baltics different generations had different perceptions about the 
authority of Norwegian managers. Younger workers in NIDA’s plants complained 
about their older co-workers who were ready to “roll out the red carpet” whenever 
Norwegian managers arrived. The younger workers also enthused about being able to 
talk so freely with their bosses.  
 
Norwegian employees’ perception of democracy in the workplace, as they put it, 
includes a worker’s right to interfere, to ask questions about how they are governed, 
to be heard and to expect to be treated fairly, even if they belong to a minority who 
disagree with the leadership. Open-door policies give a strong signal of there being a 
short distance between employees and employers. An open-door policy can also be 
viewed as an expression of mutual closeness among the workers of the enterprise. 
Gullestad links the idiom of closeness to informality, which helps explain the strong 
reactions against formal etiquette and deference in Norway (Gullestad 1992:53). 
Conversely, formality is associated with hierarchy and is antithetical to closeness 
(ibid.). Gullestad also points out that since the Second World War, and particularly in 
recent decades, the use of the polite form of address, De, has disappeared almost 
completely; this, too, is a denial of hierarchy and an expression of egalitarianism in 
Norway (Gullestad 1992). Informality, though, does not suggest anyone should act 
unprofessionally – professionalism and respect in the workplace are valued highly.  
 
Helge feels compelled to assume the role of an authoritarian manager in his Solveig 
Ltd in order to ensure discipline, effectiveness and quality of performance. He creates 
authority by sanctions (dismissal for drinking) and by raising his voice, but he also 




I wanted to motivate employees by respecting them, listening to them and 
expecting that they would work regardless of whether they are ordered to do that or 
not. But the workers here [in the Baltics] expect something quite different; they 
expect orders and authoritarian behavior on my part. At Tekstil AS [in Norway] 
workers saw themselves as more equal players and showed more initiative (Helge 
Hofset, 2006).  
 
According to Archetti (1984) the way actors build and feel power relations, reflect 
on cultural values, and other types of social exchange are based on concepts of 
trust, reciprocity and equality. Norwegians value good community members 
(samfunnsborgere) highly; therefore, trusting somebody does not take place only 
within the circle of family and friends; everybody who belongs to the category of 
samfunnsborgere deserves trust;  and  decisions are not taken behind closed doors 
(ibid.). Management is part and parcel of an authority structure in a society and in 
the Nordic countries there is a strong preference for democratic-participative 
modes of management (Byrkjeflot 2003). Efficiency, objectiveness, a positive and 
law-abiding attitude, and fact-based arguments are key symbols in the Norwegian 
model of political behavior (Archetti 1984). Unlike the Rivertroll’s attitude at 
Livpils, a decisive aspect in a conflict situation in Norway is an argument, not 
subjective values or personal preferences. A conflict will be business-like and 
observable, and will not entangle “invisible” facts and events. Similarly, in 
Norway it is not important to establish who is the father, mother or uncle of the 
involved parties in order to establish a potential personal benefit as a result of the 
conflict solution (Archetti1984:50).  
 
Sørhaug (1996) maintains that although hierarchy exists in Norway as it does 
elsewhere, its manifestations are minimal. One must have deep local knowledge in 
order to identify who is the boss of a local company, because modesty is a virtue 
(Gullestad 1992), and even claims to special status have to be inscribed in the code of 
modesty (ibid.). As has been observed in Helge’s and Knut’s factories, a manager, 
too, can don workers’ overalls and, for a number of reasons, contribute to the 
production process, which was a shock to Baltic local government representatives 
who visited Norway. 
 
Norwegian managers are straightforward in relation to issues they feel negative about. 
As the Nordic Ltd (chapter 2) case shows, they are honest in communication and 
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expect honesty from the other people. Brazilians (Wold 2007) and the Balts alike 
characterize Norwegians as people who openly express their thoughts, while they 
themselves tend to express their thoughts in a roundabout or indirect way. Norwegian 
businesspeople regard an open dialogue with opportunities for constructive criticism 
as something to be valued; they see openness and directness as virtues. In the Baltics, 
employees seemed to see direct criticism as a personal emotional assault, and women 
employees in Helge’s factories would cry if criticized too much.“When I criticize 
performance I do not criticize the person, although it seems that they take it 
personally,” Helge notes. 
 
Continuity of Values? 
 
In order for arguments concerning the embeddedness of corporate values to be of help 
in explaining the different attitudes of Norwegian managers and Baltic workers 
towards the organization of work in a company, it is necessary to understand how 
Baltic employees’ opinions of their place and role in the workplace have taken shape 
in the recent past. In line with several other Eastern European countries with a 
socialist past, the Baltics have specific concerns about the organization of work. Many 
anthropologists have pointed out that the past cannot be made irrelevant in attempts to 
depict individuals from post-socialist countries as free or unfree to act according to 
their interests. One criticism is that there has been too narrow a focus on the rational 
choice-making aspect, which makes many economists blind to the importance of 
historical and social complexity in post-socialist states (Lampland 2002). 
 
The Second World War brought half a century of Soviet occupation to the Baltics. 
Moscow did everything in its power to establish law and order and to fully subjugate 
the Baltic population. Power in the Baltics belonged entirely to the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union, which also included the local Communist Party in each of the 
Soviet republics. Other political parties or movements were prohibited. Those who 
were considered ideologically alien to the Soviet regime were persecuted, arrested or 
deported. In this way the Soviet regime exterminated its potential ideological 
opponents and was able to implement sovietization of the territory and mass 
collectivization of the countryside. Repression also covered cultural life: censorship 
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was extreme and there was wholesale destruction of Baltic literature; the majority of 
the pre-war intelligentsia was forced to emigrate (Cimdina Barstad 2003). 
 
To work well and to be a good socialist were in ideological terms the same thing (B. 
Müller 2004:155). The concept of productivity had a moral dimension of increasing 
production in order to fulfill the “rational” needs of society. The workers were 
expected to discuss official political topics without deviating even slightly from the 
prescribed official interpretation. Discontent and disagreement were not supposed to 
be expressed openly, even if informal discussions in the workplace often took the 
form of critical anecdotes and political jokes (B. Müller 2004:157). 
 
Birgit Müller states that Soviet workers experienced the relationship to the powerful 
enterprise as one of domination, as an antagonism between “us” and “them” 
(2004:161). An example is given of how, due to deviant political opinions, the head of 
a Soviet factory, working with elevators, lost his coordinating position in the 
enterprise; instead, he worked for years in an office job where he was isolated and 
deliberately cut off from cooperation with other people (B. Müller 2004:160). NIDA’s 
accountant at the industrial park in Livpils (a woman in her fifties), recalling the 
working day in a Soviet textile plant, asserted that a bottom-up initiative or an 
expression of one’s opinion was interpreted as dissatisfaction with the power and the 
system and that top-down control was felt almost at every step. Initiative was 
nevertheless tolerated at the highest echelons, she added:   
 
The Soviet state was supposed to provide jobs for everybody and, unless you 
were charged with a criminal offence, you could not be dismissed; a 
disobedient or nonconformist and disloyal employee was given a reprimand or 
an admonition. And this was not only a reprimand for professional reasons but 
also for ideological ones. Party congresses set goals for five-year periods, and if 
you put up any opposition or came forward with a different opinion, then you 
were regarded as an ideological enemy. Any difference of opinion with the 
management was ideological sabotage. A reprimand could be accompanied by 
depriving you of bonuses or of the so-called 13th wage, or of a voucher for a 
trip abroad within the limits of the Soviet Union (Livpils park accountant, 
2005). 
 
For a Soviet citizen, going abroad was seldom permitted. People needed permission 
from the so-called trio: the secretary of the Party, the manager at the workplace and 
the secretary of the labor union. To buy currency in the USSR permission was needed 
from the same trio (Cimdina Barstad 2003). The trio also decided whether to grant 
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permission to acquire a car. The workplace itself was granted, say, two cars per year – 
if it had the right candidate with permission to buy a car. People gained the right to 
buy a car through the workplace and had to go through the same procedures to gain 
the right to have an apartment, a refrigerator, pleasure trips and other substantial 
goods. The granting of such rights was supposed to be equal, but priority was given, 
for example, to work veterans, loyal workers and mothers with many children (ibid.). 
Consequently, through controlling the workplace, almost any other activity beyond it 
was also kept under control. And, should a worker disobey, s/he would be deprived of 
access to essential goods or services. 
 
An explanation for the differences of opinion in relation to the quality of goods, so 
clearly present in the factories managed by Helge and Knut, can also be sought in the 
recent past of socialist conditions of production. Why was it so difficult for Helge’s 
employees to understand the quality criteria underlying the “Made in Norway” brand? 
Why had Knut to put up an online information board with detailed specifications of 
quality criteria that was accessible at any time? Why did Helge have to keep working 
for hours, side by side with knitters and sewing-machine operators to make sure that 
the quality of products would be flawless and worthy of the “Made in Norway” label? 
The attitude towards product quality in socialist societies has been usefully 
characterized thus: “As long as the food offered was edible or the clothes available 
covered you and kept you warm, that should be sufficient” (Verdery 1996:28). The 
majority of the population in the socialist regime experienced shortages of food and 
clothing. The regime prevented people from consuming by not making goods 
available (B. Müller 2004) and by deliberately maintaining an economy of shortage 
(Ledeneva 1998). Goods were produced not for the sake of having markets and profits 
but to supply the economies of “brother” nations: 
 
Since profit was not at issue … the whole point was precisely not to sell things: 
the center wanted to keep as much as possible under its control, because that 
was how it had redistributive power; and it wanted to give away the rest, 
because that was how it confirmed its legacy with the public (Verdery 
1996:26).  
 
Instead of fulfilling the needs of consumers and producers, such central planning led 
to an economy of scarcity. As the priority of needs was established neither by those 
who produced the goods nor by those who consumed them, the planned production 
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was detached from the actual demands in society (B. Müller 2004:154). The rationale 
of Soviet society was anti-market. The monopoly of political and economic power 
allowed the rejection of the laws of supply and demand. The state sequestered a 
massive share of a gross national product for its own purposes, but the population was 
kept on short rations and their abilities to consume were limited by the meager 
resources the state placed in their hands – everything was in short supply. This state 
strategy was set against the tendency of individuals to maximize individual and 
household goals (Cimdina Barstad 2003). 
 
Müller points out that despite the strict organization of production work (workers 
received detailed construction drawings in which each welding line and each drilling 
task were explained) with an elaborate hierarchy of responsibilities, the workers 
refused to be accountable for the quality of the product outside the strict parameters 
given to them (B. Müller 2004:158), because  
 
when controlling the quality of the products, it was up to the technician to find 
mistakes, not up to the workers to avoid them, as they could refer to the old 
machines, the lack of appropriate materials, and the late arrival of spare parts 
that made the perfect accomplishment of their tasks impossible (ibid.).  
 
Faced with shortages of materials and workers and the poor quality of the production 
machines, workers realized that quality simply could not be perfect (B. Müller 
2004:164).  
 
Referring to Belshaw (1955), Barth points out that entrepreneurship is about the 
management of a business unit, profit taking, business innovation and uncertainty 
bearing (Barth 1972:5). The entrepreneur takes the initiative in administering 
resources and pursues an expansive economic policy (ibid.). Douglas (1992) notes 
that a person in an enterprise culture is said to be driven by motives of self-interest. 
When describing the Lithuanian market, Hohnen (2003) indicates that all these 
processes were contrary to the ruling ideology of the USSR era, when a citizen was 
brought up in a spirit of compliance, when uncalled-for initiative and innovative ideas 
were condemned and the state administered resources in all fields. In the USSR there 
was no individual motivation because an individual’s work was subordinated to five-
year plans, and to state, not personal, economies. A Soviet citizen’s income was 
standardized and defined by the state. The targeting of profits was publicly 
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condemned. No innovation was required because individuals had no interest in the 
results of the work. A person who did business in the modern sense of the word was 
regarded as a profiteer, and a profiteer, for his part, was a synonym for a criminal and 
earned disapproval from major sections of the community and from the state. In the 
Soviet era, initiative was assumed for the most part by company managers who were 
Communist Party members and, therefore, the enemy. Any manipulation of state 
resources was prosecuted as a criminal act. Making a profit was an immoral relic of 
capitalism, and therefore to be eradicated (Hohnen 2003:23).59  
 
In order to ascertain the mode of acting and thinking in post-socialist economies, a 
number of anthropologists have applied categories from the socialist past to 
reinterpret the capitalist present (Procoli 2004; B. Müller 2004; Buchowski 2004; 
Dunn 2004). It follows from such research, both directly and indirectly, that 
“economic, social and symbolic assets that various groups possess shape the way 
people deal with a new structural context” (Procoli 2004:9) – in this case, in company 
operations under the conditions of an emerging market economy.  
 
A prominent view of the transition from plan to market in Eastern Europe, as 
Lampland (2002) points out, is that a simple change in the structure of institutions 
would transform the economy of a particular society. Any opposition to new ideas 
would be a sure sign of irrationality. Missing from this view, according to Lampland 
(2002), is the simple but essential insight that institutions are “peopled” by actors, for 
whom the patterns of thought and action characteristic of the previous regime are 
normal and routine. The age of employees at the companies owned by Helge, Knut, 
Tore and Steinar ranged from 23 to 64. Although not all of them had had a Soviet-era 
working life experience, all had spent at least ten years of their lives in the Soviet 
Union.60 However, it would be useful to consider the following: can we, more than a 
decade after the collapse of socialism, explain the conduct of people in post-socialist 
countries as the behavior of a homo post sovieticus? According to practice theorists, 
                                                 
59 Undeniably, ‘black’ economies functioned during the Soviet era, and people profited from them. 
Following the restoration of independence, everyone had an opportunity to engage in business, and 
those who succeeded most rapidly were those businesspeople who had previously been engaged in 
‘black’ economies: they found it easier to adapt to the new circumstances, in part because they had 
already accrued some capital. 
60 The study was carried out from 2005 to 2008, i.e., about fourteen years after the Baltic states broke 
away from the Soviet Union. Norwegian managers’ stories about their relations with Baltic employees 
mainly concern the period from 1995 to 2007. 
196 
 
when people enact the patterns they have learned, they recreate the public world of 
objects and events from which the next generation learns (Strauss and Quinn 
1994:291). However, these patterns (or schemas) are well learned but do not dictate 
an unvarying pattern of behavior. People can adapt to new or ambiguous situations 
with “regulated improvisation” (Strauss and Quinn 1994:287). Responses are created 
on the spot, but regulated because they are guided by previously learned patterns of 
associations; they are not improvised out of thin air (ibid.). 
 
Since cultural understandings can be relatively durable in individuals and can be 
relatively stable historically, being reproduced from generation to generation, and can 
be more or less widely shared and thematic, in the sense that certain understandings 
may be applied repeatedly in a wide variety of contexts (Strauss and Quinn 
1994:289), it is possible that the concepts of work organization and work ethic 
internalized during the Soviet era could be active in workers’ consciousness/cognition 
a decade after the collapse of socialism. However, the model proposed by Strauss and 
Quinn does not predict the lack of change within individuals or over historical 
cohorts. Culture does not appear as a bounded entity here. Individuals’ emotions and 
motivations make a difference to how events are cognized.  
 
Barth (1972b), (1981), on the other hand, seems to reject this mode of historical 
explanation in his anthropology and writes that it is more productive to assume “that 
everything influencing the shape of an event must be there asserting itself at the 
moment of the event” (Barth 1981:6). He writes that it has a depressive effect on the 
anthropological endeavor to adopt the view that social facts are the results of previous 
critical events. Thus, if analysts emphasize structural constraints on history there 
might be a danger of placing actors under the “tyranny of cultures” (Ortner 1990), 
robbing them of choices, agency and intentionality. Certainly, to describe the attitudes 
and behaviors of post-socialist workers simply as an extension of attitudes that existed 
under communism is too simplistic and too consequential; nevertheless, this not so 
recent past cannot simply be ignored; it is important to recognize its totalitarian 
power. But it seems equally clear that it is not enough to point to socialist ideology to 
explain the embeddedness of corporate values of Baltic workers at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century. In order to explain their behavior, at least an equal amount of 
197 
 
attention needs to be given to the new era of the market economy, which they entered 
unprepared.  
 
The market economy brought to the post-socialist workers the new experience of 
existential insecurity (B. Müller 2004:165). They lost control of their material living 
conditions, and the gap grew wider between the haves and the have-nots. Workers felt 
exposed to market trends that lay beyond their control (ibid.). A worker raised in a 
socialist spirit, when entering the desired market economy order that meant sudden 
change, did not feel secure: 
 
The collapse of Party rule, the ending of full employment, massive inflation after 
decades of stable prices, a labyrinth of new, widely disobeyed laws ... it all 
combined to cast people into a state of radical uncertainty (Humphrey 2002: xvii).  
 
As the years passed, it became evident for many that the promised and expected 
transition to prosperous market democracy was not going to happen in the near future 
(ibid.). 
 
Müller describes how the change of factory regime from a socialist enterprise to a 
western company meant a radical break with the socialist past, when work had been at 
the center of social and political life and the worker the pillar of socialist society: 
 
Workers were confronted with the fact that they had ceased to be indispensable 
members of society. They could lose their jobs. The personal contribution they 
thought to make with their work to the well-being of society was no longer 
required. What counted now was the profit the enterprise could make thanks to 
their work (B. Müller 2004:169). 
 
Although work at a western company was perceived as “social advancement” (B. 
Müller 2004:187), it did not immediately translate into a conviction that there was a 
safe future. For instance, in Livpils, when NIDA established its industrial park, a 
Soviet-era enterprise still maintained a major role in the town’s economy. The public 
company Livpils AS, a huge textile plant on the outskirts of the town, employed over 
1,500 people. At the turn of the twenty-first century, it paid many of them just over 50 
lats61 per month. The financial problems experienced by the company meant irregular 
wage payments. The municipality official said that he did not really know what the 
                                                 
61 Latvia’s national currency 1 Lats = 0,7098 EUR 
  http://www.bank.lv/monetara-politika/valutas-kursa-politika/valutas-kursi (accessed 17.09.2011).  
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current situation at the plant was, but he believed it had started restructuring into 
smaller enterprises, which might soften the blow its collapse might deal to the city. 
According to a staff member in Livpils AS, most workers did not even know that extra 
hours, holiday work, standing in for someone or taking up additional duties, would all 
normally mean extra money, and that they could claim their rights in terms of paid 
leave, safety at work and normal working conditions. A social worker in Livpils said 
that rising alcoholism in the town could be directly attributed to the economic 
problems at Livpils AS, and to other unscrupulous employers who operated with no 
contracts or safety regulations, and where no social insurance statutory contributions 
were paid. She said that middle-aged people in particular found it difficult to adjust 
when they lost a factory job they had held their entire adult lives under the auspices of 




In looking at the relations between an employer and an employee, Norwegian 
anthropologist Tian Sørhaug highlights the significance of concepts such as trust and 
power. He explains leadership in organizations as dependent on the interaction of 
these two concepts. Trust shapes conditions for behavior and mobilizes action and co-
operation in organizations; nevertheless, it also means risk because to trust means to 
trust other people’s goodwill and things that have not yet happened (Sørhaug 
1996:22). Sørhaug stresses that people must possess trust in order to gain it and to 
retain it; it exists only by virtue of mutual expectations of something that has not yet 
been done (Sørhaug 1996:23). This seemingly circular argument can be clarified with 
Granovetter’s conception of the strength of weak ties (1973): 
 
Whether a person trusts a given leader depends heavily on whether there exists 
intermediary personal contacts who can, from their own knowledge, assure him 
that the leader is trustworthy, and who can, if necessary, intercede with the leader 
or his lieutenants on his behalf. Trust in leaders is integrally related to the capacity 
to predict and affect their behavior. Leaders, for their part, have little motivation 
to be responsive or even trustworthy towards those to whom they have no direct or 
indirect connection (Granovetter 1973:1374). 
 
There were no intermediary personal contacts between the local workers and the 
Norwegian managers in the case of Knut, Helge, Tore or Steinar, since the latter had 
entered the Baltic market as strangers from outside. They did their best to earn the 
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trust of the local workforce by practicing democratic leadership principles and 
operating in a socially responsible manner, and in most cases they gradually 
established a certain standing. Trust, however, also depends on power (Sørhaug 
1996). People will not dare to trust unless they are protected from wrongdoing (ibid). 
For trust relations to establish themselves there should be leaders with authority to 
sanction disloyalty and disobedience but who do not use power in ways that make 
trust relations impossible. If this does not prompt obedience then at least loyalty is 
exchanged for protection (ibid.). Thus, leadership simultaneously, and during one and 
the same relationship, is based both on trust and power, but leadership cannot rely 
only on power in the long run (Sørhaug 1996). Sørhaug concludes that a person can 
never be certain whether trust is there or not, because mutual expectations can never 
be empirically observed. Therefore, organizational practices are always underpinned 
by signs that people trust. The goals and duties of an organization or the normative 
regulations of “must”, “should” and “have to”, imposed on its members in the name 
of the organization’s goals, are authoritarian and effective only if they are entrusted 
(ibid.). 
 
Lien (2001) writes that the majority of Norwegians rely on public institutions in the 
hope that they will assume responsibility for people’s interests. This does not mean 
that the majority of the population are satisfied with what public institutions are 
doing; nevertheless, there are universal and powerful expectations that the state will 
do “its best” (Lien et al. 2001:23) in respect of intermediary personal contacts. 
Repstad adds to this argument, stating that people in the Nordic countries have more 
trust in each other – and in political institutions – than people in most other European 
countries (Repstad 2005:33). Thus, Nordic countries have an important comparative 
advantage here, as the transactional costs of social and economic exchange are low, 
because of this high level of mutual confidence (ibid.). In addition, small economic 
differences stimulate social integration in Norway.  
 
In the Baltic states, in contrast, confidence in the state and the social protection that 
might be expected from the state seems minimal. For example, the situation in Latvia 
in 2009 is presented in the Eurobarometer 70 report:62 “Latvia currently demonstrates 
                                                 
62“Netic valdībai un parlamentam”, Diena, published 17.01.2009.  http://www.diena.lv/arhivs/netic-
valdibai-un-parlamentam-13705982  (accessed 03.06.2011). 
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the highest level of mistrust in the government and the parliament among the 
European countries – 79% and 86% of the population respectively do not trust those 
institutions”. In public culture, time and again, there is evidence that Latvia’s 
inhabitants lack trust: “59% of population does not believe that the new government 
will work better”, the Apollo news portal wrote in 2007.63 Likewise, a lack of trust 
can be observed in relation to private organizations, which in their turn lack trust in 
state institutions. A majority of local companies have not prioritized social 
responsibility for their employees, at least not to the extent that in case of illness or 
job loss they are entitled to an allowance, because social welfare contributions for 
employees are rarely paid. Many people work without contracts, for minimum wage 
or for wages that are handed over in an envelope. On 18 February 2011, a national 
paper64 launched a detailed report concerning business attitudes towards the state and 
the payment of taxes:  
 
Latvia’s entrepreneurs do not trust the government and are not afraid of 
avoiding taxes. Only 20% of entrepreneurs think that the State Revenues 
Authority would definitely catch them in the act if they did not pay taxes. 
Almost 40% of businessmen fully agree with the statement that the SRA is a 
corrupt institution. More than 70% of the respondent businesses are dissatisfied 
with the taxation system in Latvia, and about a half of the respondents do not 
trust the government. 65 
 
Similarly, a universal frame of mind among entrepreneurs is characterized by mass 
media headlines such as these: “It is impossible to pay taxes and work honestly”;66 
                                                 
63  „59% iedzīvotāju netic, ka jaunā valdība strādās labāk”, Apollo, published 27.12.2007. 
http://www.apollo.lv/portal/news/articles/115810 (accessed 03.06.2011). 
64 “Pētījums: Latvijā uzņēmēji nebaidās nemaksāt nodokļus”, Diena, published 18.02.2011. 
http://www.diena.lv/petijums-latvija-uznemeji-nebaidas-nemaksat-nodoklus-768054 (accessed 
04.06.2011). 
65 The study was carried out by A. Sauka, a business processes researcher from the Riga Graduate 
School of Economics, together with London University staff members Tomasz Mickiewicz and Anna 
Rebman. The purpose of the study was to elucidate key factors influencing entrepreneurs’ choice to 
pay or to avoid paying taxes. In the course of the research, some 350 owners and managers of Latvian 
companies were interviewed. 





and “under-the-table wages can be eliminated only by motivating businesses to pay 
taxes”.67  
 
The situation was even worse in the first years of independence, or the so-called 
transition period, when the role of the post-socialist state had been reduced while the 
new market was not yet fully working (Cimdina Barstad 2003). The state was not in a 
position to provide sufficient support to everybody; the social assistance system was 
not prepared to soften the decrease in real income and the surge in unemployment. 
Family ties and social networks took over part of the role of the state by providing 
support to those in need; thus, the poorest actually turned out to be those without 
support from their social network (Gassmann 2000, 2002). Trust relationships 
consolidated in private networks, not in relations with an unpredictable post-social 
state and the new mechanisms of the market economy, which could eliminate 
nonperforming members from their workplaces because of the pressure of outside 
market forces (B. Müller 2004:164). Unemployment, low salaries, the sudden absence 
of social guarantees, the lack of adequate finance laws, and the insufficiencies of 
contract law and tax policy caused the emergence of networks of informal control and 
forced sanctions (gangs and protection teams) based on the principle that “fear is the 
best insurance” (Ledeneva 1998). The failure of privatization campaigns to guarantee 
the indexation of people’s savings, the bankruptcy of commercial banks, a sharp 
decline in health and welfare services, a rise in nationalist tensions and a general 
climate of aggressive and often desperate individualism had changed the social 
atmosphere dramatically. Not being able to trust in the state, people were forced to 
apply a variety of informal strategies to cope with everyday issues, following the 
principle that people could only trust themselves. 
 
Consequently, there are significant differences between the Norwegian and the Baltic 
working environments, not only in terms of how the duties of a manager and an 
employee are perceived, but also concerning social protection. What will happen, 
should an employee lose his or her job? Norwegian managers are not aware of this 
and, it seems, do not even realize that for this reason their employees do not object to 
                                                 
67 “Aplokšņu algas var izskaust tikai, motivējot uzņēmējus maksāt nodokļus”,Artiskampars.lv, 





working during holidays or night shifts. In the Baltics one would not find the same 
kind of social protection as in Norway. “I had better raise no objections and do as 
much as I can: to have a job is the main thing that matters”, said one of the female 
workers at the NIDA industrial park, who did not even know until this point about her 
entitlement to extra payment for working overtime.68 Norwegian managers do not 
seem to grasp “the feeling of insecurity brought about by the new work ideology” 
(Procoli 2004:8) in post-socialist contexts. The contrast between before (socialism) 
and after (the market economy) may well have been dramatic for most of the workers. 
However, the way post-socialist workers behave in relation to their foreign employers 
indicates that in order to understand the resistance towards Norwegian managerial 
policies, “categories from the socialist past may [need to] be called upon to reinterpret 
the capitalist present” (Procoli 2004:8). The new economic model brought into life 
phenomena that were unknown in the socialist past, such as unemployment and 
private entrepreneurship (Procoli 2004:10). Workers feel threatened by precariousness 
and are more vulnerable, since job loss has become a real threat: “From the system of 
protective domination they were thrown into a system of domination that exposed 
them to an uncertain future” (B. Müller 2004:150).  
 
The behaviors of Baltic workers at the turn of the twenty-first century cannot be 
explained only by their socialist past, however. The embeddedness of workplace 
values is not grounded solely in continuity with the past. The heritage of the former 
system, the new economy, and the blending of these two totalities, in combination 
with incompetence or a lack of experience in workplace democracy, are all factors 
that help to explain the embeddedness of Baltic workers’ corporate values. In all 
likelihood the behavior of local workers observed in this research (they did not voice 
opinions, did not advance initiatives, were cautious when communicating with their 
managers and did not mention their failures or errors; they did not object, but rather 
waited for orders and were humble) – arose from a fear of losing their jobs. This fear 
takes precedence over trusting the promises of workplace democracy, which would 
require involvement in decision making and in company operations. It can be 
concluded from the research presented in this section that Norwegian entrepreneurs 
                                                 
68 In evaluating working conditions in Brazil, Wold (2007) too indicates that local employees in a 
Norwegian company there were afraid of making mistakes or being criticised, as they felt this could 
result in them losing their job. 
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found it difficult to carry out their intention of promoting a democratic environment in 
their companies because this kind of work environment has no long-term tradition in 
Baltic companies.  
 
As this research shows, Norwegian entrepreneurs typically believe that decisions 
should be taken on a basis of mutual concord, whereas Baltic employees are 
characterized by more detached and formal relations to their superiors. Norwegians 
wish to solve problems jointly with their employees, supervise them less, give them 
more freedom and, through this, more responsibility. Nevertheless, it was observable 
in Norwegian companies that managers were dissatisfied with the lack of 
responsibility and initiative taken among local employees. Norwegian attempts to 
reduce the gap in their relations with employees showed only slow progress. 
Norwegian managers were concerned about this, as the employees’ reserved attitudes 
towards managers not infrequently reduced the efficiency of operations; because 
employees tended not to mention problems arising, and avoided asking questions, the 
result was uncertainty and misunderstanding. When the employees did not report 
problems, the managers thought it was because problems did not exist, so they only 
discovered them when it was too late. Local employees did not complain about their 
difficulties – for example, health problems or their inability to do an extra shift 
because of childcare – as they did not trust the administration and were afraid to 
reveal their weaknesses, which they felt the manager could then use against them. 
Norwegian managers were seldom aware that this existed. They expected their 
workers to work independently, make decisions and assume responsibility, yet 
remained unaware that the workers were afraid of losing their jobs, which created a 
pervasive fear of making an incorrect judgment call. They were afraid to object to the 
boss’s opinion. Unlike the organization management model presented by Sørhaug 
(1996), the management mechanisms in Norwegian companies in the Baltic states 
were rooted not in trust (which Norwegian managers wanted to achieve), but in the 
power that functioned due to sanctions. The manager has at his disposal the ability to 
apply sanctions (the most ominous of those being dismissal), and the fact that 
employees were aware of those sanctions made them behave as the manager wanted. 
Like the workers of other post-socialist countries, those in the Baltic had become 
accustomed to serving the state, which provided jobs that were stable and predictable, 
however modest the social guarantees that accompanied them. Unemployment, the 
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absence of social guarantees and the absence of trust were among the aspects that 
made workers feel insecure in the new capitalist economies.  
 
6.3.Entrepreneurial Activity and Society 
Social Responsibility  
 
It follows from chapters 4 and 5 that one of the motives for Norwegian entrepreneurs 
(notably manufacturers) in entering the Baltic market was a local labor force that was 
cheap and productive. Müller states that the productivity of the workers was a major 
concern for investors expanding their business into the former socialist countries. She 
describes the ways in which, leaving aside personal relations and political 
convictions, workers in the East European factories were assessed in terms of how 
much they were able to produce over a given period of time. During the process of 
transformation the concept of productivity lost the moral dimension of increasing 
production in order to fulfill the ‘rational’ needs of socialist society. Instead, she 
claims, capitalism claimed neutrality with respect to the appetites of individual 
consumers and focused on increasing the profit levels that an increase of production 
and consumption might generate (B. Müller 2004). Depicting a multinational’s 
takeover of an elevator factory in South Moravia, Müller discusses how Moravian 
workers responded to the attempt to redefine their identity through the criteria of 
productivity and how workers reacted to the restructuring of their enterprise as a low-
cost factory, where salaries were lowered to the absolute minimum and where a 
decent income could be assured only through overtime and second job.  
 
Although the multinational company described by Müller and the Norwegian 
industrialists discussed here had similar motives when entering the Eastern European 
market, the Norwegian attitude towards the Baltic factory workers differed 
considerably from Müller’s description. While she depicts how the managers of 
multinational enterprises (in post-socialist Morovo, Russia and East Germany) 
struggled to extract from their workers maximum productivity, without surrendering 
to their financial demands (B. Müller 2004: 162), this was not the case for the 
Norwegian industrialists in the post-socialist Baltics. An intensified level of work and 
productivity, achieved over a shorter time scale, without a relative increase in salaries 
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(B. Müller 2004: 169) was not an option for Helge or Tore, Steinar or Knut, although 
they openly admitted that low labor costs were the main motive for moving 
production to the other side of the Baltic sea:  
 
When we started operating in the Baltics in 1994, we experienced a huge rise in 
inflation to 25 percent. We had to raise wages four times during the first year; I 
don’t think other companies did that, too. But we did it because we did not want 
our employees to do extra jobs in order to survive. I believe we paid good 
wages, because many wanted to work for us. And hardly anybody has left; a 
major part of those whom we hired in 1994 are still working. We invested both 
time and money to train our employees and so it is important to keep them. The 
lowest wage in our company today is 500 LVL per month. That’s not bad for 
the Baltics, is it?! (Steinar Jensen, 2006). 
 
Knut did not complain about productivity at N-Welding Ltd; on the contrary, he told 
me proudly that production at Livpils is 15 percent more efficient than in Norway, 
and that all his employees there are hard working and efficient. His workers were paid 
average wages for the Baltics. And, as pointed out already, at yearly salary 
negotiations he was not stingy: the workers wanted their wages to be increased by 2.6 
percent, but Knut raised pay by 3.5 percent.  
 
Bjørg Vatne, product developer at Tekstil AS, was sure that people queued to work for 
their subsidiary company Solveig Ltd in the Baltics: 
 
Many of them have come to us from enterprises stricken by competition. They 
had not received any salary for a long time. Many had received their salary in 
linen tablecloths. We bought those tablecloths from them, so that they could get 
at least some money (Bjørg Vatne, 2005). 
  
By the same token, Tore Hauge and other Norwegian entrepreneurs in the Baltics, 
being concerned about their employees, tend to compare their performance with that 
of local Baltic companies on a regular basis: “I like to show others what I have 
established here: to demonstrate the diversity of our entrepreneurship, to show the 
opportunities that are here”, Tore states. He speaks proudly about his production 
facility in the Baltics:  
 
Baltic businessmen are notorious tax evaders; cash wages under the table are all 
but standard. We Norwegians cannot afford anything like that; we have to 
operate within the limits of the law, although sometimes it may seem tempting 
to pay under the table (betale svart), thus saving tax money. But I have made a 
promise I cannot break. My father, who opposed utflagging [moving operations 
to a low-cost country] once said that there was one thing he would not want to 
live to see: when opening a paper, he and the whole village reading in the news 
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that our company in the Baltics was paying under-the-table wages (betaler 
svarte lønninger). He insisted that I made a promise never to behave like that, 
bringing shame upon our company and family honor (Tore Hauge, 2007). 
 
Tore believes that Norwegian businesses set standards for good practice in the Baltics: 
always pay salaries on time, pay all taxes due and all social welfare contributions:  
 
Baltic companies will soon be forced to do it like us; if not, nobody will want 
to work for them, as the people see how it is in our companies: salaries are 
never delayed, you are paid even when you are sick, because all payroll taxes 
have been paid. The majority of Baltic Norwegian companies work like this. I 
know only one Norwegian company that paid cash wages, but we made him 
rearrange his operations as required by law. None of us [Norwegians in the 
Baltics] wants to read in a paper that Norwegians are avoiding taxes. We have 
already earned negative publicity because of relocating. And Norwegian 
newspapers are on the watch! (Tore Hauge, 2007). 
 
Tore’s vehement storytelling was cut short by one of his employees to whom Tore 
had offered a lift to the city, where she had to collect her own car from a garage. The 
capital city is located about 150 km from Tore’s plant and usually, when about to go 
there, Tore asks around to see whether any of his employees might need a lift. A 
couple of days ago he took her accountant’s son to a hospital in the city because she 
had not got her car.  
The inculcation of a socially responsible business ideology (albeit for reasons of 
company profits) beyond the borders of their country is also represented by Nordic 
Ltd. Through a software advertising campaign, the managers of Nordic Ltd and Safe 
Use AS aimed to raise Baltic people’s awareness of responsible entrepreneurship:  
Serious companies should also care for the environment and their workers in the 
Baltic states … We strongly encourage companies to switch to safer alternatives. 
By doing so they would promote an ethical and socially responsible business (Paal 
Riise, 2006). 
The strategy of Paal Riise and Petra Liepa, however, did not bear the fruit they had 
expected, most probably because the actions and strategies of local entrepreneurs 
were not embedded in social accountability. Most of the Baltic entrepreneurs believed 
that they would be able to bypass some of the new EU regulations. If not, they 
believed that the penalty would be lower than the cost of the software offered by 
Nordic Ltd, which would have helped them to register and manage dangerous waste 
and chemicals, and to safeguard the work environment.  
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These examples demonstrate that social responsibility is a part of the strategy of 
Norwegian companies, which is not only included in the definitions of the systems of 
company values but also voluntarily applied in daily practice. These companies, on a 
voluntary basis and beyond the requirements of legislation, meet the targets of social 
protection in their daily operations and also encourage local companies to implement 
a responsible personnel policy.  
 
Thus, relations between entrepreneurship and society could be characterized as a win–
win situation. The primary purpose of entrepreneurship is profit, because profitability 
determines the very existence of the company. However, Norwegian businesspeople 
believe that in their relations with society they cannot be merely profit seeking, 
“greedy or self-interested”, but that they must also be “socially responsible, morally 
conscious and ethically minded” (Garsten 2004:70). They are used to the fact that 
society expects a company to pay all taxes due to the state, from which society 
receives profits in the form of social guarantees, education and healthcare. Society 
expects that a company should run its business in such a manner as to improve the 
local residents’ quality of life (public space improvements, support for a local school 
or a kindergarten, jobs, clean air) – as Selvik (1986) explains (see chapter 4). 
Company employees expect that human rights standards are met, that good working 
conditions and a decent atmosphere are engendered, that workers can ensure their 
financial welfare, be appreciated in moral and material terms and achieve professional 
growth. Business partners expect not only such terms in a deal that would allow them 
to gain profit, but also a long-term partnership of honest business practices. Thus, the 
responsibility of a company towards society could be defined as a good business 
practice that demonstrates company values and acknowledges that the company has 
voluntarily included social, environmental and human rights values in their daily 
operations and in relations with the stakeholders – employees, customers, partners and 
the broader community.  
 
In the business literature, social responsibility is called corporate social responsibility, 
or CSR. It is a field of discourse dominated by such key words as “accountability”, 
“transparency”, “corporate citizenship”, “partnership” (Garsten 2004). Although the 
“the bottom line is still profit” (2004:81), within the frame of this discourse, 
entrepreneurs “try out new ways of combining profit with social accountability” 
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(Garsten 2004:71). Unlike in Norway, an understanding of responsible 
entrepreneurship in the Baltics still seems to be at an early stage of development. In 
recent studies on social responsibility in Baltic companies, Pētersons (2008), for 
example, notes that few Latvian companies go beyond doing a good deed a couple of 
times a year, in terms of their plans and activities, and as such do not really rate as 
being truly within the CSR domain (Pētersons 2008). Providers of financial services 
and consumers thereof confuse CSR with charity; they lack serious knowledge about 
what CSR entails (Olsen and Partners 2008). Social responsibility is regarded as an 
advantage only for large companies; companies are ready to discuss CSR but much 
less often to attempt active implementation. Whenever attempts are made, social 
responsibility measures are expected to bring immediate financial returns (ibid.).  
 
The fact that entrepreneurs in the Baltics, for the most part, do not regard CSR as a 
significant element of business activity, can be seen in research on local statistics. For 
instance, only 22 percent of Latvian companies had completed an environmental 
impact assessment of their operations by 2007, although a requirement to perform this 
assessment was laid down in Latvian law as far back as 2002.69 In the same region in 
2005, an opinion poll on the attitude of companies towards responsible business 
revealed that only 1 percent of respondent company representatives believed that CSR 
is self-evidently a useful concept, and only 10 percent had produced a detailed 
program for corporate social responsibility.70 
 
A significant aspect in the analysis of business–community relations, besides an 
entrepreneur’s goals and strategies, is societal expectation. To what extent does the 
society expect social responsibility from a company and does it impose penalties on 
companies that fail in terms of social responsibility? In 2009, the share of shadow 
economies in Latvia’s GDP was 40 percent (the highest in the EU); Estonia and 
Lithuania followed with 38.2 percent and 30.2 percent respectively.71 A Latvian news 
portal, Ekonomika.lv, comments that such results do not come out of the blue:  
                                                 
69 Report on National Development. Latvija. Pārskats par Tautas Attīstību. Atbildīgums. 
2008/2009:133., LU SPPI, Riga.  
70 Report on National Development. Latvija. Pārskats par Tautas Attīstību. Atbildīgums. 
2008/2009:130, LU SPPI, Riga.  
 





it would be enough to listen to opinions from public and local government officials, 
to warnings by business community figures and representatives from their social 
partner groups voiced at public debates concerning refusal to pay taxes, to be able 
to conclude that underground economies, “under-the-table” wages, partial tax 
evasion is standard in this country.72  
 
The conclusion is that when almost 40 percent of companies do not pay taxes, are not 
afraid to acknowledge evasion, and do not regard it as something particularly wrong, 
then the wider society will not condemn this as immoral behavior. The fact that 
unethical behavior can bring success and that poor living conditions stimulate a 
bending of the rules is, to a certain extent, approved or tolerated. Thus, a business 
would regard CSR as providing value-added factors only if  honesty and responsibility 
for society and the environment were regarded more widely as adding to that value. 
The major obstacle to the development of responsible entrepreneurial activity in the 
Baltics could be simply a lack of demand.  
 
“Selling their Souls at an Auction” 
 
The barb in the subtitle above was the message of the newspaper Sunnmørsposten,73 
on 27 September 2002, in an article about Norwegians who moved their factories to 
the Baltics. The article argues that Norwegian businesspeople are digging their own 
graves in being so naive as to relocate to the Baltics the competence and expertise that 
their companies have accumulated over many years. Like a flock of stupefied sheep, 
observes the article, they chase after cheap labor, regardless of how this might impact 
industrial traditions and the development of Norway’s regions. The article points out 
that the Baltic people are smart and quick in the uptake of knowledge offered by 
foreign companies, and that Norwegians are creating competitors for themselves by 
moving expertise to the Baltics on which the survival of their companies depends. 
 
NIDA’s opponents claimed that instead of promoting industries in its native Norway, 
it annihilates jobs in Norway’s regions. This was painful criticism for Tore Hauge, 
                                                                                                                                            
sasniedzot-teju-40-proc-691642 (accessed 09.06.2011.). The study was carried out by a global 
management consulting company, A. T. Kearney.  
72 ”Latvija pelēkās ekonomikas ēnā”, Ekonomika lv, published 05.10.2009. 
http://www.ekonomika.lv/latvija-pelekas-ekonomikas-ena/ (accessed 09.06.2011.).  
73 “Selger sjela si på billegsalg”, Sunnmørsposten, published 27.09.2002. 
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who had taken what he saw as the last chance to keep his business in Norway alive. 
His father had strongly opposed the family company’s relocation to the Baltics, and 
Tore only acted against his father’s will to save the factory from going bankrupt. His 
father, on the contrary, believed that he should go bankrupt with dignity in his own 
village rather than lose honor chasing cheap labor in the Baltics. Tore considers that 
the Sunnmørsposten article should have been targeted at Norwegian politicians who 
had made the situation impossible for industries in Norway. He did not move to the 
Baltics for his own pleasure; hardly anyone will now smile at Tore in his home 
village. Since the day he dismissed the workers in his native village of Dale, and 
moved the factory to the Baltics, he receives glances of condemnation wherever he 
goes. After all, Dale has been left without its major employer. If the conditions were 
to change in Norway, Tore would most probably move his factory back to his home 
village. But this seems unlikely:  
 
The Central Bank Governor in Norway has indicated that about 70,000 jobs in 
Norway’s industrial sector will have to be liquidated. And none of the politicians 
objects (Tore Hauge, 2006).  
 
Still, like any other businessperson, Tore wants his investments to be stable and 
sustainable. At least for the time being, he can administer and develop his production 
in the Baltics, compete in the global market, keep his customers and safeguard the 
company created by his grandfather.  
 
Helge Hofset gets angry about criticism in the press. When closing down his plant in 
Norway, he also met with disapproval from the villagers. His factory had also been 
the largest employer in the village and almost 100 local workers had to be fired. 
However, by relocating production to the Baltics, he saved from bankruptcy a 
company with a 150-year history, and its product development and sales departments 
are still located in Norway:  
 
In our sector it is not possible to make production fully automatic; a machine can 
knit woolen fabric, but we require many human hands to stitch the sweaters and 
other garments together. If we used Norwegian manual labor, nobody outside 
Norway would be able to buy those sweaters. Ours is a labor-intensive sector, and 
competitors from low-cost countries are breathing down our necks. Would our 
compatriots really feel better if this company, famous for its time-honored 




Henning Hansen, NIDA’s director in the Baltics, asserts that by moving labor-
intensive production to the Baltics, Norwegians can at least secure their ownership in 
Norway. Norwegians will have to get used to products bearing labels that read, 
“designed and engineered in Norway and produced in the Baltics”, he says. Henning 
even goes so far as to declare that it is the duty of Norwegian industrial companies to 
move labor-intensive production away from Norway before it is too late, because they 
need international strategies to survive in an international market. There is hardly any 
unemployment in Norway; its factories have difficulties in recruiting workers. 
Henning understands that it is hard for people to lose jobs, and yet he underlines that 
the loss of these jobs is not dramatic for the nation as a whole. It would be dramatic if 
Norwegian ownership were lost, however. Henning is convinced of this: 
 
We have to be involved in value creation outside Norway, too, which will have a 
positive impact both on our competence and capital. This is a win-win situation, 
where we help the Baltics to develop by considerably benefitting ourselves. 
NIDA’s activities in the Baltics helped to secure Norwegian ownership, and this 
is what matters. 
 
This is the simple logic of market economy: if you are unable to produce and 
compete in one place you have to move to another. International companies have 
located their production departments in lower-cost countries long ago. And, if 
labor-intensive production is closed down in Norway and products are imported? 
Would this be better? The consequences would be the same, but with one 
exception. By locating a production facility in another country the company is 
taking part in the production process as a whole; it sustains and develops 
competence and keeps ownership. Our stern critics, too, are dependent on 
globalization and buy goods that are cheaper. No Norwegian company is 
producing everything in their stables, although some insist they do. Have you 
seen anybody shear sheep outside a factory? No, the wool most likely comes 
from quite a different place, say, China. 
 
It is hard to say whether NIDA could have continued its activities in the Baltics if 
the Baltic states had stayed out of the EU. In any case, it would have been easier 
than justifying our engagement in the Baltics, as an argument of participating in 
the development of a country is politically correct. When you say that you are 
contributing to democratization and the modernization of a country, and are 
teaching them to stand on their own two feet, this is a solid argument. Together 
with NIDA, we opened the road to the Baltics by offering our competence, but 
then the EU came with its baggage. We are not able to compete with the EU 
programs. Yes, maybe everything would have turned out differently, had the 
Baltics not joined the EU (Henning Hensen, 2006).  
 
By early 2007, nobody had applied to buy NIDA’s industrial park in Livpils, so the 
tenant companies did not know what will happen in the future. After seven years’ 
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work there, Henning Hansen has sold his old town apartment in the Baltics. NIDA’s 
activities in Russia were ongoing, and an office building and a lifelong learning center 
were being located there under NIDA’s directions, because Russians “needed 
development assistance”. However, NIDA’s profits in Russia never matched those in 
the Baltics.  
 
The closure of profit-bearing NIDA operations in Livpils resembles the point made by 
Koponen (see chapter 3) that much of the “making” or instituting of the economy 
happens outside the market (Koponen 2002:543) through political mechanisms and 
imaginary standards: these relationships impose value upon goods differently than do 
market relations (ibid). Questioning the assumption that the market will decide what 
is good and bad, and the truism that the market models our behavior as closely as 




Barth (1972) notes that the entrepreneur differs from others by the concentration on, 
and maximizing of, one type of value – profit. By activities of a speculative rather 
than an institutional character, and a greater readiness to assume different risks, the 
entrepreneur invests the majority of resources in a single project and relies only on 
his/her own deductions (and not on general opinion) (Barth 1972:7f). While analyzing 
entrepreneurial activity Barth foregoes structural analysis of community. In view of 
the time in which the work was created, that is, in the late 1960s, this is a remarkable 
step. Nevertheless, his motives display methodological and theoretical reflections 
rather than opposition to a (still) dominant theoretical school. To put it succinctly, 
Barth does not think that a structuralist approach, which would allow us to identify 
the status of community members in a social structure/hierarchy, would be helpful. 
Instead, he offers to analyze the articulation between the entrepreneur’s activities and 
the community a part of which they are in terms which emphasize the reciprocity of 
local transactions. To this end, Barth is prepared to accept game theory as a model for 
further analysis: social activity should be regarded “as the result of constrained 
choices, and thereby connected with variables of ‘value’ and ‘purpose’” (Barth 
1972:7). Behavioral patterns emerge as the result of limited choices, which in certain 




The cases discussed here clearly exemplify the conflicting expectations that 
Norwegian manufacturers meet – general opinion is strong and nearly impossible to 
ignore in decision making in private enterprises. Barth indicates that when assessing 
costs subject to risk, an entrepreneur also takes into account social costs, relying on 
moral standards and those laid down in law, and certain social relations. Barth 
attempts to include these factors in a single analytical model and invites us to pay 
attention to entrepreneurs working under the conditions of their community, 
identifying the main variables that have an impact on the entrepreneur’s choices, 
notably, the structural qualities of the environment and the factors that restrict 
company development.  
 
So, an entrepreneur puts at risk not only his/her financial gains and losses; s/he must 
also be aware of the social costs of his/her activity, which could prevent the 
entrepreneur from applying strategies that might be effective in terms of generating 
profits (Barth 1972). This analytical path, which Barth formulates with a sharp focus, 
is not new in anthropology; indeed, Barth refers here to research (by Malinowski 
1922; Firth 1939; Bohannan 1955) on traditional communities.  
 
The social costs incurred when various techniques of exploitation are acted out in a 
community, as well as the social and moral restrictions (that is, what the entrepreneur 
is ready and not ready to do in accordance with a given social order – see Barth 1972), 
to a great extent define the choices and strategies of entrepreneurs. The goods 
obtained through entrepreneurial activity are clearly not restricted to purely monetary 
or even material forms, but may take the form of power, rank, experience and/or skills 
(Barth 1972:8). To understand properly the balance sheet of an enterprise, social costs 
of various kinds, which are not readily recognized as economic, must be considered. 
As in the case of an entrepreneur’s gains, a loss may also include vital intangibles like 
power, rank and goodwill (ibid.). 
 
The issue of social costs in business is aptly illustrated by Brox (1972). In order to 
empirically demonstrate that not only the ecological but also the social environment 
shapes the specific character of entrepreneurship, Brox describes life in three small 
fishing villages in East Fjord, Northern Norway. A number of businesses here failed: 
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an attempt to set up a consumers’ cooperative fails; furniture manufacturing does not 
pay off, as the price and production policy depends on family and neighborly 
relations. Raising prices to the level of those in the city and giving up small-scale 
works or repairs would be profitable practices, but this is not done for the sake of 
close family and neighborly ties because people feel they must help their own kith and 
kin. Per four hundred of East Fjord residents, there are six shop owners whose 
businesses are run from home. Although it might seem that family and neighborly 
relations might guarantee a circle of permanent customers, this relationship interferes 
with business, because it is accepted in the community that one’s own folks are to be 
supported, and profits are not to be made at their expense. In East Fjord, businessman 
Hans is remembered as a special person who owned the local post office and the local 
steamship agency, who drew the majority of his income from salmon fishing. 
Relations between Hans and his customers are on an equal footing, and Brox 
highlights two issues concerning this “equality”: local people’s desire to live in an 
egalitarian community, while under “social control” (Brox 1972:23). Social control 
manifests itself both as rumor and gossip, and as not selling the day’s catch to Hans, 
but to other buyers outside the village (more often than not, without profit), because 
one person is not supposed to own everything and one individual cannot be permitted 
to profit at the expense of others (Brox 1972:22 f). Hans calls this narrow-minded, but 
he does not gain maximum profit, because his choice to be a neighbor and a relative 
“blocks” his understanding of business values (Brox 1972:23). Thus, social 
relationships can also be an obstacle to improving one’s welfare conditions.  
 
Brox calls “herring tycoons” an ideal type of East Fjord entrepreneur. Although their 
economic activity could be regarded as highly effective (and economical – they 
operate companies and address new opportunities vis-à-vis resources and fishing 
grounds), first and foremost they are fishermen, not investors. They make a profit 
because of their professional fishing skills, not because of their ability to manipulate 
capital (Brox 1972:24). In addition, close relations within the neighborhood do not 
hinder the business of these “herring tycoons”, but ensures its stability and 
effectiveness. Brox explains, “a trader’s place in the ecological network is less clear” 
– his interests are at odds with the fishermen’s interests and thus he is regarded as an 
exploiter. If, for a trader, it is important to demonstrate and maintain social distance 
with clients and to avoid getting involved in the neighbor–relative network, then it is 
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just the opposite for a “herring tycoon”: he and his team function in one and the same 
niche and depend on each other. Besides, close neighbor–relative relations consolidate 
the team (Brox 1972:25).  
 
Businessman Larssen has full control over daily life in the neighboring village: he 
imposes no limits on loans, neither in terms of amount nor deadlines. At his shop 
people can obtain goods on barter terms, without money as a medium. He is the only 
person who can provide everything that newcomers from a neighboring village might 
need (building materials and food, for example). Fishermen sell their whole catch to 
Larssen and will later buy fish for their dinner from him. Larssen sets the price of 
goods and, although it is higher than in the city, it is more convenient for local 
residents to obtain from him the things they need, because people have little cash to 
hand in the community. Most people are not satisfied with the situation but their 
close-knit mutual relations facilitate loyalty and solidarity with Larssen. Even if they 
do not owe him anything, they bring their fish to him because, for instance, if a 
relative needed something that only Larssen could get, it would not have been 
sensible to spoil relations with him. It was due to such mutual relations between 
individuals that Larssen’s influence was “networking” through the entire social 
structure (Brox 1972:31).  
 
Although Brox’s article reflects the situation in Northern Norway in the 1950s to 
1960s, striking parallels can be drawn with a key aspect of present-day relations in 
small and medium-size Norwegian companies and society (that is, in small towns and 
villages). Larssen’s activities illustrate certain parallels that can be drawn with 
NIDA’s operations in Livpils. The activities of both Larssen and NIDA correspond to 
the very essence of entrepreneurship described by Barth, namely,  
 
to discover new possible channels and exploit them: to enter such a system in 
which value flows and expand it, short-circuit it, or otherwise make it flow 
differently, while tapping or otherwise accumulating some of the flow in the form 
of profit (Barth 1972:12).  
 
The point at which an entrepreneur seeks to exploit the environment is described by 
Barth as the niche. As in Larssen’s case, the newcomers to the Baltics (the 
Norwegian manufacturers) became dependent on NIDA. In part, they did not trust 
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the alien and unknown Baltic business environment and bureaucracy. If dependency 
on Larssen was stimulated by the shortage of monetary capital in residents, then 
dependency on NIDA was caused by a lack of cultural, social and symbolic capital. 
NIDA provided newly arrived Norwegian manufacturers with production facilities, 
staff, an accountant, round-the-clock security, important contacts in the local 
authority and customs office, potential cooperation partners, and information on local 
legislation and society in general. NIDA, in other words, developed a new niche in 
the Baltic manufacturing industry. Before NIDA arrived, few dared to move their 
operations to the Baltics, like Helge and Tore, thus assuming a heavy burden of 
social costs. A couple of years later, however, the demand for production facilities in 
Baltic industrial parks increased dramatically: quite a number of foreign industrialists 
saw the potential of Baltic workers and production conditions.  
 
The social control mechanisms delineated by Brox, and applied by the residents of 
East Fjord in the name of egalitarianism, were also present in the villages of Fjord 
County, which Jon, Mari, Knut, Helge and Tore left when moving their factories to 
the Baltics. In Norway their companies functioned as not only model sources of 
export revenues, and they were also tax payers, but they also responsibly participated 
to resolve district problems and shape the socio-cultural environment, “depending on 
what values at a specific period of time were being highlighted by the policy of a 
particular Norwegian government”, as Selvik puts it (1986:12). Production became 
too expensive and unproductive not only as the result of Norwegian workers’ 
increasing wages but also as a result of an increasing burden of “indirect costs” in the 
community. 
 
Just as corporate values are rooted in everyday values, the social responsibility of a 
company to a great extent lies in concepts concerning an individual’s social 
responsibility on a daily basis. It is possible to assess how important and self-evident 
socially responsible entrepreneurship is, in Norway, from the social ostracism and 
condemnation shown towards Tore and Helge when they moved production from 
their native villages. They lost face and their good name back home and, having taken 
to heart this loss, acknowledge that the social costs of their businesses have grown as 
a result of utflagging (moving to a low-cost country), although the costs have 
decreased in monetary terms. Like Hans from East Fjord (Brox 1972), they call their 
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fellow villagers narrow minded and feel unduly condemned, which is clearly reflected 
by Tore:  
 
It is not fair that we are being belittled as utflaggere. Many companies that go 
on producing in Norway buy all their raw material abroad. To stop buying from 
local producers – is this not considered worth condemning? It is not right that 
we are accused of treason. It is naive to believe that we can produce everything 
in Norway, because Norway has plenty of oil money. Our competitors moved 
to Portugal 20 years ago, where production costs are low. Many Norwegian 
manufacturing businesses keep hoping too long that the situation is going to 
change and then realize it’s too late, and lose their companies. The global trend 
demands that costs be reduced. I still remember condemning glances in Dale 
[Tore’s native village in the Fjord County], when we started the relocation. 
Everywhere I went my actions were condemned either by words, looks or 
avoidance. Most people believed that, since I was not fully bankrupt yet, 
moving the production meant chasing profits, not saving one’s company. They 
were certain that I had discovered a new way to earn money, and they 
disapproved of it. That was so typical of Dalenians: envy is stronger there than 
sexual appetite; it just beats everything!  
  
I was the first to relocate my factory from Fjord County to a low-cost country. 
NIDA launched their operations in the Baltic states only a couple of years later. 
I liquidated 25 jobs in my village and moved them to the Baltics, and now that 
makes me the bad guy.  
 
But my principal competitors in Europe moved their facilities to Poland and 
Romania in the early 1990s. My father was still in charge of the company then 
and stubbornly refused to move; he promised he would rationalize everything. 
Nevertheless, at the end of 1990, when I took over the management, there was 
nothing to rationalize or sell. We were too expensive for the European market. 
Disregarding his anger and the condemnation of the people around me, I had to 
take a courageous decision to move to the Baltics, and due to that, our company 
still exists. My father finally made up his mind and came to visit. Finally he 
confessed that he was gratified that the company continued working with a 
positive balance sheet and was still in business.  
 
But they [fellow Fjord County citizenry] got it their own way: protests by the 
opposition and the uproar in the media was so loud that finally the government 
demanded that NIDA close its industrial park in the Baltics, although the parks 
were bringing in a good profit, the industrial cluster had taken shape and was 
functioning perfectly. This is shortsighted and insane. Norwegian society can 
only benefit if instead of going bankrupt Norwegian companies continue to 
exist, even if in another country, and, who knows, perhaps in 20 years’ time 
they will return to Norway with accumulated capital (Tore Hauge, 2006). 
 
Social costs, social control and social responsibility convincingly indicate that 
entrepreneurship cannot be separated from the social environment in which a 
company is operating. A reputation based on social responsibility rather than on profit 
is important both for Tore’s father, who did not permit his son to relocate to the 
Baltics even though their company was on the verge of bankruptcy, and for the people 
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of Helge’s and Tore’s native villages, who publicly condemn the relocation of 
operations to the Baltics.  
 
A socially responsible business practice, of which the residents of Norwegian villages 
would certainly approve, is reflected in Henningsen’s (2007) research, which 
describes a development project in the small town of Rjukan, the birthplace of what 
was once the largest Norwegian industrial company, Norsk Hydro. The growth in 
population in Rjukan is directly related to the establishment of Hydro: the company 
not only provided jobs for Rjukan’s residents, but also was regarded as a guarantor of 
social security and welfare in the neighborhood. “At Rjukan, Hydro was the society”, 
Henningsen (2007:145) emphasizes, thus supporting empirically the indications 
observed by Selvik, who noted that the role of industry in Norway, like that of other 
business, is more all-embracing than just the production of profit-yielding 
commodities. Industry has been the principal instrument for implementing a number 
of superior social goals: security, equality, sparse settlement, high income, full 
employment and regional development (Selvik 1986:14). However, Selvik (1986) 
also states that it is partly because Norwegian industries have to shoulder a greater 
burden of social costs than their competitors in other countries that the ability of 
Norwegian industries to work profitably, increase exports and to increase the number 
of jobs available has weakened. 
 
As Henningsen describes, in the beginning of the 1900s  Vestfjorddalen valley, where 
Rjukan is located, was inhabited by only a few hundred smallholders. However, after 
the establishment of Norsk Hydro in Rjukan, the population in the valley gradually 
grew to 10,000 inhabitants. The leadership of Norsk Hydro succeeded in attracting 
foreign investors, paving the way for large-scale industrial development. Because of 
its pioneering role in the use of hydroelectric power for industrial purposes, and 
because of the unprecedented scale of the Hydro Project in a Norwegian context, 
Rjukan was seen to be spearheading the modernization of Norway – a newly 
independent state after the dissolution of the union with Sweden in 1905 (Henningsen 
2007:145). Norsk Hydro had a major role in the development of society not only 
because it offered jobs, but also because it mobilized the building of social welfare 
systems; indeed, it was sometimes difficult to distinguish those actions from the work 




By the mid-1960s, it was evident that Hydro’s production at Rjukan was not going to 
be competitive in the foreseeable future and from this time onwards the company 
gradually withdrew its activities from Rjukan; in other words, it was a similar 
situation to the one outlined here in relation to Knut, Helge and Tore at the end of the 
1990s. In 1988, Hydro finally shut down its process-based industry in Rjukan. 
Hydro’s social responsibility towards its home town was present not only in providing 
sociocultural welfare while it operated in Rjukan, but also when leaving Rjukan. 
Hydro made an agreement with the local government that it would remain present at 
Rjukan with a business employing about 400 people, and that it would donate a large 
amount of funding to finance various projects to stimulate economic growth in the 
area. Hydro, which had been the mainstay of social security in the town, did not 
relinquish its role even when relocating operations to another place, because if it had 
done so it would have risked the loss of its reputation, as we have seen in the cases of 




Whilst explaining the relations between social responsibility and profit in business, 
Garsten states that basically we should demand from companies what we demand 
from our children – that they admit it when they have done something wrong, and that 
they are honest and transparent. She clarifies that “businesses should respond to 
stakeholder demands for accountability and transparency not because it is nice to do 
so, but because it may strengthen the brand and enhances profitability in the long run” 
(Garsten 2004:81). CSR is a long-term and slightly risky investment in the brand; it is 
actually an entrepreneurial activity (ibid.) Consequently, social responsibility is not 
only about taking responsibility for the welfare of employees and the community, it 
also concerns the company’s honor, which is particularly pronounced in the case of 
utflaggere – those who leave Norwegian villages for countries with lower operating 
costs. The main fields of social responsibility for Norwegian companies include 
employees, consumers, investors, government bodies, associations and various 
interest groups, as well as assuming care for the welfare of the entire community and 
society, and environmental protection. Although this is financially costly, Norwegian 
manufacturers’ conception of socially responsible behavior is embedded enough for 
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its ideal to be taken along when relocating to a lower-cost country – although in a less 
all-embracing form.  
 
Norwegian manufacturers’ social responsibility in their companies in the Baltics 
mostly manifested itself in their attitude towards local employees, which took the 
form of their honesty or attitude towards legislation (for example, in dealing with all 
the formalities of the ‘paperwork’), and of transparency in transactions (for example, 
in publically announcing vacancies, not practicing nepotism). The mentality of social 
responsibility was also pronounced in Nordic Ltd’s confidence in terms of thinking 
about the ecological environment and work safety in industrial enterprises. This 
shows that Norwegian entrepreneurs take socially responsible practices along with 
them when they move across the border in search of cheaper labor. At the same time, 
it is obvious that their socially responsible and fair practices in the Baltics also reflect 
their sense of responsibility towards their home villages. They attempt to reduce the 
high social costs of condemnation by the native community, which was triggered 
when they relocated. By adhering to good business practices in the Baltics they are 
trying to recover their good name or at least not tarnish it any further. Consequently, 
for the most part, the companies that have left their home villages and moved across 
the borders remain within the embrace of their village’s social control, which is 
manifested in the entrepreneurs’ desire to restore their reputation, preserve their good 
name and convince their compatriots that relocating to a cheaper country was the only 
way out. They also try to show that over time relocation to the Baltics will contribute 
to the Norwegian homeland.  
 
In this discussion of company–society relations, it can be concluded that the economy 
cannot develop successfully where morals are ignored; that is to say, a 
businessperson’s conduct is embedded in the social milieu and its concept of what 
moral conduct should be. Work and unemployment, division of labor, wages, budget 
allocations, productivity, professionalism, and seller–buyer relations are closely 
related to issues of fairness, duty, freedom, rights, responsibility, conscience, honor, 
respect and the meaning of life. Company strategies are largely determined not only 
by socio-economic conditions, but also by sociocultural values, specific personalities 
and their value orientation. Behavior in the company, be it socially responsible or not, 
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starts with the individual: it is an accumulated result of the actions of an individual 
(Garsten 2004). An individual’s behavior mirrors the values of its social environment.  
In the case of the unsuccessful attempts by Nordic Ltd (see chapter 2) to promote 
socially responsible and environmentally friendly business practices in the Baltics, by 
offering software that would allow for the registration and management of dangerous 
waste and chemicals, in accordance with the EU REACH regulations, we saw that 
many Baltic entrepreneurs reasoned in the following manner: it should either be 
possible to bypass the REACH regulations, or to pay a fine for violating the 
regulations, which would be cheaper than buying the software offered by Nordic Ltd. 
It is a commonplace that individuals use consumption to say something about 
themselves, and about their family and locality; the main point about consumption lies 
with the attempt to get some agreement from fellow consumers over a definition of 
events. It can be concluded, then, that by publicly refusing a product that would 
ensure safe handling of hazardous waste and choosing instead to pay fines for faulty 
registration and storage of waste, Baltic businessmen acknowledge that, in their 
opinion, the law is not a norm and social responsibility does not pay off:  
The choices individuals make over a period of time express their view of the 
kind of universe she/he takes himself or herself to be in and the relative 
importance of everything in it, and these choices are made because they are 
expressive of his/her view on these matters. The result is that each individual is 
in a continuing dialogue with others over the way the world is to be understood 
and over what is of value or importance in it (Hargreaves Heap and Ross 
1992:4).  
 
Similar to Barth’s definition of a marketplace, Hargreaves Heap and Ross stress that 
without agreement on the most general features of their shared universe, without a 
web of shared categories and shared beliefs and values, there can be no agreement 
among individuals on the meanings of particular actions or consumption choices, and 
thus no possibility of using such choices as a means of communication (ibid.). Due to 
the fact that such social agreement is not reached overnight, but over the course of 
years, a brief examination is required into how the attitude of Baltic businessmen 
towards the law has been shaped.  
 
Describing the features of the Baltic economies during the transition period, Pabriks 
and Purs (2002) name a series of shortcomings hindering the formation of a lawful, 
fair and responsive entrepreneurial environment. For example, throughout the early 
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1990s the collection of tariffs collapsed, and the introduction of personal and business 
taxes was largely ignored. The porous borders of the region encouraged smuggling 
and the low salaries of border guards and custom agents fostered bribery and endemic 
corruption. Smuggled consumer products damaged the states’ early economic 
performance in two ways. The unpaid duty robbed the state treasury of desperately 
needed funds (for example, Latvian state revenue comes primarily from taxes and 
tariffs) and the low prices of attractive, contraband Western goods overwhelmed 
indigenous production. As a result, local industry overstated the degree of their 
financial collapse to minimize their tax dues. For instance, official tax returns for the 
early 1990s must read as if there were hardly a single profitable company in Latvia 
(Pabriks and Purs 2002). 
 
Miller, Grødeland and Koshechinka (2002) analyze the economic transition in 
Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Czech Republic and point to the interpretation of 
individual freedom there as the reckless pursuit of individual interests. They also note 
the extraordinary opportunities that privatization and other forms of redistribution of 
state property offered in terms of resultant criminal behavior. Values of the newly 
born democratic and free market society became more individualistic, more 
acquisitive and more market oriented. People felt forced, perhaps to an even greater 
extent than in Soviet times, to apply different strategies to keep their businesses 
going. Their lifestyles and careers, plans and orientations had to adapt to the transition 
chaos.  
 
In line with Helge’s observation on local business attitudes towards the law (see 
chapter 5), a local Baltic manufacturer admitted to me, “You do not obey the law but 
find out how to go beyond it. Laws are made so that you can evade them.” Another 
one proudly announced, “We are smart and know how to survive here. Those who do 
not live here will never understand that”. Yet another man, when asked about paying 
taxes, retorted somewhat impatiently:  
 
Why should I pay taxes? Riga’s Dome builds a sauna for several thousand lats 
with our tax money. That tax money is not spent on us. Why should I give them 
money to put it in their pockets? The state does not care for our health, for our 
old parents – we have to do it ourselves. I would rather use my tax money for 
such purposes. If I were to pay taxes honestly I could not survive. It is not 






The Entrepreneur and the ‘Rivertroll’, or the Corrupt Bureaucrat  
 
As the Norwegian manufacturing companies I visited did not work actively in the 
local Baltic market in terms of selling their products and cooperating or competing 
with local entrepreneurs, it was their relations with bureaucrats (without whose 
consent, businesses could not be launched successfully), not with partners or 
customers, that shaped Norwegians’ understanding of the business environment in the 
Baltic states. The Rivertroll of Livpils, who delayed connecting electric power to 
NIDA’s industrial park (see chapter 4.7), represents a persistent problem for 
Norwegian entrepreneurial activity in the Baltics; all the Norwegian businesspeople I 
met and talked with in the Baltics complained about this, although not in such a 
picturesque manner as Henning Hansen from NIDA. They all felt that Baltic 
bureaucracy is heavy handed and opaque:  
 
We are drowning in forms. Things here are unnecessarily complicated. We had 
an audit for the last three years. OK, we had some imperfect documents. But the 
auditor requested that our book-keeper documented everything we had done 
during the last three years. It is wrong. Perhaps she expected something. Back 
at home you would have got a list of imperfections and remarks, and that’s it 
(Tore Hauge, 2006). 
 
Helge’s stubborn struggle with bureaucrats is clearly reflected in his attempt to open 
another production facility in the Baltics on his own – without local partners or any 
solutions offered by NIDA. The production launch was delayed for more than a year 
due to unsuccessful negotiations with nepotism-driven local authority staff and, in 
Helge’s opinion, unsubstantiated allegations that the factory did not meet safety 
standards:  
 
While starting up Ingrid Ltd we have experienced a lot of things that could 
never happen at home. We had to wait for a year to get electricity in the factory. 
The bureaucracy is terrible. It should be made easier if they want people to stay 
and produce here. We thought it would get better after joining the EU, but we 
have not felt any difference. Too much paperwork. They should find a solution 
for it … all the customs clearance and that kind of hassle; I think it is 
unnecessary (Helge Hofset, 2006). 
 
NIDA’s management assessed in advance the potential bureaucratic complications of 
the Baltic business environment and ranked them among the most serious risks to 
successful industrial operations. Their solutions included seeking close cooperation 
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and strengthening friendship links with the local government of Livpils, and inviting 
senior local government administration staff to visit Norway while NIDA’s park was 
being set up. The position of NIDA’s management was as follows: 
 
We shall build an industrial park in a place where we can receive a blessing on 
our actions from the local authority; we are going to attract Norwegian 
investment in the community, but the local authority will help us tackle 
bureaucratic hindrances (Harald Hegstad, 2005). 
 
 
As a result of NIDA’s cooperation with the local government, NIDA’s tenants (like 
Knut, for instance) were spared the arbitrariness of the Rivertroll, which made it 
easier to plan and organize factory work in the Baltics. Helge and Steinar were 
confronted with bureaucratic hindrances only when they attempted to start another 
business in the Baltics on their own, as their first business was launched hand-in-
hand with local cooperation partners, who then undertook to settle all the formalities. 
Steinar recalls this as follows:  
 
We were spared all the problems with bureaucrats the others have been 
complaining about, because coming to the Baltics in the end of 1994 we had a 
cooperation agreement with a local telecommunications monopoly; the 
agreement prescribed that this company deals with all the paperwork, that we 
arrive to pre-prepared facilities and that we only have to install our equipment 
in its place. We did not need to go and get a single stamp by ourselves in order 
to start our operations. 
 
But, during the early stages of the transport corridor modernization in 2004, we 
were required 15–20 stamps; it was not easy, but we had been prepared for that. 
A part of the installed equipment had to be sent off to be repaired after the trial 
period. For this not to be regarded as export, we had to register the delivery as 
temporary export, so that when the repaired equipment was received back, it 
would not be listed as import. We had an agent who undertook to deal with 
these deliveries and to draw up the required papers. But things did not go well. 
About a year later a customs officer announced that our temporary exports were 
less than what we had re-imported. This was only because of packaging 
specifications: we had mixed up gross and net weights. We went through each 
delivery, series numbers, and drew up correct invoices, but the customs officers 
did not accept those, only snapped that “you have handed in your calculations 
once, it’s not possible to correct them anymore”. We were made to attend a 
smuggling meeting of sorts and to make explanations that we had not cheated. 
Then a man came and told our staff: “Come on, put 50 Lats in an envelope [for 
them] and you’ll get rid of all the problems”. But I did not do that, not because I 
could not spare 50 lats. I had strongly resolved not to do any such thing. I hired 
a lawyer and took him to the next smuggling meeting. The lawyer said that the 
hearing of the case could last for almost a year. The customs officers must have 
thought I am crazy. And this never happened again. They understood that I am 
a man of principles, and cannot be persuaded, as the lawyer certainly cost me 
much more than 50 Lats. An attitude like this is unthinkable in Norway. In fact, 
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I am surprised how sloppy and inaccurate bureaucrats can be in Norway and 
how meticulous in the Baltics. In the Baltics, they scrutinize every detail under 
a magnifying glass. I get nervous every time I have to meet local bureaucrats.  
 
We also had a misunderstanding with the State Revenues Service, when we 
were moving a warehouse from one suburban location to another. They 
demanded a report on what exactly we had had in that warehouse. I thought 
everything was okay. But three VAT invoices were missing from the 
warehouse – they were here (in the office), although they were supposed to be 
together with the wares. We were summoned to a meeting. We were met by 
very young people; I was surprised that twenty-year-old youngsters can work 
for the state revenue service. They looked at us very seriously and demanded 
explanations. We spread out all our books for the latest period and explained 
that the VAT invoices had been mislaid while relocating. All the rest was in 
impeccable order. I told them that we have been working in the Baltics for 12 
years, that we were the first to operate in the telecommunications sector with an 
ISO 1000 certificate, which is a guarantee of high quality and means that we are 
working openly and transparently. I said that we had been audited on an annual 
basis by external accounting and auditing companies, and nothing inconsistent 
was revealed. Besides, the revenues service for two years in succession has 
acknowledged us to be the best taxpayers in the region. And then, suddenly, 
such an attack because of three VAT invoices found at a wrong address. If that 
could be grounds for suspending our operations, then words fail me. Indeed, we 
had a feeling that somebody was trying to extort something from us. They 
should look at other companies. Do local companies pay any taxes at all? In the 
end we got away with a verbal reprimand. We were called up to another 
meeting, at which it was announced that we were being issued with a verbal 
warning (laughs); a number of working hours had been wasted on this. But this 
is the charm of the Baltics – extremely strict bureaucracy. People here are afraid 
of signing, they hide behind paragraphs. In Norway it is different (Steinar 
Jensen, 2006).  
 
Fear of the Rivertroll, or of the unpredictable attitude of a seemingly corrupt 
bureaucrat, who can make running a business complicated (besides having different 
opinions about a company’s organization) is the second most visible challenge to 
Norwegian business in the Baltics. The relationship between the businessman and the 
bureaucrat mirrors the citizen’s relations with the state and the law. Norwegians’ 
negative experience and lack of competence in dealing with Baltic bureaucrats 
demonstrate their expectations regarding a universal model of business–state 
relations. This model, however, is different in the Baltics, and Norwegian 
businesspeople do not fully understand practices to which they regularly ascribe a 







The Logic of Corruption 
 
One of the stumbling blocks in corruption research (and practice) has been the 
definition of corruption: which actions to include in this category and which to 
exclude. One and the same action can be regarded as corruption in one society, while 
in another it can be seen as basic decency or as an otherwise justified action. “The 
abuse of public office for private gain” is a widely accepted definition of corruption, 
states Sissener (2001:1), simultaneously pointing to the implications of understanding 
corruption as a violation of the law. Firstly, such a definition presupposes that there 
are laws prohibiting corrupt behavior and it does not allow for investigations of 
actions that corruption legislation does not cover. Secondly, it underestimates the fact 
that corrupt activity is a social act and that its meaning must be understood with 
reference to the social relationships among people in historically specific settings. 
Thirdly, it underestimates the fact that a transaction’s legality depends on its social 
context (Sissener 2001). Given that legal codes vary from country to country, 
judgments of the legality of various practices will also vary. Sissener (2001), Ruud 
(1998) and Cimdina Barstad (2003) note that the conception of corruption as the 
abuse of public office for private gain fails to recognize the importance of everyday 
dimensions and networking, and the establishment and maintenance of social 
relations. It also fails to recognize that patron–client, kinship or friendship relations 
can be important factors of social, political and economic organization. Thus, the 
majority of the Balts might say that any definition of corruption will always depend 
on moral judgment and overall context, while most Norwegians most probably would 
object to this. 
 
In an analysis of transactions between entrepreneurs and bureaucrats, Ruud (1998) 
notes that corruption can also be viewed as a practice with its own rules and dramas. 
It can be an established coping strategy in dealing with bureaucrats, and a form of 
wider practices and constructs – specifically the manner in which individuals are 
embedded in social networks, which allow bribery to appear only as a final option.  
 
Corruption tends to cover a wide range of different phenomena, such as bribery, 
embezzlement, extortion, favoritism, nepotism, the bending of rules, the abuse of 
power, influence peddling, and abuse of the public purse (Amudsen 1999; de Sardan 
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1999; Sissener 2000; Cimdina Barstad 2003). However, it is often the case that these 
practices are not considered illegal by the actors participating in them, and they are 
often not viewed as corruption at all. Where the line is drawn between what is 
corruption and what is not depends on the context and the position of the actors 
involved (de Sardan 1999).  
 
As corruption is socially embedded in the logics of gift-giving, negotiation, solidarity 
and redistributive accumulation (de Sardan 1999), separating corrupt practices from 
other forms of social exchange may prove difficult. Since understanding motive is an 
important entry point to understanding how corruption comes about and why it is, or 
is not, condemned, and why in some cases it may even be regarded as positive (Ruud 
1998), the social processes of legitimation must be seen from the actor’s point of 
view.  
 
Barth (1981) suggests that recognizing the dynamic interconnections between macro 
and micro phenomena may provide the most fruitful way to articulate the central 
questions involved here – of choice, freedom, history and the ontology of society and 
culture. Grønhaug (1974) explains that elements of macro structures are part of the 
determinants behind people’s choices and production of meaning. This indicates that 
in order to understand the reasons and forms of corrupt bureaucracy –it is necessary to 
trace the threads of influence upon Baltic entrepreneurs – both outwards in space and 
backwards in time. Corruption occurs in every political system, yet it has a distinctive 
profile in the post-communist states and part of this distinctiveness is linked to the 
nature of the former regime (Karklins 2002). The key question here, however, is not 
whether the previous regime was corrupt. Rather, it is whether and how this history 
determines the nature of relationships between entrepreneurs and officials in the post-
soviet Baltics.  
 
Less than a decade before the first Norwegian entrepreneurs and investors entered the 
Baltic market, the extreme deficit of goods and services, created by Soviet politics, 
made everyday life for the Baltic population nearly impossible without inclining 
towards practices a western observer most probably would call corruption. The value 
of the services sector as a legitimate sphere of economic activity was discounted and 
the sector was chronically underdeveloped (Dreifelds 1996). The unpredictability and 
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inertia of central planning made socialist enterprises heavily dependent on informal 
problem solving (B. Müller 2004:149). As a result of central planning’s gross 
inefficiencies, black markets flourished. People spent a considerable amount of time 
cultivating their contacts, especially with those in positions of power, for various 
exchanges based on bartering and favors. The process strengthened the bonding of 
individuals within society, but hindered rational economic relations (Dreifelds 1996).  
 
The communist regime as a system of government was “so completely in the hands of 
officials that their power jeopardized the liberties of ordinary citizens” (Miller et al. 
2001:17). Citizens could expect neither serious consideration nor fair treatment 
without making officials “interested” in their case. Dependence upon the use of bribes 
and contacts was notorious (ibid.). Timofejev (2000) reflects upon the analogy of the 
Soviet economy and the black market, where nothing was sold freely, but everything 
was acquirable if you knew whom to approach. Even with the existence of criminal 
investigations and strong penalties, he notes, market relations not only survived, but 
turned socialist prohibitions into an overall black market. In such a context, Timofejev 
regards corruption as a positive, smart phenomenon, as a manifestation of common 
sense in the economic behavior of the individual. Simis (1982) states that Soviet 
people had come to believe that everything could be attained by bribery: a good job, a 
university diploma or an undeserved judicial verdict. And although that conviction 
was far from justified in all cases, it led to a climate of tolerance towards corruption 
that held sway in Soviet society. 
 
During the communist era the state owned everything: enterprises, resources, real 
estate, and all other means of production. Ownership relations seemed to be blurred: 
everything was public property, but using public property as if it were private was a 
kind of benefit and privilege one obtained alongside positions of power, and this was 
not forbidden by law (Cimdina Barstad 2003:59). Although only the state could 
govern resources, in everyday life everyone, in respect of laws, operated with a part of 
that property. This can be illustrated through the case of a knitwear saleswoman: 
while she (with her motives and wishes) dealt with knitted goods (a piece of public 
property), she became de facto governor of that part of the property and could use it 
not only in society’s but also in her personal interests. She did not make the knitwear 
goods accessible to the whole of society by placing them on shop shelves, but sold 
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them from the backroom to those customers who could give her some benefit in return 
(Cimdina Barstad 2003). It was a blat or a barter of services: she did not exchange 
goods; she exchanged access to public property for commodities in short supply.  
 
This was only one of the Soviet-era practices suggesting that the use of public office 
for private advantage is not always widely perceived in a given society as corrupt. 
From a Norwegian perspective, practices of informal exchange taking place in the 
former Soviet Union may seem amoral, bearing the logic of corruption, while for the 
natives, such informal exchange might be simple daily routine. Soviet people did not 
regard such practices as corrupt; the very term “corruption” was introduced only in 
the 1980s (Satarov et.al.1998). The western definition of corruption – “misuse of 
public office for private gain” – can be misleading when applied to Soviet conditions, 
since the definition focuses on the boundaries between public and private properties 
and interest, while private ownership, as we know, was forbidden in the Soviet Union 
(Cimdina Barstad 2003).  
“How, if actors are fully cultural beings, could they ever do anything that does not in 
some way carry forward the core of cultural assumptions?” asks Ortner (1984:155). 
Most of our expectations about the world are learned without explicit rules being 
taught to us (Strauss & Quinn 1994). According to Ortner (1990), “structures structure 
events” when actors find them personally meaningful in a given context and 
internalize them. No permanent link is made,  
yet in the particular context in which the connection is operating, the structure 
has for the actor a certain naturalness, and realism, and hence coerciveness. The 
actor thus tends to enact the schema, and depending on his or her wealth, 
power, and charisma, may pull others along as well (Ortner 1990:91).  
 
Operating in this way a cultural schema may structure events consistently over a long 
period of a society’s history (ibid.). According to such a perspective – no matter how 
much western analysts would have wanted it – breaking free from the Soviet system 
did not mean breaking free from its past. The new system was to be built on the 
Soviet heritage, which restrained the establishment of a well-functioning democracy 
and a market economy. The legislative process itself was slowed by the new 
legislators’ lack of democratic experience. For example in Latvia, communist party 
members constituted 63 percent of the new Latvian elite in 1993 (Steen 1997), thus, 
230 
 
continuity with the previous governing system was unavoidable. The main duties of 
the new government were to introduce new legislation and to create new state 
institutions that would correspond to the needs of an independent state. But the Baltics 
were not politically, economically, or socio-culturally a blank slate on which a well-
functioning democracy could be written.  
The democratization and liberalization of post-soviet societies simultaneously opened 
the way for a broader distribution of powers, uncertainty and increased opportunities. 
This may even have increased the level of corruption among local political bosses, 
upcoming businesspeople and civil servants (Cimdina Barstad 2003), thus augmenting 
the sense of permissiveness and impunity during times of changing legislation and 
non-existent social security. I arrived at this awareness through interviews with Baltic 
civil servants in 2003 when I was carrying out research on the culture of corruption in 
post-soviet countries. Indicating that he had spent all of his conscious life in a society 
where a favorable decision could be achieved for oneself, through good contacts or a 
gift, a customs officer told me,  
 
When I got expelled from the primary school my mother went to the rector with a 
bottle of vodka and I got my place back … My uncle had a high position in 
customs for many years. It took only three days for him to arrange a position of 
customs officer for me. Well, it is not the best paid job, but it is attractive because 
of various privileges and the unofficial sources of income tied to the position in 
customs. A customs officer receives an official salary of 95 lats a months. He has a 
wife and kids. How can he support them? He would rather take a bribe of 700 lats 
and lose his job – these 95 lats per month. He will easily find as badly paid a job 
again. If he got 700 lats per month he would not risk his job by taking a bribe of the 
same amount. At least I would not take bribes then (Customs officer, 2003). 
 
Another civil servant in the Baltics confessed, 
 
Everybody thinks how to survive today and cannot afford to think how good or bad 
corrupt practices are for the state and for the future. And, let’s say, I stop such 
practices myself. I’ll just be a loser, because everybody else does it and benefits 
from it (Civil officer, 2003). 
 
However, more often than not, civil servants justified their actions by referring to 
their difficult life conditions: 
 
I want to have a job where I could earn more than I do now, in a legal way. I want 
to pay taxes, I want my salary to be clean, I want to earn a good pension. But rules 
are changing fast; you do not know what will come next year. You cannot feel safe, 




As these quotations show, people in the Baltics often saw their own informal actions 
not as criminal but as justifiable because of the transition chaos and adverse life 
conditions. The bribe givers even justified the recipients, explaining that bribe takers 
could not survive without receiving extra payments or gifts. Simultaneously, they 
blamed the Soviet past in justifying their informal activities. The Soviet past gave 
them a kind of meaningful explanation of the widespread nature of today’s corruption; 
they used it as an excuse when bribing clerks, even though the clerks’ services in 
many cases were available without bribes. They reinvented convenient practices from 
the past and accommodated them to present conditions. People found ways to take 
advantage of the state in (what was then) its formative stage, and were able to go 
beyond the law without getting punished in order to secure normal life conditions (in 
some instances, luxurious life conditions). Some even acknowledge that it was 
actually easier in those days to live with corruption than without it (Cimdina Barstad 
2003). 
 
Informal payments seemed like a kind of resistance to the unreasonable state system: 
they were regarded as token, incidental, unorganized, unsystematic, individual 
activities. Such actions were regarded as opportunistic and self-indulgent, and as 
having no revolutionary consequences, implying the long-lasting everyday resistance 
in precarious life conditions with the aim to survive today, this week, this season – as 
depicted by Scott (1985). 
 
In the customs codex it is stated that it is a gift if you present it and do not 
expect anything back. But if you expect or request something in return – it is a 
bribe. A gift, I guess, could not exceed 50 lats. But it is silly. You come to me, I 
do you a favor, and you “pay me back” after a month. It is that easy to evade 
the codex (Customs officer, 2003). 
 
In customs there will be a new system now, similar to that in the EU countries. 
The entire customs authority will be reconstructed. Clients and customs officers 
will no longer have direct contact. Clients will deliver and receive their papers 
through the window in the lobby. But our folk will always find out how to 
evade this. If my people need help I will always go downstairs to pick up their 
papers. They can call me on my mobile and say that they have just delivered 
their papers. Then I will go downstairs to the lobby and take those papers from 
my shelf. I will help them to get their papers ready faster or perhaps will take 
no account of some small imperfections. Such is our kind of thinking. Maybe 
something will change after 50 years, with new generations that never 




As with Nordic Ltd (see chapter 2), these examples suggest that common regulations 
in the European market by no means imply uniform European business practices. 
Norwegian expectations (described in chapter 4) that the Baltic regions, in becoming 
part of the EU market, would provide predictable and standardized business 
regulations (and thus easier entrance for Norwegian entrepreneurs) were not fulfilled. 
Not only in the Soviet Union, but also in post-soviet contexts, illegal or informal 
practices form an accomplished system of relations that shape a specific sub-state, 
which exists alongside the constitutional state (Cimdina Barstad 2003). The examples 
given above show how behavior differs from rules and legal norms – which poses a 
challenge to Radcliffe Brown’s suggestion that social rules and rule-bound institutions 
produce individual conformity to both society’s dictates and its social equilibrium 
(Radcliffe Brown 1952). Social structure (the level of jural rules and the social 
system) and social organization (the outcome of the application of those rules in 
practice) – as distinguished by Raymond Firth (1964) – are clearly appearing as 
separate and contrasting phenomena here. What individuals actually do, their choices 
and patterns of action within the structural framework, differs to a significant extent 
from officially defined patterns of laws, customs, statuses and social institutions. 
Therefore, it might be problematic and even misleading for an investor to conclude 
from official norms and other institutional arrangements how his workforce, or 
potential partners or representatives of the state, will actually behave.  
 
Here, it would be useful to add that post-socialist countries are not the only ones 
where Norwegian businesspeople came across an informal way of dealing with legal 
formalities, which, more often as not, take place outside the limits of the law. When 
analyzing Norwegian business experience in Brazil, Wold (2007) describes the way 
Brazilians make use of dar um jeito or jeitinho brasilieiro: “a fast, and last minute 
way of accomplishing a goal by breaking universalistic rules and instead using one’s 
informal social or personal resources” (Barbosa 1992:1, in Wold 2007:65). Wold 
further explains that since jeitinho means finding a creative solution out of a problem, 
it is a recognized institution and is given a positive value; you neither follow the rules 
nor break them outright but try to bend them in your favor. Brazilians say, “there is 
always a jeito or possible solution in Brazil” (Wold 2007:66). Wold describes the use 
of jeitinho as an important difference in the way rules are applied by Norwegian 
Hydro and the way they are applied by Brazilians. Norwegians mostly stick to the 
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rules as they are written and they do not look for alternative solutions, as is common 
practice in Brazil. Brazilians would rather regard the rules in a way that means they 
can conduct business as they see fit (Wold 2007). Since the laws are complex and can 
be interpreted in different ways, they cannot just look in a book and see how they can 
be applied – as would be the case in Norway (ibid.). However, even though bending 
the rules to find an alternative solution is not something spoken about freely, 
Norwegian Hydro, while operating in Brazil, employs one particular Norwegian 
precisely because he had learned how to use the jeitinho. 
 
Hansen (2008) describes Norwegian attitudes towards guanxi in China– a concept 
referring to a system of personal ties that carries long-term social obligations. It is 
assumed to play a vital role in Chinese business. By cultivating guanxi with 
bureaucrats, suppliers and customers, companies in China may protect themselves 
against some of the uncertainties in an economy still lacking some of the safeguards 
of a true market economy (Luo 1997, in Hansen 2008:210). Hansen explains that 
guanxi can be both positive and negative: sometimes it works as a moral system 
supervising the good conduct of its members; at other times it becomes a vehicle for 
corruption (Li 2007, in Hansen 2008: 2010). Thus, keeping the right balance between 
appropriate and adequate business relations is a considerable challenge for Norwegian 
entrepreneurs in China, since “it is not the quality and price that matter; it’s the 
relationship between the buyer and seller that’s important” (Hansen 2008:210).  
 
The attitude of Norwegian businesspeople towards ‘difficult’ Baltic bureaucrats is 
represented in a statement by the director of NIDA’s industrial park:  
 
If we come to the point that someone requests money for issuing a permit we have 
the right to, we will take our loss and go home. We will not tolerate corruption. Or 
– we will involve the media and give the signal to other investors (Henning 
Hansen, 2005).  
 
This is proof of an iron will not to give in to the local style of dealing with problems. 
In their battle with the ‘Rivertroll’, the Norwegians stubbornly kept to their trust in 
lawful, transparent and fair business practice, even though that meant waiting months 
for electric power to be supplied to their plant – as in Henning’s and Helge’s cases – 
or hiring an expensive lawyer, like Steinar did. They do this to restate and prove as a 
matter of principle that nobody could extort from them even the most insignificant or 
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informal payments. Similarly, the Norwegian entrepreneurs in China, depicted by 
Hansen (2008), showed no tolerance towards bribes and kickbacks, and many of them 
arranged meetings with suppliers to inform them that they would be cut off or 
reported “if they wave a carrot in front of any company executive (Hansen 2008:209).  
 
However, Hansen states, fancy statements are one thing, the reality can prove rather 
different. When matters have gone too far, Norwegians in China, Brazil and the 
Baltics have been known to trust their local contacts to resolve an intricate situation, 
without going into detail about how the problems are dealt with. As Garsten (2004) 
puts it, success or failure in putting a code of conduct to work, and in running a 
profitable business, often depends upon the choice of local partner. Garsten adds,  
 
Generalized discourses, such as those of corporate social responsibility, are at some 
point translated into local contexts, where existing practices, traditions and 
institutionalized ways of seeing things and doing things transform and reformulate 
ideas and keywords in specific ways (Garsten 2004:86).  
 
Henning has found the metaphor of the Rivertroll to be most apt in describing Baltic 
bureaucrats. In Norwegian folk tales, trolls are depicted as bad and stupid,74 and they 
are invariably outwitted and vanquished. Positive fairytale characters, such as 
Bukkene Bruse, Askeladden or the Boys who met the trolls in Hedal Woods, outsmart 
or vanquish the Troll with cunning or by their good qualities. And just as Norwegian 
entrepreneurs used to intimidate each other with stories about terrifying Baltic 
bureaucrats, Norwegian parents scare their children with stories about Trolls whom 
nobody has ever seen but who are said to live nearby in the mountains and forests. 
However frightening those trolls might be, they are part of Norwegian national 
discourse, and any Norwegian is able to get along with them.  
 
6.4.In Search of Norwegianness 
Interest in the specific character of a culture and a society is the basis of anthropology, 
where we treat society as a group of people having certain cultural similarities – a 
group that sees itself as being different from other groups. Such cultural features, of 
course, are not eternal and stable; they can change over the course of time, but can be 
                                                 
74 The Norwegian entrepreneurs interviewed often regarded Baltic bureaucrats as incompetent. 
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identified, compared and interpreted (Klausen 1984:8). Norwegian and other 
anthropologists, starting with Barnes (1954), who turned the village of Bremnes into a 
classic research case at a number of foreign universities, have undertaken extensive 
research in Norway. 
 
Although Norway and the Baltics can be considered close neighbors in geographic 
and cultural terms, the earlier chapters of the present research have drawn attention to 
the fact that their business environments and cultural practices differ considerably. 
Their peoples’ differing ideas on doing business have undeniably been influenced by 
businesspeople’s life experiences in their home countries. Life experiences in Norway 
and the Baltics at the turn of the twenty-first century can be juxtaposed in a number of 
aspects. In Latvia, for example, power seems to concentrate among the elites, who 
have widespread non-egalitarian attitudes (Steen 1997), facilitated by the privileged 
status of the elite in the Soviet Union and by the sudden potential to acquire affluence 
during the transition period because of a lack of relevant legislation (Cimdina Barstad 
2003). On the other hand, Norwegian politics since the Second World War, and the 
massive post-war reconstruction, resulted in a society dominated by social democratic 
ideology and egalitarianism; Norwegian society has valued highly both equality and 
individual integrity (Eriksen 1993:16). At a time when Sørhaug claims that for 
Norwegians democratic goods were absolute values, not to be doubted under any 
circumstances (Sørhaug 1984:61), the Baltic states were still ruled by communism, 
and democracy as an underlying foundation was an alien concept to their people.  
 
Due to its self-sufficiency and desire to retain autonomy, social-democratic Norway 
has opted for staying outside the European Union and is one of the richest western 
states, whereas the Baltic states, after independence from the Soviet Union, are still 
adjusting to a free market economy. Being aware of a lack of self-sufficiency, and of 
their vulnerability, they chose a strategic course towards joining the EU. 
 
Just as colonialism provides a context for anthropological studies in Britain, 
industrialization in the USA and post-socialism in Eastern Europe, the anthropology 
of modern Scandinavia has been extensively examined in relation to its welfare states. 
The “Scandinavian model” of social and economic development is characterized by a 
strong emphasis on security, safety, equality, rationality, foresight and regulation, and 
236 
 
the welfare state has encouraged social scientists to carry out research on these topics 
(Gullestad 1989:7). The study of everyday life, such as identity management within 
households, communities and ways of life, has been a key focus of modern 
Scandinavian anthropology (Gullestad 1989).  
 
Norwegians “do not regard themselves as cosmopolitan, rather to a certain extent 
reserved and introvert” (Eriksen 1993:18). They emphasize close relations with nature 
and their place of origin. Even in the 1920s, Norway was regarded as a European 
periphery and its development followed a comparatively different path from that of 
much of Western Europe. Even though Norway was in union with Denmark from 
1523 to 1814, and Denmark had colonies, Norway itself has never been a colonial 
power, and its feudalism never developed properly. The nation’s ideal formed a rural 
and egalitarian country, emphasizing modest life in contrast to city lifestyles or 
military splendor. Urbanization took place comparatively late in Norway; indeed, 
many still live in the countryside. In fact, the ideal image of ordinary life has become 
a cliché: “the small red cottage in the country” or a cabin in the mountains, where 
one “can get away from everything”, go fishing, take a walk, or ski with friends or a 
small family circle. Modesty and simplicity are valued more than luxury wares, even 
at the level of state ideology – these things are highly taxed (Eriksen 1993). But how 
can those values connect with doing business in terms of “striving, thriving and 
beating out the competition” (Vlahos 1985)? 
 
Eriksen has reflected on contemporary Norwegian identity as wedged between the 
turbulence of modernity and the inertia of tradition (Eriksen 1993:11). Berggreen 
(1993:39) claims that Norwegian identity is best characterized by the phrase “a social 
democracy in a national costume.” Both authors suggest that the ways Norwegians 
think and act reveals something specific and particularly “local”, which is worth 
knowing when analyzing entrepreneurial practices. If one assumes that life’s 
underlying values are revealed in the most authentic and natural manner in 
individuals’ daily lives in their local community, it follows that it is important to 
identify what Norwegians value the most when they develop entrepreneurship in their 




Does Embeddedness Exclude Economic Growth? 
From a historical perspective, it is apparent that Norway’s geographic location on the 
edge of Europe and its peoples’ seemingly introvert nature, has interacted with 
extraversion and external strategic communication. Although a number of peripheral 
villages still safeguard their introversion and condemn those who leave the village or 
make use of new market opportunities at the expense of local industries, there is no 
doubt that Norway is a significant and active player in the global economy. 
Norwegians, after all, have had active market relations with the Baltic region since as far 
back as the Middle Ages, when Bergen was a significant member in the Hanseatic 
League of trading cities and built strong trading links not only with German cities but 
also with the Baltics (and the Hanseatic city of Riga in particular). Moreover, several 
centuries later, in 1918, Latvia became independent from Tsarist Russia for two decades; 
by 1920 it started to plan economic development, and Norway was the first country to 
grant Latvia long-term loans, while other major European countries remained uncertain 
about whether Latvia had any right to exist at all (Karnups 2004). Today, Norwegians 
are among the most significant and visible investors in the Baltics.  
 
Eriksen (1993) indicates that, in the context of globalization, it is important for any 
society to be aware of their unique identity in order to safeguard borders against the 
outer world. Norwegians are still proud of being Norwegian, but the state has become 
much more integrated in the global world than many Norwegian people imagine 
(ibid.). The awareness of Norwegian identity is not only a kind of protection against 
changes in the surrounding cultural environment, but also a strategic move in terms of 
economic activity. As a countermeasure to the processes of deindustrialization and 
relocation of production units, the identities of local communities and regions are 
being strategically promoted. This tendency can be seen as deeply rooted in the 
workings of the global economy due to the release of capital from its territorial 
constraints and the vanishing of all sorts of local monopolies (Henningsen 2007:146).  
 
Henningsen outlines how management expertise is involved in the process of 
articulating the identity of a local community, thus building the groundwork for new 
businesses after the principal employer, Hydro, left the small town of Rjukan. With 
the aim of generating ideas for a new basis for economic activity, which, over the last 
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decades, had been channeled into keeping Hydro in Rjukan, the Over kanten project 
was launched, funded by Hydro. The project managers were consultants invited from 
Oslo, but the principal task – to formulate this new basis of economic activity – was 
performed by six working groups composed of local residents from various sectors of 
society (Henningsen 2007).  
 
During this process of generating ideas for new business activities, people emphasized 
local community values and identity. Henningsen characterizes attempts to define the 
identity and unique character of the regional community as a way to be noticed and 
heard on the global stage. Nevertheless, the meaning attributed to local community 
values in business development planning indicates both the wish and the tendency to 
embed economic activities not only in market relations but also in specific local 
settings: in the rural mountain landscape of Telemark, the heartland of folk culture   
elaborated in Norwegian nationalist imagery. Thus, the issue for people in Rjukan was 
not so much whether they wanted to make strategic use of the identity of the place, 
but how they should go about it (Henningsen 2007:147). A noteworthy aspect of such 
a strategy is the assumption “that there should be a real correspondence between the 
images projected onto the market and the values that characterize the internal life of 
the business enterprise” (ibid.).  
 
Similar to a business enterprise, the inhabitants of Rjukan involved in the planning of 
the town’s economy had to clarify the future they wished to create in terms of ‘values, 
‘stories’, ‘images‘ ‘missions‘ and ‘vision‘. The consultants drew their business 
development ideas from The Dream Society by Danish author Rolf Jenssen, who, in 
an evolutionary spirit, explains 
 
how the affluent societies of the world have passed through a number of stages 
of economic development: (hunter-gatherer, agriculture, industry, information) 
to arrive at the final, post material, stage of the dream society where the 
economy is based on the sale and consumption of the “stories” that attach to 
products (Henningsen 2007:149) .  
 
However, in order to turn economic development in a direction that would accentuate 
“the who-am-I market”, “the market for peace and mind”, “the market for 
convictions”, “the market for togetherness” and “the market for care” (Henningsen 
2007:151), it was important to change the mentality of the local community, which, 
according to the project managers, was stuck in the Hydro era and reflected 
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‘dependent’ thinking. This can also be seen in the attitudes of businessmen Hans 
(Brox 1972) and Tore Hauge towards what they saw as stuck-in-the-mud villagers 
who were unable or unwilling to accept innovative occurrences in their village. New 
ways of thinking or innovation were skeptically perceived there as a “creative 
destruction” of the existing order (Schumpeter 1942, in Lindeløv and 
Karlsen2002:115).  
 
Consultants motivated the inhabitants of Rjukan to evaluate the material and non-
material values of their community against certain set goals, by assessing which of 
these values could promote further development and which could not. An abstract 
notion such as ‘enthusiasm’ was retained from the period when Rjukan thrived in 
industrial terms (and, consequently, in social terms). The value dubbed ‘snow and 
mountains’ fitted here because it agreed with a potential investor’s plan to set up a ski 
center in Rjukan. A value like ‘the hospital’ was discarded, although for the locals it 
had become a symbol of the community’s will to survive and ability to stand against 
the central government (when the hospital was to be closed down, the townspeople 
rallied in protest and prevented it from happening). Consultants indicated that values 
should be placed in an unoccupied niche, thus indirectly echoing Barth’s (1972) 
concept of a niche as an important business asset. Rjukan could not be proclaimed a 
“miniature Norway”, as this niche was taken: another community had already 
declared itself thus (Henningsen 2007). 
 
The business development plan described by Henningsen reveals the attempt to 
modify culture, creativity and identity in a rational manner and within administrative 
categories, and subordinate values to market principles. Consultants wished to operate 
with values like disembedded units, but the local attitudes demonstrate that these 
values could not be detached from local context. Under the influence of global 
capitalism, Rjukan’s people needed to identify their uniqueness, so that it could be 
sold. In such a situation, values are dealt with as mutually independent objects, 
without assessing how fundamental and interrelated they are. It is not even assumed 
that values, which the business consultants see as devoid of any potential, are 
impossible to discard when shaping the region’s future development. Henningsen 
indicates that the values identified by applying “the filter of uniqueness” (Henningsen 
2007:155) are not in fact unique: they are values familiar to the people outside the 
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borders of a specific region, which they lack, and which they desire to get acquainted 
with and identify themselves with. Thus, in this case uniqueness means ‘to be best at’ 
something. The risks of such a strategy are the deterioration of capital during its 
exploitation and the promotion of anti-globalist sentiments (Henningsen 2007: 146f). 
 
The people of Rjukan found it difficult to give up “the previous stages of society” 
(ibid.) based upon a manufacturing economy and the material utility of commodities. 
Like villagers in Fjord County, it seems they were not ready for post-industrial life. 
To a large extent, the purpose of the Over kanten project was to raise people’s 
awareness of the non-material logic of the new economy and the human power 
shaping post-industrial societies. Over kanten provides an insight not only into what 
economic activity should be like in a Norwegian town but also allows reflections on 
communication in state–business relations and on business management principles in 
Norway. In the planning of business development in Rjukan, decisions were not taken 
by separate individuals or institutions: local people were actively involved in the 




To Fit in and to be the Same 
 
“I love paying taxes as I see how many benefits I receive from our state”, Henning 
Hansen proudly claimed. He agreed that contributions to the common good in terms 
of the family, at work, in nature and in the wider society, as well as the payment of 
higher taxes, explain the functioning of the Norwegian welfare system which, 
according to him, is the best welfare system in the world. Gullestad (1992:65) 
explains, “The welfare state in Norway is based on the ideas of solidarity, security, 
and equality defined as sameness”. The considerable effort that the government has 
made in relation to the sectors of housing, social policy, healthcare and state insurance 
funds, indicate that Norway has developed a blend of capitalist economy and strong 
state institutions (ibid.). In comparison to other European countries, Norway has 
pronounced decentralization (Eriksen 1993). To secure equal conditions (schools, 
hospitals, post offices, libraries, roads, tunnels) in urban and rural areas is a huge 
financial burden for the state. Even considering that the periphery drains the national 
budget, hardly any politician would dare not to mention “the regions” (Utkant-Norge) 




An egalitarian ideology is clearly apparent not only in Norwegian managers’ 
reflections on the organization of work in their companies but also in the reactions of 
the Fjord County village communities to the relocation of factories to the Baltics. 
They should rather go bankrupt in their own village than leave it; they should aim to 
be on an equal footing with the other village residents and not desire more than others 
– neither in attempts to make a profit or to conquer foreign markets, nor in the 
practices of applying new strategies (for instance, in discovering a new location for 
production). This was the attitude directly or indirectly displayed towards Tore and 
Helge when they closed down their production facilities in the villages of Fjord 
County. NIDA was also condemned by the wider society, both in the public space and 
in the corridors of Parliament (Stortinget), for offering better production conditions in 
the Baltics to Norwegian regional manufacturers. Public activities, which resulted in 
the political decision to halt NIDA’s operations in the Baltics, proved that the 
majority of industrialists who did not wish or were unable to leave their home 
villages, felt they were in an unequal situation, as they were unable to reduce 
production costs. Norwegian workers, out-competed by cheap Baltic labor, also felt 
they were treated unequally. 
 
What seems to be particularly visible here is the feeling that ‘we’ – in terms of 
community togetherness – are threatened in relations with those perceived as 
undermining stability in a situation of economic, social and geographic mobility. 
These empirical examples suggest that certain Norwegian ideals seem to have a kind 
of pre-capitalist flavor. Gullestad has also observed such a trend in Norwegian towns: 
 
The specifically egalitarian idea of sameness seems to be ideologically 
predicated upon a set of premises in which a static social community without 
significant mobility is assumed to be the fundamental point of reference. 
Associated with the static notion of society is the notion of fixed moral order. In 
this situation mobility (geographical and social) is viewed negatively since it 
threatens the common frame of reference” (Gullestad 1985, in Gullestad 1992: 
175). 
 
Striking similarities can be observed not only in the ideology of Fjord County villages 
and fishing villages (Brox 1972), but also in Norwegian farming villages, where 
“everybody knows ea-ch other and where the limits of ideal behavior are continuously 
tested” (A. K.Larsen 1984), thus ensuring the continuity of stability and predictability 
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from generation to generation. Anne Kathrine Larsen (1984) describes the situation in 
a Norwegian farming village as follows:  
 
In a small rural area (bygdesamfunn), one should take care of one’s farm in the 
best possible way, and not only in one’s personal interests and in those of one’s 
immediate family, but also for the sake of all the relatives and further 
descendants. This feeling must have been stronger in the olden times. Family 
ties imposed certain duties and the farm had to be managed efficiently for the 
sake of one’s offspring.  
 
The farm had to be handed down to descendants in a better condition than it had 
been when the owner himself took it over. Children are involved in farm work 
from the infancy … and one of the children had the obligation to take over the 
farm. Co-operation among generations continues while the older generation is 
able to sustain it. The welfare of a farm and the family is important for village 
life.  
 
The villagers see themselves as the carriers of Norwegian village culture where 
continuity is ensured through countless generations of kinsfolk. A family is 
associated with a specific farm and the work on this farm is the foundation of 
their lives. The reputation and status of an individual and his kinsmen in local 
culture depend on how much he/she is aware of and cultivates the material and 
moral values entrusted to him/her. To stand out against the background of 
others and claim that you are better than others or that your family has stronger 
cultural achievements than other families is regarded as an insult.  
 
It is important to avoid behaving in the manner that makes the community turn 
their backs on you. Everybody depends on each other for obtaining help, 
information, and for dealing with practical issues. It would be unforgivable if 
people ignored each other and passed each other by without a greeting, as there 
are no other social milieu at least within a mile. Thus “villageness” 
(bygdedommen) thrives and prospers, and is as important as it has been so far. It 
is the reputation of an individual, a farm or a family that mainly occupies the 
villagers’ minds (A. K. Larsen 1984:164ff). 
 
Although these are reflections on a village composed of a dozen medium-sized dairy 
farms, striking parallels can be drawn with attitudes towards industrial 
entrepreneurship in the villages Tore Hauge and Helge Hofset moved away from. In 
the “farmer–dairy–village community” relations described by Larsen, it is possible to 
see direct parallels with the “businessman–factory–village community” relations. The 
activities in Larsen’s farmers’ village and the businesses of Tore and Helge (and the 
activities in fishing villages, described by Brox (1972)) had to a great extent been 
conducted in accordance with village ideology: “everybody acts the same way and 
nobody is to presume he is better than the others” (A. K. Larsen 1984:169).  
 
“Villageness” in all these cases has acquired symbolic meaning, for the most part due 
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to its sentimental past. Bourdieu speaks about the “fatherland” a farmer is trying to 
take care of as well as he possibly can, because the plot belonged to his forefathers 
over a long period of time, and therefore acquired symbolic meaning. Once lost, it 
could only be bought back at an inordinately high price (Bourdieu 1996). Symbolic 
capital is endowed with the categories of perception and appreciation; it becomes 
symbolically efficient because it responds to socially constituted “collective 
expectations” and beliefs; it also exercises a sort of action from a distance, without 
physical contact (Bourdieu 1998:102).  
 
Ingenuity and a wish to take advantage of the opportunities opened up beyond village 
borders (namely, new, hitherto unexplored activities) were not supported, particularly 
because they took place at the expense of the seemingly continual, stable social order 
in the village. And it is not that the villagers’ concerns were unjustified, because when 
they were actually convinced that Knut and Tore could breathe life and a positive 
balance into their companies in the Baltics, other manufacturers followed their 
example – particularly when governmental actor NIDA expressed its support for such 
a strategy.  
 
Larsen’s example is also a good illustration of an individual’s reputation and 
respectability being values that the surrounding environment assigns to an individual. 
Tore’s pride in having saved his family business (by relocating to the Baltics and 
considerably reducing production costs) is groundless if society fails to appreciate his 
achievement. In other words, an individual’s right to be proud, and their grounds for 
being proud, is decided by the surrounding social environment (Archetti 1984: 55).  
 
The manifestations of shame in Norway are characterized by Archetti, in comparing 
Norwegians to the Latin American context. He writes that unlike Latin Americans 
Norwegians tend not to feel shame but do feel guilt. According to Archetti (1984), an 
individual carries the feeling of guilt inside themselves as bad conscience; it lives its 
own life in a human soul, but is not a public affair or concern. Shame, on the other 
hand, is said to imply public transgression.  
 
Shame means losing one’s honor in a public arena. For shame to be justified, rules, 
agreed upon by society, need to have been violated (Archetti 1984). But the feeling of 
guilt detests publicity; it has a powerful self-control mechanism. Archetti claims that 
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if in Norway a person settles matters with themselves, then in Latin America people 
have to restore their good name in public (ibid.). However, in the cases of Tore and 
Helge, it was a matter of shame: society publicly deemed them guilty in terms of the 
community – by gossiping and by not greeting them in public – and through the 
media. They were dishonored in the public sphere. They felt no guilt for what they 
had done, but were wounded by their compatriots’ attitude; however, they were also 
satisfied at being able to act in so shrewd a manner, by taking advantage of new 
opportunities in the new global markets, to save their companies. Nevertheless, the 
symbolic capital of their companies was lost, to a great extent. Bourdieu explains that 
the concept of honor in Mediterranean societies is a typical form of symbolic capital, 
which exists only through repute, that is, through the representation that others have 
of it, to the extent that they share a set of beliefs liable to cause them to perceive and 
appreciate certain patterns of conduct as honorable or dishonorable (Bourdieu 
1998:47). Tore’s and Helge’s patterns of conduct were perceived as dishonorable by 
the societies of their native villages.  
 
In Norway, local knowledge, including knowledge about each other, and belonging to 
the local environment are significant identity values, like life-long ties of friendship 
(Sørhaug 1996:83). Likewise, Norwegians extol individual modesty and indirect ways 
of talking about their own virtues and achievements. However, as a result of these two 
tendencies, a combination is created of a discrete public life that runs alongside a vast 
and potent flow of gossip (Sørhaug 1996). And gossip being spread is a concern for 
businesses, even when they have left their native villages. Knut, Tore and Helge are 
all worried that they will be unable to fit back into their home communities, which 
shows that hearsay and rumors work as a powerful mechanisms of social control in 
this context.  
 
Gullestad (1992) explains that in their personal lives Norwegians would rather “fit in 
with” (passe sammen med) relatives, friends and neighbors. To ‘fit in with’ means to a 
large extent to be alike. According to Gullestad (1992:192), “In everyday life the 
notion of ‘fitting in with’ is a key notion mediating between the idea of equality 
defined as sameness and unwanted differences”. Norwegians’ need to fit in with 
others can also be observed in the interiors of their homes where, especially in the 
living room, each object has to fit in with other objects: furniture, pictures and 
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accessories (pynteting) with similar properties arranged in similar composition 
(Gullestad 1992:55). Home decoration is another way of making statements about 
identity and social relationships (Gullestad 1992:52). The meaning that materializes in 
the organization of objects in space can only be discovered through associated social 
practices, which may be expected to reveal the same cognitive schemes as the objects 
in space (Gullestad 1992:63). If Zhukova’s office (see chapter 2) makes an 
ostentatious display of superiority (marble staircase, crystal chandeliers and 
candlesticks), then Norwegian workplaces demonstrate modesty and the attempt not 
to stand out among others. In the same manner as the house can be seen as a 
microcosm of important cognitive categories (Bourdieu 1977, in Gullestad 1992: 62), 
so can the office or the workplace. Such cognitive categories may be found in walls, 
doors, room divisions and objects, and may indicate what is assumed to be good, bad, 
beautiful or ugly. Thus, the physical structure of the building, its interior and the 
surrounding environment can tell us a great deal about the values of that workplace. 
 
The observations that Norwegians tend to emphasize similarity in the process of 
social life, and that in the Norwegian context differences between people are easily 
perceived as unwanted hierarchy and injustice (Gullestad 1992:185), allows us to 
understand the condemnatory attitude towards manufacturers who decided to relocate 
their businesses to lower cost countries. In addition, the underlying reason, which 
Tord Larsen (1984:37) sees reflected throughout the environment of Norwegian 
villages, tends to confirm the significant role of the notion of ‘fitting in with’: 
 
When something in our reality threatens to run wild, we squeeze it tight in its efforts 
to escape and harness it up, so we can stand amidst reality with reins in our hands 
and can always be sure where the horse is (T. Larsen 1984:36).  
 
Tord Larsen underlines here how important cultural and social predictability are for 
Norwegians (ibid.), which helps us to understand why the majority of Norwegian 
manufacturers dared to enter the Baltics only ‘through’ NIDA’s industrial park, where 
production could be launched under the predictable conditions provided by their own 
country’s institutions.  
 
Gullestad points out that the notion of equality is a useful starting point to approach 
the Norwegian version of egalitarian individualism. She explains that the English 
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word ‘equality’ translates in Norwegian as likhet, which literally means “alikeness” or 
“sameness” (Gullestad 1992:185). Equality can also be interpreted as likeverd 
(equality, or having the same or equal value), likeberettigelse (having the same or 
equal rights) and likestilling (having the same or equal status) (ibid.). All these 
notions contain the word lik (same or like), which indicates that the Norwegian 
definition of equality implies a considerable emphasis on being and doing the same 
(ibid.).  
 
Like most people in the world, Norwegians know their culture without always being 
able to explain why they understand things in certain ways (Gullestad 1992:191). 
Nevertheless, when discussing modes of life and concepts of correct behavior, most of 
the Norwegian entrepreneurs whom I interviewed referred (albeit with a faint smile) 
to the Janteloven set forth in the novel En flyktning krysser sitt spor (1933), by 
Danish-Norwegian author Aksel Sandemose. They did not quote the Jante Law word 
for word, but mentioned it as a point of reference. The Jante Law reads as follows: 
Don’t think you’re anything special. 
Don’t think you’re as much as us. 
Don’t think you’re wiser than us. 
Don’t convince yourself that you’re better than us. 
Don’t think you know more than us. 
Don’t think you are more than us. 
Don’t think you are good at anything. 
Don’t laugh at us. 
Don’t think anyone cares about you. 
Don’t think you can teach us anything. 
 
Many Norwegians interpret these lines by Sandemose as a reflection on their culture 
and the ten commandments of egalitarianism in which Norwegian mentality takes 
root; as Gullestad puts it, they are the “informal rules of correct living” (Gullestad 
1992:189). The idea enshrined in these lines is regarded as an unofficial but strong 
basis for people’s life philosophy, which is widely observed (even if people do not 
know these lines by heart) both in daily communication (especially in villages) and in 
tax policy. The ideology contained in these lines does not suppress bright 
personalities, as may seem to be the case to a careless reader, but rather opposes 
excessive conceit, pretentious luxury and affectation. It does this by accentuating that 
immoderate pride is sinful (for example, too luxurious an office for Helge’s manager); 
unnecessary spending is theft of means that could be channeled into socially 
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responsible investment. This ensures that nobody transgresses the publicly accepted 
limits of mediocrity (Archetti 1984:54).  
 
The observations made over the course of this research into Helge’s and Steinar’s 
companies, confirm that the democratic manner of organizing work implies 
individuality as a value: although people work together as a team, they should be 
ready to make independent decisions and assume responsibility. As Henning (NIDA’s 
director in Livpils) explained, “almost all Norwegians see themselves as leaders, they 
want to decide for themselves and do not want others to decide for them”. We can 
also read in the lines of the Janteloven praise for free thought, namely, anybody who 
dares to turn against a free and creative thought would be reminded: “do not think you 
are more special than me and can teach me”. Although independence is the key notion 
of Norwegian individualism (Gullestad 1992:184), it does not exclude the strong 
collective values of Norwegian society, which are best reflected in the Scandinavian 
welfare state model, stable village communities and the instinct to preserving 
continuity. No person has any right to treat the community with arrogance, but neither 
does the community have any right to treat a person with arrogance. Thus, the 
Janteloven provides for principles of mutual harmony and equality. 
 
To understand the ways in which our social experience affects how we think, we need 
to recognize the ways in which society may exert pressure on an individual and the 
ways in which it may restrict the individual’s options (Hargreaves Heap and Ross 
1992). Janteloven in this context appears as a codex that indirectly governs 
individuals in their personal interactions. If we think of modern communities as 
individualistic, anonymized and disembedded, then the analysis of entrepreneurial 
practices in Norwegian villages suggests the opposite. Villagers’ actions are restricted 
to a great extent by a complex set of social rules that favor obligations towards 
collectivity, while simultaneously not downplaying individualism – in a sort of Mary 
Douglas (1970) ideal of the “strong group – low grid” society. The village community 
has a strong commitment to equality combined with an equally strong sense of group 
identity, as well as internal equality between group members. Disloyalty expresses 
itself in contamination with relations with those outside the group (Hargreaves Heap 
and Ross 1992) or by the breeze of global capitalism. In the village communities there 
seems to be a clear boundary between members and non-members; the social milieu 
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powerfully affects an individual, and the pressure to comply is quite strong. And since 
group affiliation is strong, the group can impose effective sanctions against free riders 
– which is exactly what is reflected in the cases of Knut, Tore and Helge. In addition, 
long-termism is a typical characteristic of a society in which the group is all important 
(ibid.) – which creates long-term continuity of the habitual order.  
 
Characteristics that would correspond to a disembedded marketplace, or something 
resembling Mary Douglas’ low grid–low group society, are hard to spot in Norwegian 
villages. In a disembedded marketplace individuals would act as freewheelers, all 
classifications would be provisional and negotiable, obligations would be ambiguous, 
the social environment would be competitive, and the group would count for nothing 
(Hargreaves Heap and Ross 1992). This was clearly not the case in the villages 
described by Brox (1972) and Larsen (1984) – and in the villages of the Fjord County.  
 
As we saw in the cases of Tore, Knut and Helge, as well as in the empirical examples 
provided by Brox and Larsen, the normative structure, namely moral rules and ‘those 
things which are proper’, are important criteria for identity and social esteem. 
Gullestad’s conclusion that “social and geographic mobility can rather be a part of a 
Norwegian nightmare than that of the Norwegian dream (Gullestad 1992:197) can be 
attributed to the activities of fishermen and dairy farmers as well as to industrial 
activities in Norwegian villages. Norwegians value security (trygghet) and this is 
generally identified with stability, in both self-presentation and in confirmation of 
others; people relate to a set of rules that are perceived as stable and commonly 
accepted, even if different social groups define them in their own way (ibid.). When 
the carriers of such identity feel threatened from outside, its significance is brought to 
the fore (Eriksen 1993). 
 
Equal, but the Best  
 
Norway is certainly diverse. And, of course, human lives and experiences display 
such an extensive variety of form that any attempt at describing Norwegianness may 
seem impossible. Nevertheless, perceptions of sameness (likhet) in Norway are alive 
and well (Vike, Liden and Lien 2001:11).  Although Norway is still described as a 
rather homogeneous country, where differences between people are less pronounced 
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than in a number of other places, such descriptions can also be misleading, warns 
Vike et.al. (2001). 
 
Of course, not all Norwegian villagers lead the same lives, and a number of 
differences between urban and rural entrepreneurs and small and large companies 
could certainly be enumerated. To carry out research on a specific group or category 
of people, and then make generalized conclusions about the whole country, or a 
region to which the group or category belongs, has never been a recognized practice 
among anthropologists. And anthropologists, better than people from other walks of 
life, seem to understand how complex and manifold culture can be within one society. 
Still, in societies, notwithstanding the complexity of culture, it is possible to analyze 
common actions and ideas, which allows conclusions to be drawn about shared values 
in which the economic practices of the members of this society could be embedded. 
Such was my purpose, when I approached small and medium-scale Norwegian 
entrepreneurs, who had opted for moving their operations from a Norwegian region to 
the Baltics at the turn of the twenty-first century.  
 
An ethnographic approach can demonstrate that a concept such as “sameness” 
expresses itself as a cultural value, as an ideological stand, and as a national myth in 
entrepreneurs’ practices and their social environments, strategies and lifeworlds. And, 
for a moment disregarding Norway’s considerable cultural diversity, the outcomes of 
this and other research papers enable us to claim that specific fundamental values 
exist by which an “average” Norwegian businessperson and an inhabitant of an 
“average” Norwegian village seek to uphold their actions.  
 
The fact that the ideology of sameness contains contradiction (Vike et.al. 2001:16), 
and digression from the postulated ‘norm’, did not go unnoticed in my study. This 
digression can be noticed as a growing tendency both within Norway and as an 
overcommunicated practice in communication with people from other, non-
Norwegian societies. Although Norwegian entrepreneurs generally display similar 
features, which manifest themselves in concepts of ‘what [entrepreneurship] should 
be like’, in practice there are also differences that within the frame of my research 
should be understood as exceptions, and not that “Norwegian sameness is more a 
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myth than reality” (Kramer 1984:12). These exceptions will be examined in the 
following chapter.  
 
Gullestad, on a number of occasions, has denoted autonomy as the key concept in 
Norwegian everyday lives and in the understanding of Norway as a nation. 
Norwegians appreciate both community and independence: while equality is defined 
as sameness in Norway, freedom is often identified with independence. In this way, 
according to Gullestad (1992:199), individualism and freedom are not incompatible 
with a certain measure of conformity. She points out that autonomy means 
sovereignty, independence and self-management and that such manifestations of 
autonomy are related to individuality as a value. In Gullestad’s view, the value of 
individuality in Norway is largely understood as independence, as in “to be one’s own 
master” and to be “a master in one’s own home” (Gullestad 1992). However, 
decisions by the Fjord County entrepreneurs on saving their companies from 
bankruptcy (as would befit the owner of a company) were not approved of by their 
social environment; in fact, it was this social environment that did not allow them “to 
be their own masters” in their companies. There was a clear tension between 
independence (to be one’s own master) and community, where equality, defined as 
sameness, is a virtue.  
 
Pushing independence to extremes isolates individuals in Norway (Gullestad 1992). 
But, if relocating industrial production to a neighboring country within the EU is 
deemed extremist, then a question arises: perhaps Norwegian independence and self-
management (selvråderett) emerge instead in ideas about how to disassociate oneself 
from the ‘different’ and protect oneself and one’s community from the manifestations 
of global capitalism. 
 
The case of the Fjord County entrepreneurs is only one of many examples confirming 
that the attempt to bind together sameness and autonomy in a society “wedged 
between the turbulence of modernity and the inertness of tradition” (Eriksen 1993:11) 
reveals ever-increasing tensions. Global and currently topical concepts such as 
innovation and competitiveness seem to represent a categorical contrast to what 
Norwegian society has so far imagined or wished itself to be (Vike et.al.2001:24). In 
the perception of Norwegian entrepreneurs in the Baltics, the ideology of sameness 
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manifested itself as an insistence upon equal rules of the game in the marketplace. 
The sameness of another type in business activity, such as, for instance, the same 
results (Vike et.al.2001), could hardly be expected in a market economy.  
 
One challenge to the collectively sustained ideal of sameness in Norway is a famous 
businessman with a small-town background, Kjell Inge Røkke; he is a former 
fisherman with little formal education. He owns large companies and is immensely 
rich. To many Norwegians he is a symbol of a greater acceptance of someone 
showing that they are rich (Repstad 2005:38). Similarly, the appearance of anti-
janteloven, which urges everybody to be aware of and highlight their abilities, signals 
that a part of society wants to challenge traditional beliefs concerning socially 
recognized values of Norwegianness. Thus, it would seem that egalitarian traditions 
are now being challenged and to some extent weakened by global structural and 
ideological forces, aptly named globalization, capitalism, (neo)liberalism and 
individualism (Repstad 2005: 40). Nevertheless, according to statistics and surveys, 
much of the old Norwegian egalitarianism remains intact (ibid.). 
 
Is it possible to be the same and the best at the same time? This question arose more 
than once, while I was observing the general attitude of Norwegian businesspeople 
to what were in their opinion the “not so good”, “not so correct” or even “backward” 
practices in the Baltics. Outside their country, the image Norwegians communicate 
about Norway is that of a developed, leading nation. 
 
Looking back over Norway’s history, Berggreen (1993) discusses the conscious 
formation of Norwegianness. She claims that the formation of Norwegian identity 
was underpinned by the school system established in the 1860s, based on 
Christopher Bruun’s teaching; it encouraged young people to become aware of their 
country. Every schoolchild knew that the world was progressing and believed that 
Norway was in the vanguard of this progress. Most regarded Norway as a trailblazer, 
a leader, Berggreen states. Yet, at the time, Norway was far from having achieved a 
leading position in the field of welfare and social security. Norway became an 




According to Berggreen, Bruun’s lectures, “Fundamentals of Popular Thought” 
(Folkelige grundttanker 1878), are regarded as a manifesto of Norwegianness and 
the foundation for an individual’s moral behavior. Bruun’s national romantic 
worldview was used as a platform for the political party led by Johan Sverdrup, 
which was nicknamed the “movement of Norwegianness”. And there is every reason 
to think that Bruun is the prototype of the main character in Ibsen’s play, Brand. 
Bruun made his name in Norwegian history with a language reform that cancelled 
Latin usage and consolidated two dialects of Norwegian as the official language 
(Berggreen 1993). 
 
Berggreen believes that it was Bruun’s work and beliefs that shaped Norwegian 
confidence and sense of self, although in the twenty-first century his efforts are not 
regarded as unequivocally positive. She acknowledges that deeper scrutiny reveals 
the Nazi-like features of Bruun’s teaching, which would hardly be implemented in a 
democratic society. In emphasizing the supremacy of one nation above others, and 
synthesizing heroic images and characters that give one nation superiority over 
others, Bruun’s teaching divides countries according to such superiority. It also 
allocates gender roles whereby masculinity equates to heroism while femininity is 
second-rate and exists to support masculinity.  
 
Berggreen concludes that the formula of Bruun’s teachings is a simple stroke of 
genius: by synthesizing elements of national heritage, creating heroic characters and 
triggering powerful dichotomies, Bruun achieved a rapid upsurge of Norwegian self-
esteem. This movement resulted in a powerful and unified awareness of identity 
among Norwegians. She believes that the image of contemporary Norway beyond 
the borders of the country is as powerful as that construed by Bruun: a rich, 
developed country with considerable natural resources and deposits. Berggren’s 
reflections lead to the consideration that the image Norwegians communicate to the 
outside world more often than not differs radically from the ideal of sameness 
celebrated in domestic communication. The way in which this is practically 
manifested in relations between the Baltics and Norway will be presented in the 






The Otherness of Eastern Europe? 
 
The previous chapters have dealt with corporate ethnography through an examination 
of aspects of embeddedness: they analyzed the entrance of Norwegian businesses into 
the Baltic market, exploring their motives, strategies, challenges and experiences. The 
majority of Norwegians interviewed did not know very much about the Baltics before 
they arrived there; their ideas about the region had been drawn from the Norwegian 
mass media, tales told by friends, and by friends of friends, and from seminars 
organized by NIDA. Nevertheless, NIDA and Norwegian entrepreneurs, with their 
negotiations and transactions, took an active part in the construction of the Baltic 
market, in all likelihood being unaware of this.  
 
This final chapter will review the process of constructing the Baltic market, that is, it 
will look at what the region is like as a marketplace and as a locus of Norwegian 
business; it will seek to address a number of questions raised over the course of this 
research. What are the most remarkable features of the Baltic market in the eyes of 
Norwegian entrepreneurs? How do their perceptions of the Baltic market influence 
their entrepreneurial practices? And is it worth while talking about a specific character 
of this market, now that it is a part of the common European market with its 
seemingly global business ideology, regulated both by free market principles and 
common legislation concerning competition policy, public procurement and 
environmental policy? This concluding part of the study, then, will show how the 
social construction process manifests itself in the international market; it examines 
how the identity of Baltic economies is constructed and what repercussions these 
processes have for business activities in the region. It reflects on how representations, 
self-perception and the connectedness of social actors take part in constructing the 
marketplace images on which the identity of the Baltic economy is built.  
 
Above all, perhaps, this chapter aims to demonstrate that people and abstract notions 
of economy are interconnected and that local perception of Baltic economies differs 
from that of the Norwegian public, which belongs to a broader Western discourse of 
“Otherness”. One of the significant findings is that entrepreneurs find international 
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business operations challenging mainly because of symbolic and imagined borders 
rather than territorial divides. The empirical section of this chapter will examine the 
role of these frontiers in the build-up of different collective identities; it will also look 
at how the interaction between the various frontiers and divides influences the content 
of these identities. Such insight is important since it shows that the actions of 
entrepreneurs are embedded not only in social relations and layers of values and 
meanings, but also in the perceptions and constructions of a particular marketplace. 
 
The specialist literature to date has placed a particular emphasis on public culture and 
the role of discourse in creating a Baltic identity. It has also highlighted the ways in 
which the public and the media construct and reconstruct the image as, for instance, 
can be seen in the work of Riegert (2004), Ekecrantz (2004) and Plakans (2002). 
Moreover, it appears that attention has been focused on types of identity, which has 
left in the shadows the part played by interacting actors in the identity-building 
processes. Here, I will explore the discrepancies that emerge between the self-images 
of local Baltic actors, on the one hand, and Norwegian images of the Baltic economy 
and Baltic entrepreneurs, on the other. Images will not be analyzed merely as 
discourses. Attention will be paid to the concrete social and economic practices that 
give rise to the production of these images.  
 
As the cases outlined below will show, the identity of a particular market is both 
formable and changeable; it is interaction that builds identity. The identity of an 
entrepreneur or company develops when specific tasks in the relationship with 
specific actors are fulfilled (Johanson 2001). If interacting entrepreneurs have 
different nationalities, it is plausible that their nations will be identified with the 
results achieved. Anthropologists have pointed out for some time that identities are 
never better perceived than in places and times of encounters with their “other”, 
within real and metaphorical frontiers (Bellier and Wilson 2000:9), and that ethnicity 
or national ‘membership’ occurs when cultural differences are made relevant through 
interaction (Barth 1969). Norwegian entrepreneurs and the Balts do not share a 
common stance as regards the Baltic economy. Its image is shaped by external 
opinions as well as locally, at the intersection of various perspectives, resulting in the 
broad, even contradictory properties that are attributed to it. This chapter attempts to 
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view the Baltic economy as a socially constructed marketplace, both on macro and 
micro levels, and as a space that is perceived to be a powerful asset for Norwegian 
businesses.  
7.1.The Socially Constructed Marketplace as an International 
Business Arena 
 
Assumptions about socially constructed reality are not unfamiliar to contemporary 
social scientists (Berger and Luckman 1966; Burr 2003). Over the last decades a 
number of approaches to the study of social phenomena and humans as social beings 
have emerged. These approaches have appeared under a variety of names, such as 
relativism, discourse analysis, post-modernism, constructionism and post-
structuralism. Common to all these approaches is an assumption about socially 
constructed reality in terms of the way we apprehend the world and our common way 
of understanding, which is constructed among people through daily interactions over 
the course of social life. Such an approach can be understood as being critical of our 
assumptions about how the world appears to be; it challenges the view that 
conventional knowledge is based upon objective, unbiased observations of the world 
(Burr 2003). Advocates for constructionism state that social phenomena are created 
and reinvented in an ongoing present, and all our knowledge of them is nothing but a 
stream of reconstructed interpretations without a steady core (Friedman 1994; Handler 
and Linnekin 1984). Our knowledge is derived from looking at the world from one 
perspective or another (Burr 2003).  
 
A marketplace can be constructed and perceived in a variety of ways. The European 
market implies an aggregate of individual transactions, a certain spatial extension and 
thousands of regulations. The concept of the “market-as-a-place” has gradually been 
substituted by an understanding of the market as a process of buying and selling, until 
finally, the definite article that precedes the noun has come to denote an abstract 
aggregate geographical form (Dilley 1992, in Lien 1997:87f) – in the case of the 
present research, it denotes the Baltics as part of the common European market. Such 
a concept presupposes a community, at least perceived, of common interests and 
common goals. But simultaneously the nature and configurations of markets are 
changing worldwide: some wake up from stagnation and emerge, some mature, some 
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are struggling with the side effects of post industrialization. The rise of the emerging 
market as a concept is a consequence of new ways of looking at countries in terms of 
the development process (Montoya 2002). The liberalization and globalization of 
trade as reflected in the changing political and economic constellations, new trade 
agreements and new communication technologies are beginning to focus on the 
markets of particular countries that were previously more peripheral to the global 
economy (ibid.). This kind of construction contains a clear power aspect, where one 
part is perceived to be mature and developed and the other is seen as emerging or 
developing. Can the European market consist of both?  
 
Not only is the image of a particular market constructed, but such are also the 
practices within it. In international settings a diversity of business strategies can 
occur, as each entrepreneur has their unique interpretation of the environment in 
which they operate. Likewise, entrepreneurs have unique interpretations of how to do 
business. Over time, when operating in the same environment, a common 
understanding of how to conduct business may emerge; it could be said that business 
is socially constructed when experiences, reflections, perceptions and the actions of 
individuals interact to form common views and ways of acting (Sørensen 2004). 
However, no universal law has been discerned as to whether common views and a 
common way of acting will emerge among entrepreneurs; it is also unclear how these 
qualities are likely to develop once they have emerged.  
 
In order to approach the locus of the Baltic market as a social construction, I have 
chosen to depict the very process of social construction in the everyday encounters 
taking place between an entrepreneur and the environment s/he operates within. This 
part of the research has been carried out to reveal the extent of common views and a 
common way of acting in the marketplace, to reflect on how the worldviews of 
entrepreneurs interact, and to explore the ideology of market-related policies and 
public culture.  
 
Two vital regulating factors in the market that underlie business activity are demand 
and policy. Bourdieu (2005) states that the demand with which the producers must 
reckon is a social product: “The principle underlying it is to be found in socially 
constituted schemas of perception and appreciation that are socially maintained and 
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reactivated by the actions of advertisers” (Bourdieu 2005:89), as well as by all those 
who, through magazines and public discourse, specify, reinforce and shape 
expectations in each specific area. Bourdieu identifies the state as a significant actor 
in this process. He illustrates through the findings of his research into the housing 
sector that the market can be fully construed by the state through issuing grants to 
private persons on specific conditions and, consequently, to specific categories of 
developers of building projects (Bourdieu 2005: 89f). Similarly, the Baltic market (for 
Norwegian manufacturers) was largely construed by NIDA. Bourdieu points out that 
the largest building companies, and the banks with which they are associated, have 
means far more powerful than mere advertising for shaping demand; in particular, 
they can influence the political decisions that are likely to orient agents’ preferences 
by encouraging or countering the initial dispositions of potential clients through 
administrative measures, which function to prevent or promote those dispositions 
being put into effect (Bourdieu 2005:89). The state creates a specific network of 
regulations, where institutions, bureaucrats and politicians act within it as agents 
(Bourdieu 2005). This is a timely reminder to Barth (1972) and Brox (1972), who 
have launched research into entrepreneurial activities in Northern Norway by 
assigning to the state the role of an insignificant actor ready to voluntarily designate 
certain functions to entrepreneurs who regulate the market.  
 
In the imagination and everyday ‘economic’ practices of ordinary people, the state 
and the market can be constructed in a variety of ways: through statistics, through 
business between entrepreneurs and government agencies, through interactions with 
bureaucracy and the pronouncements of politicians, and through public culture and 
policies. By offering support to regional Norwegian manufacturing companies who 
needed a boost to competiveness and access to export markets, and who also wished 
to relocate their production units “to the industrial fairytale in the Baltics”, NIDA was 
playing a major role in creating a specific image of the Baltic market. An equally 
significant partner in this process was Scandinavian public culture.75 As Gupta (1995) 
states, representations of the state are constituted, and transformed, in public culture. 
Newspapers are perhaps the most important mechanisms in public culture for the 
circulation and reproduction of discourses and images attributed to the Baltics as an 
                                                 
75 Gupta (1995) defines public culture as a zone of cultural debate conducted through mass media, 
other mechanical modes of reproduction, and the visible practices of institutions such as the state. 
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emerging market. Policies, in their turn, can be viewed as a form of power, which 
promotes norms of conduct to be adopted and internalized by individuals (Shore and 
Wright 1996). Not only do policies codify social norms and values, and articulate the 
fundamental organizing principles of society, they also contain implicit models of 
society (ibid.). The kinds of Scandinavian market-related policies towards the Baltics 
that were reviewed in chapter 4 had economic and cultural consequences: they 
resulted in concrete actions by entrepreneurs and created new sets of relationships 
among them, with their native villages and the emerging Baltic market. In 
combination with the oral narratives of already-resident Norwegian in the Baltics, 
these mechanisms created a kind of discursive form through which daily life in the 




The Norwegian image of the Baltics seems to have been formed by a 
developmentalist perspective in which the activities of the ‘less developed’ world 
reflect an earlier position (30 years ago according to Helge, 50 years ago according to 
Bjørg) than that seen in the present day in advanced nations such as Norway. As the 
previous chapters have shown, several Norwegian managers found the temptation to 
compare the Baltic past to their own irresistible. As depicted in chapter 4, an implicit 
metaphorical connotation with regard to policies towards the candidate countries and 
emerging markets in the Baltics is the equation of “transition” and “development”. 
Shore and Wright (1996) state that reconfiguring basic categories of political thought 
to create new kinds of political subjects is one of the most effective strategies that 
institutions and organizations can employ to achieve power. The categories “new 
member states”, “post-communist block”, “developed”, “underdeveloped”, “Eastern” 
and “Western” carry a weight of historical and political baggage that is used by the 
West to produce and maintain a world structure in which “the West” assumes a 
hegemonic position (Escobar 1992).  Such categorization has a great power aspect as 
it partly overrides other means of identification and makes East European countries 
appear primary as the recipient of Western assistance. The idea of transition as 
development has a powerful effect precisely because alternative understandings are 
suppressed, and because it introduces “the Market” in the Western sense as the 
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yardstick for the measurement of progress (Sørensen 2003; Nustad 2003). Disputes 
over the quality of the items produced in the Norwegian welding and knitting 
factories in the Baltics, as well as particular corporate values praising authority in 
organizations, strengthened the perception of “transition” as “improvement” (of 
quality standards and corporate culture) in the eyes of Norwegian manufacturers.  
 
Foucault (1977) argues that the effectiveness of power lies in its ability to mask itself 
and hide its own mechanisms. By focusing on the metaphors and categories used in 
policies and public culture we can perceive how specific claims are used to present a 
particular way of defining a problem and its solution. How do policies construct their 
subjects as objects of power, and what new kinds of subjectivity or identity are being 
created? A closer look at policies encouraging investment and aid for Baltic market 
development (like those reviewed in chapter 4, for example) reveals the power aspects 
contained in this categorization. Circumscribed by popular stereotypes and captured 
in discourses of “escaping socialism”, “joining Europe”, “building democracy” and 
“establishing the free market” (Buchowski 2001:9), the Baltics is still perceived as a 
region of transition. The dichotomous designations by which these countries have 
been viewed so far – “soviet” and “post-soviet”, “communist” and “post-communist”, 
“socialist” and “capitalist” – are historically molded categories of thinking and 
cultural creations that prejudice our modes of reasoning. Anthropologists such as Pine 
and Sue (1998), Buchowski (2001), Hann (2002), Humphrey (2002) and Lampland 
(2002) state that such a conceptualization is misleading in many ways, and ask 
whether it makes sense to conceptualize the world in the kinds of predetermined terms 
that are constructed in political discourse and reflect stereotypes and relations of 
power between East and West. Whatever the answers to such issues might be, the 
impact of these designations on the process of market construction is unlikely to 
lessen.  
 
Understanding the categories used in policies and public culture develops the 
potential to disclose how policies work as governing instruments in the field of 
international business. On the one hand, policies to assist market development in 
Eastern Europe (for example, by Baltic Sea Billions – see chapter 4) could be seen as 
responses that aim to reduce the heritage of planned economy, poverty and 
corruption. But, on the other hand, it is obvious that the same policies regulate 
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Eastern markets and aim to influence the Eastern business milieu in favor of Western 
investments and companies. They also legitimize particular kinds of intervention in 
that they highlight the gap between the existing and the desired situation.  
 
Policy is not only that which is located in a written document. Policy can be found in 
the language and concepts of political speeches, in government documents, in service 
delivery, and in peoples’ experiences in their interactions with street-level 
bureaucrats (Shore and Wright 1996). Policies can be read as cultural texts, as 
classificatory devices, as narratives that serve to justify or condemn the present, or as 
rhetorical devices and discursive formations that function to empower some people 
and silence others (ibid.). The study of policy can lead straight to issues of norms and 
institutions, ideology and consciousness, knowledge and power, meaning and 
interpretation. 
 
The “Baltic tiger”, the “wild West in the East”, a “Baltic Bonanza”, “den nye 
Østen”,76 “den ville Østen”,77 “den nye Europa”,78 “den nye Bangalore”79 or the 
European Union? These are just some of the ‘tags’ the Baltic states have received in 
Scandinavian public culture and from Scandinavian entrepreneurs over the last few 
years. The image of Baltikum80 as developing from backwardness to progressiveness 
is central in practices and policies and in public culture regarding the Baltics. These 
metaphors and categories have been a powerful instrument in constructing a new 
Baltic identity, captured in the discourse of ‘democratization’, ‘capitalization’, the 
‘establishment of a free market’ and ‘joining Europe’. Such categorization partly 
overrides other means of identification and attracts investors who deliberately try to 
maintain the image of ‘Otherness’ and the unpredictability of the Baltic region – as 
for, example, we saw with NIDA – thus promoting their own businesses in the region. 
A similar symbolic build-up of interregional borders, which takes place whenever 
collective identities are being strengthened, is thoroughly discussed in various 
academic writings on “otherness”, for instance, in Said’s Orientalism and in Wolff’s 
Inventing Eastern Europe, which analyses intellectual discourse about the “backward” 
                                                 
76 The new East. 
77 The wild East. 
78 The new Europe. 
79 The new Bangalore. 
80 The Baltic countries are often referred to as ‘Baltikum’ in Scandinavia. 
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and “the Other” in a Europe undergoing the process of modernization. 
 
Post-socialist countries share one identity feature, namely, they are situated in a pre-
defined framework. One such framework is the epithet “emerging” – emerging 
democracy, emerging market, emerging economy, emerging capitalism. The 
economic identity of the Baltics is constituted of several imaginary features, which 
are part and parcel of the West-defined phenomenon of the “emerging market”. This 
kind of construction contains a clear power aspect, where one part is perceived to be 
mature and developed and the other emerging or developing. One can characterize 
emerging markets as those in which processes of modernization, industrialization and 
consumption move rapidly; consequently, investors can get a higher return on their 
money in these markets than in North America or Western Europe, where growth 
supposedly moves at a steadier pace (Montoya 2002).                                                                                   
 
Successfully growing rather than emerging: this is how Baltic officials like to refer to 
the region’s economy. By 2007 they see the Baltics as the most rapidly growing 
economy in the European Union. They are convinced that accession to the European 
Union and to the NATO alliance in 2004 improved the already-favorable investment 
climate in the Baltics and helped the region attain the highest economic growth rate in 
the European Union. Baltic membership in these two organizations is believed to have 
created promising new business opportunities for those wishing to gainfully explore 
both Eastern and Western markets. 
 
7.3.The Common Market?  
 
With the accession of new member states in 2004, the EU turned from a Western 
European Union into an all-European one. The European market became the 
dominant trade bloc in the world, embracing about 500 million people in 27 countries. 
Before joining the EU and its market, candidate countries had to prove by their 
actions that they would be trustworthy and secure co-operation partners. The 
requirements placed on the Baltic states and other EU candidate countries included 
the setting up of a democratic state governed by law, achieving institutional stability, 
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respect for human rights and minorities, developing functional market economies and 
competitiveness, combating corruption, and assuming the duties of EU membership, 
including an agreement to endorse the goals of political, economic and monetary 
union. 
 
As presented in chapter 4, Norwegians had concerns that with the EU enlargement 
their position in Europe would be marginalized. However, by joining the European 
Economic Area (EEA),81 Norway, too, became part of the Common Market and its 
common legislation, so safeguarding themselves against trade and business barriers. 
The expansion of the EU and the European market in the direction of Eastern Europe 
gave Norwegian businessmen a justified hope in new opportunities offered by Eastern 
European markets.  
 
The Common Market82 was one of the most important objectives of the original 
European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. The Member states were required to 
have formed a common market for products, services, persons and capital within a 
fully-fledged customs union. Similarly, the Common  Market and economic integrity 
has been one of the key objects of discussion since the enlargement of the European 
Union in 2004. The EEA is based on the same “four freedoms” as the EU: the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital among the EEA countries. Thus, as 
                                                 
81 The European Economic Area (EEA) was established in 1994 following an agreement between the 
member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Community, later the 
European Union (EU). It allows Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway to participate in the EU’s single 
market without holding conventional EU membership. In exchange, they are obliged to adopt all EU 
legislation related to the single market, except those pieces of legislation that relate to agriculture and 
fisheries http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Economic_Area (accessed 20.07.2011). 
82 The European Common Market was set up by the six member states of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1957. At the same time the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
was set up. The European Parliament and the European Court of Justice were formed in accordance 
with the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The treaty aimed to forge a closer union between the countries of 
Europe by removing the economic effects of their frontiers. This included the elimination of customs 
duties and quotas between members, a common trade policy to outside countries, the abolition of 
restrictions on the movement of people and capital between member states, and a Common 
Agricultural Policy. In addition to these trading policies, the treaty envisaged a harmonization of social 
and economic legislation to enable the Common Market to work. The European Community (EC) was 
created in 1967, when the controlling bodies of the EEC, ECSC, and Euratom were merged to form the 
Commission of European Communities and the Council of European Communities. The UK, Ireland, 
and Denmark joined the EC in 1973, Greece joined in 1981, and Portugal and Spain became members 
in 1986. In 1992, following the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Community became 
the European Union. 
 "European Economic Community" A Dictionary of Business and Management. Ed. Jonathan Law. 
Oxford University Press, 2009. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.  University of 
Oxford. http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t18.e2288 
(accessed 7 October 2011). 
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an EFTA country that is part of the EEA, Norway enjoys free trade with the European 
Union.  
 
But does the essence of the concept common comply with the market operations it 
characterizes? The meanings of the adjective “common” include belonging to, used 
by, coming from, done by, affecting all or nearly all members of a group or society.83 
It means that the subject of the discussion is a market that, supposedly, belongs to and 
is equally used by nearly all the societies of Europe, sharing similar attitudes,84 as the 
concept explanation presupposes. However, regardless of the meaning of “common”, 
this market does not seem to be common at all. The interpretation of the concept 
contains an inconsistency that, as this chapter will show, may also be observed 
between Norwegian and Baltic business operations.  
 
Since the enlargement of the EU, the western and eastern parts of Europe have been 
united, and the new member states have become participants of Common European 
market activities, but has true unity been achieved?  Since accession to the EU in 
2004 the Baltic countries have been involved in the process of so-called 
Europeanization (that is, the integration of disparate European communities, 
economies and societies), which has brought many Western businessmen, experts and 
consultants to the Baltics; concerted attempts have been made to clarify and promote 
the notion of a common European identity and market (Bellier and Willson 2000; 
Cimdiņa 2006). However, it might reasonably be asked whether the disparate forms of 
European identity can ever be identified with common institutions, policies and ideals 
(Bellier and Wilson 2000). 
 
The investments by Scandinavian companies and their move to the Baltics had an 
impact both on the countries of the investment origin and on the recipient countries. 
In the countries of origin, as shown in previous chapters, the effects were the loss of 
jobs and the closure of parts of the companies. On the other hand, these changes 
improved the competitive position of the companies active in foreign markets; in fact, 
this might have been crucial for their survival. The benefits accruing to the recipient 
countries were investments, new workplaces and new competencies. Such interaction, 
                                                 
83 Oxford Students’ Dictionary (1998:124). 
84 Oxford Students’ Dictionary (1998:124). 
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was motivated and promoted by the Common European market, however, the 
perceptions on which these processes were based do not represent the common 
interests and cohesion of the European market.  
 
This study is based on the assumption that human behavior is embedded in cultural 
constructions of the past and the present and, in order to understand the 
entrepreneurial maneuvers within the European market, it is important to discover the 
implications of these constructions. It follows from Norwegians’ perception that 
‘post-communism’ and ‘transition’ still are essential concepts in dealing with the 
Baltics, frequently associated with the processes of democratization, privatization, 
liberalization and capitalization. But for how long will these countries, with the 
communist past as their only common feature, be in the same boat? Asked about the 
challenges of the Baltic markets NIDA’s director in Livpils, answered:  
A challenge is to get rid of the Norwegian mentality when thinking of Eastern 
Europe. They think first and foremost of the cold war, greyness, of ugly looking 
people, and no pretty people (Henning Hansen, 2006).  
 
At that moment his Russian colleague interrupted, saying: “Perhaps at the end of the 
‘90s it was like that, but not any longer.” Nevertheless, Henning continued:  
 
But let’s imagine that we are still at the end of the ‘90s! And they (Norwegians) 
think of secret agents, the military ... But when they come over they are surprised 
that there are plenty of pretty people. They don’t see any greyness. They cannot 
believe their eyes. Last week I talked to a businessman who just had been in Riga 
for the first time. He was shocked that he had not been here earlier, many years 
ago. His perceptions about the greyness and difficulties relating to bureaucracy 
turned out to be wrong. The problem of the Baltics is that it is still associated with 
communism (Henning Hansen, 2006). 
 
At that moment the 10-year-old son of the Russian colleague interrupted: “What is 
communism, dad?” The communist past was foreign to the boy. Humphrey (2002) 
predicts that sooner or later, as the generations brought up under the communist 
regime disappear from the political scene, the category of post-communism and the 
features characteristic of it are likely to break apart and disappear. Many young 
people in the Baltics do not recognize what communism means and reject the terms 
“post-soviet” and “post-communist”, together with their stereotypes. For them, the 
label post-communist seems to be an insult and “to imply constraints on the freedom 
of people to determine their own futures” (Humphrey 2002:13). Norwegian managers 
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deliberately tried to maintain the image of the Baltics as a transition region that has 
escaped communism. Henning’s resistance to a perception of the Baltics as equal to 
Scandinavia was obvious. The “exotic” feature of the communist past was presented 
as the reason for the underdevelopment of the Baltics, and simultaneously used to 
arouse interest in becoming involved in providing expertise, or “know how”. This 
has enabled an advantage to be gained from the existing disorder.   
 
Norwegian entrepreneurs perceive the Baltics as containing both backwardness and 
perceptiveness, as remnants of the Soviet era and of emerging development potential 
within the EU. Asked about her experiences in the Baltic market, Bjørg Vatne from 
Tekstil AS gave images that reflected precisely this paradoxical mixture: 
 
Initially, I was very negative about moving production to the Baltics. We had to 
dismiss 70 women. The first time I arrived I was very skeptical about everything. It 
was cold, dirty; it was not like at home. But now when I have been there several 
times I feel more welcome and safe. But I still do not travel alone. Now we have 
our own apartment at the factory. The hotel where we used to live was terrible. The 
standard was so low and the price was inordinately high … the food was inedible, 
and it is not that we are fastidious … 
 
We have approximately 100 employees in the Baltics … Language was really a 
problem; none of them understood English. A typical Soviet problem. We offered 
an English course, but they [the local employees] were not so clever and did not 
learn much. When I think of myself, I’m sure I would have learned much more 
during such a course … 
 
Gradually we have also started to do business with local Baltic companies, 
especially when it comes to various accessories and sewing machines. But in the 
beginning we used only suppliers from home; Baltic ones were not good enough. 
They do not have the same understanding of quality; they do not understand that 
things should be done exactly as we say, and not almost exactly. That is why we 
travel over there so often. Only now they seem to have understood that we want 
products of proper quality … 
 
At home we would have to pay huge amounts for working overtime. In the Baltics 
it is not an option. Opportunity for cheap production functions very well. I have 
been in several similar factories here and see that they do not come up to the same 
level, neither socially, nor technologically, or financially. We are at a much higher 
level than they and do not feel any competition. I think locals might rather feel it 
from us because they are losing their workers to us … 
 
You know, I have lived for a while and remember how it was here [in Norway] 50 
years ago. I could say without meaning anything negative, that the stage of 
development in Baltikum is identical to that of 50 years ago. Take the social 
guarantees as an example. In the case of an employee’s illness, they collect money 
at work. That is a nice thought, but at home it was like that a long, long time ago 




Her image of and experience in the Baltic markets is connected with a burdensome 
bureaucracy, an untidy setting, her own sense of superiority and a cheap, 
hardworking workforce which, though outdated, has the potential for development 
and thus can be taken advantage of. Bjørg perceives herself and her Norwegian 
colleagues as “know-how” experts dispensing charity, setting standards of how 
things should be done correctly. The Baltic market, perceived as emerging and new, 
and with good potential for development, is indirectly but constantly compared with 
the Scandinavian market, which is perceived as developed, mature and superior. This 
perception of the Baltic market has been a drive for the establishment of such 
industrial parks as the one in Livpils. And the number of such parks in the Baltic 
region has been growing. Their role at national and international levels is to develop, 
co-ordinate and invest in infrastructure and premises for small and medium-size 
enterprises. The policy of NIDA’s park in Livpils was first and foremost to offer  
 
safety and relieve our clients of the difficulties of establishing enterprise in a 
foreign country – in a transition country of Eastern Europe. Many things do not 
function there the same way as here at home (Harald Hegstad, 2005). 
 
As noted in chapter 3, business activity is a process and contains a chain of 
transactions between an entrepreneur and his/her environment; each entrepreneur 
must initiate and coordinate a number of interpersonal relationships to effectuate 
his/her enterprise (Barth 1972). The social construction of business reality takes 
place through these interpersonal relationships, through the interactions of 
individuals who base their actions on experience, perception and reflection. When 
assuming business activities as series of interactions, it is essential to find out how 
experience and perceptions form the basis for these practices. How do the 
experiences of managers, and their perception of the situation, influence the strategy 
of the company? That is, what performative consequences do entrepreneurs’ 
perceptions of reality have in the marketplace? 
 
Among the observed companies there were similar motives for moving production 
from Norway to the Baltics. From the middle of the 1990s onwards they had 
experienced serious financial problems in their countries of origin. In order to 
survive, they moved production to either Latvia or Lithuania. By the time I carried 
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out my research (2005–2008) they were performing well, because of the ample 
opportunities available for cheap production in the Baltics. The experiences passed 
on to me reflected the image of the market that Norwegians managers had 
constructed during their stay in Latvia and Lithuania:  
 
Once upon a time there was a Norwegian who went to the Baltics. He had money, 
but no experience. Then he found someone who had experience, a local man. After 
some time the Norwegian had no money, but he had the experience. But his Baltic 
partner had both money and experience (a Norwegian manager in the Baltics, 
2005). 
 
We got many pieces of advice before entering the Baltic market; for example, to 
reckon on 10% of the building expenses for bribing if we have a building project. 
But you can push through a building project much faster in Latvia and Lithuania 
than in Norway. Most likely you will have to pay bribes also to customs officers if 
you do not have good contacts there. We do not operate with bribes because our 
secretary has her people there (in customs). But from others I have heard that they 
have to bribe officers to get their products through customs. They need to have 
‘black’ money to pay to the custom officers. It is a tradition (Helge Hofset, 2006). 
 
Another thing that strikes me is that people get judged by “faces”. Your place in a 
given network is essential ... if you do not belong to any, you are not interesting, 
because you cannot be taken advantage of. What you can actually do means only 
50%. In Norway you earn your own salary, it does not matter whose son you are. 
Everything is based on mutual services in Eastern Europe; you give a service and 
you get one back (Henning Hansen, 2005). 
 
These managers perceived practices in the Baltic market to be regulated not so much 
by official rules and standards as by habit, and by a variety of corrupt practices to 
resolve or avoid disputes. The conviction is that, in practice, legislation only provides 
guidelines; actually, everything is regulated by interaction on a personal level 
between the supervisory institutions on the one side and the manager on the other, 
according to several informants. Legislation seemed to be perceived as vague or 
contradictory, creating an environment in which consistency could only be secured 
by maintaining good relations with the people in charge.  
 
The experiences of some other Norwegian managers were quite different, however:  
 
Regarding tenders in the Baltics, I have heard so many rumors that you have to pay 
in order to win, and that everyone is corrupt there. But either we have been lucky 
or all of these stories are myths. Albeit, regarding our contracts, all the decisions 
were taken outside the Baltics. Surveillance in EU tenders is particularly strict 




I thought there was bureaucracy in the Baltics but, you know, I would say the 
absence of bureaucracy can also be a problem: no coordination among institutions, 
no resistance against ill-considered building projects (Henning Hansen, 2006). 
 
Auditing is much better here than in Norway. An audit in Norway is just about the 
accounts. But in the Baltics it is about the whole company, health and environment, 
about how you treat pallets and waste. And the majority of Norwegian companies 
are really trying to have only one account, they are really trying to be “clean”… 
(Tore Hauge, 2007). 
 
Bribing is not really necessary. In Lithuania we found out that he who claimed that 
bribes were requested at customs was the one who took the money himself, not the 
customs officers (Norwegian director of a production unit established in the Baltics 
in 2000). 
 
It is of little importance whether these quoted perceptions are true. Corruption does 
not exist only as a concrete practice – as bribery, or some other misuse of public 
office for private gain (Cimdina Barstad 2003). To a certain extent, corruption exists 
as an element of discourse – as an idea about action and its models (ibid). The same 
can be said with reference to challenges in the international marketplace. Norwegians 
do not have a common opinion about what constitutes a challenge in the Baltic 
markets: the milieu for business is perceived differently, and experiences are 
different. A Norwegian manager can warn others against widespread corrupt 
practices in dealings with bureaucracy in the Baltics, although he says he has never 
experienced corruption himself. It should not be taken to mean that such an opinion 
conforms to the facts. But for those who have such views it does not matter whether 
they are provable; for them they are true. People base their actions on their 
perceptions and images. Consequently, the perception of reality influences practice.  
 
The construction of an image of a particular market is based not only on real 
experience, but also on various myths. Social phenomena and our knowledge of them 
are created and reinvented in an ongoing presence; social phenomena are 
reconstructed interpretations without a steady core (Friedman 1994; Handler and 
Linnekin 1984). They are derived from looking at the world from some perspective 
or another, and from being in the service of some interests rather than that of others 
(Burr 2003). “The state” and “the market” are constructed in the imagination and 
everyday practices of ordinary people. There are numerous situated knowledges 
(Gupta 1995:392) through which to imagine “the state” and “the market”, including 
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statistics, dealing with managers and with particular government agencies, and the 
pronouncements of politicians. Everyday interactions with the state bureaucracy are, 
according to Gupta (1995), the most important ingredient in the construction of “the 
state”. Clearly, it is not possible to deduce a person’s understanding of “the state” 
entirely from his/her personal interaction with bureaucracy and the authorities. It is 
apparent that people also simply repeat reports they have obtained from public 
culture and policies. Representations of the state and market are also constituted, 
contested and transformed in public culture. In many East European markets the 
discourse of corruption can be central for understanding the relationship between the 
state and social groups precisely because, as Gupta (1995) writes, it plays the dual 
role of enabling people to construct the state symbolically, to define themselves as 
citizens and to make their choices. Elsewhere I have shown how the perception of 
corruption influences practice ( Cimdina Barstad 2003, 2004); the perception of high 
levels of corruption may stimulate corrupt actions that are not necessary, and easily 
lead to actual bribery or abuse of authority ( Cimdina Barstad 2003; Sedlenieks 2003; 
Gupta 1995; Karklins 2002). Likewise, entrepreneurs’ perceptions of the East 
European markets facilitate our understanding of their motivation for participating in 
these markets as the performative consequence of their perceptions.  
 
While there is no common opinion among Norwegians about what constitutes the 
challenges of the Baltic markets, opinion about what makes them attractive is rather 
more widespread: 
 
Neither Latvia, nor Lithuania has raw materials. The domestic market [in the Baltic 
states] is not interesting for us because it is too small; the purchasing power is too 
flimsy. We are here neither because electricity is cheap, nor because regulations are 
suitable. Statistics show that the Baltics do not have expert knowledge or special 
skills at a high level, only at an average level. We are here because of one thing; 
there is still a very comfortable price for the workforce. It is the main reason for 
most of the Scandinavian companies that enter this location. And it is close to 
Russia. Using the Baltics as a base for penetrating further into Eastern Europe is 
the smartest thing, as long as the workforce is cheap. The location is outstanding; it 
is close to the huge markets in Russia and the Ukraine. We are evaluating Odessa 
now; the Baltics is getting expensive. Perhaps we are going to go in for Odessa in 
the near future (a Norwegian manager in the Baltics, 2007). 
 
The idea that the enlargement of the EU has facilitated international business in 




A big problem for the Baltics is the lack of a workforce, everyone is fleeing to the 
West European countries now. It is not only a problem for Scandinavian companies 
coming here; it is a big social problem for the locals as well. It was not joining the 
EU market, but the cheap workforce that was the main reason we moved our 
production here. We came here at a time when joining the EU was not even an 
option for the Baltics (Helge Hofset 2006). 
 
Maybe it would even be better for us if the Baltics had not joined the EU. Then we 
could still live with the conviction that we had helped our sister nation in the East 
through democratization processes. Now there is no point in being Norwegian in 
the Baltics any longer. Previously, Norwegian investors had a very good standing 
here; now the focus in the Baltics is towards Brussels. There is no sense in Latvians 
and Lithuanians cooperating with Norwegian institutions because there is more 
money obtainable in the EU system (Henning Hansen, 2006). 
 
The value of the Baltic markets for Norwegians seems to be that of strategically 
advantageous locations with low production costs. Latvia and Lithuania are 
perceived to be good places for starting internationalization, and for obtaining 
experience in the internationalization of production, so that production can be 
established, or moved to other places in Eastern Europe or beyond. The Baltic states 
are used as a runway towards other East European countries. The advantage is the 
ability of the Baltic people to communicate with the whole Russian region; they 
understand the Russian language and culture, which is necessary for operating in the 
Russian markets. Simultaneously, they are perceived as the most western part of 
Eastern Europe, which makes cooperation between Balts and Norwegians easy. 
However, serious concern arises about what the strategies of these enterprises will be 
when production costs in the Baltics are no longer low:  
 
Last week I was in China to check the opportunities for production. I think those 
who register abroad now choose China instead of the Baltics. It looks like we will 
have to move our production there as well, perhaps even in the coming year. We 
have been in the Baltics for many now. What is frightening here is that everything 
is getting more and more expensive. In ten years it might be as expensive as 
Scandinavia and then it makes no sense to be here. Sweden is expensive; Norway 
is even more so, but at least there are clear settings and predictable rules to follow. 
Either the Baltics has to do something about it, or it will be impossible to be here. I 
do not dare to invest 17 million here in production equipment that I cannot move 
away. I need predictability. I’m not sure whether we can stay and produce here for 
10 more years. We have been considering Ukraine as well (Tore Hauge, 2007). 
 
If we keep in mind the concept of the Common European market discussed above, an 
essential question remains open. It is obvious that Latvia and Lithuania as emerging 
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markets are advantageous places for production. But how can we talk of common 
interests, if foreign companies come here only as long as the production costs are 
low, and then plan to leave as soon as they become too high?  Even though the 
enlarged European market is declared to be common, the experiences and attitudes of 
the Norwegian managers prove otherwise. As long as one party is perceived to be 
developed and superior and aims to exploit the other, which is perceived as emerging 
and less developed, ‘uncommonness’ among participants will persist and a truly 
common market will struggle to materialize. 
 
Partapuoli (1998) also explores a notion of the Baltics as unpredictable and emerging 
(in comparison with Norway). She explains that a number of Norwegians come to 
Tallinn to try out their entrepreneurial luck and leave if they do not succeed. At the 
start of 2000, NIDA upheld a similar image of the Baltics. However, it placed 
emphasis on long-term investment and positioned itself as a guarantor of long-term 
predictability in this seemingly risky region. By repeatedly highlighting 
unpredictability and risk in the Baltic market, NIDA could more easily sell safe 
conditions for production in its industrial park to cautious Norwegian manufacturers 
eager to exploit the area’s possibilities. The Baltics became a kind of niche product 
for NIDA and the image of the product was formed strategically, resembling 
Koponen’s explanation that “acting along a commodity network is a political act of 
negotiation and enrolment of interests” (Koponen 2002:564). In a similar manner to 
the Norwegian town of Rjukan, which was ill-suited to host large-scale industrial 
production and had to seek to restore growth by strategic promotion of the identity of 
the local community (Henningsen 2007), the identity of the Baltics had to be 
strategically promoted in order to attract Scandinavian manufactures to form 
industrial clusters. The images used in NIDA’s endeavors to strategically promote the 
Baltics as a risky, but emerging market reflect the ways in which particular people 
(Norwegians) construct “the other” in their collective imagination. 
 
An examination of the various ways in which alliances between a Norwegian 
company and the Baltic market are conceptualized, and how the key concepts of 
business reality are perceived by the participants, can be a useful point of departure 
for analyzing strategies and performances in the marketplace. Do individual 
entrepreneurial activities reflect the images of the Baltic economy on the macro 
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level? This question will be addressed in a brief review of the business activities of 
the key ‘characters’ from previous chapters and by analyzing a specific business 
operation carried out by Krister Hjellum, in whose company I conducted participant 
observation for 5 months in 2006.  
 
From Dale to Baltikum  
 
From 1967 to 1999, Dale, a Norwegian village of 5,000 inhabitants, was the place 
chosen by Tore Hauge for metal production. At one point it was decided to transfer 
the production site to the Baltics, which was unheard of at the time. Tore candidly 
admits his ignorance – he had heard rumors that a mafia was active there. When we 
first met in 2002, at his production units in the Baltics, Tore noted that there had been 
no mafia in sight: 
  
Norwegians commonly believe that Latvia and Lithuania equals Russia. But when 
they come here, their impressions are preponderantly positive. You name it; there 
are lots of Lithuanian gangs in Norway and Europe, those raging thieves. Many 
Norwegians are unable to differentiate between Latvia and Lithuania; they just 
think that the place here is teeming with crooks (Tore Hauge, 2002). 
 
Similar reflections could be heard from Steinar Jensen, a few years later:  
 
When delegations from the Norwegian private or governmental sector pay us a 
visit [in the Baltics], they always ask about problems with mafia. I do not have 
anything to tell them in this regard. I have never been robbed here, never felt any 
threat or seen any mafia here. Then they are surprised. Such things can also happen 
in Oslo; perhaps Oslo is an even more risky capital than the capital cities of the 
Baltics. Of course I do not tempt fortune, but I have never felt insecure here. No 
one pays you particular attention on the street, like it was in1990s when we moved 
here – those days it was pretty easy to tell that we were not locals. It’s not like that 
today (Steinar Jensen, 2006). 
 
As depicted in chapter 4, Tore’s production facilities were moved to Linava in the 
Baltics because he had been increasingly unable to compete in the European market. 
Over several years his enterprise in Dale had attempted to compete with two other 
European producers who by the 1990s had transferred their production facilities to 
Poland. The price of metal and the labor costs there were half what they were in 
Norway; over time, there was increasingly little interest in Tore’s products, which 
were too expensive. His 32-year investment in terms of experience and machinery 
was in jeopardy. To prevent closure, transfer to the Baltics was chosen as a last resort, 
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where Tore’s business recovered its position in the European market in just three 
years. Why was this entrepreneur saved by moving to the Baltics? The Norwegian 
government’s action plan for cooperation with EU candidate countries, in force from 
2001, gave priority to the Baltic states. Although not an EU member itself, Norway 
was willing to assist the Baltics in the accession process, as we saw in chapter 4.   
 
The public culture of those days found its expression in various headlines such as 
“Hundreds av companies relocate to the Baltics”85, “Relocation in an increased 
tempo”86, “A little piece of Norway”87, “Anticipate a massive relocation of production 
units from Norway”88, ”Norway leading in the new member states”89. In addition, it is 
clear from both policies and conversations with Norwegian entrepreneurs that 
Norwegians saw the Baltic region as dynamic and rapidly expanding; with high 
production costs at home, the Baltics was seen as the best option for investments and 
the transfer of production facilities. NIDA, which aimed to lower the threshold for 
establishing small and medium-sized enterprises in Russia and the Baltics, and the 
individual Norwegian entrepreneurs discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6, are all 
representative of this process.  
 
For Knut Kløver, the director of N-Welding Ltd, the choice of the Baltics was dictated 
by NIDA’s marketing activities, and he was encouraged by the transfers taking place 
in other companies. Knut confirmed his initial – although unfounded – skepticism 
towards the Baltic region,  
 
The safest way to penetrate the market was the NIDA park in Livpils. We wanted 
to make sure we would not fall pray to fraudsters. We had heard there was a mafia, 
one had to bribe … In fact, insofar as we are concerned, we haven’t had any such 
disappointments. The low salaries explain why production in Livpils is so 
lucrative. In Norway, an hour of welding plus insurance costs us 270 NOK, but 
here the same hour with insurance and social tax only costs 30 NOK. The Baltics 
offers countless possibilities; it no longer has to be perceived as a risky and shady 
                                                 
85 ”Hundrevis av bedrifter flagger ut til Baltikum” Økonomisk Rapport, published 29.06.2004., 
http://www.orapp.no/nyheter/neringsliv/hundrevis-av-bedrifter-flagger-ut-til-baltikum-/ (accessed 
09.09.2011.) 
86 ”Utflagging i økt tempo” Økonomisk Rapport, published 17.01.2005., 
http://www.orapp.no/nyheter/neringsliv/utflaggingen-i-okt-tempo-/ (accessed 09.09.2011.) 
87 ”Et lite stykke Norge” Dagbladet, Magasinet, published 20.01.2003. 
http://www.dagbladet.no/magasinet/2003/01/20/359196.html (accessed 09.09.2011.) 
88 ”Spår massiv utflagging fra Norge” Aftenposten, published  30.10.2002. Pp.22. 
89 ”Norge ledende i nye EU-land” Økonomisk Rapport, published 14.09.2002. 
http://www.orapp.no/nyheter/neringsliv/norge-ledende-i-nye-eu-land-/ (accessed 09.09.2011.) 
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place. The economy functions rather well and Russia with its enormous market is 
just next door. So there is no doubt that moving to Livpils was the right decision 
(Knut Kløver, 2006). 
 
 
But what factors turned Livpils into this ‘industrial fairytale’ for Norwegians? What 
precisely attracted Norwegian manufacturers to the micro-environment of this small 
town?  
 
When I first visited in 2005, Livpils’s leafy streets were well maintained and lined 
with trendy shops and bright cafes. Compared with the economic gloom in provincial 
Baltic areas just a few years previous to this, it seemed that prosperity had arrived. 
Private businesses were well established and new private housing stock was 
increasing rapidly. Although the transition had created a sharp divide between the 
‘’haves’ and the ‘have nots’, people believed their town functioned fairly well. 
Despite its closeness to the metropolis, Livpils had an unrushed, provincial feel about 
it. According to an official from the local government, eight years ago the city’s 
public finances had been in a bad state. But when I visited, it had paid off its debts to 
gas suppliers, and invested in new boiler plants to ensure that residents receive heat 
and hot water at all times. The official claimed that in doing this his municipality had 
shrugged off the old Soviet-style dependency on subsidies and ensured it had a viable 
financial foundation.  
 
A local owner of a bakery on a Livpils highway told me that life has definitely 
improved over recent years, but listed numerous problems faced by many trying to 
run a business. He claimed the tax system supported big national monopolies, leaving 
small and medium-size companies to bear an unfair burden. High interest rates and 
tough conditions for bank loans did not make life easy either. A year ago the bakery 
needed new machinery. The acquisition of new equipment is eligible for tax relief, a 
form of support the state provides for its producers. Reportedly, the baker was unable 
to obtain the necessary bank credit to buy the machinery and bought second-hand 
equipment, hoping that it would function well. However, had he been able to buy it 
new, it would have lasted longer and it would not even have been more costly, given 




A local entrepreneur from Livpils, who works in the field of electrical engineering, 
and has experience in both small and large companies, explained that the differences 
between the two were enormous. He said that the small businesses were forced to 
cheat to survive because the state has not created conditions in which they could work 
and prosper: if they offered all the social welfare benefits to their staff, and paid all 
their taxes, they would not be able to run their companies. However, he said, larger 
companies had no choice but to pay it all. 
 
Attracting investors was one of the priorities of the Livpils municipality. Recently, 
Livpils had been advertised in Norway as a convenient place for locating production 
facilities. According to a local businessman, opportunities and the tax situation were 
the same for larger enterprises, investors and for small manufacturers. But several 
manufacturers from Livpils felt quite bitter about the unfair starting point, which does 
not enable them to reach production levels that would allow them to compete with the 
foreign investors: 
 
The foreigners arrive with ready-made solutions to manufacture goods because 
they want to bring down production costs. They have found their niche and their 
sales outlets in the world a long time ago. They are not eager to sell in the Baltics 
because the market is quite small and purchasing power is not too bright either. 
The small Baltic entrepreneur, however, has to start his business, as well as having 
yet to find outlets for his goods. We hardly manage in finding our niche here, in the 
Baltic market, let alone the European one … This year we had to discontinue three 
projects because we failed to get credit from the bank. The SMEs struggle to get 
funding. I think that foreign companies have access to credit abroad, which they 
invest in the Baltics. But who will give me credit in a Swiss or Stockholm banking 
establishment? Despite our being part of the EU this is simply not an option. I must 
confess that I resort to tax avoidance to keep my business going (Local engineering 
entrepreneur from Livpils, 2005).  
 
Though the starting point for locals was not as favorable as it was for foreign 
investors, small businesses were gradually developing in Livpils. However, a Soviet-
era enterprise still maintained a major role in the town’s economy. This was a public 
company, Livpils AS – a huge textile plant on the outskirts of the town, which 
employed over 1500 people. It paid many of them just over 50 lats90 per month. The 
financial problems that the company was experiencing meant wage payments were 
not always made when they should have been. A local official said that he did not 
                                                 
90 Latvia’s national currency. 1 Lats =  EUR 0.7098 (http://www.bank.lv/monetara-politika/valutas-
kursa-politika/valutas-kursi, accessed 19.09.2011.).  
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know what the current situation was at the plant, but he believed it had started 
restructuring into smaller enterprises, which might soften any blow its collapse might 
deal to the city. According to a member of staff at Livpils AS, most workers do not 
even know that extra hours, holiday work, standing in for someone, or taking up other 
additional duties, should mean extra money, and that they could claim their rights in 
terms of paid leave, safety at work and other standard European working conditions.   
When I returned from Livpils, I went to a media library in the capital to find out how 
the economic situation in the Baltics is being evaluated by public culture. I came 
across a competitiveness study of European countries, which was carried out by the 
University of Sheffield and George Washington University. It placed Latvia at the 
buttom of the list, immediately followed by Estonia and Lithuania. Latvian experts 
were cautious and skeptical about the research – they believed that the indices of 
competitiveness used, which are based on population income and GDP, are likely to 
be inaccurate in that they disregard the role of the grey economy.91 A local economist 
stated that the study underrates the Baltic countries and that it is impossible to accept 
that in terms of competitiveness these countries are the weakest link in Europe. He 
pointed out that the World Bank has placed Latvia amongst countries currently 
implementing the most dynamic reforms with regard to the entrepreneurial 
environment. Further, he noted that Latvia ranks among the top countries worldwide 
in terms of business start-up time, according to a World Bank report, Doing Business 
2005; he also noted that Latvia’s financial sector is among the most stable in Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
Visiting a local Business Agency, I could help not but notice various business guides 
full of quotations from Baltic officials stating that the Baltics possess a unique 
advantage of being the strategic point of entry into the Russian, The Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) and EU markets. They emphasized that owing to its 
advantageous geographic location with its three ice-free ports and an extensive road 
network linking European roads to the CIS, and its high-capacity railway corridor 
linking Latvia’s ports with Russia and the Far East, Latvia could serve as an important 
link between East and West, as well as North and South. In their view, Riga, the 
                                                 
91 The ‘grey economy’ refers to workers being employed without a contract, and being paid ‘under the 
table’, without paying income tax.  
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largest city in the Baltic states, has the potential to become a significant northern 
European transport, commerce and finance centre: 
 
Since accession to the European Union the Baltics have had access to EU funding; 
it’s a good opportunity. We won a tender for modernization of the transport 
corridor. EU funding covers 75 percent of financing. Our task is to modernize the 
signaling system and traffic control in a particular road section. It is a responsible 
duty since it has to do with environmental security. Petroleum, gas and dangerous 
chemical substances are being transported from East to West through this section. 
We have a contract for 50 million euro and a job for the next 4 years. And it was an 
EU tender (Steinar Jensen, 2006). 
 
The advantageous economic and geographic location of the Baltics is also 
corroborated by the entrepreneurial strategies of Knut Kløver, Helge Hofset and Tore 
Hauge. But while Baltic officials extol the merits of the rapid economic growth and 
good opportunities for attracting investors, local SMEs feel neglected. However, the 
investor-friendly entrepreneurial environment, predicated on a macroeconomic level 
by local officials, should not be taken for granted. Everyday business encounters are a 
different facet of the Baltic economy: although they remain outside the 
macroeconomic image, they create a subjective image that is perceived by the 
investors. 
 
An Ordinary Trade? 
 
In spring 2005, Krister Hjellum’s company came to the Baltics. To get started, Krister 
needed a reliable person with experience and knowledge of Baltic and Norwegian 
languages and the area’s entrepreneurial environment. I needed to grasp the intentions 
of a Norwegian company, its fields of activity and the extent of its challenges in the 
Baltic market; thus, for the purposes of research, I decided to accept Krister’s offer 
and help him get established here. As a local with ten years of work experience in 
Norway, I was the right person for Krister’s company. To manage things from the 
Baltics seemed an excellent idea to him, because the workforce there was cheaper, 
more skilled and ambitious and, he said, it was easier to avoid issues arising from 
pointless laws, which had to be respected in Norway. 
 
Krister showed interest in an Object, offered for sale by a local state company Griva.   
Krister asked me to go forward with the offer that a Scandinavian company would 
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take the Object unseen, pay US$1 million more than other possible bidders might 
offer, pay the cash over immediately and cover extra costs for problem solving 
incurred by the people involved, as well as providing a good bonus for the owner. 
 
The structure of Griva enterprise turned out to be complicated; its management was 
unavailable. I had to ask a friend to find out the contact details of the person in charge 
of the sale. When the offer was duly forwarded, Krister expected that the person in 
charge would sell the Object immediately, stunned by his generosity. But there was 
no response to his bid. 
 
On enquiry amongst acquaintances, a man was located who knew the person in 
charge. I was introduced as the representative of a serious buyer, and a meeting with 
Griva’s board of directors was arranged. It transpired that besides the person in charge 
there was an entire board of directors and a director-general – their assent was 
required for the purchase to take place. But just prior to the meeting I was told that it 
had been cancelled, as Krister had failed to provide information concerning the buyer 
of the Object, that is, the Scandinavian company. 
 
“This is not a fairytale but the world of business, with certain rules on how you 
conduct it”, a representative from Griva enterprise said. A clear precondition for the 
meeting to take place was that documents showing the solvency of the Scandinavian 
company were to be brought along. Subsequently, I got in touch with Krister, to 
remind him to bring the required documents. 
 
“Who does he think he is?” Krister was irritated: 
Is this a kind of joke? Is this a limited company or a show with gangsters, trying to 
compete with each other? I refuse to obey such old commies. It’s plain extortion. 
They think they can treat us this way! Objects of that kind are bought and sold over 
the phone. Perhaps it’s the only item of that kind in the Baltics; they haven’t sold 
any so far [he laughs]. He attempts to pull out of the deal and believes that we’re 
fools – such a primitive mind … It looks as if they are attempting to introduce a 
new global sales practice. He said I was a bad manager? Oh, let him talk to me; I 
have worked in international business management all my life. He’s useless; we 
have to approach the director of Griva directly. Do you think it is feasible? (Krister 
Hjellum, 2007). 
 
To organize the meeting I had to seek further assistance from my acquaintances. I 
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managed to get in touch with Ieva Adamaite, the mother of a good friend of mine. 
Ieva was a powerful state official who was most unlikely to see her invitations to 
meetings turned down. In order to help us with negotiations, she called the director of 
Griva enterprise and invited him to a tea party at her villa on the outskirts of the city. 
 
The table was laid for five. As we arrived, Ieva invited me to take the seat to her right 
and showed Krister to a seat next to me. On her left were her husband and the director 
of Griva enterprise, Kalvis Mezeckis. There was an aroma of tea and freshly baked 
cinnamon cookies: Ieva’s feminine hospitality, and the cognac offered by her 
husband, brought about a pleasant and relaxed atmosphere. Krister and I were 
introduced as ‘family friends’ and ‘representatives of a promising Scandinavian 
company’. Over the course of the evening the Scandinavian interest in the Object was 
mentioned, and a great deal of time was spent discussing how to reach a deal. Kalvis 
had the profoundest respect for Ieva as politician and Ieva reciprocated in showing 
deference to Kalvis as an influential businessman. They clearly saw each other in 
terms of a mutually important friendship. It was a very pleasant evening with many 
jokes, compliments, and small talk about politics, business, property management and 
other trivia. It did not resemble in the slightest a business meeting with an intention to 
reach a deal worth several million dollars. But it was precisely in this relaxed 
atmosphere that an agreement was reached: Griva enterprise would endeavor to 
handle the deal to allow the acquisition of the Object by the Scandinavian company 
within a couple of weeks. When Kalvis, bidding us farewell, invited us on a yacht trip 
the following day, Krister was delighted and believed that it meant that the deal was 
done. 
 
Two days after the yacht trip and a hospitable reception at Kalvis’ spacious apartment, 
Krister’s offer for the Object was accepted and a meeting to sign the contract was 
scheduled. However, a week later, I heard that Griva enterprise had decided to 
terminate negotiations with Krister. This decision was based on the fact that the 
Scandinavian company Krister represented was unable to prove serious intentions and 
provide guarantees for the purchase. Krister opposed Griva’s stance, stating that 
serious businessmen should keep to their agreements, whether they were verbal or in 




Following numerous phone calls from Krister’s Scandinavian partner, who insisted 
that the Object deal was worthwhile, Krister felt it necessary to shed some light on the 
reasons for the cancellation:  
 
The greedy members of the board of Griva called me a cheat and a representative 
of a letter-box company. It was plain to see that they expected a bribe. Indeed, we 
had calculated on an impressive amount for that purpose. I sent an email to Griva’s 
lawyer, I guess, her name was Rūta Volkova; I offered her cash. No answer – 
incredible and utterly unprofessional! Obviously, they have no clue how business is 
done in the civilized Western world (Krister Hjellum, 2007). 
 
In something of a coincidence, it turned out that the lawyer, Rūta Volkova, was an 
acquaintance of mine. This fact brightened Krister’s day; he asked me to give her a 
call and tell that she would have her share, if she cooperated. From what Rūta said, I 
understood that the Scandinavians had indeed made a bad impression. Krister 
expected that my acquaintanceship with Rūta would secure him the desired deal. But 
Rūta was furious and told him that there would be a sealed-bid auction to rule out any 
personal influence and that no one would get the Object on the basis of a verbal 
agreement. However, convinced about his professionalism, Krister would still not 
give this up:  
 
Tell her that as your friend I can assist her with the selling procedure; I see that 
people in the Baltics are neither able to communicate nor do they know how to sell. 
A Norwegian can buy such an Object in Japan over the phone because there are 
international regulations in place, which provide for such an option. Balts are 
incompetent abusers of power ... But we can very well get tough with them – the 
Object can be seized (Krister Hjellum, 2007). 
 
Over the next few days, rumors started to spread that the Scandinavian company that 
wanted to acquire the Object had turned out not to be dependable. Krister was 
indignant at this, stating that Balts have no manners and no understanding of what 
Western rules of business conduct are like: “Call Rūta Volkova and Kalvis Mezeckis 
and tell them that we revoke our offer. Ours was a gift to Griva but they evidently 
don’t know how to manage things”, he stated. 
 
A Gift Turned Down, or the Social Logic of Exchange 
 
Rūta and I met only a couple of months later, when the Object had been auctioned off 
to a Mediterranean company for US$1.2 million less than the Scandinavian company 
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had offered. I brought her a bottle of wine and apologized for the trouble I had caused 
her by asking her to help my Scandinavian colleagues. But she was still upset and 
resentful:  
 
Krister believed that good contacts are enough to get everything done. He wanted 
to get some ‘easy dough’. Fair enough. I, as a business-minded person, can 
understand this, but he treats us as Africans. His attitude sucks. He thinks that 
everybody is only too happy to please him and that we’re all totally ignorant. For 
your sake I made an effort to check out if something could be done … but then he 
made allegations to the entire Griva board that I had given him some guarantees … 
He was asked to provide information on the purchaser and it appeared that the 
purchaser was a complete nonentity. He was unable to produce a single document 
proving the solvency and existence of the Scandinavian company. Griva is owned 
by the local government and has to account to the state for what it does; we can’t 
get involved in business deals with a mysterious person who claims to have several 
million bucks up his sleeve. He believed that all the board could be bribed, and 
vouched that he would pay us nearly half a million dollars. And then he walks 
around saying that somebody has explicitly demanded that he pays this amount. 
The Mediterranean company sent a normal application for the tender with all the 
germane documents, and the Object was eventually sold, albeit for a lower price 
(Rūta Volkova, 2007). 
 
How can this fiasco be explained? Why did Griva enterprise not go for a quick profit 
instead of the deal with the Mediterranean company, which was not as lucrative? Is it 
not the case that the basic objective of any market exchange or business transaction is 
to yield as great a profit as possible? Are Baltic entrepreneurs unprofessional and 
unreasonable, as Krister believes they are? How should we account for such 
seemingly irrational behavior? Are there considerations that have to do with social 
logics of exchange or the articulations of an ‘alien’ reality? Anthropologists have 
always been keen to show that economic systems and business activities can only be 
understood if examined in the context of other aspects of particular societies and 
cultures. So let us assume the rationality as context-dependent and culturally specific 
and turn to an analysis of Griva case. 
 
According to the Oxford Dictionary of Business (2003), any trading of goods, stocks, 
shares and commodities may simply be termed exchange, where one value is 
exchanged for another, just as in the sales operation surrounding the Object. Any 
exchange is based on reciprocity. For economists, reciprocity refers to two directional 
exchanges, monetized or not. For anthropologists, reciprocity, falling within the scope 
of communal transactions, is never about objects alone but about the relationships 
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developed through them (Gudeman 2001). If someone invites you home to dinner, the 
acceptance of this invitation implies an obligation to reciprocate. Ieva and Kalvis’ 
relations would have fallen into ruin unless Kalvis reciprocated Ieva’s invitation with 
the yacht trip. Having done so, he had discharged his duties towards Ieva for a given 
period of time. As for Krister, he believed that Ieva’s invitation to tea needed to be 
reciprocated with the Object deal. While Kalvis reciprocated with Ieva because their 
relations were important to him, he could not be bothered about Krister because he 
felt no need to establish relations with him. 
 
In principle, the capitalist economy recognizes only one form of commodity 
exchange, namely, market exchange based on the laws of supply and demand (Eriksen 
2001a). But markets never exist outside cultural and social contexts, and trade is not 
detached from social bonds even in capitalist societies. Buyers and sellers are 
constrained by an obligation that requires them to purchase certain things at certain 
times in certain markets, by an obligation to reciprocate, and by an obligation to 
maintain relations and networks. In most places there are rules, written or unwritten, 
that stipulate what can and what cannot be sold and purchased for money (ibid.). Even 
in modern capitalist societies, there is a general agreement that there are values that 
cannot be bought – love, friendship, trust, loyalty and reputation, to name but a few. 
But the Object Krister wanted to buy did not represent these values: it was neither 
love, loyalty nor friendship. Still, however, it was not be obtainable for the money 
Krister offered, even though it was being offered for sale.  
 
The transaction did not solely involve the Object, however. As evidenced by the 
chronology of the deal, right from the outset there were important social bonds and 
obligations. Krister did not want to reveal the identity of the Scandinavian company 
and attempted to corrupt Griva’s lawyer’s loyalty, thereby playing against ‘the rules 
of the game’; as a consequence of this, he tarnished his image in the eyes of Griva’s 
board, as well as having wasted his social bond investments, which were aimed at 
promoting his success. Precisely because gifts are socially integrating and 
concurrently capable of establishing mutual relations between individuals, the 
Scandinavians were ready to part with an impressive amount of money as a bonus for 
the enterprise. The gift imposes an identity on both the donor and the recipient, 
revealing “the idea” which the recipient evokes in the imagination of the giver (Parry 
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and Bloch 1989). The Scandinavians imagined the Baltic Griva enterprise as a body 
that for the sake of profit would execute a trade with a mysterious company that 
would offer a gift so that a positive decision could be reached. But this perception was 
simply misconceived: there was no obligation to give – and hence none to receive. 
 
It is argued that money allows us to measure everything by the same yardstick, and 
thus it reduces qualitative differences to purely quantitative ones. It denies the unique 
and is easily regarded as a means to all ends; therefore, its possession confers upon 
the possessor an almost God-like power (Parry and Bloch 1989:6). In light of such 
assumptions, it is tempting to state that money can be used to dissolve “cherished 
cultural discriminations” (ibid.), to “eat away” qualitative differences and to reduce 
personal relations to impersonality, disembedding market transactions in the process. 
In this case, the Scandinavians believed that money was a means to achieve the 
reduction of ‘qualitative differences’, that is, to conceal the fact that they were ready 
to take up power positions to which they as foreigners would otherwise not be 
entitled. 
 
The Scandinavians tried to surpass their competitors and to establish a hierarchy, with 
themselves on top in relation to Griva enterprise. The significance of such a hierarchy 
could be viewed in terms of the correlative forms of capital emphasized by Bourdieu 
(1986). In Norway, Norwegians as the majority enjoy economic, political, symbolic 
and cultural capital. Used to such a position in his own land, Krister was unable to 
accept a different status elsewhere. This can also be seen in his desire to always have 
the last word on a given subject; for example, in revoking the offer that had already 
been rejected by Griva. Likewise, one has to face the particular consequences that 
ensue from violating the obligation of reciprocity (to give, to accept and to give 
again), regardless of the place of violation, be it Polynesia or the Baltics. When 
Krister’s gift was repeatedly rejected, he threatened war, seizure of the Object and 
nefarious repercussions for both the board members and Griva’s lawyer. Refusal to 
accept Krister’s ‘gift’ could be construed as an unwillingness to enter into an alliance 
and a morally committing relationship with Krister and his partners. 
 
In the case of the Object, the Scandinavians wanted a quick and anonymous 
exchange, without revealing their identity. But the Scandinavians’ money was not 
284 
 
perceived as something anonymous; rather, it was identified as having an 
objectionable source. The lawyer Volkova understood that Krister was in the market 
for ‘easy’ money but, for her, money did not only mean profit but remained closely 
linked to its source – the giver’s attitude and intentions. Neither she nor Griva’s board 
could accept the Scandinavian way of construing money along the lines of ‘we = the 
West = money = power’. 
 
One wonders if the source of the money was the factor that ultimately made the deal 
between Griva and the Scandinavians impossible. If the Baltic economy was based on 
the principle of the gift economy, this could be a plausible explanation. But, for the 
time being, the Baltic market economy functions as well as elsewhere in Europe. 
There has been a trend towards postulating a fundamental division between monetary 
and non-monetary economies – this division being linked to other dichotomies, such 
as traditional and modern, pre-capitalist and capitalist, gift economies and commodity 
economies – with money acting as a major catalyst for the transformation between 
them (Block and Parry 1989). This notion has actually prevented a number of 
researchers from seeing the importance of money in many traditional or pre-capitalist 
economies (Fuller 1989), as well as the importance of non-monetary means or, more 
precisely, the social bonds and affiliation within which the economy is embedded in 
capitalist economies. 
 
Market exchanges, whatever we think of them, are not uniform, and markets in 
different societies function in different ways. Although the main purpose of 
commercial exchange is monetary profit, this does not mean that affiliations with 
partners and the values inherent in sustaining social relationships are irrelevant. The 
importance of personal relations  in socialist and post-socialist economies has been 
observed by many researchers, with Berliner (in 1952) as one of the forerunners, but 
also including more recently Humphrey (2000), Ledeneva (1998, 2006), Johanson 
(2001), Lampland (2002), Fürst (2004), Cimdina Barstad (2004), Cimdina (2006). 
These writers have studied the role of personal relations in both legal and illegal 
business activities in post-socialist economies. The importance of personal relations 
here can at least partly be explained as a legacy of the state-planned economy and a 
result of the uncertainty and volatility caused by reform. Networks were necessary to 
deal with a widespread shortage of goods (Cimdina Barstad 2004), while the best way 
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to enforce agreements was to do business with those whom one could trust (Johanson 
2001). This tendency is observable not only at the personal level. The fact that firms 
also tend to rely on personal relations rather than on legal systems as a means for 
solving disputes and conflicts is observed by Johanson (2001), Hendley (1997), 
Cimdina Barstad (2004), Sedlenieks (2003) and Ledeneva (1998). 
 
Finding the right people with the right connections in the Baltics used to determine 
the degree of success in further activities for the majority of those interviewed from 
various Norwegian enterprises. NIDA’s operations reduced the necessity for such 
local networks, offering a ready-made production environment in the Baltics. 
However, it is likely that the presence of instrumental relations in the contemporary 
economy is inherent to market relations as such, rather than their post-socialist setting. 
The extent to which economic life is embedded in structures of social relations is one 
of the classic questions of social theory (Granovetter 1985), be it a socialist or a 
democratic society. Networks and connections are used in many countries for various 
purposes, and in terms of the economy, they are often necessary for raising capital, 
forging stable cooperative links or finding the best solution to a particular business 
problem. Networking is considered to be a vital part of any functioning economy. 
Snehota (1993) defined the workings of the market as a process of networking, that is, 
of establishing, strengthening, weakening and dissolving exchange relationships 
between market participants. 
 
 
7.4.Frontiers and Otherness 
 
Some insight into individual personal experience, which is gained in the process of 
confronting a different environment, provides an understanding of identity-related 
mechanisms. As regards the Griva case, these mechanisms shaped the interaction 
between the parties more than their desire to make a profit. In their attempts to come 
to an agreement, Scandinavians and representatives of Griva enterprise tried to cross 
boundaries of many types: territorial, political, social, psychological and cultural, but 
without success. Yet, what borders are there to cross, one might wonder: since the 
collapse of the USSR and EU enlargement there have been radical changes, as far as 
the Baltic borders and their isolation from the rest of Europe is concerned. It could be 
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claimed that EU enlargement has brought about a world without borders, which is 
likely fundamentally to transform and approximate economic, political and cultural 
realities. But do the Balts see themselves in this new ‘commonality’ with Europe? 
And how are they perceived outside the Baltics? Although we are now witnessing the 
dwindling importance of the old, well-defined borders, new borders have been put in 
place both territorially and symbolically; these are not only physical borders, but also 
social and psychological ones. 
 
Frontiers and identities are two issues that cannot be treated separately (Klusakova et 
al. 2006). Dividing lines, frontiers and boundaries are present everywhere, separating 
and connecting objects, territories, individuals and groups. They construct and 
confirm identifications. In many situations, as in the Griva case, individuals think of 
themselves as one of ‘us’, as part of a category that is distinct from everything around 
it, which is then defined as ‘the others’. Identities create borders between 
communities and collective entities that define themselves in contrast ‘the others’. 
Thus, borders and identities belong together. Self-identification is facilitated and 
supported by the construction of images and stereotypes of ‘the others’. ‘Others’ are 
different, and as a general rule, more negative traits are attributed to them (in the form 
of characteristics); therefore, it is difficult for any of ‘us’ to accept differences or 
otherness (Klusakova et al. 2006). 
 
The local entrepreneurs of Livpils small and medium sized companies perceive 
themselves as a whole. While an essential element of connectedness among the 
entrepreneurs of Livpils is represented by shared difficulties in business, the case of 
Griva is different. When beginning the negotiations over the Object, the starting point 
for the Scandinavians and the representatives of Griva was similar: in the given 
circumstances they perceived themselves as entrepreneurs. But how did it come about 
that this collective identity, uniting both parties, could be weaker than other ties of 
collective connectedness? In the course of the negotiations another collective identity, 
separating the parties, came to the surface. Its ties of connectedness turned out to 
possess such strength as to radically oppose both parties involved in the negotiations. 
Instead of crossing the perceived boundaries, the Scandinavians and the 
representatives of Griva deliberately maintained the dimension of otherness in their 
relations, which ultimately became the main obstacle that prevented them from 
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reaching a mutually lucrative deal. To get over this ‘imaginary’ border, money and 
gifts were offered. But then it appears that an exchange of gifts, including money, 
involving ‘the others’ who are different from ‘us’, is not desirable in this context. 
 
It is important to add here that ‘us’ is never given a clear value. The feeling of 
groupness has nothing to do with the real distribution of ‘common opinion’. The 
sharing of common attributes (for example, language and habits), combined with the 
existence of certain social ties, generates groupness – a feeling of belonging together. 
Brubaker-Cooper (2000) and Voros (2006) point out that a strongly bounded sense of 
groupness may rest on a categorical commonality and an associated feeling of 
belonging together with minimal or no relational connectedness. This is typically the 
case for large-scale communities such as ‘nation’: when a diffuse self-understanding 
as a member of a particular nation crystallizes into a strongly bounded sense of 
groupness, it is likely to depend on strongly felt and perceived commonality rather 
than relational connectedness (ibid.). 
 
If we accept social reality as a social construct, that is, as something created by social 
actions, then its ‘frontiers’ come to depend on individual and group definitions, which 
in turn are based on their subjective experiences. Frontiers can be invisible – the stress 
is on the symbolic, cultural and internal perception of the line between something that 
is ‘mine’, or ‘ours’ (known), and something that is “his, hers, theirs” (unknown, 
different) (Seweryn and Smagacz 2006).  
 
Even being aware that not all Norwegian entrepreneurs share the same characteristics, 
it seems pertinent to ask what has become of the postulated ideal of equality of 
Norwegians in the Griva case, where local entrepreneurs are clearly perceived by 
Krister to be less advanced and less competent. After all, this case would seem to 
depict “us and them constructions where difference is a threat” (Vike et.al.2001:25). 
As observed in chapter 6, Gullestad (1992) has identified the particular Norwegian 
definition of equality as sameness. This equality, according to her, is sustained by 
avoiding contact with people about whom one has insufficient information, and 
through an interactional style that emphasizes sameness and undercommunication of 
difference; in such a scenario, one avoids people who are considered “too different” 
(Gullestad 1992: 174). This last strategy implies a pronounced inaccessibility, or what 
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Gullestad calls the erecting of “symbolic fences” (1992:174). In the case of 
negotiations between Krister and Griva enterprise, the process of fencing – an 
egalitarian attitude – is not applied between members who are not perceived to be of 
the same kind. Thus, egalitarianism is maintained by avoiding relations with those 
perceived as unequal. In this way a sense of superiority is also created and maintained 
in corporate settings, which Norwegians like to view as democratic and 
unhierarchical. In other words, as Gullestad (1992) states, the idea of equality as 
sameness is not incompatible with hierarchy. This has become more salient with the 
kinds of recent global socioeconomic developments of which Norwegian 
entrepreneurs are a part.  
 
Not only by Krister but also, at times, by Helge, Tore and Steinar, the Balts seem to 
be perceived as ’neophytes’ who have difficulties with the assimilation of a new, 
proper structure. This implies that these novices are not mature enough to belong to 
this new, sophisticated world (Buchowski 2001):  
 
It is perhaps this culturally biased preference for things which can easily be 
classified into existing categories which is the source of the Westerners to those in 
the liminal sphere, aspiring to enter directly into democratic society structures. 
Economic and political demands and barriers imposed by the West recall maturity 
tests set for novices to pass, if they want to find themselves in privileged clubs 
(Buchowski 2001:111).  
 
 
If local workers, bureaucrats or partners hesitate and have doubts about the 
‘Norwegian’ way of doing things, then, as the Western manager in the Moravian 
elevator factory (depicted by Müller) said, “something is wrong in their heads” (B. 
Müller 2004:163). It is not only in the Griva case, then, that Norwegian 
entrepreneurial attitudes in the Baltics resemble the “democratic mission (of their 
enterprise) in formerly totalitarian societies” (B. Müller 2004: 164). The know-how of 
Norwegian entrepreneurs was in most cases highlighted as acting 
 
against what they saw as irrationalities and the arbitrariness of the planned 
economy … and as capitalism had come out as the winner from the “competition 
between the economic systems”, they now wanted to “help the losers” to make the 
big leap into market economy and to create the cultural, legal and social frames for 




While in the case of Griva, the Balts and the Scandinavian entrepreneurs perceived 
themselves as fundamentally different from one another, in a different context there is 
a clear emphasis on the closeness of the Balts to the rest of Europe. Baltic officials 
and politicians consider the Baltics as a European country in its own right and on an 
equal footing with all the other European countries. It seems clear that on both micro 
and macro levels the distinctions between external and internal identifications and the 
dialectical relation between them are obvious. 
 
In the case of the present study, the key types of external identification of the Baltics 
are Scandinavian public culture and the narratives and policies that are barely 
acknowledged by the self-representations of local Baltic actors. The activities and 
experiences of individuals reflect how these internal and external identifications 
emerged. Following the failure to get a deal with Griva enterprise, Krister views the 
Baltics as something diametrically opposed to the “civilized western world with no 
understanding of what the western rules of business conduct are like” (chapter 7.3.). 
 
Bearing in mind the duality of cultural and market relations, it is possible to see, on 
the one hand, that culture provides a pool of resources for entrepreneurial action to 
draw from. On the other hand, entrepreneurial actions are at the same time creatively 
shaping and reshaping the market and, thus, behavior in the marketplace. From this 
perspective, individuals and groups constantly create, shape and reshape ‘frontiers’ 
and ‘borders’ in the existing cultural, social, political and economic framework.  
 
The issue of an actor’s embeddedness in his or her social environment can be seen as 
a central topic of social sciences. It could even be ranked as the principal 
interpretative pattern that is applied when construing theories that interpret society, 
just with terminological differences. All economic activities, even those presented by 
economists as “pure” economic relations, are socially embedded because they are 
rooted in socially construed policies, norms, institutions, perceptions, expectations 
and values that are shared among people. Therefore, in order to understand 




7.5.The Magnet of the Baltics  
 
My starting point was to approach business reality as a mix of unique and commonly 
agreed ways of perceiving reality and ways of acting within it. Viewing business 
reality as the result of the interplay among individuals’ constructions, self-
understanding and connectedness, the study of the interplay between individuals 
became a natural focus of this research. The best way to understand this interplay was 
to take part in it.  
 
As we have seen in the cases outlined throughout this thesis, the Norwegian 
companies in question were attracted to the Baltics because of its strategically 
advantageous location, relatively low operating costs and extensive labor force. It is 
interesting to speculate about what kind of story might be told about the Baltics by 
Tore, Mari, Jon, Helge, Harald, Knut, Henning, Steinar, Petra, Bjørg and Krister. All 
of them viewed the Baltics as a place that would enable them to show off their know-
how and entrepreneurial skills. Tore, Mari, Jon, Helge, Bjørg and Knut saw the 
Baltics as a region of cheap labor, cheap raw materials and logistics, and as a kind of 
refuge from threats of bankruptcy in Norway. For Harald and Henning it was a low 
cost but promising region, a base from which Norwegian policies could be carried out 
with a view to supporting their native businesses in Eastern Europe. Steinar and Petra 
discovered the available business niches in the emerging Baltic market, along with 
modernization processes – Steinar exploited them successfully, although Petra did not 
succeed here. Krister viewed the Baltics as a place to secure a quick profit and to 
avoid stringent Norwegian laws and regulations; he sought and found gaps in local 
laws to carry out various transactions, the legality of which even the locals have 
questioned.  
 
It would be wrong to claim that the Object deal failed because money was chosen as a 
means to reach the goal. The issue is more complex than that. The strategy of using 
non-identified money and bribes was based on Krister’s perception of the Baltics as a 
place that allows such action. The social construction of business reality takes place 
through the interaction of individuals who base their actions on experience, 
perception, reflection and various myths. This echoes the assumptions of the social 
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constructionists who state that social phenomena are created and reinvented in a 
floating presence, and that all our knowledge of them is nothing but a stream of 
reconstructed interpretations, where we always perceive the world in terms of one 
perspective or another (Friedman 1994; Handler and Linnekin 1984; Burr 2003). 
 
In the cases outlined here, experience and reputation are vital components of the 
construction of the image of the marketplace. Experience is gained from interacting, 
joint problem solving, or even from failing to solve problems related to negotiations, 
trade and business operations. Interaction is vital in gaining experience. Reputation is 
built as non-experimental knowledge gained from talks and public culture, which is 
then transformed into opinions, ideas and information about specific actors, 
organizations and states; it is then shared again, among entrepreneurs or companies. 
This process helps entrepreneurs learn about other business actors beyond the 
exchange and interaction. In the case of Tore, Steinar, Knut and Krister, their 
preconceived opinions of the Baltics, which were produced by Norwegian public 
culture and policies, turned out to be wrong. Similarly incorrect was Knut’s 
perception of safe and sustainable production conditions under the auspices of 
Norwegian governmental actor NIDA. In Knut’s case, in the end, it was NIDA that 
represented risk for his operations in the Baltics, not the unpredictable Baltic business 
milieu of which he was so afraid. Such disparity of preconceived market principles 
and marketplace behavior occurs precisely because activities in the marketplace are 
not disembedded from wider socio-cultural and political contexts. Were they 
disembedded and calculable corresponding to a supposed universal market model, it 
would be possible to predict the outcome of market operations – but more often than 
not practice differs from the preconceived market models. 
 
Representations of the Baltic states and the market are constituted, contested and 
transformed both in daily interaction and in public culture. The construction of the 
image of the Baltic market is based not only on first-hand experience, but also on 
various myths about the wild East and the Baltic tiger. As observed elsewhere 
(Cimdiņa 2006), an understanding of the perception business actors have of the East 
European markets makes it easier to understand their willingness to operate in them. It 
also helps to explain their behavior, which, more often than not, is a performative 




The trend of moving production units to the Baltics at the turn of the twenty-first 
century shaped the public culture of Norwegian entrepreneurs and producers quite 
noticeably. The issue of transferring production units to the Baltics had extensive 
mass media coverage and was also discussed at great length among entrepreneurs. A 
closer look at Norwegian public culture reveals that transition is still an essential 
concept in dealings with the Baltic countries – transition from socialism to capitalism, 
from planned economy to free market, from post-socialist to Western standards. The 
resistance to perceiving the Baltics as equal to Scandinavia is obvious.  
 
The identity of the Baltic economy turns out to be a complex one. Externally, the 
region is perceived to include both backwardness and great expectations. It has 
features inherited from the Soviet past and all the potential for development that is 
inherent in the EU. Internally, on a macro level, it is shaped by both the image 
produced by local public culture, which to a great extent aims at attracting investors, 
and by local experts’ public debate on rapid economic growth. These debates 
occasionally disregard negative statistical data from foreign sources and turn a blind 
eye to the difficulties encountered by small businesspeople.  
 
On a micro level, the interaction among individuals involved in day-to-day business 
operations reveals a different picture. Although foreign entrepreneurs are generally 
welcome in the region this is not always the case in business deals, as seen in the 
example of Griva enterprise. Successful though it might be, the record of foreign 
businesses in the area does not always equate to successful business in the Baltics. If 
they suffer a setback, investors may make defamatory statements about the Baltic 
economy. Even if local officials attempt to deny the existence of cronyism in the 
Baltic entrepreneurial environment, which is alleged by foreign experts, the deals with 
Griva and Nordic Ltd seem to prove it exists. Although foreign manufacturers find the 
Baltics advantageous and have moved their production facilities to industrial parks 
such as Livpils, local small and medium manufacturers face continuing problems. 
 
Theoretically, it could be said that the transition period in the Baltics is over. In 
accession to the European Union, Baltic countries have demonstrated that they can 
master integration into the European Economic Area. Still, such denominations as 
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“new member states”, “post communist”, “Eastern” and “emerging European” adorn 
those segments of Scandinavian public culture that pertain to the Baltic countries. 
Unlike people in the Baltics who tend to emphasize the rapid growth of their economy 
and posit that it is equivalent to and included in the common European market and its 
activities, Scandinavians still perceive them through the discourse of Otherness. In 
their view, Baltikum is either the primary recipient of Western assistance, which 
necessarily recognizes the West as a yardstick for the measurement of progress, or it 
represents an ocean of opportunities, which remain to be seized. 
  
By construing the identity of the Baltics as a place for production and an ocean of 
manufacturing and ‘going East’ possibilities NIDA, in like manner as in the case of 
Rjukan (Henningsen 2007), was ‘renting out’ the unique opportunities of utilizing the 
place. This resembles Henningsen’s argument that the identity of the place is the basis 
of its economic growth. By 2000, and with the assistance for Norwegian provided by 
NIDA’s activities, the Baltics had become a brand name for a promising 
utflaggingsland; however, it transpired that Norwegian regions were not yet ready for 
a postindustrial era, and they opposed the relocation of local production units. 
Consequently, NIDA’s profitable niche – the establishment of Norwegian industrial 







The Anthropologist in the Embedded “Corporate Jungle” 
 
While previous economic arrangements were embedded in social relations, in 
capitalism the situation was reversed -social relations were defined by economic 
relations, wrote Polanyi (1957, 1968b). He also argued that all economies are 
embedded and enmeshed in social relations and institutions, but tended to see the 
market economy as disembedded. Polanyi’s successors were critical of this position, 
but maintained a distinction between embedded and disembedded economies. The 
results of the present research question not only these assumptions about a 
disembedded economy, but also the strict distinction between economic and social 
relations and the twofold nature of the economy. I have argued here that economic 
relations and social relations are inseparable, and that economic relations are social 
relations imbued with rules of reciprocity and communal obligations – capitalism has 
not destroyed them irreversibly, as Polanyi believed. The nature of social groups is 
encompassing: entrepreneurs are kept in line by group pressure and by their desire to 
conform in modern market societies. Neither in Norwegian village economies nor in 
the emerging Baltic market was there evidence of a freestanding market domain 
“standing under laws of its own” (Polanyi, Arensberg and Pearson 1968:124) – 
regardless of the common regulative mechanism for the European market. The 
thorough empirical evidence of the entrance process of Norwegian entrepreneurs into 
the Baltics makes the opposition between the embedded and the disembedded 
economy appear meaningless and unproductive. There was nothing that resembled a 
disembedded market transaction to observe – neither in the establishment of 
production units, in the acquisition of various permissions for entrepreneurial 
activities, nor in the management of the local workforce. None of these operations 
were detached from the value systems and cultural conceptions of how to behave in a 
given situation, or from concrete social relations and obligations, or from politically 
and ideologically tinted strategies; nor were they detached from ideas about with 
whom and how one should cooperate. As to critics of the term and concept of 
embeddedness, who object to the absence of a theory of intentionality and strategic 
agency (Beckert 2003), there are such thick socio-cultural layers behind intentionality 
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and strategic agency that it is precisely an approach that takes on board embeddedness 
that can help to reveal them. 
 
Even if markets to a great extent have come to dominate other principles of social 
organization, as Polanyi reasoned, markets are not autonomous formations detached 
from socio-cultural life. The marketplace is not a disembedded domain; it consists of 
people (with their perceptions, motives, values and strategies) trying to agree upon 
values, guidelines and goals for their actions. The marketplace is an abstraction of 
human relations that are first and foremost social and embedded in multilayered value 
systems. Neither commodity nor monetary exchange is disembedded. Indeed, with the 
lengthening of kinship distance, the transactors become strangers and commodity (not 
gift) exchange emerges. But while exchanging commodities and monetary means, 
complete strangers are guided not only by their desire for benefit and a particular 
good, but also by their views on the commensurability of values, the manner of 
exchange, the acceptability of the process of the transaction and on what, in the end, 
constitutes a value.  
 
It cannot be taken for granted that seemingly destructive forces of modernization and 
capitalization alienate and undermine social relations. After the dissolution of the 
USSR and the subsequent democratization and economy transformation processes, 
social relations in the Baltics became even tighter and more vital. People were 
dependent on mutual help for various reasons: to acquire a loan on favorable 
conditions, to supply information, to get a job, to privatize state property or just to 
feed the family in a situation of sudden unemployment and a lack of social 
guarantees.  
  
Traditionally, embeddedness to a great extent has been associated with the moral 
economy and with domestic and gift exchange because they imply a close interplay 
between cultural and social mores and economic activity. However, the demand for 
profit sits uneasily with the ethic of the community in market economies, as we saw in 
the case of Brox (1972) and A.K.Larsen (1984) and in Tore and Helge’s native 
villages in Fjord County. Cultural mores also form the basis for decision making in 
modern market societies; consequently, economic activities cannot be detached from 
the social order in which all human life is immersed: “This immersion, some aspects 
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or effects of which one finds in Karl Polanyi’s notion of ‘embeddedness’ obliges us to 
conceive every practice as ‘economic’, as a ‘total social fact’ in Marcel Mauss’s 
sense” (Bourdieu 2005:1).  
 
By attempting in each case to bring to bear all available knowledge relating to the 
different dimensions of the social situation, the embeddedness of economic 
transactions can be disclosed with the use of traditional anthropological tools. To my 
mind, the argument about the disembeddedness of the market economy is faulty, and 
so is the position on how to approach economic activities in market societies. Polanyi 
observed that economies that are not built around market principles are not focused on 
the logic of individual choice, which is the basis of modern Western economic 
science, and stated that therefore they cannot be approached with the tools of 
economic science. Indeed, he claimed that the modern market economy, in which all 
things are disembedded from their social conditions of production, is best understood 
through formal economics. Doubts about the extent to which traditional 
anthropological methods can be employed for conducting research in modern 
corporate enterprises have also been expressed by Jordan and Lambert (2009) and 
Cefkin (2009).  
 
The first chapters of this thesis explored my methodological reflections on how to 
approach the corporate jungle. I discovered that analyses of companies’ annual 
reports and figures, and numerous interviews with managers, were insufficient for 
gaining an understanding of the behavior and operations of Norwegian entrepreneurs 
in the Baltics. I came to the conclusion that participant observation continues to be a 
major part of positioned anthropological methodologies; however, and perhaps this 
has become more important over time, talking to and living with members of a 
community increasingly takes place alongside reading news articles and government 
documents, observing the activities of governing elites, and tracking the internal logic 
of transnational development agencies and corporations (Gupta and Ferguson 
1997:37). “Instead of a royal road to holistic knowledge about ‘another society’” 
(ibid.) ethnography is beginning to be recognized as a flexible and opportunistic 
strategy for diversifying and making more complex our understanding of various 
places, people and predicaments through attentiveness to the different forms of 




By approaching entrepreneurial practices in modern market societies with traditional 
anthropological tools, I have ascertained that fieldwork has a constant value in 
anthropology in the transnational, global world and in the fields of economics and 
business. Evaluating such features of fieldwork as participant observation and my 
own fieldwork experiences, I have come to the conclusion that anthropology (even in 
its traditional sense) has much to contribute to the analysis of transnational 
marketplaces. Anthropological approaches to, and a situational analysis of 
transnational business operations can reveal specific discrepancies between foreign 
and local business cultures as experienced by businesspeople, their employees, 
competitors and consumers; it can also explore the ways in which these operations are 
embedded in socio-cultural realities. A clear understanding by the various actors 
involved in such cooperation of how one does business, how one approaches potential 
customers and partners, how one treats workers, competitors and authorities, and how 
one creates a suitable environment for doing business is of utmost importance in the 
daily operations of an international company. 
 
As the business reality is constructed by its actors, empirical fieldwork should be at 
the very core of research in this area. Assuming business reality to be the result of an 
interplay between individual constructions, the study of this interplay between 
individuals becomes a natural focus. It can also be asserted that the best way to 
understand the interplay is to take part in it. Business is all about social interaction; 
business reality can be seen as a mix of uniqueness and commonly agreed upon ways 
of perceiving reality and ways of acting within it. If we want to understand the 
individual manager’s actions and strategies, it is essential to reveal how s/he 
perceives the business reality, and how s/he understands its practices. The ideal in 
such a study is to maximize the interaction between the researcher and the subjects of 
the study.  
 
Business practices are embedded in local and glocal contexts, which cannot be 
comprehended by quantitative approaches and universalistic conceptions about 
cultural differences and market models. The means to carry out participatory 
observation in a company include in-depth interviews; interactions and conversations 
with managers, traders, consumers and officials; participation in meetings within the 
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company and during its encounters with competitors, local authorities and consumers; 
and extensive participation in the company’s day to day tasks. Only by participating 
in the marketplace it is possible to acquire in-depth insight into a particular business 
environment and industry. Being in the marketplace increases the chances of 
comprehending the meaning of what is happening from the actors’ point of view. 
Anthropological conventions such as naturalistic observation, contextualization, 
maximized comparisons and sensitized concepts are integral parts of the researcher’s 
toolkit (Sherry 1995). Ethnography can make it possible to grasp the particular 
complexities and dynamics of the local market situation that are concealed by 
aggregated statistical data, presentations based on generalized categories and 
superficial interviews. The open-ended, inductive approach intrinsic to the fieldwork 
method is particularly suitable for grasping relations that cannot be assumed a priori 
(Lien and Melhuus 2007). The ethnographic insistence on the actor’s point of view 
generates socially embedded understandings of social life, not least regarding the 
ways in which significant relationships are conceived and meaningful connections are 
made (ibid.). 
 
While untwisting the threads and leads of the embeddedness of Norwegian 
entrepreneurial operations in the Baltics, I felt like a cultural broker.92 My task while 
conducting fieldwork at Norwegian companies in the Baltics was to translate – to 
understand and transmit – the reality in the Baltics to Norwegian managers, and back 
again. I realized that my privilege in such a situation was my life experience in 
Norway and the Baltics; however, in order to analyze the seemingly familiar I needed 
a certain distance. Nevertheless, I was not burdened by the methodological 
challenges pointed out by Gullestad:  
 
The native anthropologist strives to get out of his/her home blindness, while a 
Western anthropologist going to a Third World country strives to get into strange 
cultural practices in order to “crack the code” (Gullestad 1992: 28). 
 
Going to the Baltics as a native anthropologist gave me certain privileges, as I 
could speak local languages and use the knowledge and experience that I had 
                                                 
92 Hansen borrows the concept of the “cultural broker” from Geertz (1960) and attributes this 
denomination to the managers working in foreign-owned companies in China, whose responsibility 
was to understand and transmit the reality in China to Norwegian headquarters, and back again 
(Hansen 2008: 201).  
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gained growing up in the Baltics. Simultaneously, I was able to approach this 
site as an outsider, since I have become used to the Norwegian way of life over 
the past thirteen years of my life. These factors empowered me with the distance 
needed to conduct successful fieldwork, “to make the familiar sufficiently 
strange for analytical treatment” (Gullestad 1992:28); they gave me the insight 
required to crack the cultural codes of both Balts and Norwegians in my chosen 
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